DECISIVE VICTORIES

GALLIPOLI
SAKARYA
DUMLUPINAR

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INTRODUCTION

The Decisive role of the Battles of Gallipoli (1915), Sakarya (1921), and Dumlupinar (1922) is little, if at all, appreciated by non-Turks, and many Turks, too. The Turks won and lost many other battles, but none had more or as much significance as these three, with the exception, up to a point, of Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444.) These were battles, which if lost by the Turks would have meant the eradication of Turkey as it stood at the time of those battles. Had Nicopolis and Varna been lost, the Turks would definitely have been pushed out of Europe and out of parts of Asia Minor, but Ottoman Turkey would have most certainly kept most of Asia Minor. Had, however, the Turks lost the three battles looked at here there would be no Turkey today. The reason is quite simple: the carving up of Ottoman Turkey, which had begun early in the 19th century, had now reached its final stage. This final partitioning of Turkey had already been decided prior to these battles (late 1914-early 1915) (then again in 1916 and 1917, and finally in 1920), and defeat would have resulted in Turkey being turned into an undefended Bantustan or Indian Reserve like in a corner of Anatolia. The aim of the Allies (France-Britain-Italy and Greece) at their San Remo meeting in April 1920, re-expressed in the Sevres Treaty of August 1920, was, indeed, to cut Turkey's territory by up to 80% and its population, more or less likewise, to be culled from 21,273,900 to about 5,000,000.[1]
Furthermore, the historical trend from the 1820s onwards has shown one fact and one fact alone: each Ottoman and post Ottoman Turkish defeat was followed by the mass removal, including mass murder and mass cleansing, of Turks by the victors. There was not a single exception to this. Whether the Greek uprising of 1821, or the wars in the wake of the so-called Bulgarian massacres in the 1870s, or the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, or during the Greek invasion of Anatolia after 15 May 1919, the same and only outcome resulted: the Turks were brutally slain en masse, their slaughterers only differing amongst themselves in the manner they slew them and in the horrors they inflicted onto them, regardless of age or sex.[2]

The mass slaying of, and atrocities inflicted on, the Turks over a whole century (1821-1922) are facts. Throughout the period they had their witnesses, from individuals to international organisations. The British (far more than all the rest put together) and others (amongst the latter the Frenchman Pierre Loti,[3] and the German Dr Jaeckh,)[4] have left us the best and most touching accounts of the terrible fate of the Turks, from

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[1] *Current History*, vol 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Terms of the Final Peace Treaty of the World War — Effects on the Map of Asia Minor p. 446.
[2] For an idea of what happened to the Turks, during the century, see:
J. McCarthy: *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*; The Darwin Press; New Jersey; 1995.
-J. Salt: *The Unmaking of the Middle East*; University of California Press, 2008.
[3] P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; Calman Levy; Paris; 1913.
[4] Ernst Jäckh; *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkan-Krieg;* Chapter 7: Deutsche und französische Augenzeugen von christlichen Massakers. (Die Balkangreuel des 30 jährigen Krieges). Martin Mörikes Verlag, Munich,1913; pp. 83-98.

1821 till 1922, telling us all they saw, whether in their capacity as war photographers or correspondents,[5] soldiers,[6] writers,[7] professionals or ordinary people,[8] or even diplomats.[9] It is not just what they tell us that is gripping, it is also what and how they felt for the Turks at the moment these were being slain or being inflicted upon other horrors, as individuals or in groups. Their accounts are not just a unique legacy to history, they also remain supreme instances of universal humanity, without frontier or creed.

What is crucial to note here, and this is the focus of this work: whilst the Turks could flee in their millions towards Asia Minor prior to 1914, after that, they had nowhere else to go. This meant that had they lost at Gallipoli, and most principally at Sakarya and Dumlupınar, they would have had either to fit in and survive in the reserve assigned to them in Asia Minor, or simply disappear altogether.

This claim might sound somehow exaggerated; the fact is, once more, the mass slaying of Turks, or inflicting any woe on them, or erasing Turkey out of existence, all these were legitimised, and put on the high morale ground by both the Turks' slayers and their backers. Among these were political and religious elites and, above all, opinion makers, scholars most particularly. One should not look at today's Eurovision song-contest, or the UEFA Champions League, and similar manifestations, which seem to accept Turkey's existence and even its belonging to the European/Western community, for it does not. Those believing in, or claiming, the latter are deluding themselves. One should not be fooled either (here one is addressing some sections of Turkey's population) that dislike of Turks is just a temporary manifestation owed to AKP/Erdogan policies, or Islamism. Turks are simply disliked to such a level that reading commentaries on any article on Turkey, especially during the latest stand off with Russia (2015-2016), showed the overwhelming majority of commentators' (regardless of their status and occupations) wish was to see Turkey nuked by Russia. Those amongst the Turks today who think that, by removing another layer of clothing, dyeing their hair blonder, and leading by the leash three dogs instead of two, and downing two bottles of whiskey instead of one, would endear them to Western audience, are just being naive (not to use a more pejorative set of expressions to describe their naivety). They can sell themselves and their country if they wish, but they will remain ostracized as the Turks have always been, are, and will remain. Centuries of hatred of the Turks are not going to fade like that, and Turks have to live with it.

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[5] E. Ashmead Bartlett: *With the Turks in Thrace*; George H. Doran Company; New York; 1913. F. McCullagh: *Italy's War for a Desert;* Herbert and Daniel; London; 1912. E.N. Bennett: *With the Turks in Tripoli* (London, 1912). E.N. Bennett: *Among the Cretan Insurgents*, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, February 1898; pp. 166-169.

[6] T. Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution,* 2 vols; Edinburgh, William Blackwood, 1832.

[7] M. Pickthall: *With the Turk in Wartime*; J.M. Dent &Sons; London; 1914.
A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922.

[8] P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; Calman Levy; Paris; 1913, offers us a long list of their names and professions. He himself wrote some of the most passionate denunciations of the crimes against Turks in 1912.

[9] See Foreign Office reports; such as F.O. 195-1185; No 73. F.O. 195-2438, no 6650; Lamb to Lowther, Salonica 3 December 1912, etc. See also R. Millman: *Britain and the Eastern Question*; Oxford; 1979; pp. 125-89.

Back in 1914 and the years after, the consensus amongst the Powers, and among the Greek and Western elites, with hardly any exception, was that Turkey had to be carved up/dismembered/removed from the map, following victory, and that this action was thoroughly justified, both morally and legally. The justification was provided on the ground that the Turks:

> Having failed in terms of civilisation, and being barbaric, murderous, bestial (and similar depictions), had no right to exist.

The literature, pamphlets, discourse (political or other) stating this fact at the time of the mass slaying of the Turks from 1821 till 1922, is abundant.[10] This vast literature on its own would form a multi-volume encyclopaedia, and this work will give some extracts of it. That literature, at times, seems to be one copy of the same work, reiterating the same arguments in different languages, and by different authors, namely that the Turks had only been a hindrance to civilisation and the civilised, and their massacres or oppression of everyone meant that their disappearance was not just the solution for a better humanity but was also right. It was, with some slight variations, the same argument subsequently used by the Nazis in their mass removal of the Jews.

If the evidence of what happened to the Turks and the justifications for the removal of both nation and people are plentifully available but are not known today, this is NOT the responsibility of the slayers, or those who justified the slaying en masse of Turks, or those who planned and sought to implement the carving up of Turkey and its removal from the map. The responsibility for this rests with the Turks themselves, that is their historians, media, and other means of communications, who, a few exceptions aside, have shown incompetence at highlighting this essential fact of their history. In this respect, Turks, just as other Muslims (including this author's Algerian countrymen and countrywomen), whether as historians or other elites (journalists, teachers, artists, writers, television and film makers...), with some exceptions, have failed to tell the historical tragedy of their people.

As one of the few exceptions, the best, and now sadly defunct, Turkish historian, Salahi R. Sonyel, correctly notes in what is certainly the best article written by any scholar on both the manner the demonising of the Turks and its devastating impact work,[11] the Turks have failed to address this issue (of their massacres and they being labelled as the murderers instead) not just throughout the years, but throughout the decades. The point that Sonyel made in 1998 was made already back in 1922 by the American Rear Admiral Chester. The Admiral was one of Theodore Roosevelt's closest friends and for years had been an observer of world affairs. He had visited and stayed in Turkey regularly from the late 19th century (when in 1896, he was sent on a

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[10] This literature and the hostile views of the Turks are summed up in these works:
A. Cirakman: *From the Terror of the World to the Sick man of Europe;* Peter Lang Publishing; New York; 2002. N. Daniel: *Islam, Europe and Empire*, University Press, Edinburgh, 1966. N. Daniel: *Islam and the West*; Oneworld; Oxford; 1993. J. Davenport: *An Apology for Mohammed and the Koran*; J. Davy and Sons; London; 1869. R. Kabbani: *Europe's Myths of Orient*; McMillan; 1986. E. Siberry: *The New Crusaders*; Ashgate: Aldershot; 2000.

[11] Salahi R. Sonyel: Disinformation, the Negative factor in Turco-Greek Relations, *Perceptions,* March-May 1998, pp. 39-48.

war mission against the Turks, and he was in command of the first American battle ship sent to the region), until the early decades of the 20th century, at the time when Turkish massacres of Christians were supposed to have reached their peak.[12] In his lengthy article, on this issue, he says, amongst others that

> There are no prejudices against Christians in Turkey, let alone killings of Christians. Massacres of the past were enormously exaggerated by prejudiced writers and speakers... The Turk has been and is the most misrepresented person in the world. I know some of the falsehoods which have been and are being circulated in America... inspired—although the newspapers have not understood this—by the enemies of Turkey. One reason why these misrepresentations persist is that Turkey never has felt it worth while to organize any agency to state her case abroad... The Turks ever have been curiously indifferent with regard to what the outside world has thought of them, or else have been unable to discover how to tell their story...[13]

This work does not have the intention or the capacity to put the picture right as far as the alleged historical guilt of the Turks or the woes inflicted on them are concerned. This is up to the Turks themselves. What this work does is to deal with the victories cited above and their vital impact. It is an attempt at looking at the issue from as wide a perspective as possible to enlighten on the general context, background, and impact of these victories, for without a general picture, it is impossible to reach the right conclusion, or any conclusion for that matter. Any narrow study would just highlight some specific matters, which can be of interest, but would definitely fail to capture what was truly at stake and why what happened happened.

Likewise, this author is not going to recreate the glory of Turkish history; this is up to Turks themselves if they wish to do it.

The Victorious Turkish Entry into Smyrna in September 1922. (From a painting of the same year.)

[12] Rear Admiral Chester: Turkey Reinterpreted; *Current History* Vol XVI, No 6, Sep 1922, pp. 939-946.
[13] Ibid, pp. 942-5.

This work has nothing original in it. The author has simply collected facts from the time of the victories cited above and conveyed them. These facts exist, although buried and hidden away by modern scholars busy reshaping world history. This reshaping of history will be shown in great detail, especially in chapters one and two.

As it proceeds, this work will highlight the other essential elements noted above: how every Turkish defeat (whether under the Ottomans (prior to 1908) or after), was followed by the systematic extermination of Turks. The Turks' foes did this, and whilst they did it then, they felt that they were only paying back the Turk for his "atrocities of them." And today's historians, with rare exceptions such as Bernard Lewis,[14] Lord Kinross,[15] E.K and S.J Shaw,[16] N. Stone, H. Lowry, Justin McCarthy, E.J. Erickson, Jeremy Salt, A. Wheatcroft,[17] and maybe one or two others unknown to this author, entirely, and intellectually, back the views of the Turks' foes. Historical writing in the West has tended to minimise the crimes of the Turks' foes and to exaggerate those of the Turks. This same writing, again, as will be shown throughout this work, has also obscured and muddled many central issues, besides disappearing from knowledge many facts and contemporary sources of such facts.

It is therefore highly crucial to rebuild the real picture of events by setting aside this misinforming scholarship and to rely principally on the primary sources from the times of the events. To be even more faithful to these sources, it is highly important not to reinterpret them but to let those who lived the events speak, instead, in their own words. Therefore, this work will deal with the battles — first Gallipoli, then Sakarya, and Dumlupınar — as seen from both sides, giving both generous attention. It will put the battles in the context of the time, and will let the politicians, whether Westerners, Turks, or Greeks, or others, express their views, aims and hopes. It will allow the historians and leading figures hostile to the Turks explain their ideals and dreams of a world without the Turk. It will give space to witnesses who saw things on the ground, however unpleasant this was. How the fighting went on the ground will also be depicted according to how military officers and also soldiers saw it, and went through it.

It is not that this author has unearthed this material, hitherto hidden in some complex, inaccessible, archive vault. Not that complicated at all. These facts and material are available, and easily so. Forgotten today, erased from knowledge by the fraternity writing for us history, yes, this is true; but still the facts and the sources bearing these facts exist. All this author does is to let them talk: the facts of the times, the people behind the policies, the admiral, the historian, the witness who saw, and also the soldier — all presented directly, raw, whole, to the public of today; not the facts as massaged by the scholars of today.

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[14] Who is not a favourite of this author in regard to his views of Islam, but who has always stood in defence of Turkey's historical record.

[15] J.B. Kinross: *The Ottoman Centuries*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1977.

[16] S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw: *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*; 2 vols; Cambridge University Press; 1977.

[17] P. Wheatcroft: *Infidels*; Penguin Books; 2004.

One

THE EVER NOBLE AND GALLANT OTHER (Not the Turk)[18]

Following the victorious Turkish entry into İzmir, in September 1922, Churchill lamented:

> The catastrophe which Greek recklessness and Allied procrastination, division and intrigue had long prepared now broke upon Europe. The signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres had only been preserved in their world of illusion by the shield of Greece.
>
> That shield was now shattered. Nothing but a dozen battalions of disunited British, French and Italian troops stood between the returning war and Europe. … The re-entry of the Turks into Europe, as conquerors untrammelled and untamed, reeking with the blood of helpless Christian populations must, after all that had happened in the war, signalize the worst humiliation of the Allies. Nowhere had their victory been more complete than over Turkey; nowhere had the conqueror's power been flaunted more arrogantly than in Turkey; and now, in the end, all the fruits of successful war, all the laurels for which so many thousands had died on the Gallipoli Peninsula, in the deserts of Palestine and Mesopotamia, in the marshes of the Salonika front, in the ships which fed these vast expeditions; all the divisions of Allied resources in men, in arms, in treasure which they had required; all was to end in shame.[19]

Indeed, Churchill could not help express his deep frustration and anger at Turkish success. In fact, it was the most unexpected, and the most dreaded of all outcomes. Now, he could see with horror that the Turks were the great victors despite all that had been thrown at them. To him, as to others, i.e. the vast majority of Western deciders, if not all, for Turkey had (and still has) hardly any friend whatsoever in the West, this outcome was equivalent to a historical disaster.

What was so painful for Churchill and those who lamented the Turkish victory were essentially two elements:

-First, obviously, the Turkish victory itself.

-Second, and even more painful, is how close the West, at last, came to accomplishing the dream of centuries: suppressing outright Turkish presence/existence.

In regard to the first issue, Churchill himself states how this Turkish victory was accomplished despite so many Western sacrifices and campaigning; and also plotting, scheming, by so many allies — the French, the Greeks, the Italians, the Russians, the Armenians, and whoever sought to gain from a Turkish downfall. Against all the odds, though, and by an extraordinary feat of valour, resilience, and exceptional

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[18] According to Western Views, past, present, and very certainly future, too; with few exceptions such as Stanford Shaw, Justin McCarthy, E.J. Erickson, A. Wheatcroft already referred to.

[19] In (Lord) P. Kinross*: Ataturk, The Rebirth of a Nation*; Weidenfeld and Nicolson; London; 1964; p. 330.

military leadership, the Turks managed to overcome the odds and win. Winning on this occasion was not like any other winning, this ultimate victory saved Turkey and Turks.

Indeed, never had Turkey been so close to being phased out, with most certainly the only exception being that of 1402, when Timur the Lame came close to also phasing the whole Ottoman realm out of existence. Indeed, only one year before the Turks made their victorious entry into İzmir in September 1922, after a bewildering and swift advance early in the Summer of 1921, the Greeks had swept everything in front of them. They won; they conquered; they looted and slew, of course; and the Turks, armed and unarmed, in their countless numbers were fast running east. Greece had, it would seem, accomplished the Grand Idea, fulfilled the Dream, not just of hers (that is recovering the old Byzantine realm of nine centuries earlier,) but also of others. Turkey, in this Summer of 1921, found herself somehow exactly in the same situation as over five centuries earlier, when in the wake of the battle of Angora, in 1402, Timur the Lame had just about wiped out Ottoman existence.[20]

1. History, Disasters, and Decisive Victories

In 1402, following the crushing of the Ottomans, the same euphoria that resulted from the Greek victories in 1920-1921, also overwhelmed the West. Returning from the site of battle, which they had watched as the guests of Timur, the Christian ambassadors brought to Europe the great news that the power of the Ottomans had just been ended, and that Timur had avenged all previous defeats suffered by Christendom.[21] It was jubilation of the first order; not just that the power of the Ottomans had been crushed, but also that the long, patient work of plotting the Turkish downfall had been fulfilled.[22] Needless to go into this too long, but from the 13th century, Western Christendom had been building links with the eastern Mongols in order to defeat Islam, and the Turks in particular.[23] Mongol power had been crushed in the 13th century by the Mamluks of Egypt, and as a result the early Byzantine-Mongol alliances against the Ottomans dating from early in the 14th century did not succeed.[24] With great perseverance, though, the Papacy continued the work of gaining the alliance of the Mongol East until Timur came forth. Although Muslim in appearance, he loathed Muslims in general, the Ottoman Turks in particular, and felt great

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[20] H. Inalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*; Phoenix Press; 1973; p. 16 ff.

[21] R.De Zayas: L*es Morisques et le Racisme d'Etat;* Les Voies Du Sud; Paris; 1992; p. 136.

[22] H.A. Gibbons: *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, 1906, p. 249.

[23] L. Hambis: Saint Louis et les Mongols; in *JRAS*; 1970; pp. 25-33. P. Pelliot: Les Mongols et la Papaute; in *Revue d'Orient Chretien*; 1923-1924; and 1931-2. Also see contemporaries (envoys and ambassadors to Mongols, in the building of Christian Mongol alliance): Hayton and Carpini: J. Hayton: La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient, in *Receuil des Historiens des Croisades Armeniens*; vol ii; Paris; 1906; pp. 111-253. John of Plano Carpini: *History of the Mongols*; IV; tr., by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey in *The Mongol Mission,* C. Lawson; New York; Sheed and Ward; 1955.

[24] Pach in Stritter, Memoriae Populorum, iii. 1086-7; D'Ohsson: *Histoire des Mongols*; La Haye et Amsterdam; 1834; iv. 315. Hertzberg: *Geschichte der Byzanliner und des Osmanischen*..., p. 461.

affinities and sentiments for the Christian West.[25] His devastation of the Muslim world (Muslim India-Southern Russia Khanate-Syria-Iraq) and the Ottoman realm, amply justify his record as possibly the greatest ever mass slayer of Muslims and destroyer of the Muslim world.[26] The Christians of the East of Europe, Wylie points out, were swift to recognise a welcome ally 'in the infidel Timur,' and the Greeks in Constantinople and the Genoese in Pera had already offered to work with him against their common enemy, the Ottomans.[27] The Western Christians were keen to court 'the friendship of the blood-stained and savage conqueror.'[28] The role of mediator or ambassador between the West and Timur was played by an Englishman, John Greenlaw, a Dominican friar, who had for some time made himself prominent in the East by his zeal in stirring the Christian sections of the population against the Turks.[29] The strong alliance with Timur bore its fruit with his defeat of Bayazid at Angora in 1402. It also brought the even greater news that just as he did in Muslim India, Iraq, Syria, and other parts of the Muslim world, he had left little, if anything, standing in the Ottoman realm.[30] In the brief interval between his victory at Angora and his death in 1405, Timur utterly devastated the Ottoman dominions in Asia Minor, slaying Turks en masse, and carrying away into slavery countless numbers of women and children.[31] Timur thus earned himself the adulation of Christendom, Henry IV of England writing to him expressing the hope that he would be converted and become 'the champion of Christianity.'[32] What increased the Western-Byzantine euphoria even more was the news that the surviving sons of Bayazid were at war with each other over whatever remained of Ottoman territories.[33]

Remarkably, one of the sons, Mehmet I, in anticipation of what Mustafa Kemal would do centuries later, dragged himself from the devastated field of Angora, with barely anything, and retired to Amasya.[34] There he began to set the foundations of power for the eventual rebuilding of the Ottoman state, which gradually, in a phase which lasted over a decade, and despite all the enemies, wars, rebellions, and catastrophes, he was proclaimed sultan of a new, and powerful again Ottoman realm — Ottoman Turkey emerging like a phoenix out of the ashes.[35] The scale of the accomplishment can only

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[25] Sylvester de Sacy: Memoire sur une correspondence inedited entre Tamerlan et Charles VI; *Extrait du Moniteur*; No 226; 1812; pp. 7-8; A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*; Methuen; London; 1938; pp. 256-7.

[26] F. F. Armesto: *Millennium;* Touchstone Publishing (Simon and Shuster New York; 1995), p. 115. E.R. Wolf: *Europe and the People Without History*; University of California Press; Berkeley; 1982; p. 45. See also jean Aubin who both details and delights at Timur's destructive work, and dismantling of the Muslim and Ottoman realms: J. Aubin: Comment Tamerlane Prenait les Villes; in *Studia Islamica*; vol 19; pp. 83-122.

[27] J.H. Wylie: *History of England under Henry IV*; Longman; London; 1884; p. 313.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] E. Gibbon: *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*; vol 5; ed. W. Smith; London, 1858; pp. 55-6. E. Pears: The Ottoman Turks to the Fall of Constantinople; in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge University Press, J.R. Tanner et al ed.; 1923; vol IV; pp. 653-705; pp. 679-80. J. Aubin: Comment; op cit; pp. 116-7.

[31] H.A. Gibbons: *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, op cit, p. 257. A. De Lamartine: *History of Turkey*; 3 vols, tr., from French; D. Appleton and Company; New York; 1855; vol 1; p. 341.

[32] H.A. Gibbons: *The Foundations*; p. 259.

[33] See for good outline on the civil wars in particular, H. Inalcik: The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades; 1329-1451; p. in K.M. Setton ed: *A History of the Crusades*; The University of Wisconsin Press; 1975; vol 6; pp. 222-75.

[34] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, 1976, vol 1; p. 37.

[35] H. Inalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*; op cit; p. 17-18 and subsequent pp.

be measured by the fact that most places elsewhere in Asia never recovered from Timur's passage to this day.

Five hundred years later, in June 1919, Mustafa Kemal would, by an exceptional concourse of history, find himself in Amasya, whose inhabitants had sent him a deputation declaring their loyalty.[36] 'This was a place well fitted to become the cradle of a Nationalist Revolution.'[37] In Amasya, Mustafa Kemal, together with the early leaders of the War of independence, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Rauf Orbay, Kâzim Karabekir, found themselves with the same task as Mehmet I, in more or less the same conditions, to bring back to life a realm that was all but gone. How could Turkey recover? How could it even survive? It had nothing; it had been devastated not just by the First World War but also by more than eleven years of endless wars. It had ben attacked from the south by the British and French, from the west by the Greeks; Russians and Armenians from the north and east; Bulgars, Serbs and others in Europe, the Italians elsewhere, and hostile internal forces from the interior. There were refugees from all parts in their hundreds of thousands; the economy was in ruins; the treasury inexistent; the army disbanded; the casualties and wounded in their millions; a hostile government under the clutches of the Western Allies in Istanbul; hostile Western forces everywhere in control; invaders streaming from all sides; the Greeks in İzmir, and preparing to move in. Simply, it was a mammoth task that would have defeated any mortal, however optimistic and resilient he was. Mustafa Kemal, assisted by those named and others who were to come forth, led towards some of the most decisive victories in Turkish history, the most decisive of recent times: Sakarya and Dumlupınar. These came in the wake of yet another crucial victory: at Gallipoli. As will be seen in the following chapter, had the Turks lost these, or even any one of these three battles, there would be no Turkey today.

What is even more remarkable, looking back at history, was that the disaster of Angora (1402), just as the disastrous situation of 1920, found the same sort of characters in leadership: both patriots, for whom the sanctity of the Turkish realm meant everything; both extremely able, both determined, fearless of death, and great leaders of men, able to obtain the best out of most. The latter is a rare quality only found amongst such towering figures of world history as Othman or Napoleon. What Mehmet I and Mustafa Kemal also had in common was the undaunted belief in Turkey and its people, and the belief that they could, against all the odds, rebuild the nation from the disastrous state it was in. Another person would have never assumed what Mustafa Kemal did under the circumstances Turkey was in. None then gave Turkey a chance of survival; all only spoke of the phasing out, dismemberment/partitioning of the country, not just as an aim, but also a certainty.

If one pushed the analogy further, one would discover that on both occasions, in 1402 and in 1920, the two disastrous situations were sandwiched between two sets of decisive victories that somehow contributed also to the preservation of Turkey. Whilst

[36] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 168.
[37] Ibid; p. 170.

the 1920 situation found itself sandwiched between the great victory of Gallipoli of 1915 and the victories of Sakarya and Dumlupınar in 1921 and 1922, respectively, the 1402 disaster found itself sandwiched between two other decisive Ottoman victories: Nicopolis in 1396 and Varna in 1444.

This work will deal with Gallipoli, Sakarya and Dumlupınar, but here briefly, it is worth looking at the victories of Nicopolis and Varna, not just for the sake of bringing the analogy between the two periods once more, but also to highlight the point that somehow Turkey seems to have always won the battles that mattered most, the battles that decided its destiny.

Indeed, whilst the great and well known Ottoman military exploits such as at Kosovo, in 1389, the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the victory at Chaldiran (1514), Mohacs (1526), Prevesa (1538), and others were some of the greatest in history, and served to create or reinforce Ottoman power, they somehow could not decide the survival of Turkey. Nicopolis and Varna, for the same reason as the victories of Gallipoli, Sakarya, and Dumlupınar did. The Turks could indeed afford to lose at Lepanto (in 1571), or against Russia, or even the First World War, but not in these five battles. Here it would be interesting to bring some explanations of why Nicopolis and Varna were absolutely crucial victories.

Nicopolis was the culmination of a vast Western crusade. Briefly here, throughout the late 13th and early 14th centuries, Western Christendom devised projects for marching through Asia Minor for the dual purposes of extinguishing both Muslims and Greek Orthodox 'heretics,' and 'Recovering the Holy Land.'[38] Prior to the Battle of Nicopolis (in 1396), Venetian correspondence with Constantinople reveals that the allies hoped for assistance from Timur the Lame.[39] The Crusade of Nicopolis was the ultimate Crusade following in the wake of others such as that of Smyrna (1344), Alexandria (1365), and Gallipoli (1366.)[40] On this occasion, the army gathered by the West, exceeding 100,000 men, included the flower of all Western Europe.[41] Confidently they marched, with the aim, that after defeating Bayazid and 'ridding Hungary of the infidels,' says Froissart,

> The Christians would go to Constantinople, pass beyond the 'Arm of St. George,' and enter Syria; they would free the Holy Land and deliver Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher from the pagans and from subjection to the soldan and the enemies of our Lord.[42]

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[38] J.J.N. Palmer: *England, France and Christendom*; Routledge; London; 1972; p. 205.
For these crusades, see K.M. Setton ed: *A History of the Crusades*; op cit; See also N. Housley for reasons for reasons behind such crusades. N. Housley: *The Later Crusades;* Oxford University Press; 1992. In G. Mollat ed: *Letrres Secretes et Curiales du Pape Gregoire XI... interessant les pays autre que la France*; 3 fascicules; Paris; 1962-65; fasc. 1; nos 1172-4; p. 162. H. Inalcik: The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades; 1329-1451; in K.M. Setton: *A History*; op cit; p. 241.

[39] J.N Palmer: *England and France,* op cit, p. 202.

[40] S.J. Joseph Gill: *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400*; Rutgers University Press; New Jersey; 1979; p. 193.

[41] Delaville le Roulx: *La France en Orient au XIV em Siecle;* Ernest Thorin Editor, Paris; 1886. A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade of Nicopolis;* Methuen & co. Ltd; London; 1934. T. Godefroy: *Histoire de Messier Jean de Boucicaut;* vols VI and VII; Paris; 1825.

[42] Kervyn de Lettenhove, ed., *Oeuvres de Froissart,* XIV (Brussels, 1872) (henceforth referred to as Froissart: Oeuvres) Froissart, in K. Setton: Crusade of Barbary and Nicopolis; in K.M. Setton: *Papacy and the Levant;* The American Philosophical Society; Philadelphia; 1976; vol 1; pp. 327-69; p. 345.

However, at the battle, which took place on 25 September 1396, the Ottomans displayed an extraordinary feat of arms, and crushed the Crusaders, wiping out entirely the elites of Western Christendom.[43]

Had on the other hand Nicopolis been lost by the Ottomans, the Crusaders would have marched unopposed to Jerusalem, for there was no force between them and the Holy Sites. Jerusalem would have been captured in 1396 instead of 1917; and what consequences the Crusade victory would have had on Islam, and the Islamic East, which was being invaded and devastated by Timur right then, is impossible to state. Whether there was an arranged agreement between the Crusaders and Timur to attack simultaneously, as happened with previous Crusader-Mongol arrangements in the mid 13th century, when the French King St Louis (Louis IX) and the Mongols agreed simultaneous attacks on the Islamic world, is not known, though very likely.[44] However, according to Atiya,

> If the crusade of Nicopolis (1396), either by accident or by design, had been postponed for another six years until the time of the Battle of Angora (in 1402, when Timur destroyed the Turkish army, and caged Bayazid to death), the power of the Ottomans might have been wrecked for ever, their rule in Europe nipped in the bud, and who knows?- the dream of uniting the forces of the West and the Far East (Eastern Christians) in conjunction with the Tartar against the Mamluks realised and the Holy Land regained for Latin Christendom.[45]

Had the Christians also won at Nicopolis, Palmer notes, Western Christendom could easily have transformed this situation quite radically.[46] The Turks would have been completely expelled from Europe; and since their base in Asia Minor was limited, they would have found it far from easy to make a comeback even after the withdrawal of the Crusading forces.[47]

Also when Timur destroyed Ottoman power in 1402, thankfully for Ottoman Turkey, there was no Western army to finish his job, for the elites of Western Christendom had been laid stiff on the field of Nicopolis six years earlier. This somehow brings yet another analogy with the 1920 situation. By the time the Greeks invaded Turkey in 1920, the armies of Western Christendom had been wiped out in the senseless carnage of the Great War in the fields of Flanders and northern France. The Western populations had had enough; the post war influenza epidemics was doing the final mass killing; the Italians were losing in Libya; the British were stuck in another conflict, even closer home, in Ireland; the French were bogged down in the Rhineland trying to smother whatever was left of German power, and both countries were also

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[43] For the battle of Nicopolis, see the following literature: G.C. Macaulay: *Chronicles of Froissart*; Macmillan and Co; London; 1899. Delaville Le Roulx, *La France en Orient;* 220-320) as well as a collection of pertinent documents (II, nos. *v* ff., pp. 18 ff.). See also A.S. Atiya: *Nicopolis*, and *Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, pp. 435-62; K. Setton: The Crusade of Barbary and Nicopolis; pp. 328 ff; R. Rosetti, "Notes on the Battle of Nicopolis (1396)," *The Slavonic (and East European) Review,* XV (1936-37), 629-38. Alois Brauner, *Die Schlacht bei Nikopolis (1396),* Breslau, 1876; The study of the Prussian general G. Köhler, *Die Schlachten von Nicopoli und Warna,* Breslau, 1882.

[44] L. Hambis: Saint Louis et les Mongols; in *JRAS*; 1970; pp. 25-33; at p. 28. P. Pelliot: Les Mongols et la Papaute; in *Revue de l'Orient Chretien*; 3rd Series; vol 23; 1922-23; 106 ff. J.J. Saunders: *Aspects of the Crusades*; University of Canterbury; 1962; at pp. 50 ff.

[45] A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*; p. 22.

[46] J.J.N. Palmer: *England, France and Christendom*; op cit; p. 207.

[47] Ibid.

trying to contain the Bolshevik Revolution, which, mercifully for Turkey, had occurred at the most favourable time ever, in 1917. So, somehow it was left to the Greeks and Armenians to do most of the invading of Turkey; and whilst Karabekir dealt with the Armenians, Mustafa Kemal and his commanders had to deal with the more dangerous Greeks.

In regard to Varna, following the so much sought Union of the two Churches (Catholic and Orthodox, under Catholic sway in 1439), Western Christendom, having recovered at last from the Nicopolis disaster, prepared to march east, again, for the same aims as Nicopolis half a century ago. As the Catholic historian Tuleja writes, the Crusade of Varna was 'a strong Christian military effort which might accomplish what the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 had failed to do.'[48]

A new, great Christian, military leader, Hunyadi, had emerged. Sultan Murad II, having been duped by signing a peace treaty at Sezged (just like the peace treaty of Mudros in 1918),[49] thought he had gained peace with Christendom, and so, retired to Anatolia to enjoy days of tranquility, leaving his young son, Mehmet II, in charge. The Christians used the opportunity so well; they prepared their armies, the men collected under Hunyadi of Hungary and King Ladislaw of Poland, the leaders of the Crusade, represented all the forces that the Papacy and Western Europe could muster; and the presence of Cardinal Julian Cesarini, the Pope Legate, gave it the sanction of an international army representing Christendom.[50] The Christians also constructed a fleet, which they placed in the waters between the two continents in order to stop Murad from returning to Europe.[51] Then they marched intending first to destroy the Turks in Europe, and then move forward into Asia Minor.[52] Plans for the divisions of the Ottoman realm among the victors were already made; there was also, Vaughan notes, 'Much talk in classical style of driving the barbarians from the soil of Hellas, as well as of re-taking Jerusalem.'[53]

Yet, against all the odds, Murad managed to cross from Asia into Europe, and joined his armies with those of his son Mehmed.[54] In Varna, on 10 November 1444, the Ottomans crushed the Crusaders.[55]

After this military success, there was hardly any Christian force left, nor the will to fight the Ottomans. Crusading was dead for a while.

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[48] T.V. Tuleja: Eugenius IV and the Crusade of Varna: *The Catholic Historical Review*; Vol xxxv; 1949; pp. 257-73; at p. 257.

[49] E.S. Creasy: *History of the Ottoman Turks*; Khayats; Beirut; 1961; p. 66.

[50] E. Pears: *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*; Longmans; London; 1903; p. 159.

[51] For details on the efforts put by the papacy and Christian powers for preparation of this fleet, see Tuleja; pp. 259 ff.

[52] N. Jorga: *Notes et extraits pour server a l'histoire des croisades au XVem siecle*; Paris; Ernest Leroux; 1899; and 1902. M. Chasin: The Crusade of Varna; in K. M. Setton ed., *A History of the Crusade*; vol 6; pp. 276-310. C. Imber: *The Crusade of Varna*; *1443-5*; Ashgate; 2006.

[53] D. M. Vaughan: *Europe and the Turk*; op cit; p. 57.

[54] Jehan de Wavrin, edited by N. Jorga, *La Campagne des Croisades sur le Danube;* Paris: J. Gamber, 1927). Excerpt from the *Anciennes Chroniques d'Angleterre* by the Burgundian chronicler Jehan de Wavrin (d. *c.* 1474); p. 35.

[55] For great details on battles, see: Anonymous: *The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Sultan Mehmed Khan*; in C. Imber: *Varna;* pp. 41-106. See also M. Chasin: The Crusade of Varna; op cit.

Nicopolis and Varna, just like Gallipoli, Sakarya and Dumlupınar were in the end victories for the destiny of a people and nation. Yet, remarkably, and here yet another shared element between all these Turkish victories, when one goes through scholarship, with rare exceptions, their appreciation is one of the most dire.

2. Scholarship and Turkish Victories

In their ground-breaking work on Ottoman military history, Uyar and Erickson observe:

> Throughout much of its existence, the Ottoman army was an effective fighting force with professional military institutions and organizational structures. However, the view of this army in the Western world is often negative and based largely on Euro-centric narratives and histories that tended to present the Ottomans as savage and backward enemies who were only able to succeed by their sheer numerical strength, geography, stupidity of their rivals, or pure luck.[56]

Indeed, it is systematic in Western, or Western-based, scholarship that all Turkish victories are said to be owed to these factors just listed by Uyar and Erickson. With rare exceptions such as Leroulx,[57] who acknowledges superior Ottoman military capability, courage, and leadership, the rest of the literature entirely dismisses that. It is claimed, for example, that the Ottoman victory at Nicopolis (1396) was accomplished by the Serbs who fought in Ottoman ranks. Atiya tells us:

> The battle of Nicopolis was preceded by an encounter in which two sections of the hostile powers were engaged in a day's conflict. The battle itself was fought in three main stages. In the first stage, the French won a number of successes over the Turkish vanguard and 'main battle'; in the second, they encountered the Turkish rear, which consisted of the flower of the Ottoman Spahis, under the command of Bayazid himself, and the result was the complete rout of the Christians.[58] The last phase of the battle was a *melée* in which (King) Sigismund and a number of loyal Hungarians were involved in a desperate struggle with the Turks. Unfortunately, the King's last efforts were foiled by the appearance on the scene of Stephen Lazarevic, a Christian vassal of Bayazid, and his Serbian contingent.[59]

It is also claimed that the Ottoman victory at Varna (1444) was due to divisions amongst Christians, their indecisiveness, Genoese betrayal, the weather, and also, as Pears writes, 'Further advance, if desirable was difficult, on account of the illness of

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[56] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Ataturk*; ABC and Clio, Santa Barbara, California, 2009; p. Preface x.
[57] De La Ville Leroulx: *La France*; op cit.
[58] A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade of Nicopolis*; op cit; p. 82.
[59] Ibid.

(its leader, King) Ladislaus.'[60] Imber, who has completed the latest work on this Crusade, states en passant, 'That Murad II owed his victory in 1444 (Varna) to a Genoese ally.'[61] Imber also keeps repeating that the Ottomans nearly lost that battle, and might even have lost it, but the Christians, somehow, failed to realise that.

The same argument is used for the Turkish victory at Gallipoli, which was deemed, Uyar and Erickson remark, as a "narrowly missed victory" by many western military historians and enthusiasts, who blame everything 'ranging from command and coordination problems and poor planning to geography and climate. Speculation is rife with many might-have-beens, which are still popular.'[62] If and when such historians acknowledge this Turkish victory, then, they attribute its essence to German military command.[63]

Also in regard to Gallipoli, a great variety of other reasons were noted. The list is long, but includes explanations such as allied mistakes,[64] friction between the army and navy, reliance on inexperienced troops and commanders,[65] the Turks having more troops readily available on the peninsula,[66] ill conception and execution of Ally strategy,[67] and many others of the same nature.[68]

Writing about the Ottoman army at the siege of Constantinople, in 1453, Pears says:

> There were 140,000 effective soldiers, the rest, making the number of Mahomet's army amount to 200,000, "being thieves, plunderers, hawkers, and others following the army for gain and booty."[69]
>
> In this army the most distinguished corps consisted of at least 12,000 Janissaries, who formed the bodyguard of the Sultan. This force had shown its discipline and valour at Varna and at Kosovo. This, the most terrible portion of Mahomet's force, was derived at that time exclusively from Christian families. It was the boast of its members that they had never fled from an enemy, and the boast was not an idle one. The capture of Constantinople, we are told, owed in

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[60] E. Pears: *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*; op cit; p. 165.

[61] C. Imber: *The Crusade of Varna*; op cit; p. 5.

[62] C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, *History of the Great War, Military Operations Gallipoli*, vol. 1, (Nashville: The Battery Press reprint, 1992), vii–ix, 70–71, 87–89; Basil H. Liddell-Hart, *History of the First World War*, (London: Book Club, 1977), 214–215, 223, 227, 239–242; Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, (London: Papermac, 1995), 46, 419–420; Robert Rhodes-James, ''Gallipoli Campaign,'' in (ed.) Richard Holmes, *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 345.

[63] Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great War, 18–19; Steel and Hart, History of the First World War, 45–47; Michael Hickey, Gallipoli, (London: John Murray, 1995), 23–24, 117, 125, 145–146; all in M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Ataturk*; ABC and Clio, Santa Barbara, California, 2009; p. 258.

[64] Tim Travers, 'The Other Side of the Hill', *Military History Quarterly* 12 (3) (Spring 2000): 2-20, 2.

[65] Tim Travers, *Gallipoli 1915* (Charleston, SC: Tempus Publishing, 2001), pp. 222-228.

[66] Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 420.

[67] Field Marshal Lord Carver, *The Turkish Front 1914-1918, The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2003), p. 246.

[68] See C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *History of the Great War, Based on Official Documents: Military Operations Gallipoli*, vol. 1 and 2 (London: HMSO, 1924-1930) and C.E.W. Bean, *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: The Story of ANZAC*, vol. 1-2 (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1981) (reprint of 1942 edition).

[69] E. Pears: The Ottoman Turks to The Fall of Constantinople. In *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol IV: Edited by J.R. Tanner, C.W. Previte; Z.N. Brooke, Cambridge University Press, 1923; pp. 653-705; at p. 696.

> large measure to the monster gun cast at Adrianople by Urban, a Hungarian or Wallach.[70]

Toynbee, once a leading Turkish hater, who, for reasons to be seen subsequently, changed his views, was asked, or allowed, by the Greeks to march along them in order to record their 'glorious conquest of Anatolia' in 1920-21. What he wrote eventually drove them and their supporters to loathe him. Regarding Turkish military victories in the War of Independence and how they were perceived or explained away, he notes:

> On the 23rd March 1921, the Greek Northern and Southern Armies took the offensive simultaneously from Bursa and Ushaq. After encountering stiff resistance, the Southern Army occupied Kara Hissar, but the three northern divisions beat in vain against the heights which they had taken in their stride two months before.'[71] But now the Turks were not the weak forces of before. 'The approaches [to their defences] were now swept by a well-served artillery; the slopes were scientifically entrenched; and the trenches were manned by troops who held their ground.'[72] 'After several days' murderous fighting,' the Greeks made gains but at horrendous costs, and 'the failure of the Northern Army necessitated a strategic retreat of the Southern from Kara Hissar.'[73]
>
> On the 2nd and 3rd April, I walked back the forty-odd miles to Brusa with the 7th Division — an interminable procession of troops, mules, ox-carts and lorries crawling along a foundered road.[74]

Expecting to meet nothing but chettes, now the Greeks faced a real, well trained, Turkish army that threatened their destruction. This disaster needed to be explained away:

> The Greeks [Toynbee resumes] could not get over their surprise at the transformation of the chettes into soldiers, and scented the "hidden hand." The Turkish artillery must have been served by Russian or German gunners to make such good shooting, Italian sappers must have traced the trenches, French officers have kept the infantry steady. I convinced myself to my own satisfaction that this was a hallucination.[75]

The reason for Greek defeat Toynbee explains was that: 'The Greeks' unchallenged ascendency during the preceding two years (1919 and 1920) had been due to the fact that, before their landing, the Allied control had broken up the Turkish military machine.' However, by the spring of 1921 the army was built again.[76]

The Greeks were not satisfied with that explanation, and kept finding others. Toynbee again:

> I was considerably amused when I found a French garrison in the Brusa hotel, because I had just been hearing from Greek soldiers of all ranks that French

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[70] E. Pears: The Ottomans; op cit; p. 696.
[71] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922; p. 233.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid; p. 234.
[76] Ibid; pp. 234-5.

> officers were directing operations on the other (Turkish) side. I watched this second legend spreading through the Greek Army and growing in dimensions hour by hour. First a French uniform had been observed in the Turkish trenches. Then an officer in French uniform had been bayoneted by an evzone in one of the Greek attacks, without having time to utter more than the single word "Pardon." And later, a long way behind the front, I met the evzone who had both killed the one and captured the other! The French had also inflicted casualties on the British. One of the English attaches, who had been shot by a Kemalist one day, was shot all over again by a French colonel the day after, and was welcomed by the waiters as one risen from the dead when he turned up at the hotel that evening for dinner.[77]
>
> So the story of the French officers spread from mouth to mouth, and it was curious to see its effect upon the Greek Army's moral. At first it made them angry and combative. "We should have got through the first day but for the French, and we shall get through now in spite of them." But later, as victory failed to come, I could see how the rumour bred discouragement. "We are not up against the Kemalists but against the French,'' or 'How can we fight the French?" were phrases repeated to me during the last days of the battle by many Greek soldiers. If the Greek High Command are not sensible enough to explode this legend quickly, its ultimate effect on the Greek Army's moral may be extremely bad. But that is their affair. It is our business to see that Near Eastern legends without truth behind them do not trouble the good relations of England and France.[78]

Here one has the duty to comfort the Turks; they are not alone in being so disparaged. All Muslims are. Explanations for Muslim victories against Christians range from bad weather, to hot uniforms, to sandstorms, snowstorms, rainstorms, winds blowing in the wrong direction, to the use by Muslims of Christian mercenaries, to every other possible excuse. But one of the best of all is by M.W. Baldwin who devotes a major part of his book seeking justifications for Salah Eddin's defeat of the Crusaders at Hattin in July 1187. Here are some of his explanations:

> As the (Christian) men prepared for the march, in the small hours of the morning, a time when man's courage is at its lowest ebb, feelings of despair and foreboding crept through the ranks. They left a deep impression on the chronicler. Though skeptical of their truth, he nevertheless relates weird tales and premonitions of disaster which, he says, passed about after the army had started. Evidently the stuff of later legend, they indicate this state of mind.[79]
>
> A foot-soldier of the rear-guard captured a Saracen woman who was thought to be a witch and who pretended to have been employed by Saladin to lay a spell over the army. To their dismay, the fire which was prepared to burn her left her unscathed. Finally a foot-soldier clove her head with a Danish axe. It was said

[77] Ibid; p. 256.
[78] Ibid; p. 258.
[79] *Eracles,* pp. *54ff.;* Ernoul, pp. 163ff. See also *Itinerarium,* p. 14.

> that even the horses were affected and touched no water for the day or night before the army set out, and so failed their riders the next day.'[80]

One would think one historian coming with an imbecility is fine, but it seems this is a general practice. Here is Jean Richard, the illustrious historian of the Crusades on the same event:

> The heat was overwhelming, and the men were depressed. They felt ill fortune in the air about them; had they not come upon a witch, a Moslem slave belonging to a Syrian from Nazareth, in the act of casting spells to deliver the army, as she had confessed, to Saladin? They had burned her, of course, but would this undo the effect of her Witchcraft? And Saladin had 60,000 men and the crusaders only 30,000.[81]

Whilst the Arabs thankfully found indulgent minds here and there, the Turks, on the other hand, especially during the First World War (for reasons to be explained further down), found themselves at the end of some of the most derogatory literature ever devised, which went beyond denying them any merit of any sort. Here is A. Mandelstam's (who subsequently arose as one of the world's leading figures in the field of 'Human Rights') view of the Turk:

> The role of this domineering race seems to us rather tragic. The tragedy of the Turkish people consists in the fact that since it appeared on the world arena, it has done nothing to legitimise its existence in terms of civilisation. It intruded into the lives of other nations only to spread streams of tears and blood. It asserted itself in the world only by the use of chains, to shackle the religion and racial entity of other people, to shackle thought, to shackle the freedom of its own children, to shackle, finally, the Muslim woman. The Turk has only subsisted thanks to the enslavement of others. Having secured his domination over the old cultures, the Greek, the Arab, the Armenian, he elected himself as the master of the enslaved nations, which were full of vitality; having usurped the Divine City (Constantinople), which was predestined as the centre of the world, the Turkish people then became numbed in utter immobility. Strangled from every side by Islamic scholastic Tradition, it had delivered not a single instance of creative genius. Having borrowed its religion from the Arabs, whose spirit is utterly alien to it, it was unable to create a national "Church." The Turkish language is too poor to convey scientific thought, and so it takes out the Arab literature all forms of abstract thought. And whilst it wears the sumptuous vestment of Arab thought, and whilst it wears the precious stones stolen from the Persian treasury, the Turkish people has never given birth to any new idea. Never has the world been surprised by new melodies or songs from Turkish lips; never has the Turkish mind enriched humanity with new forms and images. The Turkish people has legated nothing to humanity in terms of poets, artists, sculptors, musicians, or scholars, whom humanity can

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[80] M.W. Baldwin: *Raymond III of Tripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (1140-1187)*; Princeton University Press; 1936; p. 114.
[81] J. Richard: *The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem*; tr., by J. Shirley; North Holland Publishing Company; Amsterdam; 1979; Vol A; p. 175.

> celebrate with fondness and joy. He has legated nothing of the beautiful or true, or good. He has been a sterile people, a people that bore no fruit. His mission was to destroy, and destruction does not require a soul. A soul is necessary to lay the foundations of a national existence, and this soul, until now is lacking in Turkey. The Young Turks have tried at some point to give Turkey this soul, but, unfortunately, we have seen: they themselves were without any soul.[82]

The logical mind would say how could then this so impotent Ottoman rule be able to govern the greater part of the world for many centuries? How was it that it was under the Ottoman Turks, and under they alone, that for centuries, so many races and ethnic groups lived side by side in harmony, despite the odd problem?[83] Only in Ottoman Turkey could religious and other minorities find shelter amongst the Turks whilst they were burned alive all over the Christian West.[84] Only in Ottoman Turkey the Greek Orthodox found protection, and if it were not for the Ottomans, the Greek Church and the Orthodox faith would have been wiped out in the 15th century.[85] Also it was in Ottoman Turkey alone and its realm where the Jews could find safety, and where none would burn them alive in their synagogues as they were elsewhere.[86] Nations in the supposedly barbaric Ottoman times used to compete for Turkish favours whether in Istanbul or in Algiers.[87] Ottoman sea admirals ruled the oceans, and Kheir Eddin Barbarossa was the builder of the French navy, and its master, too, at a time when France owed to Ottoman Turkey its very independence and safeguard from Imperial ambitions.[88] Istanbul under the Ottomans down to the early 19th century was the most diverse, the most prosperous, and the best administered city in the whole of Europe and possibly in the world.[89] There is so much more evidence from history of Turkish civilisation and others' barbarism that one can exhaust oneself should one pursue this matter.

One might wonder at such blindness from authors (such as Mandelstam and others) writing between 1915 and 1920, until one realises that it was not really blindness and imbecilic claims made by otherwise competent minds. The aim of such writers was in truth to darken the Turkish subject so much, to paint him cruel, beastly, and barbaric, and thus make legitimate the carving up of Turkey and the sharing out of the spoils

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[82] A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917; p. 581.
[83] T. Arnold: *The Preaching of Islam*; M. Ashraf Publishers; Lahore; 1979; relevant chapter. S. Lane Poole: *Turkey;* Khayats; Beirut; 1966 ed., originally published in 1908. J.B. Kinross: *The Ottoman Centuries*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1977.
[84] W. Durant: *The Reformation;* Simon and Schuster; New York; 1957. H.C. Lea: *A History of the Inquisition in Spain;* 4 vols; The Macmillan Company, New York, 1907; vol 3.
[85] S.J. Joseph Gill: *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400*; Rutgers University Press; New Jersey; 1979. F. Babinger: *Mehmed the Conqueror*; tr., from German by R. Manheim; Bollingen Series XCVI; Princeton University Press; 1978.
[86] S. J. Shaw; E.K. Shaw: *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols; Cambridge University Press, 1976. Y. Courbage, P. Fargues: *Chretiens et Juifs dans l'Islam Arabe et Turc*, Payot, Paris, 1997.
[87] G. Fisher: *The Barbary Legend*; Oxford; 1957. L. Valensi: *Le Maghreb Avant la Prise d'Alger;* Paris; 1969. L. Valensi: *North Africa Before the French Conquest; 1790-1830*; tr. by K. J. Perkins; Africana Publishing Company; London; 1977.
[88] G. Casale: *The Ottoman Age of Exploration;* Oxford University Press; 2010. R.B. Merriman: *Suleiman the Magnificent, 1520-1566*, Harvard University Press, 1944. Ekrem Rechid: *La Vie de Khairredine Barberousse,* Paris, 1931.
[89] G. Young: *Constantinople;* Methuen & Co Ltd; London; 1926.

resulting from such carving. Such a literature even justified the extreme misdeeds inflicted on the Turks, rendering them excusable.[90]

3. Gallantry and Bestiality: The Held and the Real

Toynbee first wrote, in 1917, some of the most anti-Turkish stuff available in literature in a book: *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks* with a preface by Viscount Bryce titled *The Liberation of the Peoples Who Now Lie Beneath the Murderous Tyranny of the Turks* and *The Expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire which has Proved Itself so Radically Alien to Western Civilisation.*[91] In this work, which he wrote during the First World War, when employed by the British Ministry of Propaganda, Toynbee spoke of Turkish massacres of Arabs, Nestorians, Armenians, Christian missionaries, and everybody else it would seem, and then concluded:

> These crimes, and the phases of Ottoman History which lead up to them, demonstrate, in the language of the Allies' Note, that "the Ottoman Empire has proved itself radically alien to Western Civilisation." Where Ottoman rule has spread, civilisation has perished. While Ottoman rule has lasted, civilisation has remained in abeyance. It has only sprung up again when the oppressed peoples, at the cost of their own blood and by the aid of civilised nations more fortunate than themselves, have succeeded in throwing off the Turkish yoke; and these struggles have been so much regained for liberty and progress in the world, because the infliction of Turkish rule upon any other people has been an incalculable loss. To this long history of horror the Allies are determined to put an end. They will "liberate the peoples who now lie beneath this murderous tyranny." But they proclaim no tyrannous intention against the Turks themselves.... There are regions in Asia Minor where the Turk is undisputed occupant of the land. The Allies have no intention of deporting or exterminating the Turk from these regions, as the Turk has deported the Armenians from the regions that are theirs. The Turk, like the German, Magyar and Bulgar, will remain where he belongs. Out of the broad territory over which he at present domineers, he will be allowed to keep his just pound of flesh, but woe to him hereafter if he sheds one drop of Christian blood...[92]

Toynbee's work was prefaced at length by Viscount Bryce's piece, which also dwelt on Turkish barbarities, and thus justified the oncoming partitioning of Turkey. A. Mandelstam,[93] in Russia, E. Driault,[94] in France, and a few others also released similar

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[90] As Pierre Loti notes in his *Turquie agonisante* and Ernst Jäckh in his *Deutschland im Orient*; pp. 83-98 where they detail the horrific treatment of the Turks by Christian powers during the Balkan Wars 1912-1913; when the evidence of such crimes was so overwhelming that it could not be ignored, as hundreds of people produced evidence of such atrocities, then the reply in some of the media that such atrocities were only payment for past Turkish oppression of their subjects.

[91] A.J. Toynbee: *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*; Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1917.

[92] Ibid, pp. 17-9.

[93] A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917; p. 581.

[94] E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient*; Paris; 1920; 8th edition.

works at the same time. All these works, bearing the same substance, written in the same tone, sharing the arrangement of the chapters, with similar arguments and facts, and reaching the same conclusion, they could have been written by the same person. Their conclusion was

> In view of Turkish crimes, and utter lack of contribution to civilisation, Turkey had to be phased out of existence, to be shared out by various peoples, Greeks and Armenians, principally, and the Turks confined to some remote corner of Anatolia.

More on the substance of this literature, and what resulted will be seen as the work progresses.

In atonement, years later, Toynbee admitted:

> I was being employed by His Majesty's Government to compile all available documents on the recent treatment of the Armenians by the Turkish Government in a "Blue Book," which was duly published and distributed as war-propaganda.[95]

In 1921, as a champion anti-Turk, Toynbee was invited to join the Greek advance into Anatolia, those who invited him certain that his writing would immortalise the great Greek 'reconquest' of Anatolia, six or so centuries after the Ottomans "stole" it from their forefathers, the Byzantines. Here came the most unpleasant surprise to the Greeks. What Toynbee wrote and published in 1922 came as an utter disappointment. Toynbee not only wrote about Greek crimes, he titled his longest chapter: *War of Extermination, a passionate denunciation of crimes against the Turks*.[96]

It is needless here to go into what Toynbee wrote beyond few extracts in order to highlight the issue that is central in this work: that had the Greeks won at Sakarya and Dumlupınar, the following is what was in store for the Turks:

> Abundant material evidence in the shape of burnt and plundered houses, recent corpses, and terror-stricken survivors. We witnessed robbery by Greek civilians and arson by Greek soldiers in uniform in the act of perpetration. We also obtained convincing evidence that atrocities similar to those which had come under our observation in the neighbourhood of the Marmara during May and June 1921, had been started since the same date in wide areas all over the remainder of the Greek occupied territories.[97] My dossier of evidence is in order, and I should publish it if I felt at any time that it would be useful to do so. But it has no proper place in this book, and it has been my misfortune to handle such documents so many times that I have no wish to repeat a very distasteful task. The genesis and nature of atrocities, as illustrated by occurrences since May 1919 in Anatolia, are the subject of this chapter.[98]
>
> During the first raid of Greek chettes upon Armudlu on the 19th April 1921, kaiks sailed round the coast from the chettes' home-villages to carry away the

[95] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922; p. 40.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid; p. 260.
[98] Ibid.

> loot, and the spoil from Hoja Dereyi-Bala was transported by trains of mules. I personally questioned a number of survivors from the group of Turkish villages round Fistikli about the temper of the Greek chettes during their operations. They all agreed that they were not in a state of fury or excitement. They plundered first and killed afterwards, and they sang at their work, even when they got to the killing. It was the exhilaration of a cat who has caught a mouse to play with.[99]
>
> A significant feature was the murder of rich men and subsequent seizure of their property. Sometimes the whole family was killed and the house burnt, to cover the tracks of the criminals. I have in my possession accounts of many such murders committed by Greek soldiers or chettes or by both together in the course of raids on villages in different parts of the Greek occupied territory.[100]

The genocides were not perpetrated in the heat of combat or for security reasons, but were systematic, just a matter of annihilation of the Turks. This was also the opinion of M. Gehri, the representative of the Geneva International Red Cross:

> At the time of our investigation, the Peninsula of Samanli-Dagh [the Yalova-Gemlik Peninsula] was behind the Greek front, and it has never been a theatre of hostilities since the beginning of the Greek occupation. Until March last, the region was quiet. The crimes which have come to our knowledge fall within the last two months (end of March to the 15th May). They are subsequent to the retreat of the Greek army after the defeat of EskiShehir [İnönu]. Possibly they are a consequence of it.[101]

The Inter-Allied Commission in the Yalova-Gemlik Peninsula, in their report of 23 May 1921, summed up this point as follows:

> The Commission endeavoured to arrive at the causes which, in less than two months, brought about the destruction or evacuation of nearly all the Moslem villages of that part of the kazas of Yalova and Guemlek which is occupied by the Greeks.[102]
>
> The members of the Commission consider that, in the part of the kazas of Yalova and Guemlek occupied by the Greek army, there is a systematic plan of destruction of Turkish villages and extinction of the Moslem population. This plan is being carried out by Greek and Armenian bands, which appear to operate under Greek instructions and sometimes even with the assistance of detachments of regular troops.[103]

Toynbee lists hundreds of villages destroyed, burnt to the ground, their populations slaughtered, and women raped, including the elderly.

Toynbee does admit to some Turkish excesses, but regarding Turkish troops, here is what he has to say:

> The Turkish troops on their side consisted of three categories — regulars, volunteers, and local chettes. I had a glimpse of all three from the 29th June to

[99] Ibid; pp. 276-7.
[100] Ibid; p. 277.
[101] Ibid; p. 278.
[102] Ibid; p. 283.
[103] Ibid; p. 284.

> the 2nd July 1921 at Ismid, and was impressed by their discipline. The chettes were undoubtedly under the Army's control. The volunteers, who came like the regulars from distant parts, were properly organised units. The regulars themselves, in spite of their miscellaneous uniforms, were unmistakably fine soldiers. I saw them in circumstances of extreme provocation, but they stood the test. There had been no retaliation upon the churches for the state in which the Greeks had left the mosques; no wrecking of the deserted Greek and Armenian shops, though the sign of the cross still remained chalked on their shutters to distinguish them from the Turkish shops, which the Greeks, before they left, had systematically looted; no violence against the few native Christians who had remained, in revenge for the previous massacre of Turkish civilians. The sale and consumption of alcoholic liquors had been effectively prohibited by the military governor. At night the town was quiet, the troops sober and orderly, and a Westerner could walk the streets in the dark with no adventures except courteous challenges from sentries and the offer of a lantern to light him on his way.[104]

What is easy to note these days is that whilst Toynbee's first work for the British Propaganda Ministry (i.e. the one titled *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*) is widely used and referred to by modern scholarship, his second work depicting Greek crimes: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, published five years later in 1922, is barely known or cited in reading lists, including by Turks themselves. For writing this book, in fact, Toynbee became shunned, including by those who were kind to him before, and lost his chair at the University of London.[105]

Whilst Toynbee's view of such events is thus obscured, in contrast another type of narrative is thrust forth such as by Clogg, for instance.[106] Clogg is a modern (1990s) writer on Greece, and just like his colleagues today (with a couple of exceptions), in his work on the Greek war in Turkey, there is not a faint mention of anything Toynbee witnessed, nor any reference whatsoever to Toynbee himself. This being another instance of modern historians not only doing away with inconvenient facts but also with inconvenient sources. Let's read Clogg's accounts on the violence in Smyrna (İzmir) in 1919 and 1922; first following the Greek landing in 1919:

> The ostensible purpose (of the Greek landing) was to protect the local Greek population from Turkish reprisals. But, in an ominous presentiment of future trouble, the landings were marked by Greek atrocities, with some 350 Turks being killed or wounded in fighting with Greek troops. Despite the ruthless punishment of the Greek culprits and the arrival a few days later of the Greek high commissioner, Aristeides Stergiadis, an austere disciplinarian with a genuine commitment to the even-handed treatment of Greeks and Turks, the damage had been done. The landings in Smyrna had acted as the catalyst for a

[104] Ibid; p. 240.
[105] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 329.
[106] R. Clogg: *A Concise History of Greece;* Cambridge University Press; 1992.

> revived Turkish nationalism under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (subsequently Atatürk), who repudiated the authority of the supine Turkish government centred in Istanbul. Before long irregular warfare had broken out between rival Greek and Turkish forces.[107]

Then following the Turkish entry in Izmir in September 1922, the same Clogg writes:

> A Fire (in September 1922) devastated much of the Greek, Armenian and Frankish [European] quarters of the city which the Turks had called *Govur Izmir* or 'Infidel Izmir', so large was its non-Muslim population. Only the Turkish and Jewish quarters survived the holocaust. The fire had been started by the Turks after they had retaken the city following the chaotic defeat of the Greek forces occupying Asia Minor. At the outset, the Turkish occupation of the city in the wake of the retreating Greek troops had been relatively orderly. But law and order broke down as Turkish troops sought their revenge, initially against the Armenians. In the ensuing bloodbath, in which some 30,000 Christians perished, Archbishop Chrysostomos of Smyrna was hacked to death after being handed over to a Turkish mob, meeting a martyr's death a century after the execution of the Ecumenical Patriarch Grigorios V.[108]

Never mind his ridiculous lamenting of the death of the patriarch dying 'a martyr's death,' Clogg is telling fallacies when referring to the incidents following the Greek landing, a matter to which it will be returned in chapter 5; he also tells a fallacy when he says the Turks started the fire in Izmir, for to this day nobody knows who did it. He also lies when he speaks of the death of 30,000 Greeks and Armenians, providing no evidence for his claim, whilst as noted at the time by contemporary witnesses:

> As events turned out it was not massacre but fire that made a tragedy of the Turkish reoccupation of Smyrna. The excesses committed by the Turkish soldiery against the local Greeks were brutal indeed, but of a sporadic and individual kind.... An official American observer, contradicting lurid reports in the American press, afterwards estimated the total deaths, from various causes, at about two thousand.[109]

Where there is a problem is not with the distortions, but with the fact that such distorting works are the most popular, as found by this author, who came across no less than seven copies of the book by Clogg on the shelf of the UK university library where he worked and not a single copy of Toynbee's book on Greek atrocities, including during their entry into Smyrna. In fact, in that same library, Toynbee's work belongs to a special collection whose access is one of the most arduous any researcher can come across. The students, therefore, are forced to use the book which gives the worst picture of Turkey, and never have a chance of getting a proper, balanced account of the story; and hence, develop a thoroughly distorted view of the Turks, which they carry with them, including in their jobs, whether as journalists, teachers, civil servants, bankers, farmers, or army officers.

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[107] Ibid; p. 93.
[108] Ibid; p. 94.
[109] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 324.

Clogg is not alone in telling stories which are contrary to what contemporary witnesses saw. Let's pick another reputable Western historian, R.C Hall, and another conflict, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913.[110] This is what he writes in his chapter on atrocities of that war:

> The Balkan Wars initiated an age of horrible actions committed upon both military and civilian populations in Europe. Atrocities of course have never been entirely absent from Europe. Indeed, as recently as 1876 reports of Ottoman massacres of Bulgarians were instrumental in provoking the Russo-Turkish war. The slaughter of Islamic Slavs and Turks by Bulgarians received much less attention. Nevertheless, the suffering of prisoners of war and targeting of civilians by military units initiated an age of inhumanity in Europe that spanned the entire century. The soldiers of the Balkan and Ottoman armies often behaved brutally toward their adversaries. Both sides frequently refused to take prisoners and killed any wounded enemy that they encountered... Ottoman soldiers, as they retreated from the fields of their defeat, sometimes vented their frustrations on Christian villages they passed through with the usual actions of murder, arson, pillage, and rape.
>
> A tendency to regard civilian populations as targets of war marked the Balkan Wars. This was not the first nor last time atrocities directed against civilians occurred during a European conflict. It was, however, the first time in the twentieth century that opposing military forces targeted civilians. Accusations of atrocities were made against all sides in the Balkan Wars. This was one aspect of the Balkan Wars that did not generally prevail in the European fighting after 1914.[111]

One is not, of course, going to spend much effort commenting on many of the idiotic claims in this passage, such as the one made in the last two lines, for if one did, one would be still answering it in the next decade. Hall cites some facts in respect to atrocities against the Turks which he can back by references, and then makes claims against the Turks which he does not back by references, for he is telling fallacies. The Turks were the ones who were mass-slaughtered, mass-expelled, and mass-raped in the Balkan Wars, not in their tens of thousands, but in their hundreds of thousands. Witnesses saw the Turks being bayonetted to death, clubbed to death, mutilated, hanged, burnt alive, drowned en masse, women raped, their breasts sliced off, and countless other deeds on the part of Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians and Greeks; eye witnesses who saw these acts number in their hundreds.[112] These witnesses included teachers, army officers, consuls, paper editors, businessmen, sailors, engineers, doctors, and war correspondents, from Germany, Austria, Britain, France, Italy; and Jewish men and women.[113] They give the names of places where the atrocities

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[110] R.C. Hall: *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*; Routledge, London; 2000; p. 136.

[111] Ibid.

[112] See their accounts in P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; Calman Levy; Paris; 1913.

[113] See P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; op cit and also Ernst Jäckh; *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkan-Krieg;* Chapter 7: Deutsche und französische Augenzeugen von christlichen Massakers. (Die Balkangreuel des 30 jährigen Krieges). Martin Mörikes Verlag, Munich,1913; pp. 83-98.

happened, the times, the days, the circumstances, and even who led such atrocities.[114] These witness accounts are available, and yet the scholarship of today remains, with rare exceptions entirely blinded to them, never referring to them or citing them in their reading lists. The only reference this scholarship makes is to the flawed Carnegie Commission of Enquiry which arrived onto the scene nearly two years after the Turks had been mass murdered.[115] Hall, or any modern scholar, will never be able to provide one single example of the Turks expelling the Serbs, Bulgarians, or Greeks, or Montenegrins in that conflict, or inflicting atrocities on them. This author challenges any Western or other author to prove the contrary. The Turks were just fleeing for their lives as they were entirely overwhelmed by the combined Christian onslaught. If Hall, or any other, wanted to know what truly happened in that conflict, and instruct themselves, they should have, or should read Erickson's *Defeat in Detail,*[116] from the military aspect, and McCarthy's *Death and Exile*,[117] from the humanitarian aspect, or the accounts by war correspondents who were present on the ground.[118] Finally, like Clogg cited above, between what Hall says, and what contemporary observers saw, there is a huge gap. Here is what the British photographer-reporter, Baldwin, by no means a friend of the Turks, and who was there, taking pictures of the war, saw and wrote:

> The first village through which I passed was deserted and in ruins, the smoke still pouring upwards from houses that had been fired. Many poor fellows were lying dead at the roadside and in the fields; and there were others who, with just a spark of vitality remaining to them, raised their heads and glanced listlessly at me as I rode by, closing their eyes so soon as I had passed to await the end that could not be long delayed. Never a murmur or a groan came from their parched lips. The Turkish peasant-soldier—and these men seemed to me to have been recruited largely from the peasant class—is possessed of wonderful patience and fortitude, and faint appeals for bread or water were the only sounds I heard; there was no cursing and no complaining.
>
> Here let me say that throughout the time which I spent in the Thracian battle-zone I saw no single instance of that ferocity and cruelty with which the Turks have too often been falsely charged. I am not, of course, in a position to refute every allegation that has been levied against the men of the Ottoman army, but I have seen their conduct under conditions of a character which might be expected to put a severe strain on the morale of the best European troops, and I cannot recall having witnessed, even during the panic, any single outrage or

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[114] Ibid.

[115] Carnegie Commission of Investigation. *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the causes and the Consequences of the Balkan Wars*; Washington DC; 1914.

[116] E.J. Erickson: *Defeat in Detail*; Praeger; London; 2003.

[117] J. McCarthy: *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*; The Darwin Press; New Jersey; 1995.

[118] Such as E. Ashmead Bartlett: *With the Turks in Thrace*; George H. Doran Company; New York; 1913. H.C. Seppings Wright: *Two Years Under the Crescent*; Small, Maynard & Company; Boston; 1913.

> atrocity, or to have heard of any through other correspondents, English or foreign.[119]

And here, one must point out, that R.C. Hall is by far one of the more acceptable faces of modern Western scholarship, for simply others dealing with this and other subjects are beyond redemption.

Here it ought to be noted that it is never pleasing to delve into the filth that history throws at one, i.e atrocities, the outcome of the vile side of humans, at its peak in times of violence. If one has to do it, it is principally:
-Firstly in order to address the other side of the ideological war, that Muslims/Turks do not have the monopoly of bestiality but the other side is well endowed with it just as it is best endowed with the capacities to alter the picture and to distort.
-Secondly: It is not the Greek or Serb murderer, or any other murderer, who is the worst being. The worst is the lying historian and opinion builder, who, for whatever reason, distorts the picture, makes of the Turk/Muslim a perpetual criminal and so legitimises their killing on account of their guilt or their bloody genes.
-Thirdly: Leaping into the muck is done in order to bring forth one of the essential points addressed in this work, that is absent from Western literature, which renders the appreciation of the victories at Gallipoli, Sakarya and Dumlupınar incomplete. This essential point is: Every Ottoman and subsequent Turkish defeat was accompanied by mass-removal of the Turks; and so, had the Turks indeed lost these battles, and in view of the Balkan horrors briefly cited, there would be no Turks to tell the tale today.

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Another Area of Muddling

Old Western sources down to the First World War, without a single exception, only discuss the elimination of Turkey. They do justify this on the grounds already cited (Turkish barbarism, crimes...) but they had no qualms expressing their wish to see both Turkey and its people removed.
Today's Western narrative completely sets aside what has just been said, and then drowns the reader in a mass of material which muddles facts. Information is disappeared, sources of facts are disappeared, events are put forth in the wrong context or chronological order, an abundance of irrelevant information is included, so much so that in the end the foggiest picture is what emerges. So, let's look at some instances to highlight how Western historians muddle historical facts.

We begin with Mango, possibly one of the better historians, especially of Ataturk.[120] Mango's work is necessary for any reader concerned with the phase looked at in this work, and indeed he is a great writer, unfortunately, with a tendency to let his views mar facts, besides his use of the tricks of the modern Western historians in muddling facts. Let's look at this

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[119] H.F. Baldwin: *War Photographer in Thrace; An Account of Personal Experiences During the Turco-Balkan War 1912;* Fisher and Unwin, London, 1913; pp. 148-9.
[120] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999.

instance regarding the Conference of San Remo (Spring 1920), and the Greek military invasion of the early Summer of 1920:

> The clash outside İzmit, when the nationalists defeated the Disciplinary Forces, had serious consequences. British forces opened fire on the nationalists and bombed them from the air to force them back from the vicinity of the capital. Nevertheless, there was panic in Istanbul. The British commander, General Milne, asked for reinforcements. He was told that only Greek troops were available.[121] This gave Venizelos the opportunity for which he had been looking.
>
> Before making up their minds on the Turkish peace settlement, the Allies had asked Marshal Foch to determine the military strength needed to impose a treaty on the Turks. On 30 March, Foch reported that at least twenty-seven divisions would be required, and that these were not available. Venizelos was ready to oblige. He was warned by the British government that he could not expect help in a war between Greece and Turkey, but he disregarded the warning, hoping to involve Britain in hostilities. Allied representatives in Istanbul advised their governments against a resumption of warfare in Turkey; their warnings too were not heeded.[122]
>
> Between 19 and 26 April, the Allies held a conference in San Remo, on the Italian Riviera. A plan to partition Turkey was agreed. Lloyd George went along with Venizelos, and the French, who needed British support to hold down the Germans, and who were promised Lebanon, Syria and a slice of Turkish territory further north, went along with Lloyd George, against their better judgement. The Italians, who were far from satisfied with the promise of a zone of influence in southern Anatolia, could not stop the plan, although they were resolved to sabotage it. Venizelos now wanted to create facts on the ground in preparation for a peace conference. For over a year Greek troops had not been allowed to cross the Milne line, which had been drawn round İzmir. On 20 June, in exchange for the despatch of one Greek division to the İzmit peninsula, Lloyd George and Millerand authorized a 'concerted action' in the İzmir area.[123] Given an inch, Venizelos took an ell. On 22 June, Greek troops crossed the Milne line, and moved east and north.[124]

Of course Mango is muddling facts, and is utterly distorting historical reality. Let's first quote Kincaid Jensen who adds two interesting details:

> Venizelos declared his readiness to be used as the dagger of the Allies, and demanded only as small recompense for his services important additional slices of Anatolian territory... The English fleet was to act in cooperation with the Greeks.[125]
>
> The French... urged that action be taken as speedily as possible in order that their troops might be relieved from the pressure from the Turks in Cilicia.[126]

So, here we note that Venizelos rather than acting as a sole force, and being only authorised, already received the practical support of both France and Britain, that is active military support. The plan of attack was in fact prepared by both Greeks and General Milne, Commander of the Allies Forces (see chapter 6 for details). Venizelos, moreover, was not acting to assist the French, as we should see in chapter five onwards, he was acting in concert with the French and Armenians, and also other forces to attack Mustafa Kemal from all sides. The idea, or the aim, was very simple and clear: The offensive by the Greeks in the early Summer of 1920, just as by their allies, was to grab all territories as were to be codified at Sèvres (August 1920). Prior to the Greek attack, and this is what Mango fails to tell us clearly, and which is vital: at San Remo in April 1920, the Allies had agreed the carving up of

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[121] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* Allen Lane; London; 1973, p. 125.
[122] Ibid; pp. 121-23.
[123] Ibid; p. 125.
[124] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 281.
[125] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, 1920-1922; in *Int. J. Middle East Stud.* 10 (1979), 553-565; at p. 555.
[126] D.Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* London; 1931; p. 255·

Turkey (up to 85% of its territory,)[127] and it was at San Remo that the Greeks were given the OK to launch the offensive against the Turks. Thus their action was not in response to Turkish threat on İzmit as Mango and others tell us, it was the cause and preceded such Turkish threat on Izmit. The time between San Remo and Sèvres was to implement on the ground what was meant to be codified at Sèvres months later in August. If you put Sèvres after the military events, it is difficult to see the relation between events, which is what Mango does. If on the other hand, as Kinross does, the articles of San Remo (which are those of Sèvres) are explained first and the Greek action after that is described, it all becomes clear:

> It was [Kinross says] an early product of that circus of allied conferences which, with continuous rounds of entertainment, followed the signature of the treaty of Versailles. The final draft of the Turkish peace terms was agreed by the Supreme Council at San Remo in a sumptuous villa. It amounted, as Kemal had long foreseen, to the end of the Ottoman Empire and its break-up into a series of small states and foreign spheres of interest. All that was to remain of Turkey was a rump of an inland state, with most of its outlets to the sea under foreign control, and its sovereignty reduced to a shadow..... By an additional Tripartite Agreement, much of the rest of Anatolia was partitioned into French and Italian zones on the lines of the original secret treaties. Turkey's finances would be wholly directed by the Allies. The Turkish army would be reduced to a token force under Allied supervision, while a limited Turkish gendarmerie would be officered by foreigners... The party thus moved across the Channel, and at a more formal conference in the agreeable Villa Belle at Boulogne, with tea-parties at the Pré Catelan and a fête at the Casino, the Supreme Council authorized a Greek advance from Smyrna. It began on 22nd June with the crossing at four points of the Milne Line, which had been laid down in Paris as the limit of demarcation between Greeks and Turks. It was a further violation of the Armistice which Kemal compared to the German invasion of Belgium.[128]

Not only does Kinross clarify the whole issue, he shows that the Allies were in full backing of Venizelos, and that the partition of Turkey was already agreed; and now, all that Greece was doing was to make it a fait accompli before Sèvres.

Moreover Mango, just as most Western historians, is distorting facts when he presents the situation as if the Italians and the French were against the dismemberment of Turkey. How could he and they reconcile this claim with the fact that the French and Italians were at both San Remo and Sevres and played leading parts in the carving up of Turkey? The French and Italians, as chapter seven of this work will show, only became favourable to the Nationalist Turks when:

-Venizelos, their ally, lost the Premiership, and their enemy, King Constantine, took power in Greece after the November 1920 elections.

-The Nationalists proved their military worth in defending Turkey, especially after the victory at Sakarya. It was only after that victory that both French and Italians signed accords with Mustafa Kemal.

Now we pick another scholar, Helmreich, who literally shows some of the best skills at confusing the picture of how the allies misled the Turks to sign the treaty of Mudros (October 1918), offering them an honourable peace in order to detach them from the Germans, and then implement what they already had in mind: dismember/partition Turkey.[129] Let's look at some of his claims:

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[127] *Current History*, vol 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Terms of the Final Peace Treaty of the World War — Effects on the Map of Asia Minor p. 446.

[128] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 231-2.

[129] P.C. Helmreich: *From Paris to Sevres;* Ohio State University Press; Columbia; 1974; pp. 3 ff.

> 'WHEN the Paris Peace Conference convened on January 12, 1919, there was little real agreement among the Allied and Associated Powers on the specific demands that would be made on the defeated nations. In fact, even within the national delegations little concord existed as to policy or plans. On no question was this vagueness of policy more complete than that of the disposition of the Ottoman Empire.'[130]
>
> 'The circumstances surrounding the signing of the armistice intensified France's distrust of British intentions in the Near East, yet the terms themselves failed to provide any guidelines for an ultimate solution. This is not to say that such guidelines did not exist. Their very profusion and seeming contradictions served more to complicate and confuse the issue than to cast any light upon it. The fate of the outwardly "sick" Ottoman Empire had been the source of European diplomatic negotiation and intrigue for much of the nineteenth century. It was hardly surprising that settlement of the "Eastern Question" had been the topic of many statements and agreements, both public and secret, by the Allied powers during the course of the war.'[131]

Then he goes on to sum up these various agreements with not a mention of any partitioning of Turkey. Somehow he makes it appear that the whole matter regarding Turkey was decided in the wake of the Armistice by otherwise divided Western powers seeking to come to some sort of agreement over the Ottoman realm, always seeking the best out of complex situations, and always paying the greatest care and attachment to universal principles.

In truth, contrary to what Helmreich says, the Turkish issue, i.e. partition, was resolved long before, at the latest at the start of the First World War if not even earlier, and that the whole matter of subsequent agreements, meetings, contacts, treaties, or whatever, were only occasions to codify what had been agreed and alter things according to new developments, primarily the Bolshevik Revolution, which put Russia out of the partition act. This matter will be looked at in the second chapter in great detail. Here, contrary to what he says, the plans devised by the allies between 1915 and 1916 envisaged that besides an independent Arabia and Armenia there should be an independent Turkish state in a portion of Asia Minor, and with its capital at Ankara or Bursa.[132] The Sykes-Picot agreement, which he refers to but only applies to its Arab aspect (whilst his book is on Turkey), had already taken from Turkey the major part of its territory, limiting the Turkish state to a few provinces in Anatolia, with much reduced access to the Black Sea coast.

If Helmreich and historians holding the same views were right, that is that the Allies had no pre-plans to dismember Turkey, then many actions by the Allies become entirely incomprehensible and fit no logic. If their intention was not to dismember Turkey, the Allies would have never allowed the Greeks to land in May 1919 in İzmir; and never would the Allies have allowed the Greeks to advance in June 1920. In the same vein, the Sèvres treaty would have never been an utter replica of what was already agreed in 1915-1916. If the aim was to deal with Turkey through the power of diplomacy after the war, the French and the Armenians would have never attacked Turkey as they did, nor would have the Greeks been armed, and countless other acts to be seen in chapter five.

Looking at the issue from another angle also confirms the dismemberment logic. Everything that happened after the Armistice, whether the quiet and sustained disarmament of Turkey, the disbanding of the armies, the arrests of many officers, the pressures on the puppet Istanbul government to carry out policies aimed at removing all forms of opposition to Allies' policies, and every single other policy, demonstrate the slow but resolute march towards

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[130] Ibid; p. 3.
[131] Ibid; p. 5.
[132] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 139.

disarming and gradually grinding at Turkey's vitality until it could be broken piece by piece without any resistance.

Should we, even, take our eyes and minds out of all this, and look at history in its ensemble, we will see a clear, simple, picture: The West had, and for nearly a century, if not longer, one aim and one aim alone: the carving up of Turkey. This project is found not in most, not in the majority, but in all thoughts, plans, projects, ideas, literature, fiction, historical books, agreements (secret or otherwise,) treaties, projects, everything that was planned or devised or thought by the West towards Turkey.[133] There is not one single piece of evidence to show the opposite. And for those who want one further piece of enlightenment, had the coup of 15 July 2016 succeeded, Turkey would have lost a third of its present territory, and not just in the south east. Dare anyone contradict this claim and the claim that: plans for dismembering Turkey have not disappeared from the agenda.

We look at the matter from another historical perspective: the dismemberment of Turkey does not date from 1920 but from around late in the 18th century. From the early 19th Century, the Ottoman realm was emasculated piece by piece until on the eve of the First World War there remained only Turkey as we know it today. That final block of land was further, and in theory, cut to pieces and its morsels shared out between late 1914 and early 1917. It was only the victories at Gallipoli, Sakarya, and Dumlupinar that foiled this project.

The fact is: All the West had for Turkey was its suppression off the map, simple. Turkey was accepted only once the Turks had reached İzmir in September 1922. Once the Greeks failed, there was nothing to oppose the Turks with. The Turks, by then, had already defeated the French; the Russians were out of the game; the Italians were bogged down in Libya; and Britain would have had to face the Turks alone. Risking a fight with the Turks when they faced troubles in Ireland, war against the Bolsheviks, the Arabs in rebellion, and simmering trouble in Persia and India, the British, realistically, accepted that the game was up. The survival of Turkey therefore owed to Turks alone, and to nobody else.

The thing that spoilt the big Western Idea was that some formidable Turks anticipated their dishonesty after the Mudros Treaty. Had Mustafa Kemal and others such as Karabekir not anticipated the Allies' schemes and not prepared, and had they allowed the allies to proceed as they were, there would be no Turkey today. The Allies were only doing the same thing as they did in Varna centuries before: They signed a peace treaty, and then they prepared to phase out Turkey. The Allies were using the same trick with the Arabs. The difference: Mustafa Kemal understood the trick. The Shereef of Makkah did not. This is the reason why Mustafa Kemal succeeded, whilst the Shereef failed and was only shocked by Western duplicity. The difference between the two: Mustafa Kemal was a brilliant mind, with immense intellect, a man who devoured books, a man with a huge abstract universe in his head. The other was just an ignorant sod with power who never touched a book.

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[133] Such as: E. Freeman: *The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline*; MacMillan; 1877.
A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917.
E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a la paix de Sevres;* Librairie Felix Alcan; 8th ed; 1920.

Two

UNDERSTANDING THE DECISIVENESS OF THE VICTORIES

The reason why Muslim scholars, just as other elites (politicians, journalists, artists….), with rare exceptions, fail to understand anything in respect to any issue of value or interest (including our subject) (or even issues dating from 2016-2017, and after,) and fail to come out with anything logical, constructive or coherent, or long term, and fail to have any world view on any matter, is because they know nothing of history. They just rush to the immediate to try to explain or deal with what has centuries old foundations. Their writing, reasoning, actions, views, policies have failed, fail, and will fail, for they lack the immense light that history alone provides.

So, here, and whilst it would seem to many that this chapter is an unnecessary delving into a distant past that might be of interest to read, but of no relation with our subject, let's tell them that they are wrong. It is impossible to appreciate how decisive the victories looked at here were, and their place in Turkish history without understanding the historical background to them. Any approach that deals too narrowly with these victories, without looking at the bigger picture in terms of space and time, will fail to capture the real impact they had on Turkish history, or on the very fate of Turkey itself and its people. Of course, if these victories were looked at from a purely military aspect, only a brief historical introduction and some short section on the art of war or military warfare, or Turkish military experience, would be enough. This work, however, as already stated, is not concerned with the military aspect as a priority. The military aspect of these victories will have its place but will not be dealt with as a matter of pre-eminence. Anyone interested in this needs to consult the best sources on the subject or any subject to do with Turkish military experience: E.J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar.[134] This work looks indeed at the wider historical background, going at least a century back in regard to some issues, and centuries even further back in relation to others, in order to explain how decisive these victories were for the fate of Turkey and the Turkish people.

Surely, most people reading through this would already be asking: why is the claim made that such victories were decisive for the survival of Turkey as a nation, and the Turks as a people? The answer will be given in great detail in the final heading of this chapter, but expressed briefly here: Had the Turks lost these battles, there would be no Turkey today.
Which leads to the next query: Why would the existence of Turkey be threatened in its very existence by the loss of such battles, for Turkey lost the wars with Russia in the

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[134] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Ataturk*; ABC and Clio, Santa Barbara, California, 2009. See also E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli, the Ottoman Campaign;* Pen & Sword, Military; Barnsley, UK, 2010. -Idem: *Defeat in Detail*; Praeger; London; 2003.

late 1870s, lost the Balkan Wars in 1912-13, the First World War in 1914-1918, and many other battles and wars and has survived? At first sight, this makes the claim of the title of this book and the previous lines look rather silly at best. The answer again will be given in this chapter and also the specific chapters devoted to each battle which will explain that Turkey could afford losing all it lost except what it won: Gallipoli (1915), Sakarya (1921), and Dumlupinar (1922).

The latter claim in turn would make the reader ask, 'Why these and not others?' This again will be dealt with by showing that these were the battles Turkey could not afford to lose like others, for these were battles for survival.

But what supports the claim that had Turkey lost these battles it would have been phased out of existence, nation, and people? This is what this chapter will dwell on at great length. Briefly here, Turkey was earmarked for removal both as a country, and its people, too. This seems a very extreme claim, indeed; yet as will be shown here, of all countries worldwide, Turkey was the one meant to be phased out, erased out of existence, through a dismemberment/carving up/partitioning policy that would grant its different geographical parts to various claimants or interested parties.

This policy had (and still has) a long history as looked at in this chapter, dating from as early as the 17th century, taking a coherent shape in the 18th century, as the first plans for dismemberment were put forth; then its implementation on the ground began early in the 19th century. On the last point, already, in July 1807, at their meeting at Tilsit, Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I agreed the partitioning of the Ottoman Realm.[135] Then, throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman realm was dismembered piece by piece. Following the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the carving of nearly all what was left of European Turkey, by the eve of the First World War, the turn of Turkey proper, as we know it today, had arrived. Once the old source of squabbles between Russia and the West, that is Istanbul, had been resolved, and that the West had at last agreed to cede it and the control of strategic waterways to Russia in late 1914, there was nothing left to stand in front of the removal of Turkey off the map. Agreement for that was reached in early 1915 as will be shown in ample details in subsequent chapters. Except for one thing and one thing alone that saved Turkey during and after the war: the resistance and resilience of its people, helped it must be said by one of the most decisive moments in history: the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Had the Turks lost at Gallipoli in 1915 whilst Russians and Westerners were still allies, Turkey would have been phased out of existence right then, in 1915. Had the Bolshevik Revolution not happened, the Russians and their Western allies would have finished off Turkey instead of entering into conflict as they eventually did. Had the Turks allowed the post Armistice conditions (following the war in 1918) to proceed peacefully; had they failed to take up arms; had they allowed the Allies to dismantle their fighting capacities as was proceeding; had they failed to repulse the French and Armenian attacks in 1919 and 1920; had they not been able to fight the Greeks, the only operational army that could conquer Turkey at the time; and had it not been for the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Turkish lives and the

[135] W. Miller: *The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913*; Cambridge University Press; 1913, pp. 38-9.

leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and men such as Kâzim Karabekir, Fevzi, İsmet, Nur Ettin, and the many other commanders who will be cited further on, there would be no Turkey today. The Allies San Remo agreement of April 1920 declared that Turkey was to be amputated of over 85% of its territory, and its population to be cut by 16 millions (out of roughly 20 millions) to just around 4 millions.[136] It was as simple as that, and this is precisely what any person setting aside the combined nonsense/distortions promoted by the vast conglomerate of Western scholarship of today (and their followers: Turks and others), and instead looking at history and its facts would discover simply, clearly, plentifully, and well-evidenced.

In order to understand the whole matter, it is crucial to first understand the fundamental reasons for the quest for the removal of the Turk and then proceed from there. As things stood around the time of the First World War, reasons for the removal of Turks and Turkey could be summed up as this:
-The centuries-old hostility of the Turk, the perennial enemy.
-Rewarding the various allies fighting together in the First World War with territorial concessions at the expenses of the Turks.
-Rewarding the old and faithful Armenian ally with large territorial grants.
-Obtaining great strategic, financial and economic gains from the capture of important zones of influence formerly parts of the Ottoman realm.
-Gaining revenge over the old Ottoman foe that had humiliated Christendom for centuries in the field of battle, now at last broken; and hence smothering life out of it for eternity.

Let's look at the historical foundations of these points just made to explain their rationale, for without this historical journey nothing in the Western attitude towards the Turks whether in 1918, or 2018, can be understood.

1. The Very Long War on, and, the Turk: 14th-16th Centuries

The Turk, the Ottoman Turk that is, was the main reason why it took Western Christendom centuries before it subdued the Muslim world in the 19th century. Today, in 2017-2018, the thought or suggestion of a Western physical/colonial control of the Muslim world would bring at best expressions of derision from everyone, including historians. The Muslim world in our day can be made to sing the right tune from any distance. Not so much the case a century ago. In the generalised amnesia induced by modern scholarship, it is easy to forget that not so long ago, virtually the whole Muslim world was under Western military dictate. Attempts at bringing such a Muslim world under Western domination did not date from the 19th century but went back to the medieval times and continued unabated throughout the centuries. This will be touched on briefly further down to highlight the issue. Here, in short: Had it not

[136] *Current History,* vol 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Terms of the Final Peace Treaty of the World War — Effects on the Map of Asia Minor p. 446; for the entire plan see whole article pp. 445-448.

been for the Ottomans, the only military power of Islam for many centuries, the Muslim world would have been long occupied, torn apart, and its people, most certainly subdued at best, mass removed at worst, unless they were able to successfully amalgamate within Christian society through religious conversion or Jewish-like assimilation. It is this vital role played by the Ottomans that cost Turkey the perennial ire. As Toynbee notes:

> In fact, the Turks have not only had the discipline of "self-help." As depositaries of the Caliphate and as the only even quasi-independent Power surviving in the Middle Eastern world, they have been looked up to by the other members of Middle Eastern society, and have had to shoulder some part of their burden in addition to their own immoderate load. This ordeal of acting as bulwarks against Western aggression might have been preferable to being made, like the Greeks, into protégés of the Western intelligentsia, if their Western adversaries had shown chivalry or had even played fair. But unhappily the record of the West in its dealings with Turkey has been not only ungenerous but unscrupulous.[137]

Looking at the Western-Islamic ten-century old conflict is not the object of this work. The hundreds of battles fought by the two faiths are not of interest here, except that their endlessness, their violence, destructiveness, and bitterness highlight the nature of the conflict: a war to the finish. Who is at fault, or noble, fair or criminal, when, where, and why what happened- happened, and whether there is a chance for peace one day between the two great faiths are also issues which are not of interest in this work, although they remain of immense interest and need to be studied separately, as there might be a solution, with a bit of good will and Western refrain from meddling in Muslim business.

What matters under this heading are two major issues:

- The rise of the Ottoman Turks, by a historical coincidence of the first order, occurred precisely at the time when the power of the Muslim world had all but gone.
- The rise of Ottoman power also took place precisely when the Christian West began devising a new round of decisive crusades against the Muslim world.

Although the Crusades of 1095-1291 had ended in Muslim victory, the period stretching from the late 13th through to the 14th century, coinciding with the rise of the Ottomans, was marked by such a sharp decline of the Muslim world that its very survival was in doubt. In the East, the Muslims evicted the Crusaders in 1291, but it was at considerable cost. Islamic civilisation and power, dominant between the 8th and 12th centuries, totally collapsed in the wake of the Crusade (1095-1291) and Mongol (13th century) invasions.[138] It ought to be reminded here that the Mongols descended on, and devastated the world of Islam in two major invasions: 1219-1222 (under

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[137] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922; p. 352.

[138] J.A. Brundage: *The Crusades*; The Marquette University Press; 1962. A note from R.A. Rotz on J.J. Saunders: *A History of Medieval Islam*; Routledge; London; 1965. T.A. Archer: *The Crusades*; T. Fisher Unwin; London; 1894.

Genghis Khan), and in 1258 and after (under Hulagu and his successors.)[139] The Mongols and Crusaders were allies in the vast scheme aimed at the entire removal of Islam and its adherents.[140] Under Mamluk aegis, most particularly the leadership of Baybars (Sultan 1260-1277), the Muslims managed to beat both foes and their other Christian allies (Maronites, Armenians, and Georgians).[141] The cost of victory and two centuries of warfare was, however, gigantic — on such a scale that some regions have remained in a state of decay to this day.[142] It is highly probable that at least between six and eight million Muslims perished as a result of the Crusades and the 13th century Mongol onslaughts, whilst, at the same time, all forms of scholarship and manifestations of civilisation were extinguished.[143]

In the west, in Muslim Spain, following the collapse of Almohad power in the 13th century, the country fell into chaos and civil wars. Seizing their opportunity, the Christians launched a vast offensive, which netted them nearly the whole of the country. When in 1248, Seville, the Muslim capital, fell, it signalled the end of Muslim Spain. Only the Grenada enclave remained in Muslim hands.[144] The Spanish 're-conquest,' just like the Crusades in the East, was particularly vicious and bloody, and ended in the mass removal of Muslims.[145] Whenever Muslims survived mass slaying, it was only to find themselves mass-enslaved.[146] Gradually, the faith of Islam was wiped out by ever increasing and more severe regulations and measures.[147] By the time of the Grenada Wars (1482-1492), with the exception of that enclave,

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[139] Baron G. d'Ohsson: *Histoire des Mongols*; 3 vols; La Haye et Amsterdam; 1834. J. Curtin: *The Mongols; A History*; Greenwood Press Publishers; Westport; 1907. Ibn al-Athir: *Kitab al-Kamil*; ed., K.J. Tornberg; 12 vols; Leiden; 1851-72.

[140] L. Hambis: Saint Louis et les Mongols; in *JRAS*; 1970; pp. 25-33. P. Pelliot: *Mongols and Popes;13th 14th Centuries;* Paris; 1922. P. Pelliot: Les Mongols et la Papaute; in *Revue d'Orient Chretien*; 1923-1924; and 1931-2. Also see contemporaries (envoys and ambassadors to Mongols, in the building of Christian Mongol alliance): Hayton and Carpini: J. Hayton: La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient, in *Receuil des Historiens des Croisades Armeniens*; vol ii; Paris; 1906; pp. 111-253. Hayton: *Histoire Orientale ou des Tartares;* tr., by N. Falcon: in *Receuil des divers voyages curieux faits en Tartarie, en Perse et ailleurs*; ed., by M. Molther; 1829. John of Plano Carpini: *History of the Mongols*; IV; tr., by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey in *The Mongol Mission,* C. Lawson; New York; Sheed and Ward; 1955. See for excellent accounts on this: R. Grousset: *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem;* Paris; 1934-5.

[141] Abu al-Fadail: *Tarikh al-Mansuri* in *Bibliotheca Arabo-Sicula*; Second Appendix; Leipzig; 1887. Ibn Abd al-Zahir: *Al-Rawd al-Zahir fi Sirat al-Malik al-Zahir* (Rawd); ed., A.A. Khuwayter; Riyadh; 1976. Partial ed., and tr. F. Sadeque: *Baybars I of Egypt*; Dacca; 1956. Abu'l Fida (Abul Feda and other spellings): *Al-Mukhtassar fi Akhbar al-Bashar* (Annales); in *Receuil des Historiens Des Croisades; Historiens Orientaux* (RHC Or); Paris; 1841 ff. vol 1; pp. 1-186.
A.A. Khowaiter, *Baibars the First;* The Green Mountain Press; London, 1978.

[142] See A. Watson: *Agricultural Innovation in the Early Islamic World*; Cambridge University Press; 1983; Chapter twenty Five: Agriculture in retreat.

[143] The figure on population decline can be reached by adding estimates of losses found in the many sources: J. Glubb: *A Short History of the Arab Peoples*; Hodder and Stoughton, 1969; p. 213. J.J. Saunders: *Aspects of the Crusades*; University of Canterbury Publishing; Canterbury; 1962; Y. Courbage, P. Fargues: *Chretiens et Juifs dans l'Islam Arabe et Turc*, Payot, Paris, 1997; S. Runciman: *A History of the Crusades*, Cambridge University Press, 1962.

[144] Felipe Fernandez Armesto: *Before Columbus;* Macmillan Education; London, 1987; p.52.

[145] J.F. O'Callaghan: The Mujedars of Castile and Portugal in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in J.M. Powell, ed., *Muslims Under Latin Rule, 1100-1300,* Princeton University Press, 1990; pp. 11-56; at p.15.

[146] A. Thomson; M.A. Rahim: *Islam in Andalus* Taha Publishers; London; 1996; p. 107. N. Daniel: *The Arabs and Medieval Europe*; Longman Librarie du Liban; 1975. T. Glick: *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1979; p. 100.

[147] E. Lourie: Anatomy of Ambivalence: Muslims under the crown of Aragon in the late thirteenth century, in E. Lourie, *Crusade and Colonisation, Muslims, Christians and Jews in Medieval Aragon*, Variorum, Aldershot, 1990.
T.B. Irving: Dates, Names and Places: The End of Islamic Spain; in *Revue d'Histoire Maghrebine;* No 61-62; 1991; pp. 77-93.

everywhere the status of Muslims had deteriorated to such a point that there could no longer be spoken of a compact Muslim entity.[148]
Muslim North Africa was likewise in a moribund condition. In the mid 13th century the Almohad Empire fell to pieces.[149] In its place there arose three separate mini-powers: the Merinids of Morocco; the Ziyanids of western Algeria; and the Hafsids of eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania.[150] The story of these dynasties was incessant warfare between petty rulers, and between members of the dynasties.[151]
While the Maghrib was destroying itself, Aragon, Castile and Portugal, assisted by the Italian city states, gained in economic and military strength.[152] The Maghrebi civil wars, more importantly, encouraged Christian Crusading against them, and soon plans for the sharing out of the North African lands were made and soon were being carried out by the leading Spanish and other Christian dynasties.[153]
Arabia, that is the Peninsula now mostly under Mamluk rule based in Egypt, had lost all but few remnants of visible power. Local princes in many places were only strong enough to fight each other, which they constantly did, but very much unable to oppose any invader.
At the dawn of the 14th century, as Christian military power was about to overtake that of Islam, it seemed that all that was necessary, from a Christian point of view, was to deal a blow to the tottering Mamluk state in Egypt, remove the moribund dynasties of North Africa, and thus accomplish the final overthrow of Islam.

For the purpose of final overthrow of Islam, a comprehensive strategy was put in place, and was amply legitimised. In Christian minds, for centuries already, the overthrow of Islam was justified on the ground that Muslims had not only usurped Christian lands, but were also blasphemous, idolater pagans, who required the heavy hand of Christianity.[154] Oldratus de Ponte (d. 1335) summed up the Western attitude to Muslims:

> Muslims are by nature uncivilized and therefore deserve conquest, not only on religious grounds but also because of their barbarous way of life.[155]

The 'Recovery of Holy Land' lost in 1291 was the focus of the top hierarchies in the West, whether amongst monarchs, popes or men of letters who served them. In Thaddeo of Naples' *Hystoria de Desolacione et Conculcacione*….,[156] one of the many

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[148] H.C. Lea: Moriscos of Spain; S. Lane-Poole: *The Moors in Spain;* Fisher Unwin; London; 1888. S.P. Scott: *History of the Moorish Empire*; in 3 vols; The John Lippincott Company; Philadelphia; 1904.
[149] K.M. Setton: Crusade of Barbary and Nicopolis; in *Papacy and the Levant;* The American Philosophical Society; Philadelphia; 1976; vol 1; pp. 327-69; p. 330.
[150] Ibid.
[151] A. Laroui: *The History of the Maghrib*; Princeton University Press; New Jersey; 1977; p. 205. H.W. Hazard: Moslem North Africa; in K.M. Setton ed: *A History of the Crusades*; The University of Wisconsin Press; 1975; vol 3; pp. 457-85; p. 479.
[152] Ibid, p. 232.
[153] C.H. Bishko: The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492; in *A History of the Crusades*; K.M. Setton ed; vol 3; pp. 396-456; at p. 434; Ch. E. Dufourcq: Un Projet Castillan du XIIIe siècle: La Croisade d'Afrique, *Revue D'Histoire et de Civilisation du Maghreb*, I (1966), pp. 26-51.
[154] See N. Daniel: *The Arabs and Medieval Europe*; Longman Librarie du Liban; 1975.
[155] In J. Muldoon: *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels*; University of Pennsylvania Press; 1979; p. 19.
[156] Thaddeo of Naples: *Hystoria de Desolacione et Conculcacione... Terre Sancte* in AD MCCXCI; edited by Comte Riant; Geneva; 1873. See also A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages;* Methuen & Co Ltd; London; 1938.

published pamphlets of the time, the author exhorted the Pope as 'Vicar of Christ among nations to eradicate paganism and redress the injury to the Saviour that his name may be honoured throughout the world.'[157] It also exhorted all the faithful to 'avenge the bloodshed of Christians on Eastern soil and by force of arms to save the Holy Land which is our heritage.'[158]

Strategies for the accomplishment of this abounded. Ramon Lull (d. 1315), for instance, stated that when the recovery of Spain from the Muslims was complete, it would be necessary to carry the war beyond the Strait of Gibraltar to the other side.[159] He suggested that the Crusade should expel the Muslims from Spain, then cross into Africa and move along the coast to Tunis, and so to Egypt, and bring back that land to the Christian fold.[160]

A great number of strategists working with or on behalf of the Papacy came with an abundant literature and ideas which all converged towards the same conclusions. In the works of Fidenzio of Padua, *Liber recuperationis terrae sanctae,*[161] Hayton's *Flor,*[162] Burcard's *Directorium ad Philippum Regem,*[163] Pierre Dubois's *De Recuperatione Terrae Sancte,*[164] William of Adam's *Directorium ad Philippum Regem,*[165] and the countless others written around the early 14th century and serving as guides to the new Christian strategy to vanquish Islam once and for all, the main ideas were: to destroy Islam's economies, strengthen alliances with Islam's eastern Christian-Mongol foes, and launch various armies through Asia Minor in order to recapture the Holy Sites.[166]

It just happened that by then, there stood a new Islamic foe that had arisen out of the unexpected: the Ottomans. Needless to go here into the history of the Ottomans, their rise and so on, as this has been very well dealt with by the likes of Kafadar and Inalcik in particular.[167] It happened that the Ottomans not only came forth suddenly, they managed to crush the two great Crusades of Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444), which were aiming precisely at carrying out the vast schemes of 'Recovery of the Holy Places,' and, en passant, destroying the Greek Orthodox 'heresy.'[168]

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[157] Thaddeo of Naples: *Hystoria;* 64-5.
[158] Ibid; 65-6.
[159] Cited in D. Abulafia: *Spain and 1492*; London; 1992; p. 69.
[160] S. Runciman: *A History of the Crusades*, in 3 vols; Cambridge University Press, 1962; vol 3; p. 431.
[161] Fidenzio of Padua: '*Liber Recuperationis Terrae Sanctae,*' Edition G. Golubovich: Bibliotheca Bio-Bibliografica Della Terra Santa; 5 vols; Florence; 1906-27; Vol II; 9 et seq..
[162] *La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient*, op cit; N. Housley: *The Later Crusades*; op cit; p. 25.
[163] See French translation by J. Mielot of Lille; B.N. fr. 5593 and 9087. Baron de Reiffenberg edition of Burcard Directorium in *Monuments Pour Servir a l'Histoire des Provinces de Namur, de Hainaut et le Luxembourg*; vol iv; pp. 227-312;
[164] P. Dubois: *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae,* ed., V. Langlois; in Collection de texts pour servir a l'etude de l'enseignement de l'histoire; Paris; 1891. P. Dubois: *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae,* ed. Angelo Diotti (Testi medievali di interesse dantesco, I; Florence, 1977).
[165] See French translation by J. Mielot of Lille; B.N. fr. 5593 and 9087.
[166] For the best on this issue, nothing better than N. Housley, N. Housley: *The Later Crusades*; Oxford University Press; 1992. N. Housley: *Documents on the Later Crusades; 1274-1580*; Macmillan Press Ltd; London; 1996.
See also A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*; Methuen & Co. Ltd; London; 1938.
[167] H. Inalcik: *The Ottoman Empire*; Phoenix Press; 1973. C. Kafadar: *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995.
[168] A.S. Atiya: *The Crusade of Nicopolis;* Methuen & co. Ltd; London; 1934. J. Delaville Le Roulx: *La France en Orient au XIV em Siecle;* Ernest Thorin Editor, Paris; 1886. N. Jorga: *Philippe Mezieres (1327-1403) et la croisade au XIVem siecle*;

It soon became obvious that the Turk was not only the principal foe to be removed, his removal was also out of necessity as he stood in the geographical space that needed to be crossed by invading armies on their way to Jerusalem, that is Asia Minor. Removing the Turk also resolved the major Christian headache of the time: removing the Greek Orthodox 'heresy.' Crusading against the Turks thus also became a means to try and bring the Eastern (Byzantine/Greek-Orthodox,) Church within Catholic sway.[169] The two aims of removing Turk and Greek 'heresy' became combined into one: eliminate the one in order to eliminate the other, or the elimination of the one leads to the elimination of the other.

This vast project would necessitate and unite Western Christendom in acting in one block. Jean Germain (in 1451) addressing the French King Charles VII, said that:

> We should bear in mind that through God's direction everybody is starting to lay a hand to this holy work. In addition to the Lord of Acre in Syria, whom I mentioned above, 200,000 fighters in Armenia have offered to serve the Christians in this matter; and 50,000 Georgians are just waiting for the Christian army to appear. Then there are the Hungarian and Polish forces, under the leadership of Count John [Hunyadi] the White, called the voivode, who are all eager to push back the Turk... So all agree that with the mobilised help of [all] Christendom, they will chase [the Turks] shamefully out of Greece....[170]

Once the Turks had been pushed out of Europe, Jean Germain continued, this would be followed by the recovery of Asia Minor, Lesser Armenia, and the lordship of Antioch and Tripoli, and thus the overland route to Jerusalem would be opened.[171] But it would not end there, as Germain insisted:

> And so it will follow, Most Christian Prince, that you will be the cause of the restarting of the old voyages and passages overseas which we call 'crusades'... Following your example, the other princes of Christendom will endeavour to render it aid and support in the East and elsewhere. God willing, they will recover Granada and Africa.[172]

And this is precisely what occurred on the ground except that now the Ottomans had become involved in the matters of such vast scheme, i.e. spoiling it.

In the wake of their victory over Muslims in Iberia itself and in pursuit of the vast project of Christianisation of the whole world, beginning with North Africa, the two Iberians countries, Spain and Portugal, the then leading Christian powers, began to share out the Maghrib. The Portuguese were first on the scene, throughout the 15th

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Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes. Fasc 110. Paris; 1896. S.J. Joseph Gill: *Byzantium and the Papacy 1198-1400*; Rutgers University Press; New Jersey; 1979. L. Bellaguet, ed: *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, Contenant le Règne de Charles VI, de 1380 a 1422,* Paris, 1839. M. Chasin: The Crusade of Varna; in K. M. Setton ed., *A History of the Crusade*; vol 6; pp. 276-310. T.V. Tuleja: Eugenius IV and the Crusade of Varna: *The Catholic Historical Review*; Vol xxxv; 1949; pp. 257-73.

[169] See also Doukas: *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*; Wayne State University Press; 1975.

[170] In C. Schefer (ed.), 'Le Discours; in N. Housley: *Documents on the Later Crusades; 1274-1580;* Macmillan Press Ltd; London; 1996, p. 141.

[171] Ibid; p. 142.

[172] Ibid.

century bringing under Christian sway the towns of Ceuta, Tangiers, Arzila, and many others to the south on the Atlantic Coast.[173] Following their capture of Grenada in 1492, the Spaniards followed in the carving up and Christianisation of the eastern Maghrib (Algeria, Tunisia and Libya).[174] The Spaniards took Melila (1497), Mers el-Kebir (1505), seized Wahran (Oran) in 1509, and Bejaia and Tripoli (both in 1510), and threatened Algiers.[175] When Algeria was on the verge of being overwhelmed by Spanish conquest, the Sheikhs of Algeria called for the Ottoman Turks to intervene.[176] The Barbarossa, who were already in the region since around 1504-5, acting subsequently with Sultan Selim I's support,[177] established their headquarters in the Algerian eastern town of Jijel and began the counter re-conquista in the Maghrib.[178]

In the East, early in the 16th century, following the Portuguese arrival in the Indian Ocean region, the Portuguese admiral, Albuquerque, began to implement his ambitious plan: to push through the Red Sea to Makkah and, after conquering the Muslim holy city, exchanging it for Jerusalem.[179] Albuquerque also dreamed of an alliance with the Christian king of Ethiopia, who had been identified as the real Prester John,[180] and even considered a grandiose scheme starving Egypt by diverting the Nile through Ethiopia to the Red Sea.[181] Egypt and the Holy Lands remained at the very centre of Portuguese strategic calculations throughout the early decades of the 16th century.[182] The Portuguese push, although bearing economic aims, had religious emphasis, with the Pope assigning it the task of encircling the world of Islam from the rear and helping restore Christianity in the Middle East and India while Spain did the same in the New World.[183] This scheme was thwarted by the Turkish Ottoman arrival in the region in 1517, during Selim I's rule. Mamluk Egypt by then was on its knees and could not offer any real opposition, and the Arab kingdoms were divided and

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[173] C. J. Bishko: The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, op cit; p. 448. E. Cat: *Petite Histoire*; op cit; p. 225.
[174] J.M. Abun Nasr: *A History of the Maghrib*; op cit; p. 162.
[175] J. Glubb: *A Short History of the Arab Peoples*; Hodder and Stoughton, 1969; p. 262.
[176] G. Fisher: *The Barbary Legend;* Oxford; 1957; p. 36.
[177] J. Glubb: *A Short History*; op cit; p. 262.
[178] E.H. Currey: *Sea Wolves of the Mediterranean*, New York, 1910. G. Fisher: *Barbary Legend*; Oxford, 1957.
C.F. Duro: *Armada Espanola desde la union de los reinos de Castilla y de Aragon; 1476-1664;* 4 vols, Madrid; 1895.
Ekrem Rechid: *La Vie de Khairredine Barberousse,* Paris, 1931. D. Haedo: *Topographia e Historia General de Argel,* Valladolid; 1612; new ed., by Y. Bauer y Laundauer; 3 vols; Madrid; 1927. Hajji Khalifa: *The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks*, tr. J Mitchell, London, 1831.
[179] *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso D'Albuquerque,* tr., from the Portuguese edition of 1774 by W. Birch (London: Hakluyt Society); (Burt Franklin Repr; New York, 1970), Vol. III, p. 37. H.V. Livermore, *A New History of Portugal* (Cambridge. 1967), p. 142.
[180] Christofer Bell in his *Portugal and the Quest of the Indies* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974) says (p. 154); Father Francisco Alvares, *The Prester John of the Indies, Being the Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Ethiopia in 1520,* trans. Lord Stanley (London: Hakluyt Society, 1881); revised ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1961). Also *Legatio David Aethiopiae Regis ... ad Clementem Papam VII,* Paris, Antonius Augerelius, c. 1531, which in the Bologna ed. of 1533 bears the name, Prester John, as author.
[181] O.W. F. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks* op. cit., p. 34. See also H. Morse Stephens on Albuquerque in *Rulers of India,* 1892; *Imperial Gazeteer of India* (Oxford, 1907/1908), Chapter 2.
[182] G. Casale: *The Ottoman Age of Exploration;* Oxford University Press; 2010; p. 33.
[183] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol 1; op cit; p. 99.

weak. There was no effective opposition to the Portuguese. The Ottoman arrival changed all that and secured the safety of the Holy Sites and the region.[184]

The Ottomans were hence not only blocking progress through the continent and Asia Minor defeating the various Crusading armies such as at Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444), they were also blocking progress elsewhere, and by the 16th century, it had thus become clear that one power held the lead in Islam, and should it be defeated, the balance of power worldwide could be shifted dramatically. It was, thus, quite understandable that the Western ire towards Islam became focused on the Turks in both deeds and rhetoric, and that the destruction of the Turkish enemy became a matter of priority. (By the way the same view remains engrained in many minds, and explains why the Turkish tilting towards Islamic rule in recent times is the greatest aberrations for some as it revives the old fears, and why the coup in 2016 was supported by about everyone in the West, and why Turkish explanations and reasoning today (by politicians, media and others), not based on this historical logic, is at best a waste of time for the concerned.) (Also, Westerners, unlike Muslims, not only understand history very well, they also do base the present on the past, and do put history induced terms before any others, including financial and other interests.)

2. Means and Necessity for the Destruction of the Empire of the Turks (17th-18th Centuries)

> The Near Eastern question may be defined as the problem of filling up the vacuum created by the gradual disappearance of the Turkish empire from Europe. Its history, therefore, may be said to begin at the moment when that empire, having attained its zenith, commenced to decline. The European dominions of Turkey reached their greatest extent in the latter half of the seventeenth century, when "the great Greek island" of Crete, as the modern Hellenes love to call it, at last surrendered to the Turkish forces, and the king of Poland ceded Podolia to the Sultan. But the close of that same century witnessed the shrinkage of the Turkish frontiers. The peace of Karlovitz in 1699 has been justly called "the first dismemberment of the Ottoman empire." It was the initial step in the historical process which has slowly but surely gone on ever since. The eighteenth century saw the continuation of the work begun at Karlovitz, though now and again the Turkish dominions gained some temporary advantage, and European statesmen anticipated the dismemberment of the Sultan's European possessions and formed schemes for the partition of the spoil.[185]

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[184] G. Casale: *The Ottoman Age of Exploration;* op cit; p. 32. A. Hamdani: Ottoman Response to the Discovery of America and the New Route to India; in *Journal of American Oriental Society*; Vol 101; 1981; pp. 323-330; at p. 327.
[185] W. Miller: *The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913*; Cambridge University Press; 1913, p. 1.

Already, at the peak of Ottoman power, in the 16th century, there emerged strongly a rhetoric that associated 'monstrous Turkish cruelties inflicted upon the Christians' with the need to wage war on the Turks. Arredondo's *Castillo inexpugnable defensorio de la fee* etc., written for Charles V (Emperor 1500-1558), captures the essence of this, its English title being:

> *Inexpugnable castle, defender of the faith and admirable discourse to conquer all enemies, both spiritual and corporal. A true account of marvellous things, both ancient and modern. An exhortation to pursue the Turk, and to conquer him, and to annihilate the sect of Muhammad, and every heresy, and to win back the Holy Land with Great and Joyous Triumph.*[186]

Ideas and plans for the destruction of the Ottoman realm gradually built up. The Frenchman Lucinge, writing early in the 17th century, advised:

> However, the "empire of the Turk cannot receive any damage or alteration by outward causes, it is necessary that inward causes, either separate or mixed, effect it." So that it would be easier to defeat it by an open force. The inward and mixed causes are defined as the defects that might enable the enemy to introduce tumults into the empire. These include the hatred, contempt and disobedience of the emperor's officers and servants…
>
> [Lucinge offers to ruin the empire by conspiring against it abroad and at home:] His (The Grand Turk) people must be provoked to rebellion, his great men and chief officers are to be gained.[187]

The plan of a new Crusade was drawn up by a French priest; a "sure means of destroying" the Ottoman Empire was also published by a French diplomat.[188]

The idea of fomenting trouble within the realm was particularly attractive. According to Knolles, writing later in the same 17th century, with all their power and might, the Ottomans are not invincible. They have weaknesses. One of them is that it is not easy to keep obedience of so many distinct nations some of which he assumes are discontented.[189] One of these nations was Greece; and Eton, writing in the 18th century, noted how the solution 'to the miserable condition' of the Greeks is very simple and profitable for Europe:

> Greece can no longer submit to the Turkish yoke; she pants for emancipation and already aspires to be ranked among the independent states of Europe. The rise or rather the renovation of her power will form an important era for European politics.[190]

He also says:

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[186] In J.S. Geary: Arredondo's Castillo inexpugnable de la fee: Anti Islamic propaganda in the Age of Charles V. Published on June 23; 1528 by Juan de Junta; in J.V Tolan ed., *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam*; Routledge; London; 1996; pp. 291-311; at pp. 293-4.

[187] R. de Lucinge: *The Beginning, Continuance and Decay of Estates;* tr. J. Finet; (London; 1606); in A. Cirakman: *From the Terror;* op cit; pp. 89-90.

[188] W. Miller: *The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913*; Cambridge University Press; 1913, p. 3.

[189] R. Knolles: *The General Historie of the Turks….*; (London; 1687-1700); p. 990.

[190] W. Eton: *A Survey of the Turkish Empire;* (London; 1798); p. 334.

> The expulsion of the Turks from Europe and the reestablishment of the Greek Empire, is more to the advantage of Britain than even of Russia itself; that so far from being a usurpation, it is an act of justice; and that according to the laws of nations, the Turks have not, by length of possession, acquired a right to domain of the countries they conquered.[191]

The removal of the Turks gradually became seen as a civilising act; this idea would become a central theme just prior to the final carving up of Turkey in 1915-1920. Back in the 18th century, Hunter stated that in the hands of the Ottomans, Turkey was 'a wasteland,' however,

> In the hands of a well-governed, civilised and enlightened people, Turkey would certainly be one of the most beautiful and productive countries in the world.[192]

In 1777, the French Count St Priest after arriving in Istanbul to assess the situation amongst the Turks, and prepare the eventual French carving up of the Ottoman Empire, concluded that:

> There was no administration, no financial resources, just restive populations, rebellious pachas, a disorderly army, the pride of the barbarian, the hunger of the savage, rulers made beastly by the harem culture, who learnt to rule by repression, ministers and generals mere animals picked from an ignorant mass, full of intrigues, adventurers and favourites put in power by the chance of circumstances, this is Turkey.[193]

About a decade or so before Count St Priest, other French diplomats had already noted the decay of the Ottoman realm and the great opportunities this offered. Three decades before the French invasion of Egypt, in 1798, the Duc de Choiseul, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a dispatch to Count de Vergennes in 1766, alluded to the decay of the Ottoman realm.[194] For the Duc of Choiseul the occupation of Egypt was the ideal form of compensation for the French losses in America and in India.[195]

It was at this juncture that opened the Question of the Orient, of an eventual sharing out of the Ottoman Empire. Wars against, and meddling in, the Ottoman/Turkish realm became the regular currency for much of the time from the late 18th century until (a pessimist/realist would say) today. The European powers' aim, Glubb notes, was not for the Ottoman Empire to be reformed but to be destroyed.[196] The French Count Massin, who had been in the service of Russia with the rank of Rear-Admiral, proposed around 1771 six secret different hypotheses, three of which concerning Turkey, upon which Austria and Russia might come to an agreement and find mutual advantages.[197] The two first stipulated an alliance intended to drive the Turks

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[191] Ibid; p. viii.
[192] W. Hunter: *Travels in the Year 1792*; (London; 1796); p. 394.
[193] G. Hanotaux: (vol 5 written by H. Deherain): *Histoire de la Nation Egyptienne*; (Paris; Librarie Plon; 1931); pp. 203-4.
[194] Ibid; p. 202.
[195] Ibid.
[196] J.B Glubb: *A Short History;* op cit; p. 251.
[197] A. Sorel: *The Eastern Question;* Howard Fertig; New York; 1969; p. 159.

definitely out of Europe; in this case the partition might be effected in two ways. First, Austria would take Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania, and Macedonia up to the Morea; the rest, with Istanbul and the Dardanelles, would be assigned to Russia.[198] Second, Macedonia, Albania, Roumelia, the greater part of the Archipelago with the seaward countries of Asia Minor, would form a kingdom which should have Constantinople as its capital, and its investiture should belong to Russia; Russia would keep for herself the greater part of the territories on the left bank of the Danube, the shores of the Black Sea — with the exception of the Crimea, which should remain independent under a Russian protectorate — and the two Kabardas; Austria would take Wallachia between the Danube and the Aluta, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Herzegovina; the Morea would form an independent State under an Austrian Archduke, or would be handed to Venice, which in that case would cede to Austria Istria and Fiiuli, and would form a league with the allies against the Ottomans.[199]

Voltaire in the later stages of the 18th century acted as a leading, tireless voice, just as De la Croix; Byron, Chateaubriand, and others, were to do in the following century, to urge such dismemberment. Following the Russian victory over the Turks in September 1769, courtesy of French intrigues,[200] Voltaire called the sovereigns of Europe to arms to march against the Ottomans 'for the glory of their crowns and the profit of their states.'[201] To Catherine II of Russia (1726-1796) he suggested:

> Your majesty should be beating the Turks towards Yassi or elsewhere, were I Emperor of the Romans, Bosnia and Servia would soon see me, and afterwards I would come and beg a dinner of you at Sophia, or at Phillipopolis in Romania; after which we would partition in friendly fashion.[202]

Voltaire did not hide his hatred of the Ottomans whom he described as 'tyrants of the women and enemies of arts'. These 'barbarian usurpers' must be chased out of Europe. He accused them of having destroyed 'Our ancient heritage from the Orient's Christian realm' and added:

> I wish fervently that the Turkish barbarians be chased away immediately out of the country of Xenophon, Socrates, Plato, Sophocles and Euripides. If we wanted, it could be done soon but seven crusades of superstition have been undertaken and a crusade of honor will never take place. We know almost no city built by them; they let decay the most beautiful establishments of Antiquity, they reign over ruins.[203]

Greece's 'recovery of its former land mass' was subject to particular attention. Already at the time, Tsar Peter the Great of Russia (1672-1725) told them of the

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[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid; p. 160.
[200] Beer; vol i., p. 256; in A. Sorel: *The Eastern*; op cit; p. 55.
[201] Voltaire in A. Sorel: *The Eastern*; op cit; p. 55.
[202] Voltaire to Catherine II, May 27, 1769.
[203] I. Karlsson: The Turk as a Threat and Europe's Other; in *International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy;* issue 1, 2006; pp. 62-72; at p. 66.

approaching restoration of the Byzantine Empire.[204] The accession of Catherine II subsequently revived Peter's Great Plans. Russian agents were sent to stir up the Greeks and Montenegrins into rebellion. War broke out in 1768, and a Russian fleet, largely officered by Englishmen, was despatched to the Peloponnese, received the submission of 18 islands in the Archipelago, and at one moment threatened Istanbul itself.[205] It was, however, decades later, around the end of the 18th century, that the idea of a restoration of the Byzantine Empire with Napoleon's aid became general among the Greeks; and, he, Napoleon, was regarded as 'a deliverer of the Hellenic race.'[206]

Whilst Turkey proper was still not entirely sorted out, by the late 18th century, however, as Sorel remarks, the future of the European and Christian provinces of the Ottoman realm, was a self-evident truth. Everyone was anxious 'to get rid of the Turks,' and all Western statesmen were anxious that Russia should not alone, if at all, reap the benefit of their expulsion.[207]

3. Dismembering Ottoman Turkey from the 19th Century Down to Sèvres

As Ottoman power slumbered further, Voltaire's contemporary Volney held:

> The decree is gone forth, the day approaches when this colossal power shall be dashed to pieces and fall crushed by its own weight. Yes, I swear it by the ruin of so many empires destroyed: the empire of the crescent shall suffer the fate of the states whose scheme of government it copied. A foreign people shall chase the sultans from their metropolis; the throne of Orkhan shall be overturned; the last shoot of his race shall be cut down and the hordes of Oguzians (the Turks by their pre-Ottoman designation), deprived of its head, shall be scattered.... Till there shall arise among the Arabs, the Armenians, or the Greeks, legislators who shall form new states.[208]

In order to break the Ottoman realm, the policy or method was to justify wars against it, and remove its people en masse; "Turkish crimes and barbarism" were, thus, used and enhanced with an effectiveness little seen before. Turkish "barbarism" was immortalised by the French painter Delacroix in his 'Massacre at Chios,' where he painted the Turks slaying powerless Greek women, children and elderly. The philosopher Heine was of the opinion that the Turk bore 'A fanatical hatred' for people of different faiths whether Jews or Christians; 'for both creeds are hated by

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[204] W. Miller: *The Ottoman Empire 1801-1913*; Cambridge University Press; 1913, p. 6.
[205] Ibid; p. 7.
[206] Ibid; p. 4.
[207] A. Sorel: *The Eastern Question*; preface p. viii.
[208] Volney: *Les Ruines*; (Paris; 1798-9); *The Ruins*; (London 1845); p. 22; in N. Daniel: *Islam; Europe;* op cit; p.72; and A. Cirakman: *From the Terror;* op cit; pp. 149-50.

him, he looks upon them as dogs and gives them this honourable title as well.'[209] At the outbreak of war between Russia and the Ottomans, which soon followed the Greek War of Independence (1821 onwards), Heine celebrated the Russian Tsar Nicholas I as avenger of the Greeks:

> The knight of Europe who protects Greek widows and orphans from the Asiatic barbarians.[210]

In truth, as to be seen further down, in all conflicts involving Turks and Christians, claims and propaganda about Turkish barbaric deeds were one thing, reality on the ground was the entire reverse. At the launch of the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the Greeks rose and massacred all the Turks - men, women and children- on whom they could lay hands.[211]

> In the Morea [Peloponnese] shall no Turk be left,
> Nor in the whole wide world.

Thus ran the song, which from mouth to mouth, announced the beginning of a war of extermination of the Turks.[212] The Turks who resided in the countryside or in unfortified towns were either cut to pieces or forced to flee into strongholds.[213] According to William St. Clair:

> The Turks of Greece left few traces. They disappeared suddenly and finally in the spring of 1821, un-mourned and unnoticed by the rest of the world... Upwards of 20,000 Turkish men, women and children were murdered by their Greek neighbours in a few weeks of slaughter. They were killed deliberately, without qualm and scruple, and there were no regrets either then or later. The men were killed at once, and the women and children divided out as slaves usually to be killed in their turn later. All over the Peloponnese roamed mobs of Greeks armed with clubs, scythes, and a few firearms, killing, plundering and burning. They were often led by Christian priests, who exhorted them to greater efforts in their holy work.[214]

So great was the slaughter that the leader of the uprising, General Kolokotronis, himself says that, from the gate to the citadel his horse's hoofs never touched the ground.[215] His path of 'triumph' was carpeted with corpses... Women and children were led out to a ravine in the neighbouring mountains and there butchered like cattle.[216]

Whilst it was meritorious and acceptable for Christians to kill Muslims, alleged Turkish "barbaric deeds" towards the Christians were used to call for tougher Western

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[209] In P. Kappert: From Romanticisation; op cit; p. 39.
[210] Ibid.
[211] T. Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution,* 2 vols; Edinburgh, William Blackwood, 1832.
[212] See W. Alison Phillips, *The War of Greek Independence 1821 to 1833;* London: Smith Elder, 1897, p. 48.
[213] T. Gordon, *History,* op cit, vol, I, p. 149.
[214] William St. Clair, *That Greece Might Still Be Free - The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*, Oxford University Press; 1972 pp. 1-2.
[215] Alison Phillips: *The War of Greek Independence,* op cit, p. 61.
[216] Ibid.

answers,[217] i.e. the need for crusades against the Turk. On July 6, 1827, a treaty was signed at London between Russia, England, and France, the declared aim of which was 'to stop the effusion of blood and to effect the reconciliation of the Turks and the Greeks,' but in reality it was to give a hand to the Greeks who were losing the contest militarily.[218] One other excuse was to afford 'protection to the subjects of other powers who navigated the seas of the Levant in which for many years 'atrocious piracy' had been taking place, which neither Turkey nor revolted Greece could prevent.'[219] And so, on October 20, 1827, the combined fleets of England, France, and Russia entered the Bay of Navarino, in which the Ottoman-Egyptian fleet was moored, and there destroyed it.[220] At the same time, inland, troops under the French Marshal, Maison, completed 'the deliverance of the Greek territory.'[221] The destruction of the Ottoman fleet not only decided the Greek issue, it left Turkey vulnerable, and so Russia soon declared war on Turkey, and with its command of the sea crushed the Ottomans, forcing them in August 1829 to agree to the Treaty of Adrianople. By this treaty Russia gained part of the left bank of the Lower Danube, provinces in Asia and Europe, passage of the Dardanelles, and even an indemnity 'for injuries done to Russian commerce' and another sum, amounting to nearly $25,000,000, was to be paid to the Russian Government for the costs of the war.'[222]

Decades on, in the late 1870s, in the wake of the so-called Bulgarian massacres, the same technique was relied upon with the same effects. As to be amply seen below, as with the Greek case, it was mainly Muslims who were massacred, but in the ensuing hysteria of the supposed massacre of Christians, Russia, with agreement and support from the West, went on the attack and defeated the Ottomans. Coming in the wake of these Russian-Ottoman wars, the Berlin Congress, which lasted for a month until 13 July 1878, resulted in further shrinkage of the Ottoman realm. The Turks lost Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to Russia besides having to pay a war indemnity set at 802.5 million francs.[223] In all, the Ottoman Empire gave up two-fifths of its entire territory and one-fifth of its population, about 5.5 million people, of whom almost half were Muslims, but much worse, so great were the financial strains, it made the empire's survival extremely precarious.[224]

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[217] C. Grossir: *L'Islam des Romantiques*; (Maisonneuve; Larose; Paris, 1984); p. 103.
[218] E. Creasy: *Turkey*; The H.W. Snow and Son Company; 1910 (henceforth cited as Snow ed); p. 424.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid; p. 425.
[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid; p. 432.
[223] S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; p. 191.
[224] Ibid.

The Turk does not belong to the European Family:

Cartoon from the Magazine Punch - The Unspeakable Turk (1914):
Lady Europa is trying to introduce the Turk to the infant European (Greece or any new nation of Europe).

The Turk is trying to look at his best, but definitely he does not. He is simply too uncouth, too dangerous looking, too backward to fit in. Not much has changed since.

In 1912, there took place the Crusade by Christian Balkan States aiming at removing their Asiatic 'Barbaric oppressor.'[225] Secretly assisted by European powers, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria launched a vast military onslaught on the Turks between 8 and 18 October 1912. Their aim was to wrest from Turkey its last 'Christian' provinces, and to share the spoils.[226] European Turkey was nearly impossible to defend due to both the length of the borders and the fact that the four enemies could strike from anywhere.[227] Outnumbered two to one, the Turks were quickly defeated, but still fought resiliently.[228] They managed to push back the Bulgarians at the Çatalca Line, saving Istanbul, but the rest of European Turkey was lost. The results for the Turks were dreadful. An estimated 125,000 soldiers were killed in the wars or died of disease and starvation, but many were murdered by the victors.[229] The worst casualties were civilians who suffered terrible cruelties.[230] As a result of the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria was enlarged by almost 30%, and gained an outlet to the sea; Serbia's

[225] B. Granville Baker: *The Passing of the Turkish Empire in Europe*; London; 1913; p. 317.
[226] For the Balkan wars see this author's Long War.
[227] J. McCarthy: *1912-13, Balkan Wars. Death and Forced exile of Ottoman Muslims, an Annotated Map* at http://www.tc-america.org/files/news/pdf/balkan-wars-map.pdf
[228] In E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient*; Librairie Felix Alcan; Paris; 1921, pp. 395 fwd.
[229] J. McCarthy: *1912-13, Balkan Wars;* op cit.
[230] For cruelties inflicted on Turks as witnessed on the ground, see Ernst Jäckh; *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkan-Krieg;* Chapter 7: Deutsche und französische Augenzeugen von christlichen Massakers. (Die Balkangreuel des 30 jährigen Krieges); Martin Mörikes Verlag, Munich, 1913; pp. 83-98; P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; Calman Levy; Paris; 1913.

territory increased by 82% and its population by over half; Greece and Montenegro experienced comparable gains, whilst the Turks lost 83% of their land and 69% of their population in Europe.[231]

A few years on, there occurred the next phase of phasing out Turkey on the occasion of the First World War, not at Sèvres (in 1920), as is often claimed, but earlier in the war when the decision to carve up Turkey was taken. The plans devised between 1915 and 1917, envisaged that besides an independent Arabia and Armenia there should be an independent Turkish state, confined within the boundaries of Asia Minor, and with its capital at Angora or Bursa.[232] The Turks were to be removed from much of Asia Minor and altogether from Europe, where, according to leading political figures, they had been for centuries 'a source of distraction, intrigue and corruption... of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned.'[233] Istanbul, Eastern Thrace, and the Straits would go to the Russians, in return for a British sphere of influence in Persia. After 1917, this accord was denounced by the Soviet Government, following the Bolshevik Revolution, and Russia renounced all such Tsarist claims.[234] Elsewhere, the Sykes-Picot agreement partitioned the greater part of the Arab world and parts of southern Turkey between France and Britain. The Italians were granted a large portion of Asia Minor, namely the province of Adalia, to the west of Cilicia, the Dodecanese Islands, and the port of Smyrna with much of its hinterland. Eventually, adjustments were made as an inducement to Greece to enter the war by the side of the Allies, which revived the Greek Great Idea. The Treaty of Sèvres only finalised these plans with slight variations, but Turkey as we know it today was to be no more.

The partitioning of a country or the removal of a people is not something that can be done by military men, or on the spur of the moment. This is impossible. History teaches us that the removal of a people, or the phasing out of a nation, can only work when there is an intellectual framework behind it that has already prepared the complex legal, moral, historical, and even practical ground. Whether the removal of the Jews by the Nazis, or of the Bosnians by the Serbs and Croats, or any other historical instance, a thorough extinction of a nation needs this intellectual contribution. The partitioning of Turkey had a vast intellectual and literary background. It is literally tens, if not hundreds, of works by statesmen, historians, retired diplomats, military figures, Churchmen, artists, intellectuals, and all sorts of influential Western figures who dealt with the matter.[235] The final heading in this chapter will offer a sample of such works. Without any exception, they all agreed in respect to the 'barbarism of the Turks and their crimes against Christians,' and so

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[231] S.J Shaw and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; vol 2; p. 298.
[232] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 139.
[233] Lord Curzon in P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 139.
[234] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 140.
[235] E. Freeman: *The Ottoman Power in Europe, its Nature, its growth and its Decline*; MacMillan; 1877. B. Granville Baker: *The Passing of the Turkish Empire in Europe*; London; 1913. A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917. E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient*; op cit. H.A. Gibbons: *Venizelos;* Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston, 1920. Talcott Wlliams: *Turkey, a World Problem of Today;* Doubleday; New York; 1921.

concluded on the need for the removal of Turkey. It was the same argument made against the Indians of the Americas, who needed to be removed on account of their barbaric practices and deeds.[236] Granville, Mandelstam, Driault, Freeman, Gibbons, and countless others, who throughout the 19th and early 20th century devoted considerable space to 'Turkish barbarism and blood lust,' concluded:

> **The phasing away of Turkey, the culling of its population by about 80%, and reducing Turkey to a small, unarmed, Indian like reservation/Bantustan in some corner of Anatolia.**

Their arguments and their plans were the same, with just slight nuances and minor alterations, with what Sèvres (August 1920), or San Remo (April 1920) (which in fact was the mother of Sèvres) came with. It is a fallacy of the first order to state that Sèvres dates from 1920. Sèvres, in its substance, dates from at least a century earlier.

The anti Turkish propagandist rhetoric works like some sort of hammering machine that pounds into the minds the same substance and objective over the decades. During the First World War, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George instructed those employed by the British War Propaganda Ministry on the aim and direction of anti-Turkish propaganda:

> The Turks' inability to govern, their misrule and above all massacres of the hardworking population must be emphasized. I hardly need to point out that this should be done gradually and the articles spread over a long period so that our purpose is not too obvious. Sir Mark Sykes' article in the Times is exactly what we want to see.[237]

In this article, which was later spread throughout the United States, expressions such as 'merciless tyrant', 'unprincipled bully', 'unadulterated barbarians', a 'degenerate race that has littered the earth with ruins' were used. Sykes even fabricated quotations by different members of the Turkish government including that it was the Turks who had invaded and destroyed Baghdad in 1258, 'a conscious attempt to interfuse the history of the Turks and the Mongols.'[238] The British Propaganda Ministry also published a *Blue Book*, chiefly inspired by Greeks and Armenians, which expressed an open and unconstrained hatred of the Turks in racist terms.[239]

It was the same message, in tenor and in substance, to the views of the Turks decades earlier in the 1870s, which in the end resulted in over a million of Turks slain or exiled.[240]

Arnold Toynbee's first work *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks,*[241] dating from 1917, fed the same rhetoric and gained huge popularity, and to this day, in fact. His second, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, published in 1921, which details

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[236] W. Howitt: *Colonisation and Christianity*: Longman; London; 1838. Ward. Churchill: *A Little Matter of Genocide*; City Lights Books; San Francisco; 1997. D.E. Stannard: "Genocide in the Americas" *The Nation*, (October 19, 1992; pp. 430-34). –D. E. Stannard: *American Holocaust; The Conquest of the New World;* Oxford University Press; 1992.

[237] I. Karlsson: The Turk as a Threat; op cit; p. 68.

[238] Ibid.

[239] Ibid.

[240] J. Salt: *The Unmaking of the Muslim World; A History of Western Disorder in the Arab World;* University of California Press; 2008 p. 31 ff.

[241] A.J. Toynbee: *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*; Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1917.

the atrocities inflicted on the Turks,[242] has hardly received any notice to this day. The whole scheme being that the Turks had to be deprived of any form of humanity or sympathy, just like the Indians, as a pre-requisite to their disappearance.

Two elements stood in front of the final removal of the Turks. The first was the eternal squabble between Western and Eastern Orthodox Christians, as noted and well summed up by Creasy:

> Despite their utmost resistance, it has been their lot merely to furnish the spoil over which the others have quarreled. The active aggressive factors have been these same foreign powers and former subjects who, notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defense, would have put an end to Ottoman dominion in Europe if they could only have agreed among themselves about the succession. This, however, they have never succeeded in doing; in fact, the clash of their rival ambitions has repeatedly provoked the bitterest animosities between them. Animosities of every kind have in truth been rife in all that has pertained to the Eastern Question. In its later stages one of its noteworthy features has been the revival of that hatred between Latins and Greeks, Catholics and Orthodox, which goes back to the crusades and earlier. Western Europe had disliked the Greeks since the first active contact with them in the days of Godfrey of Bouillon (1095-1096), and each fresh meeting had increased the friction, until it culminated in the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade (1204), an injury which Eastern Christendom has never forgiven.[243]

The second, and defining factor that delayed and eventually defeated the project of carving up or phasing out Turkey was the Turkish determined fight. This will be amply looked at in the following chapters. Nogales, a Venezuelan officer who fought amongst the Turks, declared them to be 'of the greatest and unmatched breed of soldiers.' He gives us aspects of this:

> Whenever I remember those scenes of almost incredible valour, I cannot help feeling proud of having led those brave and modest "unknown soldiers" of the Ottoman Empire.[244]
>
> So "courageous" and "ferocious" was their spirit that seeing them die without any complaints, not even a moan[245]
>
> The Turks did not surrender even when faced certain defeat. In spite of being "doomed" and knowing it, nevertheless they continued fighting stubbornly till the end.[246]

This was particularly obvious during the Balkan Wars of 1912 when Turkish soldiers held defensive lines till all were slain, German officers, in particular being particularly struck by Turkish gallantry.[247]

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[242] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922.
[243] E. Creasy: *Turkey* (Snow ed); op cit; 6-7.
[244] Rafael de Nogales y Mendez, *Memoirs of a Soldier of Fortune* (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1932), 336.
[245] Ibid, 348.
[246] Ibid, 331.

When Mustafa Kemal, years after the Gallipoli campaign (1915) was revisiting the battlefields of Chunuk Bair (Turkish: *Conk Bayırı)* and Anafarta, he was asked by a companion why no great monument marked them, he replied,

> The greatest monument is Mehmedjik himself. It is thanks to him that these lands have remained within the Turkish frontiers.[248]

At the Battle of Dumlupinar (late August 1922), the Turks attacked the heavily defended Greek positions on hilltops. On one of them,

> The Greek fire mowed them down. Soon there were pyramids of Turkish dead before the wire and the earth was red with blood, lying in pools on the hard ground. But more came on, clambering over the bodies of their comrades. Kemal-eddin Sami (their commanding officer) looked away, overwhelmed by the spectacle of slaughter and bloodshed. Then he heard an Imam chanting from the top of the rock, and knew that the position was captured.[249]

At Gallipoli, Sakarya, and Dumlupınar, the Turks knew the price of defeat. Mustafa Kemal summed it up perfectly when addressing the American general, J.G. Harbord, in Sivas during the Congress in that place:

'What do you expect to do now?' Harbord asked him.

Mustafa Kemal had been playing with a string of prayer beads as he talked. Now with a gesture of nervous tension he pulled the string apart, and the beads were scattered all over the floor. Picking them up one by one he remarked that here was the answer to the general's question. He meant to draw the pieces of his country together, to save it from its various enemies, to make of it an independent and civilised state.

Harbord suggested that such a hope was against logic, against military facts. 'We know that individuals, now and then, commit suicide. Are we now going to see the suicide of a nation?'

Kemal replied, 'What you say, General, is true. What we want to do, in our situation, is explainable neither in military nor in any other terms. But in spite of everything we are going to do it, to save our country, to establish a free and civilized Turkish state, to live like human beings.'[250]

Kemal put his hand on the table, palm upwards. 'If we can't succeed,' he continued, 'rather than fall into the palm of the enemy like a bird, and be condemned to a gradual, ignoble death' – he closed his fingers little by little as he talked – 'we prefer, being the sons of our forefathers, to die fighting.' His fist lay clenched before him.[251]

Defeat was not an option. At Gallipoli, Sakarya, and Dumlupınar it was either victory or Turkey off the map.

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[247] In E. Driault: *La Question;* op cit; p. 397.
[248] Lord P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 94.
[249] Ibid; p. 312.
[250] Ibid; p. 189.
[251] Ibid.

4. Dismemberment and What it Entails

The Dismemberment of Turkey does not mean, as put coldly in written terms, just cutting this and that piece of a map away. In reality it meant something else: a territory passing under Christian control, and then, for this to happen, the Turks to be removed en masse. All incidents from the late 19th century until the War of Independence (1919-1922) highlight this without one single exception.

When the Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina rebelled in 1875 and the Bulgarians followed in their wake, newspapers were filled with accounts of Christians massacred by Turks, Pomaks (Bulgarian Christian converts to Islam) and Muslim Circassians.[252] The most vociferous about these massacres was no other than Gladstone, former British Prime Minister. Having been ejected out of power, he now saw the opportunity to regain his seat from Disraeli, and thus wrote his infamous "Bulgarian Atrocities,"[253] which 'stirred the indignation of the whole Christian world.'[254] The net results were two: Gladstone regained the Premiership, and the Turks were massacred and expelled in the hundreds of thousands. Everybody used Gladstone as the source of their knowledge of the massacres by the Turks but Gladstone had never set any part of his body in or near Bulgaria. British journalists and envoys kept sending cables back to Britain that it was the reverse that was happening, i.e., that it was the Turks who were being mass-slaughtered.[255] But everyone was convinced of who the vile beast was, and as the deeply devout E.A. Freeman, wrote in 1877 in the *Contemporary Review*:

> Opposing the Turks had become a moral imperative: Men came together as if to deliver their own souls, as if their hearts would not rest within them till their tongues had spoken... to wash their hands clean from the deeds of which they had just heard the tale.[256]

And so, Turkish villages, one after the other, were pillaged and destroyed. Fleeing refugees were attacked by predatory Bulgarian bands even as they streamed out of the 'conquered' territories.[257] More than 260,000 Muslims were killed or died from war-related causes, and more than a half million were driven out of Bulgaria, representing a total Muslim population loss of about 55%.[258] About this, there were no tracts, no atrocity propaganda.[259]

Another few decades forward, and the same happened again. In 1912, in the wake of the First Balkan War, over half a million Muslims were slain, and over a million were expelled or fled the region for Turkey.[260] In many places, such as Kurkut, men, women and children were collected by Bulgarians in the mosque and in barns and were burned

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[252] J. Salt: *The Unmaking of the Muslim World;* op cit; p. 31.
[253] W. E. Gladstone, *Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East,* London: John Murray, 1876.
[254] W. Miller: *The Ottoman Empire;* op cit; p. 366.
[255] See Foreign office reports; such as F.O. 195-1185; No 73; Layard to earl of Derby, 26 July 1877, see also media accounts.
[256] E. A. Freeman, 'The English People in Relation to the Eastern Question', *Contemporary Review,* February 1877.
[257] J. Salt: *The Unmaking of the Muslim World;* op cit; p. 32.
[258] J. McCarthy: *The Ottoman Peoples*; p. 48. See also McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, op cit; p. 91.
[259] J. Salt: *The Unmaking of the Muslim World*; op cit; p. 32.
[260] P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; op cit; also Jaeckh; op cit.

to death.[261] In Drenova Turks were flogged by Serbs to death.[262] Countless more were also burnt alive in Rainovo, Kilkis, and Plantza[263]; whilst in Thrace were slain around 200,000 (a figure that included some Greeks murdered by Bulgarians as well).[264] Turks were also killed en masse by the Greeks and their bodies left as witness to the deeds.[265] Many more died from starvation and disease in lands where they were left without either food or housing.[266]

Turks expelled out of Bulgaria (1877-78)

The same story repeating itself. Another flight east in the mud.

Turks fleeing the Balkans in 1912

[261] FO. 195-2438, no 6650; Lamb to Lowther, Salonica 3 December 1912.
[262] FO. 371-1762, no 55161; Greig to Crackanthrope, Monastir, 19 November 1913.
[263] Based on report of father Gustav Michel as did Consul Lamb. The Crimes of Bulgaria, Washington, 1914; pp. 12-15.
[264] Based on the report of Rene Puaux of the Paris *Temps;* corroborated by various contemporary sources.
[265] The Report of the Carnegie Commission of Investigation; op cit; pp. 282-3.
[266] Justin McCarthy: *Death and Exile*; op cit; p. 141.

Prayers for Turks drowned en masse; one of the many similar scenes dating from 1912-1913.

Seven years later, when the Greeks landed in İzmir in May 1919, the outcome was this, noted by Toynbee:

> On the 15th May 1919 [following the landing at İzmir], a destructive force was let loose in Western Anatolia, as sudden and apparently incomprehensible in its action as the eruption of a volcano. One morning, six months after the close of the European War, civilians and disarmed soldiers were massacred in the streets of Smyrna; whole quarters and villages were plundered; then the rich valleys in the hinterland were devastated by further arson and bloodshed... In fact, a wholesale ruin of the country and extermination of its inhabitants began, over an area which extended with alarming speed.[267]

Toynbee devotes the near entirety of his work to highlight the atrocities inflicted on the Turks.[268] He writes the following:

> During the early summer of 1921, I was for some weeks in intimate contact with Greek soldiers and civilians then engaged in atrocities upon Turkish peasants, and with the survivors of their victims whom the Ottoman Red Crescent was attempting to rescue. My strongest impression during this horrible experience was of something inhuman both in the bloodthirstiness of the hunters and in the terror of the hunted. At the moment of embarkation, especially, when we were on the point of getting these defenceless men, women, and children, with a remnant of their worldly possessions, out of their tormentors' clutches, the tension used to mount and mount till it seemed as if the Greek soldiers and chettes must spring upon their prey. But for the presence of the three Allied officers attached to the Red Crescent Mission, I think they

[267] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 107.
[268] Ibid; p. 259 ff.

> would have done so. They were furious at being cheated of their kill, and resisted the evacuation not only of men capable of military service but of old men, women, and children whose residence in the occupied territory was if anything a military disadvantage to the Greek Army. The Turkish survivors, on their side, were paralysed with terror, and could not realise that they had been rescued from their pursuers.
>
> We had left Yalova the evening before (25 May), made our passage during the night, and the refugees with whom our decks were crowded were at last in safety, after months passed under the shadow of death. But they could not shake off the nightmare.... Even in Stamboul harbour, the hunted animal was still under the fascination of the beasts of prey.... It was like some metamorphosis in classical mythology. In both hunter and hunted, the 'subconscious' pre-human animal had come to life.[269]

By the spring of 1921, the Turkish Ministry of Refugees in Istanbul estimated the numbers of refugees fleeing in terror at something between 200,000 and 325,000.[270] Toynbee notes:

> At Yalova, for example, when I was helping to evacuate the Turkish survivors of Greek atrocities and was making lists of names of the men of military age whom the Greek authorities were detaining, I found that about one in three came from the Yannina district in Epirus. At Gemlik and other places it was the same — and now the racial war, passing from Europe into Asia, had overtaken them, and they were being uprooted again.[271]
>
> In Istanbul, I came across one family of Turkish refugees from Thrace who had been uprooted no less than six times since the beginning of the First Balkan War. Three or four successive evictions were not an uncommon experience.[272]

These instances explain why the victories of Gallipoli, Sakarya and Dumlupinar were so vital, for, defeated, at the hands of local Christians, burning with hatred for the Turk, Asia Minor would have become the Graveyard of the Turks.

It is in this light that the victories of Gallipoli, Sakarya and Dumlupınar should be seen, for it is this that history tells us, not what a corrupt modern narrative seeks to convey to us.

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[269] Ibid; pp. 262-4.
[270] Ibid; p. 169.
[271] Ibid; p. 139.
[272] Ibid.

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General Consensus: The Turk Has to Go

The partitioning of Turkey, and the removal of the Turks from at least Europe and large parts of Anatolia was agreed for very long prior to the war, and rather than being disputed by anyone, it was agreed by all. A brief look at some of the literature over the decades from the late 19th century until 1920, highlights the point that all sources, regardless of nationality, used the same arguments of 'Turkish barbarism and massacres of Christians' to justify the dismemberment of Turkey and the removal of Turks. Here follows a small sample of such literature:

Freeman writes in 1877:

> From the experience of the past I infer that the only way to settle that question is to get rid of the standing difficulty, the standing complication, the standing cause of discontent and revolt and massacre, namely the rule of the Turk. And I further infer from the experience of the past that the rule of the Turk can be got rid of, because, wherever men have thoroughly had the will to get rid of him, he has been got rid of. He has been got rid of in Hungary, in Servia, in the liberated part of Greece. With the same hearty will and zealous effort, he may be got rid of in all the other lands where he still does his work of evil.[273]

Then after writing 300 pages depicting all sorts of horrors, which he attributes to the Turks, he concludes:

> We have thus seen what the Turk is, what he has done, how he has grown, how he has decayed, how his victims have risen up against him, and how we have dealt between him and his victims. We have seen what is our duty to the brethren whom we have wronged; we have seen that our interest and our duty do not clash. The policy of 1827 (support for Greece) should be the policy of 1877. "Pax in terris hominibus bonae voluntatis." Peace and friendship, frank and cordial union, among all powers that will join to cleanse Europe from its foulest wrong, its blackest shame. But not peace where there is no peace — no partnership, no paltering, with evil — no year of grace which will only be another year of broken promises — but united action in the noblest of causes, united action to free the East from bondage, and to clear the West from dishonour. Let us once more remember what the enemy is. It is the common enemy of mankind. If he no longer sacks Otranto or bombards Vienna, it is not because he lacks the will, but merely because he lacks the power. Where he still holds power, his power is in no way better, it is rather in all things worse, than it was when he sacked Otranto and bombarded Vienna. What the Turk, his Sultan and his Sultan's following, then were, that they still abide, in all except the dazzling greatness which half leads us to forget that their greatness was wholly a greatness of evil. The Turk came into Europe as a stranger and an oppressor, and after five hundred years he is a stranger and an oppressor still. He has hindered the progress of every land where he has set his foot. He has brought down independent nations to bondage; by bringing them down to bondage, he has taught them the vices of bondmen. He has turned fertile lands into a wilderness, he has turned fenced cities into ruinous heaps because under his rule no man can dwell in safety. Wherever his rule has spread, the inhabitants have dwindled away, and the land has day by day gone out of cultivation. While other conquerors, even other Mahometan conquerors, have done something for the lands which they conquered, the Ottoman Turk has done nothing for the lands which he has conquered; he has done everything against them. His dominion is perhaps the only case in history of a lasting and settled dominion, as distinguished

[273] E. Freeman: *The Ottoman Power in Europe, Its nature, Its Growth, and Its Decline*; MacMillan; 1877; Preface X.

from mere passing in-roads, which has been purely evil, without any one redeeming feature.[274]

The view was shared across the board in the West that the Turk had to go whether in literature, intellectual discourse, or popular culture as expressed by this cartoon:

Lady Europa is sending the misbehaving Turk to his corner: Asia Minor (in Punch magazine: The Unspeakable Turk, 1914).

Whilst the notion that the Turk had to go was shared by all and at all times, in the first two decades of the 20th century, corresponding to the period under discussion here, the idea was promoted with even greater urgency and emphasis. In 1917, the highly influential Mandelstam, after devoting hundreds of pages to all forms of Turkish evil, concludes his book (in capital letters):

CONCLUSION GENERALE DE CE LIVRE:

LA TURQUIE AYANT VIOLÉEES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DE LA NATION A L'ÉGARD DE TOUS EES PEUPLES NON-TURCS SOUMIS A SA DOMINATION, DOIT ÊTRE DECLAREE, PAR LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE, DÉCHUE DE TOUT DROIT A LEUR TUTELLE.

L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN, QUI SE MAINTIENT PAR LA SEULE FORCE DES TURCO-ALLEMANDS, DOIT DISPARAITRE, ET LES DIFFÉRENTES NATIONS QUI LE COMPOSENT, LA NATION TURQUE COMPRISE, DOIVENT RECEVOIR DES ORGANISATIONS AUTONOMES, RÉGLÉES SUR LE BUT COMMUN DE L'HUMANITE.[275]

Which translates: Turkey having violated the rights of humans and nations in respect to all non-Turkish people, its domination and tutelage of other peoples must be ended by the International Community. The Ottoman Empire which is now maintained only by German and Turkish force must disappear, and all the nations which make up the Ottoman realm, including the Turkish nation, must obtain self rule, according to the shared aim of humanity.

Before that, Mandelstam had summed up what Turkey and Turks amounted to:

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[274] Ibid.

[275] A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917; p. 586.

> The dismemberment of the Vampire State is a result of the Allies aims. They will never again allow that the Turks remain the tutors of the Armenians, the Greeks, the Arabs, Syrians,.... The Turk will be deprived of its tutorship... This verdict is based on legal conscience... no more small or large massacres; no more enslavements, torture, rape... The victory of the Allies will impose the respect of human rights in the whole universe. The Ottoman Empire of Darkness, uncompromising enemy of such rights, will be brought down... We must remind: we have no racial prejudice of any sort; our negative judgment of the Turkish race does not deny its capacity for improvement. We have only judged the Turks on account of their past and present, but we cannot deny that the Turks, just like the Blacks, in a distant future, might lose their present characteristics, which make them today a danger for humanity and civilisation. A regeneration of the Turkish people is possible. This is true. However, until the Turk acquires a new soul, the right of humans is entirely opposed to the fact that he acquires such a soul at the expense of the souls of others. Turkish regeneration does not require at all his tutelage over Armenians, Greeks and Arabs... The Turks have been far too long mass executioners and parasites. Therefore, let them carry themselves to Asia; and there try to create a Turkish state, and in that environment, they will one day find their way back to humanity.[276]

Writing at precisely the same time, his book being at times an entire replica of the other ambassador, Mandelstam, the American ambassador in Turkey, Henry Morgenthau (1913-1916), said amongst others:

> So far as I can discover, the Ottoman Turks had only one great quality, that of military genius. They had several military leaders of commanding ability, and the early conquering Turks were brave, fanatical, and tenacious fighters, just as their descendants are today. I think that these old Turks present the most complete illustration in history of the brigand idea in politics. They were lacking in what we may call the fundamentals of a civilized community. They had no alphabet and no art of writing; no books, no poets, no art, and no architecture; they built no cities and they established no lasting state. They knew no law except the rule of might, and they had practically no agriculture and no industrial organization. They were simply wild and marauding horsemen, whose one conception of tribal success was to pounce upon people who were more civilized than themselves and plunder them.
>
> In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these tribes overran the cradles of modern civilization, which have given Europe its religion and, to a large extent, its civilization. At that time these territories were the seats of many peaceful and prosperous nations... Over all this part of the world the Turk now swept as a huge, destructive force. Mesopotamia in a few years became a desert; the great cities of the Near East were reduced to misery, and the subject peoples became slaves. Such graces of civilization as the Turk has acquired in five centuries have practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises... In the course of time these Turks might learn certain things from their European and Arab neighbours, but there was one idea which they could never even faintly grasp. They could not understand that a conquered people were anything except slaves... It is true that the early Sultans gave the subject peoples and the Europeans in the empire certain rights, but these in themselves really reflected the contempt in which all non-Moslems were held... The sultans similarly erected the several peoples, such as the Greeks and the Armenians, into separate "millets," or nations, not because they desired to promote their independence and welfare, but because they regarded them as vermin, and therefore disqualified for membership in the Ottoman state... Christians could not

[276] Ibid; pp. 576-80.

> ride a horse in the city, for that was the exclusive right of the noble Moslem. The Turk had the right to test the sharpness of his sword upon the neck of any Christian.
> Imagine a great government year in and year out maintaining this attitude toward many millions of its own subjects! And for centuries the Turks simply lived like parasites upon these overburdened and industrious people. They taxed them to economic extinction, stole their most beautiful daughters and forced them into their harems, took Christian male infants by the hundreds of thousands and brought them up as Moslem soldiers. I have no intention of describing the terrible vassalage and oppression that went on for five centuries; my purpose is merely to emphasize this innate attitude of the Moslem Turk to people not of his own race and religion — that they are not human beings with rights, but merely chattels, which may be permitted to live when they promote the interest of their masters, but which may be pitilessly destroyed when they have ceased to be useful. This attitude is intensified by a total disregard for human life and an intense delight in inflicting physical human suffering, which are not unusually the qualities of primitive peoples.
> Such were the mental characteristics of the Turk in his days of military greatness. In recent times his attitude toward foreigners and his subject peoples had superficially changed. His own military decline and the ease with which the infidel nations defeated his finest armies had apparently given the haughty descendants of Osman a respect at least for their prowess. The rapid disappearance of his own empire in a hundred years, the creation out of the Ottoman Empire of new states like Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and the wonderful improvement which had followed the destruction of the Turkish yoke in these benighted lands, may have increased the Ottoman hatred for the unbeliever, but at least they had a certain influence in opening his eyes to his importance.[277]

Arnold J. Toynbee, as seen in the previous chapter, was involved in the propaganda campaign during the First World War, and whilst he was employed by the British Propaganda Ministry, he published in 1917 *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks,* in which he claimed that throughout their history the Turks had crippled the gifted nations they subjugated, and sucked life out of them. In that work, he made the same arguments as others, that the Turks had massacred Armenians, Greeks, and seemingly everybody else.[278] Like all other propagandists of the time, he also insisted on Turkish barbarism, incapacity for civilisation, or progress. And like all propagandists, he reached the same conclusion that Turkey needed to be suppressed and its people locked in some corner of Anatolia, bearing no arms, and under the watchful Western eye. Unlike the rest, Toynbee, however, marched with the Greeks in 1920-21, and saw what he saw, realised who truly was the mass murderer, and reported what he saw.[279] More than this, Toynbee went, in the late Spring of 1921, to places such as Gemlik, Kumla, and surrounding areas, where the Greeks were murdering and helped save hundreds, possibly thousands of Turks. The fear of his pen might have induced the Greeks to kill many less than they would otherwise have done.

From the French side, it was Driault who replicated the views of Mandelstam, Toynbee, and Morgenthau:

> The Turks, despite five hundred years of domination in Europe have always remained foreigners. They do not belong at all to the Mediterranean World; they belong to Oriental Asia; they are of the Mongol race, which is the reason why they have remained encamped in Asia Minor and the Balkans... They did not convert to

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[277] Henry Morgenthau: *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*; Double Day, Page & Company; 1919; pp. 277-81.
[278] A.J. Toynbee: *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*; Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1917.
[279] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922.

> Christianity; they crushed the people with heavy taxes; they stole their boys and girls for their harems; they slaughtered everyone for whatever trivial reason; they ruined the once brilliant cities of Baghdad and Damascus; because of them dead silence has ruled for over five hundred years in the east... Now, thanks to the pressure of the great powers, the death of the sick man is imminent.[280]

The American writer, William Milligan Sloane, after a journey through the European parts of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, wrote:

> From Asia they came, to Asia they return with little regret and being a totally unhistoric people it is doubtful whether centuries of European abode would in their future tradition be much more than a tale of Scheherazade. In order to understand and do justice to the Turk we need a fourth dimension. He is our antipode.[281]

Another American writer and former Ambassador in Berlin, James Gerard, proposed that the Turks should be treated in the same way as America's Indians and placed in reserves.[282]

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[280] E. Driault: *La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a la paix de Sevres;* Librairie Felix Alcan; 8th ed; 1920; pp. I-IV.

[281] In I. Karlsson: The Turk as a Threat and Europe's Other; in *International Issues and Slovak Foreign Policy;* issue 1, 2006; pp. 62-72; at pp. 67-8.

[282] Ibid p. 69.

Three

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN
(February-April 1915)

On March 18, 1915, as the Allies boats steamed victoriously through the Dardanelles, heading for Istanbul to bring the country to account, the triumphant mood was thus expressed:

> It was a day out of season: pleasant, warm, with bright sunshine and a flawless overarching sky. De Robeck's attacking fleet, the mightiest ever seen in the Mediterranean, was spearheaded by four dreadnoughts, flanked by two battleships. A mile behind them came the four French men-of-war, also flanked by British battleships. Six more battleships, surrounded by destroyers and trawlers were held in reserve; they were to clear away the last obstacles, sail through the Narrows, and enter the Sea of Marmara the following morning. Twelve hours later the Union Jack and the French tricolor would fly over Constantinople.[283]

This was meant to be the apogee of the campaign, at least against Turkey. Once Constantinople was blasted by the Allies fleet, Turkey would be out of the war, thus, ready for dismemberment as already agreed by the Allies. Except for some unforeseen events, most notably to do with a steamer and some bad weather. This was before Turkish valour and local command did the rest. Whilst Turkish valour was in evidence throughout, atrociously incompetent General Command on the part of the triumvirate in charge of Turkey then (using the term Ottoman in relation to Turkey after 1908 is one of the most miserable errors made by many historians, including this one initially, for Turkey, especially during the First World War, was under the rule of a trio of incompetent persons) presaged disaster from the start of the conflict, and Allies optimism was entirely justified.

1. The First World War, and Turkey's Reluctant Entry

The First World War was not caused by the murder on 28 June 1914 of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That murder was just the signal for long held ill feelings and fast rising tensions to burst amongst European powers after they had been, and were still, squabbling over lands and riches, most particularly those of the Muslim world (Morocco) and former Ottoman lands (Libya, the Balkans, Iraq...). The First World War was the first in which not only new mass killing machines were used: intense, continuous, heavy artillery fire; planes; gas; and the lethal machine gun; it was also the first war, especially on the western front, where armies entrenched themselves, and then slaughtered each other in turn or simultaneously by all the means

[283] In W. Manchester: *Winston Spencer Churchill. The Last Lion: Visions of Glory 1874-1932;* New York: Laurel/Dell, 1983, p. 538.

just cited, thus wiping out a whole generation of Western men. There is no better evidence of cold barbarism and inhumanity as that shown by the Western deciders and the thinkers who backed the war, and who sacrificed so many lives whilst they themselves directed events from the safe distance. Amongst the British deciders, Asquith gave a son, at least. Lloyd Georges was plain despicable: he gave away the lives of millions of others.
This work is neither capable nor interested in providing a full picture of this conflict, not even of the role of Turkey in it. There are countless works which can show events much better. Focus under this heading is on the general events that led to Gallipoli.

Turkey itself was reluctant to join the war. If a conflict had to take place and Turkey could not avoid being involved, it would have been preferable if it took place not in late 1914 as the Western and Russian war-mongers were pushing for, but around 1920, if at all. As Djemal (Cemal) Pasha, one of the three leading persons in power in Turkey (the other two were Tala'at and Enver) noted, the country, already bled and broken by earlier wars, especially the Balkans in 1912, would have first to strengthen its means of defence and make the army stronger.[284] The war did not wait, though. Forced to choose, Turkey went first for the Allies, France and Britain, who rejected her, whilst Germany was willing to join her in open alliance.[285] Germany was the only country to oppose the dismemberment of Turkey, rather the opposite, Germany's interests requiring that in order for her 'to escape the pressure of the iron ring around her,' Turkey's dismemberment had to be avoided at all cost.[286]
The alliance with Germany was sealed, but the Turks still sought to delay, for they knew they were not ready for any conflict, yet. Their hand was forced by a sudden Turkish navy raid under the command of German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon on several Russian Black Sea ports on 29 October, 1914.[287] Few days later, on 2 November, Russia declared war, followed by Britain and France on 5 November. Turkey responded with its own declaration of war on 11 November.[288]

The first few months of the war proved disastrous for Turkey, as its armies were crushed on all fronts, disasters which Kinross blames on Enver:

> Had her leaders been wise they would have devoted this period to a defensive strategy, conserving and building up such military strength as she had, completing the training of her forces and disposing them with forethought, waiting to see from which quarter the Allied threat would come. But Enver would have none of this. He preferred great and romantic adventures. He saw himself in the role of an Islamic Alexander the Great, moving against Britain in quest of a new Turkish Empire in Asia.[289]

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[284] Djemal Pasha: *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*; Hutchinson & co; London; 1922, p. 114.
[285] Cemal gives an account how Turkey was forced in the war and how it was rejected by the Allies. Shaw vol 2; p. 310.
[286] Djemal Pasha: *Memories of a Turkish Statesman*; op cit, p. 113.
[287] M. Aksakal: *Defending the Nation: The German-Ottoman Alliance of 1914 and the Ottoman Decision for War*. Princeton: Princeton University Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 2003, 112–150, 156–175, 186–189.
[288] H. Menteşe: *Halil Menteşenin Anıları* (The Memoirs of Halil Menteşe), *Hürriyet*, Istanbul 1988; p. 53.
[289] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation*; Weidenfeld and Nicolson; London; 1964; p. 69.

So, in November 1914, a Russian advance in the direction of Erzurum was pushed back after a few days fighting.[290] The following month, in the third week of December, after many delays, in the middle of a snowstorm blowing across the desolate highlands, 9th and 10th Army Turkish Corps left all their heavy artillery and equipment behind and took only light mountain guns in order to move fast.[291] In fact, total surprise was achieved, but the initial success was thwarted by a number of mishaps.[292] The courage of the troops could not prevent a disaster; the snow-storm raged, and the Turks were frozen and starved to death in great numbers.[293] Following this, a Russian offensive in the early Winter of 1915 threatened the whole Turkish eastern army. A desperate defence by the 9th Army Corps enabled the 10th to retreat, but at the cost of encirclement and eventual surrender of the corps and three divisional headquarters (over 200 officers, including the 9th Army Corps commander, were captured).[294]

A second Turkish failure followed, this time on the Egyptian frontier. The operation was directed by the Navy Minister Cemal Pasha. Accompanied by his German chief of staff, Kress von Kressenstein, and by members of Enver's Special Organisation, Cemal led a force of 18,000 troops across the Sinai desert to the Suez Canal.[295] On 2/3 February 1915, the Turks reached the canal and succeeded in getting 600 men across, but were beaten back by the British. The people of Egypt did not rise against British rule, as Enver and Cemal had hoped, and the Turkish expeditionary force returned to Palestine having suffered some 3,000 casualties and achieved nothing.[296]

It was in this context that two major operations were simultaneously launched against Turkey in mid-late Winter, 1915, one from the east and another from the west, aiming at removing it off the field of war, in fact removing it off the field/the map altogether. In this regard, Russian aims had already been made clear from even before the start of the war. On 1 October, 1914 a Russian high official had stated that

> This war can be of no use to us if it does not bring us Constantinople and the Narrows. Constantinople must belong to us and to us alone.[297]

When this was agreed in London by France and Britain, the Russians became quite interested, and so their involvement in the war, and, thus, their Caucasus attack (mid-late Winter 1915.) The plan was for a Russian push into eastern Anatolia to be accompanied by an open Armenian revolt against the Turks.[298] The Russians had raised four regiments of Armenian volunteers and sent agent-provocateurs into Turkish territory well before the start of the hostilities.[299] Armed by the Russians and

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[290] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; vol 2; p. 315.
[291] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 247.
[292] H. Altınbilek and N. Kır: *Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi*: vol 2; section 1, Ankara, 1993; pp. 382–3.
[293] M. Philips Price: *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1917; p. 58.
[294] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 248.
[295] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 141.
[296] Liman von Sanders, 46. The Sarıkamış disaster is described in S.S. Aydemir: Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa (Enver Paşa – from Macedonia to Central Asia), I–III, Remzi, Istanbul 1971–2; III, 169-180.
[297] Lars Kannengiesser: *The Campaign in Gallipoli*; London, 1928; p. 34.
[298] R.G. Hovannisian: *Armenia on the Road to Independence,* Berkeley and Los Angeles; 1967; pp. 45-47. W. E. D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields,* Cambridge, 1953, pp. 251-277.
[299] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 263.

organised by revolutionary groups (foremost among them were the Dashnaks), the Armenian rebels captured the city of Van on April 14, 1915.[300] The Turkish Third Army deployed a gendarmerie division, a few regulars and reserve cavalry regiments, and besieged the city, but despite atrocious fighting the rebels held firm until they were subsequently relieved by the Russians.[301] Whilst the Turks were bogged down in the east, they were fighting for the survival of their country in the west: the great campaign of Gallipoli had begun.

2. Gallipoli: The Background

The following aims to look at the battle, not so much from the military side, although this takes a good place, but rather from the historical angle, including the background to, and Western aims behind, the Gallipoli campaign, and the great impact this battle had on the fate of Turkey. For the strictly military side of the story, especially from the Turkish side, there is nothing better than Erickson's fairly recent work, a work that will remain hard to equal for a very long time to come.[302] Erickson's work breaks the battle into four phases:
The first phase, beginning in 1912 with the fortification of the Peninsula and lasting until 24 April 1915. This phase includes fortifying, garrisoning, and the training of army units on the Peninsula.
The second phase, 'the Landings', from 25 April until 1 May 1915, corresponds to the first landings and fighting that ensued.
The third phase or 'Stalemate', running from 2 May until 6 August 1915.
The fourth and final phase of the campaign, called 'Anafarta' by the Turks and 'Suvla' by the British, lasted from 7 August until 8 January 1916 (date of final Ally evacuation).[303]
To this division one must add the crucial events between February and 25 April 1915, i.e. the attempts by the navy to break through onto Istanbul and submit it to a bombardment aimed at bringing Turkey to heels. The following looks at the whole operation from both Turkish and Western sides, just as it does with all major events subsequently.

Of course the reasons for the operation, like everything of historical interest, are not to be found/sought in today's (lame) scholarship (whether Western or Turkish) (the excellent M. Uyar and E.J Erickson amongst the exceptions), and are to be sought elsewhere. Contemporaries who lived through events are and remain the best sources.

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[300] Ibid.
[301] A. P. Hacobian, Armenia and the War: An Armenian's Point of View with an Appeal to Britain and the Coming Peace Conference, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 70–80; Garegin Pasdermadjian, Why Armenia Should be Free: Armenia's Role in the Present War, (Boston: Hairenik Publishing, 1918), 17–23; J. McCarthy, Armenian Rebellion at Van, 180–221; Allen and Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields, 297–301.
[302] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign*; Pen &Sword; Military; Barnsley; UK; 2010; Introduction xiv.
[303] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign*; Pen &Sword; Military; Barnsley; UK; 2010.

In regard to Gallipoli, some modern army officers, Americans, generally, such as Erickson, Patton and others are also excellent sources.

Lt. Colonel Douglas J. Scott of the American army explains:

> In 1915, a window of opportunity existed for the Royal Navy to seize the Dardanelles solely by the use of sea power. This would open up the sea line of communication to Constantinople thus allowing Allied forces to attack the German homeland from Constantinople through the Balkan states.[304]

Referring to Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, he adds:

> Winston Churchill wrote in The World Crisis, 1915 that two advantageous factors existed to the benefit of the Allies: first, the existence of naval guns which far outranged the guns in the (Turkish) forts, and which were at the same time of immeasurably increased destructive power; secondly, the existence of a large class of heavily armed and heavily armoured ships which must pass out of commission in the course of a few months.[305]
>
> The crews of this fleet of ships would soon be needed to man new ships coming into the fleet as a result of the outbreak of war rendering the current fleet obsolete but only because of lack of personnel. Their guns were still more than what was required to knock out the forts adjacent to the Dardanelles.[306] So the plan was very neat and tidy; a systematic advance with the large ships providing protective cover for the smaller minesweepers with all operations conducted outside the maximum range of the large caliber weapons of the Turks. The result of positive execution of this battle plan would have been a decisive victory that linked the Russian front with the Western front, turning them into mere holding actions. Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire would fall, followed quickly by Bulgaria, opening the way for an attack on Austria-Hungary through the Balkan states. It was thought that this plan could be completed quickly enough to avoid the costly trench warfare.[307]

Subsequently, in March 1915, when he was appointed chief in command of the expedition, Sir Ian Hamilton was told the overall aims of the operation by Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War:

> Once the Fleet got through the Dardanelles, Constantinople could not hold out. Modern Constantinople could not last a week if blockaded by sea and land. That was a sure thing; a thing whereon he could speak with full confidence. The Fleet could lie off out of sight and range of the Turks and with their guns would dominate the railways and, if necessary, burn the place to ashes. The bulk of the people were not Osmanli or even Mahomedan and there would be a revolution at the mere sight of the smoke from the funnels of our warships. But if, for some cause at present non-apparent, we were forced to put troops ashore against organized Turkish opposition, then he advocated a landing on the

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[304] Lt Colonel Douglas J. Scott: *The Naval Campaign in Gallipoli*; Lessons Learned; Air War College Research Report; Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; March 1986; p. 1.

[305] Winston S. Churchill: *The World Crisis, 1915*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923, pp. 96-97.

[306] Ibid, pp. 96-102.

[307] Lt Colonel Douglas J. Scott: *The Naval Campaign in Gallipoli*; p. 5.

> Asiatic side of the Bosphorus to hold out a hand to the Russians, who would simultaneously land there from the Black Sea.... The moment the holding of Constantinople comes along the French and the Russians will be very jealous and prickly. Luckily we British have an easy part to play as the more we efface ourselves at that stage, the better he, K., will be pleased... Therefore, it will be best in any case to "let the French and Russians garrison Constantinople and sing their hymns in S. Sophia," whilst my own troops hold the railway line and perhaps Adrianople. Thus they will be at a loose end and we shall be free to bring them back to the West; to land them at Odessa or to push them up the Danube, without weakening the Allied grip on the waterway linking the Mediterranean with the Black Sea.[308]

Throughout the conference between Hamilton and Kitchener, reference was made repeatedly to the expectation that the Turks would not fight.[309] The Turks would not be able to resist the Royal Navy, but if they did, the Army's services were required, an army landing would surely unbalance the Turks and cause them to capitulate.[310] Regardless, once the Gallipoli Peninsula was in Allied hands, the Turks would see that resistance was pointless and simply quit.[311]

This map shows at once the simplicity and the great ingenuity of the plan. It only sufficed to get into the Marmara Sea, and the Allies as just described had the overwhelming power to do it over the Turks. The plan by itself and a look at this simple map shows that Turkey had truly no chance. The war could easily have ended in 1915, at least for Turkey, and yet...

This was the overall strategy, and the main aim was to kick Turkey out of the war, and begin its dismemberment. There were further aims linked with both strategy and main objective. One of them was a continuation of the old Crusading ethos, to accomplish the centuries old aim of removing the Turk and 'Recovering the Holy Land.' Indeed, the Russians could keep Constantinople if they wished to; the British looked further south. Ashmead Bartlett, the official war correspondent who

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[308] Sir Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli Diary;* London: Edward Arnold, 1920, vol 1; pp. 10-11.
[309] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? Why Did Albion Succeed? A Comparative Analysis of Two World War I Amphibious Assaults, in *Baltic Security and Defence Review,* vol 13, issue 2, 2011, pp. 128-161; at p. 130.
[310] Ibid.
[311] Ibid.

stood in awe as he watched the vast armada, hundreds of vessels of all sizes and makes, about to move on to blast the Turks, noted:

> The knowledge that other crusades had not been conspicuous for their success was in the minds of many who watched the assembly of this vast armada, and the preparations for disembarking the army on an unknown shore. However, we live in the hope that the Expedition will avenge the Chivalry of the Middle Ages, whose bones lie scattered in forgotten graves throughout the old Ottoman Empire from the gates of Vienna to Jerusalem. The immensity of the task and the difficulties to be overcome, even in these days of steamships and rapid transport, increase our admiration for the Knights of old, who attempted the capture of Constantinople with none of the advantages which we now enjoy. The Expedition to the Dardanelles is on a scale unprecedented in the annals of England, or of any other nation, of which we have authentic facts and knowledge. The closest parallels are the Spanish Armada, 1588; Napoleon's Expedition to Egypt, 1799, and the Anglo-French Expedition to the Crimea, 1854…
>
> I have attempted to describe this great fleet of infinite variety, but what of the transports collected together from all parts of the world to carry the Crusaders to Gallipoli—perhaps to Constantinople! From the quarter-deck of the London I can read the familiar names of famous liners belonging to almost every company which has ever carried the British flag. The resources of our Mercantile Marine seem unlimited. By day the spectacle is grand, as this immense fleet lies in the great bay on a surface as smooth as glass, with innumerable flags flying, and the smoke rising expectantly from hundreds of funnels; at night thousands of lights sparkle on the water, and the signals heliographed by electric lamps twinkle brighter than the stars above. In a few days this immense armada will be launched to its fate, either to meet a second Salamis, or to carry the Crusaders victoriously to Byzantium, after 468 years of Ottoman misrule.[312]

John Masefield, in his *Gallipoli*, completed just a few months after the expedition, wrote about the soldiers when they first saw the beaches of Gallipoli:

> These men had come from all parts of the British world, from Africa, Australia, Canada, India, the Mother Country, New Zealand, and remote islands in the sea.
>
> They had said good-bye to home that they might offer their lives in the cause we stand for. In a few hours at most, as they well knew, perhaps a tenth of them would have looked their last on the sun, and be a part of foreign earth or dumb things that the tides push… And perhaps a third of them would be mangled, blinded or broken, lamed, made imbecile or disfigured, with the colour and the taste of life taken from them, so that they would never more move with comrades nor exult in the sun…

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[312] E. Ashmead Bartlett: *The Uncensored Dardanelles*; Hutchinson & Co, London, 1920, p. 39; p. 42.

> But as they moved out these things were but the end they asked, the reward they had come for, the unseen cross upon the breast. All that they felt was a gladness of exultation that their young courage was to be used.[313]

Crucially, however, before the Ally navy began to sail, first towards Istanbul, and subsequently onto Gallipoli (both objectives in the Spring of 1915), some events of decisive importance had already taken place in the Winter, and without looking at such events, nothing of the whole Gallipoli history would be understood (which is the fundamental weakness of most works on the subject.) The Turkish defensive system, and one incident in particular, relating to the role of a Turkish ship, the *Nusret*, in this system, besides the weather, had the most decisive role in the whole history of modern Turkey.

On 3 January, 1915, the Admiralty telegraphed Admiral Carden, commanding the British fleet in the Mediterranean, asking him for an assessment of whether or not the Straits could be forced and if so, for his plan for forcing them.

A little later, Admiral Carden replied stating his plan: four successive operations. First, the destruction of the outer forts at Helles and Kumkale; second and third, two operations consisting in removing the mine fields and destroying the forts between the entrance and the narrows; and the fourth phase, the passage of the narrows.[314] There was no mention here of the landing.

The Turkish General Staff knew that the Dardanelles was a target of the British Royal Navy from the start of the First World War.[315] The Royal Navy had conducted a first, tentative bombardment of the forts at the entrance to the Straits on 3 November 1914, which speeded the program of fortification and defence improvements.[316] However, Erickson notes, the first phase of defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula dates from earlier, in 1912, with the reinforcement of the Dardanelles Strait against threats to the peninsula from the Bulgarian army and Greek navy in the Balkan Wars of 1912/13.[317]

In fact, it should be mentioned here that the war with Italy (1911-1912) was the main factor in awakening the Turks to the defence of the Dardanelles, for the Italians had made many probing attacks, showing deficiencies in the system of defence, and their impact on the Turkish system of defence was noted in the study by the American Commodore Beehler.[318] When the Italians attempted to rush through a fleet of torpedo boats in a night attack in 1912, they were repulsed by modern guns and searchlights.[319] The Turkish coasts were now difficult to attack, and the swift current of the Strait made the use of floating mines a decisive complement to the shore line defences.[320] The fortifications begun in the late 19th century consisted of a number of concrete and earth embrasured gun positions on both sides of the Strait.[321] These forts

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[313] John Masefield, *Gallipoli;* New York: Gossert & Dunlap Publishers, 1916, p. 34.
[314] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; Headquarters Hawaiian Department; August 1936; p. 4.
[315] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; p. 128.
[316] Edward J. Erickson, Gallipoli: *The Ottoman Campaign*, op cit; p. 9.
[317] Ibid; p. 1.
[318] Commodore W.H. Beehler: *The History of the Italian Turkish War*; Annapolis; 1913.
[319] Major Edwin W. Dayton: Military Operations of the War; *Current History* (CH) Vol 6; p. 502.
[320] Ibid.
[321] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign*; Pen &Sword; Military; Barnsley; UK; 2010; p. 1.

were strongly garrisoned, and a large mobile force of Turkish infantry was entrenched in the very difficult hill country of the peninsula.[322] Before 1912, these installations were under the command of the Çanakkale (known to the British as Chanak in 1915) Strait Forces and Fortification Command.[323] In the wake of the Balkan Wars, following the reorganisation of the army in 1913-1914, the Strait Command was renamed the Çanakkale Fortified Area Command (Çanakkale Müstahkem Mevki Kumandanlığı), but continued to maintain its artillery brigades and command of all of the forts on both sides of the Dardanelles.[324] Up until the activation and assignment of the Fifth Army on 24 March, 1915, the main responsibility of the defences remained under the command of the Artillery Corps.[325] In fact, nearly every artillery officer, especially the heavy artillery branch, served at least one term in the Çanakkale Fortified Zone Command before 1914.[326] Regarding artillery, it was vastly increased after the outbreak of the war in August, 1914.[327] Prior to the Allies campaign, Patton states that there were 78 pieces of medium and light artillery and 400 submarine mines.[328] In the placing of guns, earth works were used. In addition a number of dummy trenches were built and during the fleet bombardments, which would eventually take place, charges of black powder were exploded at various points in these trenches to deceive the naval gunners.[329] Erickson remarks that when the Turkish army mobilised in August 1914, its tactical units began to prepare for war 'under the dynamic training guidance of a revived military machine.'[330] He claims that the defences guarding the Straits were so improved that at no time after 17 August 1914 (two and a half months prior to the outbreak of hostilities) were the Dardanelles defences unready to receive an attack.[331] Soon thereafter the army deployed mobile tactical ground forces to the Strait and the peninsula, which were continually reinforced after the brief Royal Navy bombardment in November and strongly prepared the defences to repel an allied amphibious invasion.[332]

3. The Execution of the Allies Plan: February-March 1915

On 13 January 1915, came the Allies decision that the Admiralty should launch a naval expedition in February, consisting of four phases. The fleet should destroy the Gallipoli Peninsula defences in 3 phases, then on Phase 4, get through the Dardanelles, anchor off Istanbul, get it to submit to the Allies; and should it refuse, just burn the place to ashes.[333]

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[322] Major Edwin W. Dayton: Military Operations; op cit; p. 502.
[323] T.C. Genelkurmay Baskanligi, hereafter TCGB, *Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Balkan Harbi (1912-1913).*
[324] Ibid.
[325] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 258.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Major Edwin W. Dayton: Military Operations; op cit; p. 502.
[328] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 6.
[329] Ibid.
[330] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign*; op cit; p. 1.
[331] Ibid, 28.
[332] Ibid; p. 1.
[333] Sir Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli Diary;* op cit, vol 1; pp. 10-11.

Before 15 February, a powerful allied fleet had been assembled in the Aegean Sea and the neutral Greek islands of Tenedos, Imroz, and Lemnos had been occupied as a naval advance base.[334] The first of Carden's four operations, i.e: the destruction of the outer forts at Helles and Kumkale, started on 15 February. This task was accomplished by the navy without any trouble as they remained at a range of 12,000 meters, which was beyond the reach of the Turkish guns.[335] Bad weather between 16 and 25 February prevented any further bombardment. On 26 February, a detachment of marines was landed at the mouth of the Strait and blew up the old forts.

Phases 2 and 3 consisted in minesweeping and in destroying further forts.[336] Minesweepers protected by battleships entered the Straits daily, the sweepers removing the mines and the battle ships bombarding the forts. By 4 March, the outer forts were considered neutralised. At this point, many believed victory to be inevitable, and that the fleet could expect to arrive in 'Constantinople' within 14 days.[337]

Despite some Turkish opposition, the operations continued and by 17 March, phases 1, 2, and 3 were considered completed and the stage was set for phase 4 which was to culminate in an advance through the Straits straight on to Istanbul.[338] Admiral Carden fell ill, and command of the allied fleet was given to Admiral de Robeck.

A week earlier, on 11 March, General Sir Ian Hamilton, was appointed to command the expeditionary force and started for the Straits on the 13th, arriving at Lemnos on the 17th in time to be present for the battle of the 18th which was to top (as the 4th phase) the operation.[339] Hamilton was told by Kitchener that:

> The Turks are busy elsewhere (fighting the Russians and Armenians); I hope you will not have to land at all; if you do have to land, then the powerful Fleet at your back will be the prime factor in your choice of time and place.[340]

Meanwhile, on the Turkish side, already, from the beginning of 1915 it became evident, from intelligence reports of enemy naval and troop movements, that Allied forces were assembling on the islands before the Dardanelles, and that an Anglo-French attack on Istanbul, through the Narrows and across the Sea of Marmara, was imminent.[341] The failure of the Caucasian and Egyptian campaigns had lowered morale, and 'the people of Constantinople,' says Kinross with a certain sense of exaggeration, 'began to talk despondently of the capture of the city as though it had already occurred.'[342] The Germans, fearing the arrival of the Russians, began to talk of a separate peace, and Turkish families began to leave for Anatolia.[343] The Turkish

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[334] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 5.
[335] Ibid; p. 6.
[336] Ibid.
[337] The London Daily Chronicle, Saturday 6 March 1915, in *Current History*, vol 2; Apr Sep, 1915; p. 170.
[338] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 6.
[339] Ibid.
[340] Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli Diary*, op cit; vol 1; p. 6.
[341] Lord P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 71.
[342] Ibid.
[343] Ibid.

Government prepared two special trains on the Asiatic side, with steam up for departure at an hour's notice, one for the Sultan and his suite and the other for the Diplomatic Corps.[344] The Government had made plans to move to Eskişehir, where the Archives of the Sublime Porte and the gold from the banks had already preceded them, whilst works of art were buried in the cellars of the museums.[345]
In reality, although some of these precautionary steps had been taken, the Turks were not keen on surrender, rather the opposite. At the time of the first Allied bombardment, Turkish forces in the Dardanelles area came under two separate commands. The defence of the Gallipoli Peninsula was entrusted to the 3rd Corps, under Esat Pasha, a general of Albanian origin who had gained fame as the defender of Yanya (Yanina) in the Balkan Wars.[346] But the forts at the entrance to the Straits and the land defence of the waterway were the responsibility of the Çanakkale Fortified Area commanded by Cevat Pasha (Çobanlı).[347] The Turks were waiting.

On 18 March 1915, in application of Phase 4 of the operation, the joint British-French fleet attempted to force its way through the Straits with the aim of blasting Istanbul either into surrender or turning it to ashes (as directed by Lord Kitchener (above). On the morning of that day, the main attack began. A war correspondent thus describes the scene:

> The sight was most magnificent. At first the fleet was ranged in a semi- circle some miles out to sea from the entrance to the strait. It afforded an inspiring spectacle as the ships came along and took up position, and the picture became most awe-inspiring when the guns began to boom. The bombardment at first was slow, shells from the various ships screaming through the air at the rate of about one every two minutes. Their practice was excellent, and with strong glasses I could see huge masses of earth and stonework thrown high up into the air. The din, even at the distance, was terrific, and when the largest ship, with the biggest guns in the world, joined in the martial chorus, the air was rent with ear-splitting noise.
>
> The Turkish batteries, however, were not to be drawn, and, seeing this, the British Admiral sent one British ship and one French ship close inshore toward the Sedd-el-Bahr forts. "It was a pretty sight to see the two battleships swing rapidly away toward the northern cape, spitting fire and smoke as they rode. They obscured the pure atmosphere with clouds of smoke from their funnels and guns.[348]

Up to this point, there had been no activity on the part of any Turkish naval vessels. In that situation, it would have been suicidal for the few Turkish vessels to come anywhere near this powerful armada. However, seven to ten days earlier, under cover

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[344] Ibid.
[345] Ibid.
[346] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 144.
[347] U. İğdemir: Atatürkün Yaşamı (Life of Atatürk) (Vol. I 1881–1918), AKDTYK, Ankara 1988 (1st impression TTK, Ankara 1980); p. 37.
[348] *The London Daily Chronicle*, Saturday 6 March 1915.

of rain and darkness, the Turkish steamer *Nusret* was able to lay a line of twenty mines parallel to but offset to the right of the centre of the channel.[349] These mines were laid after the Allied minesweepers had cleared this area in preparation for this 4th phase, which consisted in ships to steam up this channel as they pounded the forts on either side of the shore.[350]

As each line of ships completed their shelling they executed right turn to head back down the channel allowing the next line of ships to move forward into position for firing (see preceding map). During the course of this manoeuvering, four Ally ships, the *Bouvet*, *Irresistible*, *Ocean* and *Inflexible*, struck mines and were sunk with heavy losses of men and officers, whilst the French battleships *Suffren* and *Gaulois* were also damaged.[351] All the ships had sailed through the new line of mines placed secretly by the *Nusret* a week or so earlier.[352] The Allies were unclear what awaited them, and the fear of losing the whole fleet and many men forced revision of the plans. On 20 March Admiral de Robeck telegraphed the Admiralty:

> Plan for reorganising minesweeping progressing… It is hoped to be in a position to commence operations in three or four days.[353]

In London, lost time mattered more than the loss of ships, especially as it was seen that most of the battleships were too old, meant to be scrapped, and were thus expendable.[354] Moreover, shipments of arms and munitions from Germany were on their way to Turkey, and the window of opportunity was closing.[355] De Robeck decided to continue with the mission. But 'the fates now stepped in.' On 19 March, the day following the great battle/disaster, the weather suddenly turned for the worse as far as the Allies were concerned, and a fateful helping hand for the Turks. Day after day northeasterly gales blew strongly, with a visibility so poor that firing was out of the question. No offensive action was possible until the storms abated.[356]

Whilst the storm raged, there occurred numerous exchanges between Admiral de Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been placed in command of the ground forces being sent to support the Navy, as well as several telegrams between Admiral de Robeck and the Admiralty in London.[357] In the end, it was decided to cancel the original plan of the naval-only campaign, and replace it with a plan to wait for the ground forces and then proceed with a combined operation. 'The result is history.'[358]

The ensuing delay in order to coordinate the combined campaign allowed the Turks to rearm, and eventually caused the campaign to end in disaster for the Allies, with

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[349] Lt Colonel Douglas J. Scott: *The Naval Campaign in Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 6.
[350] Ibid.
[351] For the best report on these particular events see The Dardanelles Bombardment; Official Reports of British Admirals Reveal Stirring Details of Naval Operations; CH 10; Apr-Sep 1919; pp. 158-161.
[352] H. Broadbent: *Gallipoli: The Fatal Shore*; Camberwell, Victoria: Viking/Penguin; 2005; pp. 33-4.
[353] E. Wheler Bush: *Gallipoli*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975, p. 63.
[354] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* Naval War College; Newport Rhode Island; 4 May, 1994, p. 14.
[355] Ibid.
[356] E. Wheler Bush: *Gallipoli*, p. 63.
[357] Lt Colonel Douglas J. Scott: *The Naval Campaign in Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 8.
[358] Ibid; p. 9.

considerable casualties, besides adding nearly another three years to the war, and somehow saving Turkey.

In reality, and looking at evidence, it would seem that the naval campaign was so close to being successful, but this was unknown to the Allies at the time. According to a German Official Account:

> Most of the Turkish ammunition had been expended. The medium howitzers and minefield batteries had fired half of their supply… for the five 35.5 cm. guns there were only 271 rounds, say 50 each; for the eleven 23 cm. between 30 and 50 rounds per gun. Particularly serious was the fact that the long-range H.E. shells, which alone were effective against armour, were nearly used up. Fort Hamidieh had only 17 of them, Kilid Bahr but 10. Also, there was no reserve of mines. What, then, was to happen if the battle was renewed on the 19th and following days with undiminished violence?[359]

The Allies had no such problem. They had fired in one day 2,000 shells without putting off one shore battery, which inspired the Turks with confidence, 'and they are looking forward to further engagements with calm assurance,' said a German officer.[360] This German officer who was reporting in April 1915, just like the Allies, was not aware of the previous official account reported secretly regarding the Turkish shortage of shells. Had it not been for the weather, and had the allied fleet continued its assault on the 19th of March….

Whilst it would take the Allies weeks to move onto Plan B, the Turks used the break not only to repair any damage inflicted, but also improve their system of defence in light of the recent experience. A network of roads was set up, trenches were dug or reinforced, and so were gun defences, whilst mines were assembled from torpedo-heads.[361] Enver also decided to form a separate army, the Fifth, for the defence of the Dardanelles, which was to include all the forces in the Dardanelles area, and he appointed Liman von Sanders to command it.[362]

Von Sanders and his small staff arrived and took command of the Dardanelles Fortified Zone on 26 March.[363] The new army had six infantry divisions organised into two army corps, one of which was III Corps containing Mustafa Kemal's 19th Infantry Division, which, subsequently, was to play a vital role.[364]
Everyone knew that a large Allied army was assembling for an assault, but where would the landing take place? After a brief inspection, von Sanders disregarded the experience and advice of the Fortified Zone Area Command and disbanded the old defence system.[365] According to the old plan, all units placed their main bodies near

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[359] Muhlman, a staff officer of Liman von Sanders, in *'Der Kampf um die Dardanellen, 1915*; p. 74.
[360] As The Turks Saw it. Berlin, March 22, (via London, 11:33 A. M.); in *Current History*, vol 2; Apr-Sep 1915; p. 219.
[361] See Commodore Beehler: *The Italian;* op cit for lessons learnt from conflict with Italy.
[362] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years;* op cit. 54.
[363] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 259.
[364] E.J. Erickson: *Mustafa Kemal Ataturk*, Osprey, 2013, p. 15.
[365] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years in Turkey*, pp. 57–9.

the possible landing sites and kept small reserves in the interior, Von Sanders, deeming this unsuitable for defence against modern amphibious warfare, decided that units should be placed in an observation and screening force watching over the beaches while maintaining main bodies as mobile reserves.[366] Also, the Fortified Area Command expected the main attacks to come at the southern tip of the peninsula (Seddülbahir – Cape Helles region) and Kabatepe (Gaba Tepe) region, because according to their estimate, only these two areas offered a favourable opportunity to overcome the Straits' defences, whilst Von Sanders estimated the Bolayır (Bulair) – Saros region and Beşik (Besika) Bays as the probable main landing sites.[367] So he concentrated the defence in three areas: at the Bolayır isthmus, the northern neck of the Peninsula between the Sea of Marmara and the Gulf of Saros in the Aegean; at the southern tip of the Peninsula, and on the Asian shore; and at the entrance to the Straits.[368]

On 7 April, von Sanders designated Kemal's division as the Fifth Army reserve and moved it north from Eceabat to an assembly area centred on the tiny village of Bigalı.[369] Kemal, his chief of staff Major İzzettin (later Çalışlar), and his regimental commanders trained their men for war with intensive live-firing exercises, long and rapid road marches, and combat drill rehearsals.[370] Just like other Turkish units, not only were they well-trained, but in many cases they were also well-led and prepared, and most of the regiments included veterans of the Balkan Wars, who had been training together for periods of up to eight months.[371] British assumptions regarding the Turkish Army's fighting abilities, which they dismissed, were about to cost them dearly.[372]

The Turkish system of defence, however good, was not without flaws (due to General Command's incompetence as has already become obvious during the Sarikamis and Egyptian operations). Mustafa Kemal, who had arrived in February 1915, knew the Gallipoli Peninsula from his operations against the Bulgarians in the Balkan Wars, when his headquarters, as now, was at Maidos.[373] He had then formed strong opinions about its defence, which conflicted with those of his fellow staff officers, who believed that any enemy could be prevented from landing on the Peninsula by adequate barbed wire defences on shore.[374] Kemal argued, on the contrary, that any enemy could land under cover of naval fire and that it would be the task of the defence to tackle him, after he had done so, from defensive positions inland.[375] Discussing these tactics with Rauf Orbay, who as a naval officer agreed with them, he said at the time, putting himself in the place of the enemy, 'You may have as many barbed wire

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[366] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 259.
[367] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years in Turkey*, 59–61.
[368] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; op cit; p. 144.
[369] E.J. Erickson: *Mustafa Kemal Ataturk*, op cit; p. 15.
[370] Ibid.
[371] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli*; op cit; 34.
[372] Major Gregory Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; p. 136.
[373] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 73.
[374] Ibid.
[375] Ibid.

defences as you like, but I can easily break them to pieces and land; and if I don't find superior forces to stop my advance on land, I can very well occupy the peninsula.'[376]
Kemal had learnt this lesson of military science during the Libyan campaign in 1911, when the Italians had landed their troops under the cover of naval fire, making shore defence by the Turks impossible. This had brought his attention to the inherent tactical power of naval bombardment and land-sea manoeuvres, which many others had not experienced.[377]
Mustafa Kemal, thanks to his knowledge of the terrain, also agreed with the rest of the Turkish staff that the enemy would land at two main points – Cape Helles, at the southern tip of the peninsula, where he could command the land on every side with his naval guns; and Kabatepe, on the western coast, whence he could most easily cross to the Narrows on the eastern coast.[378] Liman von Sanders was convinced otherwise, as already noted, having sent two divisions to the region of the field of Troy (on the Asian side); and two others to the narrow northern isthmus of the Peninsula at Bulair, for which he earmarked two more.[379] Of his remaining two, one was sent to Cape Helles, while the last, the 19th, under his own direct control but under the effective command of Mustafa Kemal, was held as the main reserve of his army near Maidos, ready to move to any area, north, south or west, where the main attack might fall.[380]

Turkish intelligence believed that 70,000 Allied soldiers were about to descend on the peninsula;[381] and indeed, they were not far from the real figure. The expeditionary force under General Hamilton consisted of the following:

The Royal Naval Divisions – 11,000 men.
The Anzac Corps and Cavalry – 35,000 men.
The 29th British Division, 18,000 men strong.
The French Division, numbering 18,000 men.
Total Force: 81,000 men and 178 guns.[382]

The sight of the vast armada heading was impressive. Ashmead Bartlett, the official war correspondent, thus put it:

> Whatever the eventual fate of the combined naval and military Expedition against the Dardanelles, it appeals irresistibly to the imagination. As a spectacle it is superb. Who will ever forget the scene in Mudros Bay during these weeks? From the quarter-deck of the *London* there lies spread out before my eyes an assembly of warships, transports, and smaller craft such as have never been brought together before. The whole of the bay is studded with ships, and with boats and launches plying between them. They vary in size and design from the mighty *Queen Elizabeth* with her huge 15-inch guns, dominating the picture, to the little blue-painted fishing smacks of the islanders. Every type of warship,

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[376] Ibid.
[377] Ibid.
[378] Ibid.
[379] Ibid.
[380] Ibid; p. 74.
[381] E.J. Erickson: *Mustafa Kemal Ataturk*, op cit, p. 15.
[382] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 9.

> which can be spared from the other theatres of war, and hundreds of transports, have been collected at Lemnos for this, the last and the greatest of the crusades against the Ottoman Turks.[383]

General Hamilton's plan for the landing on 25 April was as follows:
-The ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) were to land on the west side of the Peninsula and approximately 20 kilometres north of the Gallipoli peninsula's southern tip; in the vicinity of the Kabatepe and, having secured their left flank by seizing the strategic Hill 971, were to advance swiftly on Maidos to sever the Turkish communications.[384]
-The British planned to land on several beaches at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Each beach was distinguished by a letter (S, V, W, X; Y). The 29th Division was to land at these five beaches at the toe of the Peninsula and, supported by artillery fire of the fleet, was to advance and capture the commanding height of Achi Baba.[385]
-The landings at "Y" and "S" beaches were to act as flank protection while the main force was to get ashore at "X," "W," and "V" beaches all in Cape Helles (see following map.)
-The French were to land in Asia at Kumkale. The villages of Kumkale and Yenişehir were chosen because they stood almost directly opposite V Beach in the Helles area where the British 29th Division was to land.[386] The French objectives were to pin the Turks away from the main landings on the other side of the European side, prevent Turkish reinforcements over from Asia, and, even more importantly, stop Turkish shelling of V Beach.[387]
-The naval division, without the detachments, was to act as a floating reserve.[388]

4. The Allies Landing: 25 April 1915

Before 5 a.m. on 25 April 1915, the Turkish troops in the vicinity of Helles could see the flotilla numbering more than 200 vessels approaching the shore and they predicted the probable points of landing by the way the elements grouped themselves and the direction of their movements.[389] Very quickly, patrols and observation posts along the coast were reinforced from the reserve battalions in each sector and the higher command was notified.[390]
Soon after dawn the Allied troops landed in force, the British at Cape Helles and the Australians and New Zealanders north of Kabatepe. The Helles landing was made by

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[383] E. Ashmead Bartlett: *The Uncensored Dardanelles*; Hutchinson & Co, London, 1920, pp. 38-9.
[384] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 13.
[385] Ibid.
[386] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles; The French in Gallipoli;* The Joint Imperial War Museum / Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study; Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000; p. 3.
[387] Ibid.
[388] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 13.
[389] Ibid.
[390] Ibid.

the 29th Division under the command of Major-General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, on five beaches in an arc about the tip of the Peninsula, designated from east to west as S, V, W, X and Y beach. The landing troops were made up of English, French, Scots, Irish, Australians, New Zealanders, a Jewish Legion, men from both the French and British colonies, as well as a regiment of British Gurkhas, the 6th Gurkha Rifles.[391] At V Beach, the covering force from the Royal Munster Fusiliers and Royal Hampshires was landed from SS *River Clyde*, which was run aground beneath the fortress so that the troops could disembark directly via ramps to the shore. The Lancashire Fusiliers landed from open boats on W Beach, a small beach overlooked by dunes and obstructed with barbed wire.[392]

The news of the landing reached General von Sanders at the town of Gallipoli shortly after 5 a.m. and is described by him in the following terms:
From the many pale faces among the officers reporting in the early morning, it became apparent that, although a hostile landing had been expected with certainty, a landing in so many places surprised many and filled them with apprehension. My first feeling was that our arrangement needed no change; that was a great satisfaction.[393]



Map of the Allies Landing on 25 April 1915. This does not include the Anzac Cove, further to the north where Mustafa Kemal was involved.

Towards 8.00 a.m., a report from the vicinity of Bulair arrived informing that a considerable number of transports and war vessels were approaching and shelling the shore in the higher part of the Gulf of Saros.[394] Von Sanders took some inspection of the ships in action and owing to the fact that they rode very high in the water, he concluded that they contained no troops and were simply engaged in a diversion.[395] He was not yet convinced that no landing would be made at Bulair as he only moved a

[391] For the landing and subsequent operations, see I Hamilton: *Gallipoli Diary*; E Ashmead Bartlett: *Dardanelles uncensored*; and so on.
[392] For the military logistics, armies, etc, see, for instance, see Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli*; E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli*.
[393] Liman Von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; p. 63.
[394] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 13.
[395] Ibid.

few battalions from the 5th and 7th Divisions, then in that vicinity, until noon on the 27th.[396] The Allies, he judged, sought to cut the narrow neck of the peninsula and so isolate the whole of his army.[397] Whilst he remained far to the north, on the Bulair isthmus, keeping an eye on Allied ships carrying out diversionary manoeuvres, it was the 9th Turkish Division, under Colonel Khalil Sami, which took the brunt of the first wave of Allied landings from Seddülbahir to Arıburnu.[398] There indeed, battle raged ferociously.

Whilst this is not the place to analyse the battle sector by sector as a multitude of works have done it,[399] and much more competently than this author would ever be capable of, it is worth looking at some of the action to highlight the matters of interest in this work, i.e the nature and impact of the battle.

From the start, the Allies met stiff Turkish resistance, which was least expected, as it was thought the Turks would be overawed by the display of the Allies' power, and in this situation to surrender in droves. On some of the beaches the Turks inflicted so high casualties on the landing infantry that they threatened to annihilate them in their entirety. This was the case on the V Beach, where the troops emerging one by one from the sally ports on the *River Clyde* presented perfect targets to the machine guns in the Seddülbahir (literally, Sea Barrier) Fort, at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. Out of the first 200 soldiers to disembark, only 21 men made it onto the beach.[400] In many of the boats every man was killed or wounded before he had a chance to land. Of those hit while yet in the water, the wounded were quickly drowned, weighted as they were, with more than 80 pounds of equipment.[401] The Turks claim that not a single boat of the first wave was able to return to the vessels for its second load.[402] In fact, on some of the landing boats, John Masefield, who wrote possibly the first or one of the first two books on Gallipoli (in 1916), states that the average life of an Allied soldier was not more than three minutes.[403] Contrary to what many modern authors wrongly state, contemporary accounts show that the officers were as gallant as the men. On that same V Beach, more men tried to land, headed by Brigadier-General Napier, who was instantly killed with nearly all his followers.[404]

> During this carnival of death [says Patton] in which heavy shells from the Asiatic shore added their bass notes to the high, staccato cackle of the rifles and machine guns, the heroism of the infantry was well equaled by the valor of the

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[396] Ibid.
[397] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 74.
[398] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 146.
[399] I. Hamilton: *Gallipoli Diary*; E. Ashmead Bartlett: *Dardanelles*; op cit; Turkish side: E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli*; op cit.
[400] "Irish battalions—major battles (Part III of XI) Helles Landings, Gallipoli, April 1915" *Royal Dublin Fusiliers: Remembering the Great War website*. 2005.
[401] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit, p. 28.
[402] Ibid.
[403] J. Masefield: *Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 39.
[404] Ibid; p. 40.

> sailors, who, manning the boats and deprived of the thrill of combat, stayed by their oars until death relieved them.[405]

The Turkish platoon beat back several determined attacks on their hilltop position, the defenders eventually disengaging under cover of darkness.[406] At that same Seddülbahir, a Turkish sergeant, Mehmet, achieved national fame by rushing at a British sailor with a rock when his rifle jammed. Mustafa Kemal helped publicise this incident,[407] which gave birth to the term Mehmetçik (Little Mehmet), used to this day as a nickname for Turkish soldiers.[408] Likewise, the French on the Asian shore faced the firepower of the Turks, and as with the other Allied landings, soon the waiting hospital, the transport ships, and the beaches were filled with bodies.[409]

Everywhere the Turks were inferior in numbers, and of course, armament. On X Beach, by 11:30 a.m., seven British companies were engaged against a force of Turks who could not possibly have exceeded one and a half companies.[410] At 1:00 p.m., the 2nd Battalion of the Division reserve, the 87th Brigade, namely the Inniskilling Fusiliers, began to land. From 11:30 a.m. on, the troops at X Beach, which by 1:00 p.m. had been increased to three battalions, remained idle. This inertia, Patton explains, is probably accounted for a number of reasons, including, heavy losses in commanding officers, and the fact that the British at all the beaches were obsessed with the belief that they were opposed by at least a division of Turks.[411] Here, Patton offers us a good picture of how the situation evolved throughout the day in regard to the size of the opposing armies:

04:30 a.m.; 1,500 British opposed to 700 Turks.
05:30 a.m.; 4,000 British opposed to 700 Turks.
10:00 a.m.; 8,000 British opposed to 4,200 Turks.
02:00 p.m.; 12,000 British with two mountain batteries opposed to 6,300 Turks with 14 guns.
04:00 p.m.; 16,000 British opposed to 8,400 Turks.
At dark; 22,000 British opposed to 8,400 Turks.[412]

The fact that the power of a force is not measured by its number is seen with the attack against the Australian brigade by fifteen Turks (under Mustafa Kemal).[413]

Despite their lower numbers, and their much lower armament and fire-power, especially artillery, the Turks resisted so stoutly as to disable the Ally plan and their advance. Masefield explains why the Allies could not press on, not due to bad

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[405] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*, op cit; 28.
[406] E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to Die: a History of the Ottoman army in the First World War*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing; 2000; p. 84.
[407] Mustafa Kemal's report of 7 March 1915 to the command of the Straits Fortified Area (Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, I, 210). In the account 25 December 1916, he sent to the military history department of the Ottoman general staff, he said that he had immediately requested that Sergeant Mehmet should be decorated as an example to others (Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, I, 282).
[408] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 143.
[409] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles; The French in Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 3.
[410] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; 23.
[411] Ibid.
[412] Ibid; p. 18.
[413] Ibid.

command or any other reason offered by lousy historians today (Erickson excepted), but simply due to the fact that they had been bled to death by the Turks. At V Beach, the Munsters lost more than one-third and the Dublins more than three fifths of their total strength. The Lancashires at W Beach lost nearly as heavily as the Dublins. At X Beach, the Royals lost 487 out of 979. At Anzac, Mustafa Kemal's fighting ground, one Australian battalion lost 422 out of 900. All these battalions had lost more than half their officers.[414]

In spite of fierce Turkish opposition, the Allies established beachheads from where they intended to progress; two of them that could have resulted in Turkish disasters, instead, ending in Ally abysmal failure: i.e Arıburnu point (Anzac Cove), and Y Beach. We look at both, beginning with the Anzac Cove landing.



This map shows the main landing sites on the Gallipoli Peninsula, including the Anzac Cove. It also shows Y beach and to the far north the Suvla Bay site, which will come to fame in August of the same year. It also shows the front lines at the end of the campaign (December 1915-January 1916).

The Anzac Cove Landing and the Role of Mustafa Kemal

The Anzac Cove is notoriously famous, for there it was that Mustafa Kemal saved the situation with his men. On the morning of 25 April, his 19th Division was being held in reserve at Bigalı (Boghali) Village, near Maydos, some five miles away from Anzac Cove on the other side of the Peninsula.[415] Mustafa Kemal, awoken that morning at Bigalı by the naval bombardment, soon found himself right at the centre of the events. Artillery fire came from beyond the Sari Bayır (Bair) range, a long and often precipitous ridge running parallel with the western coast, and rising up to three prominent crests of a thousand feet, and breaking

[414] J. Masefield: *Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 61.
[415] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 146.

up near the sea into subsidiary ridges covered in ravines.[416] On Khalil Sami's instruction to despatch a battalion immediately to help hold the hills east of Arıburnu point, Mustafa Kemal led his 57th Regiment, a cavalry company and a mountain battery across the Peninsula.[417]

At Anzac Cove, the Australians had struck the beach at exactly 4:30 a.m, unseen by the Turkish sentinels until they were within fifty yards of the beach.[418] The effect of surprise and the small number of defenders was decisive, and the first wave of Australians numbering first 2,500 men, then 4,000 by 5:30 a.m. ran over the single company opposed to it.[419]

About 6:00 a.m., Khalil Sami, commanding the 9th Division received the news that Ally troops had landed in the vicinity of Kabatepe. Not knowing anything about the landings at the toe of the peninsula, he directed his northern sector reserves, which consisted of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 27th Infantry, reinforced by the machine gun company of the 9th Division, to move from the village of Maydos to the scene of the landing and drive the English into the sea.[420] This force started on its four-mile march at 7:30 a.m, but an hour and half later, was spotted, and under fire from the Allies, suffered considerable losses.[421] When these troops started marching, Khalil Sami was informed that a battalion of Australians had landed further to the north near Arıburnu and were moving in the vicinity of Hill 971, which was the crest of the mountain ridge Sari Bayır.[422] As the situation at the toe of the Peninsula was then becoming critical and as he had no more reserves to spare, he asked Mustafa Kemal to intervene. Mustafa Kemal himself, had, as early as 5:30 a.m., received information of the landings, realised quickly these were no mere diversions, and had already begun to act. Even more, he also had long understood that any force taking Hill 971 had the key of the Peninsula in its possession.[423] A single battalion was not sufficient to hold the position, so, acting beyond his authority as a divisional commander, he ordered his best regiment, the 57th, with a mountain battery, to advance up the ridge to the crest of Koja Chemen.[424] It so happened that on the morning of 25 April, the 57th Regiment, 19th Division, was scheduled for a field exercise in the vicinity of Hill 971.[425] On reading the report of the landing, Mustafa Kemal turned to his chief of staff and asked, 'Have the men ammunition?' On an affirmative reply, he ordered the regiment reinforced by one mountain battery to move at once and, map in hand, personally led it along a route to place it between the advancing enemy on Battleship Hill and the crest.[426]

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[416] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 74.
[417] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 146.
[418] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 16.
[419] Ibid.
[420] Ibid.
[421] Ibid; p. 17.
[422] Ibid.
[423] Ibid.
[424] Lord P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 75.
[425] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 17.
[426] Ibid.

Kemal's decision was a bold one. He was committing the bulk of von Sanders' reserve, on the basis of not very clear information as to the strength of the enemy, but only on that of his own intuition that this was the crucial attack. Had his judgement been wrong, had the enemy planned another important landing elsewhere, there would have been only one Turkish regiment left to resist it; but he was right, and he knew it.[427] The Australians had indeed landed en force, not at Kabatepe, as they had planned and as the Turks had expected, but on a beach at Ariburnu – the 'Cape of Bees' – a mile to the north of it, the site now known as Anzac Cove. Here the Turks were unprepared for them, and despite formidable natural obstacles the Australians swept through confused opposition.[428]

Kemal, followed by his officers and men, were battling through the difficult terrain made of thick undergrowth, dried-up watercourses strewn with boulders, trying to find their way. Two guides, sent on ahead, lost touch with the main body and it was Kemal himself, riding at the head of a company and consulting a map and compass, who finally led the way.[429] From Koja Chemen he looked down and could see the powerful armada, but he could not see where the landed Australians were. Seeing that his men were tired from their arduous climb, he ordered their officers to give them a ten-minute break, whilst he, and a few of his staff, moved towards Conk Bayırı (Chunuk Bair). As the horses could not move through the very difficult terrain, they dismounted and proceeded on foot. Then reaching the crest of a hill, waiting for his troops to catch up, suddenly there emerged a group of retreating Turkish soldiers from the 9th Division. He asked:

> "–Why are you running away?
> "– The enemy, sir …" they said.
> – Where?"
> "Over there," they said pointing to hill altitude 261 metres. [This hill led to higher peak known as Conk Bayırı, Chunuk Bair in British sources.] A line of Australians was freely advancing. They were closer to Kemal than his own troops, whom he had left behind to rest.
> He turned to the men:
> "–You mustn't run away from the enemy!"[430]
> –'We've no more ammunition left,' they replied.
> –'If you've got no ammunition, you have your bayonets."
> [I] ordered them to fix their bayonets and lie down.[431]

As they did so, the Australians halted, also lying down. The Turks had won time. He sent an officer back to instruct his own infantrymen to join them as a matter of emergency, together with any available gunners from the mountain battery.

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[427] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 75.
[428] Ibid.
[429] Ibid.
[430] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 146.
[431] Mustafa Kemal reports this portion of the words he addressed to the troops in the report which he submitted to the military history section of the general staff in January 1917 (Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, I, 292). The additions occur in the interview he gave to Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın) in March 1918 (Şapolyo, 106, 108).

It was a moment of hesitation by the Australians that may well have decided the fate of the Peninsula, for now the 57th Regiment began to come up, and Kemal sent it straight into action. He rode through the forward positions, driving the troops over the slope, placed his mountain battery on the ridge, helped wheel its guns into position, then, directing operations from the skyline with a complete disregard for his own life,[432] he ordered the Regiment:

> I don't order you to attack. I order you to die. By the time we are dead, other units and commanders will have come up to take our place.[433]

By the end of the battle almost the whole of the 57th Regiment had died, 'Charging continuously through a curtain of enemy rifle-fire to win immortality in the annals of the Turkish army.'[434]

But the Turkish fire was even more deadly, shattering the Anzacs as they surged into view over a ridge, while Turkish artillery pounded them, forcing them to scatter and take cover in the scrubs without the possibility to return fire. Their artillery was not yet in action, and even the naval batteries did not fire, fearing to hit their own men on a front so confused.[435] As shells exploded and gun-fire mowed men from every direction, all around, troops were engaged in fierce hand to hand fighting; neither Turks nor Australians knew just who was friend or foe.[436] Meanwhile Kemal, once again without authority, had ordered a second regiment – composed of Arab troops – into the line to reinforce the first.[437] Then he rode back to the Corps Headquarters at Maydos to report to Esad Pasha and urge upon him the necessity for an all-out attack with every man available. Esad agreed and handed over to him the remaining regiment of the 19th Division, thus putting him in command of the whole Sarı Bayır front.[438]

As the afternoon wore on, the Anzacs were slowly driven back, not indeed to the sea, as Kemal insistently urged, but to the coastal spurs and ridges which they had occupied early that morning.

When night fell, the fighting calmed somehow. But, in the words of the official historian, there was

> No rest for anyone on those rugged hillsides that night. Worn out with fatigue, scattered and disorganized, it was impossible for either side to make further progress. But the noise of battle continued; and with only the flash of their assailants' rifles to guide them, invaders and invaded alike kept up a continuous fire.[439]

By the end of the first day, the British had successfully seized a precarious foothold, but at great cost.[440] That night, Anzac troops that had become separated from their

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[432] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 76.
[433] The fullest Turkish account of the fighting, based on Mustafa Kemal's subsequent reports, is in C. Erikan, *Komutan Atatürk* (Atatürk as a Commander), T. İş Bankası, Ankara 1972; 128 et seq.
[434] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 76.
[435] Ibid.
[436] Ibid.
[437] Ibid; p. 73.
[438] Ibid.
[439] Ibid.
[440] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; p. 136.

units began to drift back towards the beach.[441] General Birdwood at Anzac Cove sent a message to Hamilton, asking that a withdrawal from Anzac might be necessary that night.[442] After conferring with his officers, Hamilton replied that a supreme effort must be made to hold on, insisting that the southern force had established a bridgehead around Cape Helles, and should advance the following day, diverting pressure from Arıburnu. He added a postscript: 'You have got through the difficult business and you have only to dig, dig, dig until you are safe.'[443]
The Turks had effectively wrested the initiative from the Allies, at least in the vicinity of Anzac Cove.[444] Kemal himself spent the night without sleep, riding over the whole front, seeking information, and giving orders for the following day. Ally reinforcements were being landed under cover of darkness as he rode.[445]

The Landing at Y Beach:

> Cleverly conceived, happily opened, hesitatingly conducted, miserably ended – such is the story of the landing at Y Beach.[446]

The Ally failure on the Y beach once more highlights the fact that the great difference between the Allies and the Turks was not just mere determination but also leadership initiative on the ground. Turkish officers died at an extremely high rate, suggesting their fighting at the head of their men,[447] and adapting to the evolving situation. This was not the case for the Allies. Not that Sir Hamilton was a coward, far from it, and British officers know how to fight, too, and they paid a considerable price. On this occasion, it would seem the problem was mainly poor communications and most certainly a too strict abiding by the plans, which was especially obvious during the first moments of the landing.[448] Sir Ian Hamilton monitored events from aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*, and Admiral de Robeck, commander of the Royal Navy's ships in the eastern Mediterranean, was also aboard the *Queen Elizabeth*.[449] Hamilton's failure to plan for communications between the forces ashore and afloat affected badly the Ally action at Y Beach.[450] The landings at Y Beach were aimed at relieving pressure on other landing sites further south and cutting Turkish communications with the toe of the Peninsula, besides protecting the left flank of the British line as it advanced north.[451] The spot selected was a secluded gully three and one quarter miles northeast

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[441] R. Pryor, Gallipoli: *The End of the Myth;* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009; p. 119.
[442] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; p. 137.
[443] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 77.
[444] C.E.W. Bean: *Official History of Australia in the War 1914–1918: The Story of Anzac* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1938), 1: 461.
[445] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 77.
[446] Brigadier General C F Aspinall-Oglander: *Official History of the Great War: Military Operations - Gallipoli*, Volume I (London: William Heinemann, 1929), p. 214.
[447] This is noted by all historians of the Gallipoli campaign, including Ashmead Bartlett; Sir Ian Hamilton; Erickson;…
[448] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; 139.
[449] Ibid.
[450] Ibid.
[451] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 19.

of Tekke Burnu with water so deep that cruisers could lay within 400 yards of the beach. The beach was narrow, and from it rose steep slopes to a height of about 250 feet.[452] The great advantage here was that the Turks were not expecting a landing at this location and had therefore left it undefended; the nearest Turkish troops were two platoons of infantry more than a mile away to the south, near the mouth of Gully Ravine.[453]

Early in the morning, as the naval bombardment opened down the coast at Helles, two battalions were landed at Y Beach.[454] Scouts quickly scaled the cliff and, with the exception of four Turks (two of whom were killed and the others captured), there was no other opposition.[455]

The main landing of the 29th Division at Cape Helles was being held up due to the fierce fighting at V and W Beaches, and was in serious danger of failing altogether, while a march south would have allowed the Y Beach force to encircle and destroy the entire Turkish garrison.[456] But this was not included in the remit of the Y Beach force. They only did what they had been asked to do. Valuable time was lost, and soon Turkish reinforcements were on their way south. At 1:00 p.m., Colonel Khalil Sami, commanding the 9th Turkish Division, had sent a battalion of the 25th Infantry, a section of machine guns, and a battery of field artillery from his reserve at Serafin Baru, to attack Y Beach so as to remove the threat to his communications with Helles.[457] The first attack started at 5:30 p.m., preceded by brief shelling, and thereafter, other attacks were repeated with great force.[458] Two more companies of Turks, also from the 25th Infantry, arrived at 11:00 p.m. to bring the attacking Turks to almost half the strength of the defending British.[459]

Captain R.W. Whigham, commanding 'D' Company of the 1st KOSB, recalled the fighting:

> By this time one could see far better what was going on as the moon, which was nearly full, lit up the whole of our front and one could see line upon line of Turks advancing against our position. They fought with extraordinary bravery and as each line was swept away by our fire another one advanced against us... The attack worked up and down our whole front as if they were looking for some weak spot to break through our line. I saw one man, during one of these advances continue to run towards us after all his companions had stopped. He ran at full speed towards us, dodging about all over the place. He got up to within about fifty yards of the trench and then I saw him drop. Four times during

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[452] Ibid.
[453] A. Richards: Helles: *The Landing on 'Y' Beach, 25 April 1915;* The Joint Imperial War Museum / Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000: *Anthony Richards (IWM);* p. 1.
[454] Major Gregory A. Thiele: Why Did Gallipoli Fail? op cit; p. 139.
[455] A. Richards: *Helles: The Landing on 'Y' Beach,* op cit; p. 2.
[456] *Ibid.*
[457] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 20.
[458] Ibid.
[459] Ibid.

> the night they got right up to my trench before they were shot and one Turk engaged one of my men over the parapet with his bayonet and was then shot.[460]

At dawn the Turks withdrew for a while but at 7:00 a.m. on the 26th, they made a final attack which broke the centre of the British line but which was finally stopped.[461] Once more, Captain Whigham describes what happened:

> We were beginning to hope that now the daylight was coming we might be able to drive them off for good when a terrific fire was poured into us from all sides and we were heavily shelled. The Turks broke right through our line. I saw the men in the trenches begin to crumple up but the Turks were right on our flank and nothing could stop them and our men began to retire right on top of us, many of them jumping into the trench we were in and if we had not retired we would have been trampled to death. We got out and ran for the gorge... and here I managed to stay a few of the men and lined them up to try and keep back the Turks... The only thing I could do was to collect as many as I could and get them up onto the top of a bluff to my right and then I made them lie down and open a heavy fire on the Turk. Then I went along to the right of our position to find out what had happened... I found dead and wounded lying about all over the place. The Turks had broken through and got right into the trenches and had to be driven out at the point of the bayonet and our losses were very heavy. Wherever I went I found our poor fellows lying dead and here and there a Turk who had got right in beyond our trenches. For a long time I thought I was the only officer left alive and then I discovered a subaltern in the RMLI and we collected as many men as we could find to repel any further attack on our position. Fortunately the Turk had got more than he bargained for during the night and left us alone but it was a fearfully anxious time.[462]

On this the Turks withdrew for the rest of the day, not another shot was fired. The British, however, began to send the most disjointed messages, asking for assistance, the final straw being the bursting in their ranks of some Navy *overs* about the time of the last Turkish attack.[463] The sight of wounded troops being evacuated gave the impression to many of those at the main landing place that a withdrawal had begun, and many unwounded stragglers climbed into the boats making the situation worse.[464] Panic, 'that most contagious of military diseases,'[465] spread across the beach and a series of further alarmist messages were sent throughout the next hour to the supporting ships, calling for help.[466]

> In my opinion [says Lieutenant Keyes] we could and ought to have held that position, and the reason why we failed was that the majority of the Plymouth Battalion of the RND ran... I only allowed boats to approach to embark the

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[460] *Papers of General Sir Ian Hamilton*, File 17/7/33 – Ms Transcription of a letter written by Captain R.W. Whigham, 25 April – 10 May 1915, pp.5-6.
[461] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 21.
[462] Captain R.W. Whigham, *Papers of Sir Ian Hamilton*; op cit, pp.7-9.
[463] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 21.
[464] A. Richards: *Helles: The Landing on 'Y' Beach,* op cit; p. 4.
[465] Brigadier General C F Aspinall-Oglander, op cit., p. 210.
[466] A. Richards: *Helles: The Landing on 'Y' Beach,* op cit; p. 4.

> wounded, and as more boats came in they got out of hand, and approached the beach. There were about 400 RMLI on the beach, mostly without rifles, and very few officers. These men rushed to the boats. I managed to stop the rush and tried to organise them and drive them up the cliff to fight, but they were quite hopeless.[467]

It now seemed too late to stop the withdrawal, or to retrieve the lost opportunity, except by a fresh landing under fire. Colonel Matthews therefore signalled to the 29th Division:

'Situation critical. Urgently need reinforcements and ammunition, without which cannot maintain ridge at Y. Alternative is to retire on to beach under cover of ships' guns.'[468]

As the Division had not replied to any of his nine messages asking for help, when at 11:00 a.m., he found that nearly all his men had left, he too gave in and evacuated the position although there was not a living Turk in sight.[469]

> This [Patton says] is probably the most futile (and possibly the most disgraceful) 31 hours in the history of the British Army. True, the losses had been over 600 on the part of the British and about fifty percent on the side of the Turks but, when it is realized that the total number of Turks hardly equaled the British losses, we have to admit that they shot well.[470]

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The Devastation of War

Ashmead Bartlett, who a few days earlier had watched the impressive armada sailing to conquer 'Constantinople,' now could see what had become of some of the men on board:

> Throughout the afternoon the fighting continued, and the *London* was continually receiving signals to bombard positions, where the Turks were vigorously pressing the Australians back to the first line of hills they had seized at dawn. It became more and more obvious that the Dominion troops were extremely hard pressed. The wounded were brought off the shore in boats and pinnaces, in a never-ending stream, and the accommodation on the single hospital ship, allotted to Anzac, speedily gave out. As usual, with the start of all British expeditions, the medical arrangements were totally inadequate to meet the requirements of the hour. Optimism had minimised our casualties to the finest possible margin, but the Turks multiplied them at an alarming rate. Apparently there was no one in authority to direct the streams of wounded to other ships where accommodation could be found for them, and many were taken on board the warships. Finally, orders came that the wounded were to be sent on board those transports which had already discharged their landing parties, and doctors would be sent aboard to look after them until they reached Egypt. But many succumbed who might otherwise have been saved. The boats returning to the *London* all brought the same tale of things going badly, heavy casualties, the beaches choked with wounded, who could not be moved, while the enemy's attack

[467] Letter from Lieutenant Commander Adrian Keyes RN; letter of 9 April 1918, p. 1.
[468] A. Richards: *Helles: The Landing on 'Y' Beach,* op cit; p. 5.
[469] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 21.
[470] Ibid.

showed no diminution in strength or persistency. About 9.30 p.m., one of our pinnaces came off for fuel and water, and I was able to return in her to the beach. We steamed in close to the shore under what appeared to be a kind of hailstorm caused by the bullets striking the sea. Fortunately most of this fire was high, and I found some cover under the shelter of the hills, when I had landed on the narrow beach, some thirty yards wide.

I climbed ashore over some barges and found myself in the semidarkness amidst a scene of indescribable confusion. The beach was piled with ammunition and stores, hastily dumped from the lighters, among which lay the dead and wounded, and men so absolutely exhausted that they had fallen asleep in spite of the deafening noise of the battle. In fact, it was impossible to distinguish between the living and the dead in the darkness. Through the gloom I saw the ghost-like silhouettes of groups of men wandering around in a continuous stream apparently going to, or returning from, the firing-line. On the hills above there raged an unceasing struggle lit up by the bursting shells, and the night air was humming with bullets like the droning of countless bees on a hot summer's day.[471]

Elsewhere, on V Beach is the description by Masefield, following a day of intense fighting, and the most formidable Ally artillery fire, which left everything in rubble:

The day passed thus, but at nightfall the Turks fire paused, and the men came ashore from the *River Clyde*, almost unharmed. They joined the survivors on the beach, and at once attacked the old fort and the village above it. These works were strongly held by the enemy. All had been ruined by the fire from the fleet, but in the rubble and ruin of old masonry there were thousands of hidden riflemen backed by machine guns. Again and again they beat off our attacks, for there was a bright moon and they knew the ground, and our men had to attack uphill over wire and broken earth and heaped stones in all the wreck and confusion and strangeness of war at night in a new place. Some of the Dublins and Munsters went astray in the ruins, and were wounded far from their fellows, and so lost. The Turks became more daring after dark; while the light lasted they were checked by the *River Clyde's* machine guns, but at midnight they gathered unobserved and charged.

They came right down on to the beach, and in the darkness and moonlight much terrible and confused fighting followed. Many were bayoneted, many shot, there was wild firing and crying, and then the Turk attack melted away, and their machine guns began again. When day dawned, the survivors of the landing party were crouched under the shelter of the sandbank; they had had no rest; most of them had been fighting all night; all had landed across the corpses of their friends. No retreat was possible, nor was it dreamed of, but to stay there was hopeless.

Lieut-Colonel Doughty-Wylie gathered them together for an attack; the fleet opened a terrific fire upon the ruins of the fort and village, and the landing party went forward again, fighting from bush to bush and from stone to stone, till the ruins were in their hands. Shells still fell among them, single Turks, lurking under cover, sniped them and shot them... This was the worst and the bloodiest of all the landings.[472]

[471] E. Ashmead Bartlett: *The Dardanelles Uncensored*; op cit; p. 48.
[472] J. Masefield: *Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 41.

Four

GALLIPOLI (Phase Two)
(May 1915- January 1916)

> Much as the world appreciated the virtues of the Turk as a fighting man, it must be confessed that he furnished the allied troops with an unpleasant surprise. He displayed, first of all, a quite remarkable degree of bravery, hurling himself against the intrenched troops of France and England with an abandon and a disregard of personal safety that excited the admiration of his enemies. The whole Gallipoli campaign is replete with examples of Turkish valor.[473]

1. May 1915: A War of Attrition on All Fronts

The last few days of April ended with what was to be expected: violent assaults and counter-assaults by both sides. In Asia, the situation had stabilised, with German Lieutenant Nicolai's 3rd Infantry Division inflicting heavy losses on the French and completely driving them off by April 29.[474] This success made it possible for the Turks to move another regiment of the 11th Infantry Division and two regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division across the Narrows in successive detachments to reinforce the forces there.[475]

These arrivals were a welcome boost to already heavily-bled Turkish ranks, now facing the first, heaviest counter-assault, in the so-called First Battle for Krithia on 28 April. This first major breakout attempt by the Allies occurred at the Cape Helles beachhead (at the southern Tip of the Peninsula), and was aimed at the capture of the village of Krithia (Alçıtepe). Although sustained by massive artillery fire from land and sea, this attack failed in the face of fierce Turkish defence by the 9th Infantry Division, and both sides suffered heavily.[476] On 30 April, the Turks responded with a counter-offensive, which was beaten back with heavy loss of life.[477] The Turks had tried to counter-attack by night, but the scarcity of artillery ammunition limited their preparatory barrage to just a few minutes, which only succeeded in waking up the British in their trenches.[478] Also as Richard Pelvin shows the navy played a central role, not just in carrying out the traditional maritime tasks, but also in assisting Ally

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[473] The Project Gutenberg eBook, *The Story of the Great War*, Volume IV (of 8), Edited by Francis J. (Francis Joseph) Reynolds, Allen L. (Allen Leon) Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller; vol 4; 2009; p. 344.
[474] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 84.
[475] Ibid.
[476] Ibid; p. 85.
[477] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 147; E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 85.
[478] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 85.

land-fighting, especially at night.[479] The ships' guns held up Turkish reinforcements, their searchlights hindering Turkish attacks by night, and worse, as here Liman van Sanders explains:

> It must be stated here that the artillery effect of the hostile battleships constituted a support of extraordinary power for the landing army. No heavy land artillery can so easily change position and direct its fire on the enemy's flank and rear as was possible to the guns of the ships. Add to this that the ships' guns could direct their fire as on the firing ground without being under fire themselves, and that observation was assisted by captive balloons and aviators, in both of which the (Turkish) Fifth Army was wholly deficient.[480]

The month of May would witness the same war of attrition both sides throwing all they had at each other in one of the deadliest contests of world warfare. Between 1 and 2 May, Turkish attacks against the French, who had now joined the rest of the Allies on the Aegean side of the Straits, resulted in 2000 French casualties.[481] The following days, on the night of 3-4 May, Turkish attacks intensified and virtually every man in the French 1st Division including cooks and orderlies, became involved in the defence of their positions.[482] It would seem by this stage, the Senegalese troops had become reluctant to fight, leaving their positions relatively quickly, and there seems to be the case of execution of Senegalese on the spot witnessed by a French doctor.[483] Here, we have some very interesting accounts by German officers who noted how the Muslim troops from French colonies were not keen to fight the Turks, which somehow echoes the same fact witnessed on the British side at Kut al Amarah as to be seen further down. A German officer notes in his letter how French Colonial troops and Senegalese came ashore in small boats and tried to gain ground. Some of the Senegalese straight raised the white flag and sought to join the Turkish side.[484] As soon as this was noticed by the Allies' fleet, they began shelling heavily the Senegalese party killing many.[485] Those amongst the colonial troops that could join with the Turks spoke of how Ally propaganda had spread the news that the Turks had given the Germans the Holy places of Makkah and Madinah, and that now, the Allies were 'About to bring the blasphemers to account and to win back these places so holy to the Moslems.'[486] It is easy to imagine how in those days of poor communications and widespread illiteracy it would be quite easy to convince simple, uneducated, young men, especially if say an imam or tribal leader, whether sold out or out of fear, confirmed those stories.

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[479] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla, August 1915: Naval aspects of the Suvla Bay landings and the genesis of modern amphibious warfare;* The Joint Imperial War Museum / Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000; pp. 1-10.
[480] Liman von Sanders: Five Years; op cit; p. 69.
[481] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles; The French in Gallipoli;* The Joint Imperial War Museum / Australian War Memorial Battlefield Study; Tour to Gallipoli, September 2000; p. 6.
[482] Ibid.
[483] Subin *Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles, Dr Subin's letters to his English Wife.* William Heinemann, 1916; in Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles;* p. 8.
[484] With the Turks on the Plains of Troy; From a German Officer's Letter; in *Current History* vol 3; Oct 15-March 16; p. 76.
[485] Ibid.
[486] Ibid.

As the second battle of the Krithia opened on 6 May, the French were forty minutes late leaving their trenches, and pinned down by intense Turkish fire, could hardly make any progress in the area of Kereves Dere.[487] As they failed to fill the gaps, the British Hood, Anson and Howe Battalions were exposed to Turkish fire and suffered huge losses.[488] Two days later, on 8 May the French had still not made any significant advance and were despairing of ever getting near Kereves Dere.[489] The Commander of the 1st Division's Metropolitan Brigade reported that the morale of the famed Zouave troops was failing, and all of the Frenchmen were tired and despondent.[490] To compound the situation, the Turks, who had survived the bombardment, submitted the attacking Allies to intense fire from rifles, machine guns, and artillery, taking a huge toll across the Allied line. The French managed in the end to capture only four hundred meters in three days of costly attacks.[491]

Just like the French, the British had suffered immensely; by May 5 the British 29th Division had lost one-half of its men and nearly 70 per cent of its officers.[492] Losses on both sides were offset by the arrival of fresh troops; the Allies from the sea, the Turks by land. The Allies' logistics were formidable. Their command of the seas was a major element in this; and the availability of vast naval transport playing a central role. Subsequently, for the Suvla operation, the huge liners, which could move at a speed of 25 knots, made them virtually impossible targets for the submarines of then, and so they could reach Mudros directly without much difficulty.[493] Each of these giant vessels that could carry up to 6,000 men made the trip from the UK to the Gallipoli front line in just a week, when other transports spent fifteen days via Alexandria.[494] The *Aquitania* was thus able to carry in one month nearly 12,000 troops in two voyages;[495] and even more, these ships literally carried men from the embarking port straight onto the battlefield. On the Turkish side, when the French evacuated their beachhead on the Asian shore at Kum Kale, late in April, Turkish troops opposing them were moved to the other side of the Narrows, while troops which had been kept further north at Bolayır moved down to Arıburnu, and even more reinforcements arrived from as far afield as Syria.[496]

Throughout the campaign, except for very brief spells, the Turks controlled the higher grounds, but this was by no means without disadvantages. Ally shells could reach them with lethal power. On another level, whilst the Allies down by the beach had the sea water to keep them refreshed through the Summer (drinking water came in large

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[487] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles;* op cit; p. 7.
[488] Ibid.
[489] Ibid.
[490] Ibid.
[491] Ibid.
[492] Major Edwin W. Dayton: Military Operations of the War; *CH*; Vol 6; p. 503.
[493] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla*; op cit; p. 5.
[494] Ibid.
[495] Ibid.
[496] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 147.

containers), the Turks, on land, although having enough drinking water, suffered considerably from heat, smells of corpses in their thousands, left unburied, decaying under the late Spring-and Summer heat, and no possibility to escape in the refreshing sea-water as the Allies could.

Most certainly the greatest Turkish disadvantage lay in artillery fire capacity, whether in respect to the range of the guns or the lethal power of the shells; they also had both in much lower numbers. Turkish field batteries were only able to fire approximately 18,000 artillery rounds between early May and the first week of June.[497] Which is utterly negligible in comparison to the Allies, who could fire that amount in just a few days. In fact when they landed, the Allies pounded Turkish positions with 345 naval guns, some of which were of very large caliber, without any interruption for long stretches of time, meaning that if each of them fired only fifty rounds, which was certainly far exceeded, that would equal in one day what the Turks fired in one month.[498]

Whilst on land, the French 75-mm guns caused terrible havoc on the Turks, naval gunfire was most effective on many instances against their flanks, such as on 6-8 May, when Turkish frontline trenches on the left flank at Helles were destroyed.[499] The effects of Ally shells were utterly overwhelming. The war correspondent Ashmead Bartlett wrote:

> Turkish infantry moved forward to the attack, they were met with every kind of shell which our warships carry, from 15-inch shrapnel from the *Queen Elizabeth*, each one of which contains 20,000 bullets, to 12-inch, 6-inch, and 12-pounders. The noise, smoke, and concussion produced were unlike anything the imagination can picture, or words can paint. The hills in front looked as if they had been transformed into smoking volcanoes; the common shell throwing up great chunks of ground and masses of black smoke, whilst the shrapnel formed a white canopy above. Sections of the ground were covered by each ship all round our front trenches, and, the ranges being accurately known, the shooting was excellent.[500]

Here is General Hamilton, from the deck of his warship, watching shellfire from land and sea blasting the Turkish front:

> Under so many savage blows, the labouring mountains brought forth Turks. Here and there advancing lines; dots moving over green patches; dots following one another across a broad red scar on the flank of Sari Bair; others following – and yet others-and others, closing in, disappearing, reappearing in close waves converging on the central and highest part of our position. The tic-tac of the machine-guns and the rattle of the rifles accompanied the roar of the big guns as hail, pouring down on a greenhouse, plays fast and loose amidst the peals of God's artillery. We have got some guns right up the precipitous cliff: the noise doubled; redoubled; quadrupled, expanded into one immense tiger-

[497] E.J Erickson: *Ordered to die*; op cit; p. 89.
[498] For the figure of 345 guns, G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 25.
[499] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla*; op cit; p. 2.
[500] E. Ashmed Bartlett: *The Uncensored Dardanelles*; op cit; p. 52.

like growl—a solid mass of the enemy showed itself crossing the green patch—and then the good *Queen Lizzie* picked up her targets—crash!!! Stop your ears with wax.

The fire slackened. The attack had ebbed away; our fellows were holding their ground. A few, very few little dots had run back over that green patch – the others had passed down into the world of darkness.[501]

The Allies Dig in.



In the middle of the stalemate that lasted until the great offensive of August 6, both sides kept mounting attacks and counter-attacks, which entailed terrible losses.

Erickson observes how both the Allies and the Turks were able to penetrate the other's lines to a depth of 500-1,000m but then, unable to reinforce these penetrations for further advances, being subsequently pushed back by violent counter-attacks.[502] Both sides were unable to control the attacks 'in a manner that maintained unit integrity and these battles ended with the attacking formations hopelessly intermixed and leaderless.'[503] The human cost in these situations of tenacious close combat in a restricted space, involving tens of thousands of men armed with the means of modern

[501] Sir Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli*; vol 1; pp. 154-155.
[502] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 92.
[503] Ibid; p. 93.

warfare, could only be devastating butchery. This is perfectly caught in the following description by Masefield, who, however partisan in favour of the Allies, captures perfectly, as no ordinary historian can, the triviality, violence, and rawness of such encounters. In the wake of the Allies' 29th Division attack on the Turks (the Second Battle of the Krithia) on 6 May:

> They dashed on, or crawled, for a few yards at a time, then dropped for a few instants before squirming on again... Men fall wounded in the fire, and the cartridges in their bandoliers explode and slowly kill them... Those who are not killed lie down among the flowers, and begin to scrape little heaps of earth with their hands to give protection to their heads. In the light sandy marl this does not take long, though many are blown to pieces or hit in the back as they scrape... A man peering from his place in the flowers may make out that the man next to him, some three yards away, is dead, and that the man beyond is praying, the man beyond him cursing, and the man beyond him out of his mind from nerves or thirst...
>
> There is a little wood to their front; they make for that, and suddenly come upon a deep and narrow Turk trench full of men. This is their first sight of the enemy. They leap down into the trench, and fight hand to hand, kill and are killed, in the long grave already dug. They take the trench, but opening from the trench are saps, which the Turks still hold. Men are shot dead at these saps by Turk sharpshooters cunningly screened within them...
>
> Bombs begin to drop among them from the Turks. Creeping up, the men catch them in their hands before they explode, and fling them back so that they burst among the Turks. Some have their hands blown off, others their heads, in doing this, but the bloody game of catch goes on till no Turks are left in the sap, only a few wounded groaning men who slowly bleed to death there... Fire opens on them from snipers in the trees and from machine guns everywhere; they drop and die, and the survivors see no enemy, only their friends falling and a place where no living thing can pass. Men find themselves suddenly alone, with all their friends dead, and no enemy in sight, but the rush of bullets filling the air. They go back to the trench, not afraid, but in a kind of maze, and as they take stock and count their strength there comes the roar of the Turkish war-cry, the drum-like proclamation of the faith, and the Turks come at them with the bayonet.[504]

Turkish tenacity and their willingness to die for land, faith and family were without fail. Mustafa Kemal recounted to the journalist, Rushen Eshref, who came to interview him for the press, how, at one point in a battle in May, on the enemy lines a mere ten yards away,

> All the men in his first trench fell. Those in the second, seeing them fall, at once took their places, 'knowing that they too would die, but remaining unshaken. Those who could read died with a Qur'an in their hands, and those

[504] J. Masefield: *Gallipoli*; op cit; pp. 75-80.

> who could not called upon Allah with a prayer.' Therein, he declared, 'lay the spiritual strength of the Turkish soldier, which should make victory possible.[505]

'There was neither talk nor thought among them at any time of surrender, nor could there have been in an army so placed and so valiant,' notes Masefield, though he was himself a British war propagandist.[506] The French likewise, at the end of May, delivered an official statement reviewing recent operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula, paying tribute not just to the bravery but also 'coolness' of the Turkish troops.[507]

What distinguished Gallipoli, just like the rest of the killing fields of the First World War, was the use of some formidable weapons of war, the machine gun being one, its destructive work already appreciated; navy shells, also their destructive power already seen; another being aviation. Whilst the Turks had a mere handful of planes, the Allies, once more, had the overwhelming superiority in the field. Planes were not used then for massive bombardments as they were subsequently, although their observation of Turkish troops caused the latter considerable harm. From the earliest days, spotting for the ships was carried out by aircraft operating from nearby (Greek) islands and the aircraft carrier *HMS Ark Royal*, as well as by kite balloon.[508] Their effectiveness was demonstrated by a string of successes against gun positions on the Asian shore in May.[509] The only precautions for the Turks were to either camouflage effectively their positions and artillery, or cease firing when an aircraft was sighted.[510]
Obviously these new weapons would entice prudence, the fact was, the Turks, just as the Allies, were determined for victory, regardless of the cost; men and officers were both ready and willing to offer the ultimate price. On 19 May, there was a major onslaught by the Turks on the Anzac bridgehead, conceived by von Sanders himself. The plan, which, Kinross says, 'Displayed little tactical finesse, was to fling an overwhelming force, reinforced from Helles and from the Asiatic side, against Arıburnu, and thus either to annihilate the Anzacs or to drive them once and for all into the sea.'[511] The only problem was that now the Anzacs were solidly dug in, protected by intense artillery fire and also by aerial observation, which could detect Turkish movement, as on this instance. The outcome was a mass slaughter of Turks.[512]
The following day, a truce was arranged for one day to bury the dead. Mustafa Kemal's chief of staff, Major İzzettin (Çalışlar), noted in his diary:

> We saw thousands of our dead on the battlefield – a token of our heroism. The British delegates were dignified and cool. Their behaviour was correct.[513]

Turkish tenacity had cost the Allies dearly, too. According to German estimates, by this time, the Allies had lost 30,000 men in killed, wounded, and missing.[514] On sea,

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[505] Lord P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 79.
[506] J. Masefield: *Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 65.
[507] In *Current History* vol 2; p. 804.
[508] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla*; op cit; p. 2.
[509] Ibid.
[510] Ibid.
[511] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 79.
[512] Ibid.
[513] I. Çalışlar: Atatürk'le İkibuçuk Yıl (Two and a Half Years with Atatürk), Yapı Kredi, Istanbul 1993, p. 39.
[514] In *Current History*; vol 2; p. 804.

losses had been equally bad under Turkish artillery fire and also torpedoes. On May 12, Turkish destroyers in the Dardanelles torpedoed and sank the British dreadnought *Goliath*, with 500 men being lost.[515]

And so, May ended just as it had begun. On 29 and 30 May, Mustafa Kemal led another major attack at Sazlıdere, a dry torrent bed leading down from Conk Bayırı. Fighting went on until the early hours of the morning. Major İzzettin noted:

> Our repeated attacks have not been successful. Our casualties have been heavy. This has increased the sense of security of the English. But they lack daring. If only they attacked, we could then counter-attack and enter their positions. Thank God, our fighting spirit is strong. But waiting is oppressive.[516]

Uyar and Erickson correctly observe the flawed nature of these assaults leading to heavy Turkish casualties during the fateful month of May 1915, and during the first half of June.[517] As an example, the 15th Division was annihilated after the costly failure of the night attack of May 3–4, and the 22nd likewise by the day attack of May 19.[518]

Not that the Allies had it their way. Far from it. They paid an equal, maybe even heavier, price than the Turks. In the first month, Hamilton lost forty-five thousand men… 'It was over-the-top carnage, with no gains of consequence,' says William Manchester.[519]

2. June and July 1915: Summer Heat, Courage, and Carnage

The Battle of Krithia cited above was a microcosm of the battle of Gallipoli, itself part of the much larger confrontation of the First World War. The Battle of Krithia had and symbolised everything that occurred in the campaign: the brutality and inhumanity of war, the courage and resilience of men, the mingling of men from many parts of the world in one spot to kill and to die together.

Early in June (4th), there took place the Third Battle of the Krithia. The British again took the offensive, sending several divisions to attack the 9th and 12th Infantry Divisions holding the Turkish lines.[520] That morning the Turkish trenches came under a naval bombardment beginning at 8 a.m. By 11.45 a.m., the 12th Infantry Division reported that its entire front was under fire from three battleships and that an enemy attack was imminent.[521] The French were an inclusive part of the Allies' offensive. They were now commanded by the famed General Gouraud, who, on arrival, had brought with him the 2nd Division which included another Metropolitan Brigade and

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[515] Ibid; p. 807.
[516] I. Çalışlar, op cit; 40.
[517] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History*; op cit; p. 260.
[518] Ibid.
[519] Manchester, William: *Winston Spencer Churchill. The Last Lion: Visions of Glory 1874-1932*; New York: Laurel/Dell, 1983; 551.
[520] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 87.
[521] Ibid.

more Colonial and Zouave troops, commanded by General Bailloud.[522] Gouraud was determined to make his mark and reverse the fortunes of the French.[523] This time the goal was the Haricot Redoubt (named for its bean like shape), a trench system above Kereves Dere.[524] The British attacks began at 12.10. Most of the attacks penetrated 200 to 450 metres into Turkish defences. The farthest went about a kilometre. The fighting was fierce, and none of the men on the Ally side wavered; bayonets thrust forward, they thrust forward, too. The Turks stood and fought. It was yet another carnage. In the bloody and fierce encounter any position lost was soon retaken. The Allies' attack faltered. Wave after wave of attackers were repulsed.[525] Hardly any ground was gained, the losses were horrendous, and again the Royal Naval Division and other British units were left exposed.[526] Expecting the British attacks to continue, the Turkish 5th and the 11th Infantry Divisions moved into the front lines ready for a massive counter-attack in the event of Allied breakthrough.[527] The Allies, however, quit, leaving the front relatively unchanged. The Turks had lost just over 50 men, and 4,903 men were wounded (most of which were certainly bayonet wounds).[528] The British suffered 4,500 casualties, whilst the French another 2,000 on that day.[529]

On 21 June, however, the French were more successful. Early in the morning of that day, the troops had a hot breakfast with extra rations of rum, each commander fully aware of his task. After the usual bombardment announcing an attack, and once Turkish positions were deemed softened enough, the French rushed forth. Haricot Redoubt fell, and with little trouble they gained a foothold on the nearby Quadrilateral Redoubt.[530] The Colonial sections had more trouble. They were thrown back by Turkish defences and the first line of the Ally trench soon became dangerously overcrowded. After a number of failed attempts to move forward, Gouraud insisted on a final push by the Regiment de Marche d'Afrique, and the second line of Turkish trenches was captured.[531] The captured trenches were on a spur overlooking Kereves Dere and so the French found themselves looking down over the Turks for the first time. 2,500 French were killed or injured, but 6,000 Turks were also lost according to Ally figures.[532] Here, one has to be careful of the propagandist nature of failure and success, and figures for casualties. Whilst some accounts speak of French victory on this occasion, Erickson states that the major and costly French attack on Sedd-el-Bahr on June 21 and 22 failed.[533]

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[522] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles*; op cit; p. 8.
[523] Ibid.
[524] Ibid.
[525] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 87.
[526] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles*; op cit; p. 9.
[527] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 88.
[528] Ibid.
[529] According to Turkish estimates; E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 87.
[530] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles*; op cit; p. 9.
[531] Ibid.
[532] Ibid.
[533] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 89.

It ought to be remembered that the front line embraced a number of fronts, including in places distant from Gallipoli, and involved the use of all forms of military means available to the Allies. In the Aegean, behind the Turkish lines in the Sea of Marmara, the Navy was adding to the Turks' problems by waging a highly successful submarine campaign.[534] From 25 April, when the Australian submarine *AE2* successfully forced a passage through the Dardanelles, the Navy had maintained a submarine presence in the Sea of Marmara.[535] Land communications with the Gallipoli Peninsula were extremely poor, consisting in a few roads, crossed not by trucks, but by pack of animals, camels and ox wagons, carrying supplies to the front, only a few tons at a time.[536] The Turks could not venture into the Sea for fear of submarine attacks causing large steamers to cut their presence, with much decreased sea communication only maintained by small ferries and sailing craft.[537]

The Turks, as noted already, had inferior artillery fire power, and by mid-June, an already bad situation had grown worse, with mounting scarcity of shells.[538] On 22 June, 1915, von Sanders reported to Enver Pasha that he had problems with artillery ammunition, especially for howitzers.
A Fifth Army report to the Turkish general staff on 23 June highlights the problem:

Fifth Army Ammunition Expenditure Report, 8 May-8 June, 1915

Type	**Shells expended**	**Available**
Field artillery guns	29,462	19,500
Mortar	1,868	788
Mountain howitzers	2,446	Unknown
120 mm gun	1,548	72
150 mm quick fire	765	97
120 mm howitzer	486	173
150 mm howitzer	446	259
105 mm mortar	4,142	1,169
210 mm mortar	165	26

(Source: Turkish General Staff Archives (ATASE) Fifth Army Report to Turkish General Staff, June 23, Archive 4/8749, Class 3474, Folder H-11, File 7-8.

Careful examination of this report, Erickson explains, reveals several severe problems with ammunition availability.[539] The apparent mountain of field artillery ammunition was for guns with low or flat trajectories which were not of great use in trench warfare.[540] The most useful artillery sorts in trench warfare were howitzers and mortars which had high arcing trajectories, and it was precisely these that the Turks

[534] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla,* op cit; p. 8.
[535] Ibid.
[536] Ibid.
[537] Ibid.
[538] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 88.
[539] Ibid
[540] Ibid; p. 89.

suffered shortages of; fewer than ten thousand shells had been fired in the thirty-day period shown.[541] Von Sanders had already understood this problem, as Turkey lacked every kind of ammunition factory and had to import about all its necessities of war, which, with Ally ships ruling supreme, ended at the bottom of the seas.[542]
Technically, in order to offset their inferior firepower, and avoid the pulverising effect of Ally shells, the Turks had to attack by night. This option, though, was also closed onto them. Operating close to the beaches, the Ally destroyers were still able to provide quite adequate support. For example, for the assault on the Turkish right on 28 June, support was provided by the light cruiser *HMS Talbot* and four destroyers.[543] Even this limited support destroyed the Turkish frontline trenches nearest the Sea, allowing them to be easily occupied and the second line quickly overrun. A Turkish counter-attack that night was detected by the searchlights of the destroyers Scorpion and Wolverine and 'was swept away by their guns.'[544]
The Turks had to keep devising ways and methods to beat away the Western juggernaut, for in some situations, Turkish gallantry was not enough, and throughout the campaign, this is what they did.

A British offensive at Cape Helles on 12 and 13 July failed with heavy casualties.[545]
This is what we read in many works, i.e. those which mention it (for most don't): a line on a fight, a tiny dot in history, perhaps escaping or failing to grasp the interest of the vast majority of those who read it. And yet, this little dot bears so much of history, so much of the human tragedy of war; its harshness, its human toll, and also countless other images of those who were there (besides some of the defence tactics adopted by the Turks, in sudden eruptions from where and when expected the least). Here, we have the account of three Scottish Borderers who were amongst the many nationalities who fought on those two days: on one side the English, the French, and the Scots themselves, and the Turks on the other.
Sir Hamilton's assigned aims for this attack were to be a follow-up to the 28 June operation (itself a follow-up to previous operations, themselves follow ups to previous operations).

> 'That advance,' Sir Hamilton insists, 'had driven back the Turkish right on to their second main system of defence just south of Krithia. But on my centre and right the enemy still held their forward system of trenches, and it was my intention on the 12th July to seize the remaining trenches of this foremost system from the sea at the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the main Sedd-el-Bahr-Krithia road, along a front of some 2000 yards.[546]

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[541] Ibid.
[542] It is crucial to read von Sanders to understand the challenges facing Turkey in this and other areas. Regarding military capacities, ammunitions, navy and so on, see pp. 60 ff.
[543] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla,* op cit; p. 3.
[544] Ibid.
[545] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 89.
[546] Sir Ian Hamilton in Sorley Brown Editor: *War Record, 4th Bn. King's Own of Scottish Borderers;* John McQueen and Son, Galashiels; 1920; p. 35.

> On our right the attack was to be entrusted to the French Corps; on the right centre to the 52nd (Lowland) Division. On the 52nd Division's front the operation was planned to take place in two phases; our right was to attack in the morning, our left in the afternoon. Diversions by the 29th Division on the left of the southern section and at Anzac were to take place on the same day so as to prevent the enemy's reserves from reinforcing the real point of attack.'[547]

The first Scottish participant's account says:

> A great bombardment by our artillery on the Turkish trenches at 6.55 on the morning of the fatal 12th a gloriously fine summer day signified that the battle had begun, and the Battalion eagerly awaited the order to advance. At 7.35 a.m. the range of our artillery was lengthened, and the Battalion moved to the attack, passed over the first and second trenches, and continued advancing with the object of occupying the third trench. Not a man faltered, and it has been well and truly said that no finer charge was ever made on any field of battle.
>
> [After advancing a distance of some 400 to 500 yards, the battalion realised they had passed their objective, and had to march back.]
>
> When retiring the Battalion had to pass through the zone of fire of our own artillery, also the fire from the enemy's artillery and machine gun and rifle fire, and this circumstance caused very heavy losses…
>
> Captain Forrest writes: "It is with sadness one takes up the pen to put on record the deeds of the Battalion on and around the 12th of July, 1915, when so many good officers, N.C.O.'s, and men laid down their lives. However, it is their just due that these deeds should be put on record, so that future generations may know what Border men were able and willing to do in the interests of King and Country."[548]
>
> The Battalion was ordered to take its place in the firing line on the afternoon of the 13th… At a given signal, when the artillery increased the range by 300 yards, every officer, N.C.O., and man went over the parapet except a few who had already been killed or wounded by the Turkish counter bombardment. The first trench was reached with comparatively few casualties, as was the second, some prisoners being sent back from both. The Battalion kept steadily on until it was seen that there was no third trench to take and occupy. They were through the Turkish defences, but were much too small a body to remain out in the open. The commanding officer, second in command, and adjutant, held a consultation, and orders were issued to get back and occupy the second trench, which had been passed over, and it was during this time that so many casualties occurred. The front which had been broken was narrow, and the Turkish machine guns on the right and left were by this time in position to enfilade the returning men.[549]

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[547] Ibid; p. 36.
[548] Ibid; p. 20.
[549] Ibid; p. 20.

The grand total of the casualties from the battalion amongst men and officers was 553, or more than half of the original strength of the Battalion when it left Cambusbarron some weeks earlier.[550]

> When all were so brave and wore Fearlessness like a shroud [says the participant] it may seem invidious to make any distinctions, but special note may be made of the gallantry of Captain Wallace, whose stirring cry, "Come away, Borderers! Don't be beaten!" inspired the eager men he led, and who, although badly wounded and with blood streaming down his face, continued to advance until he was wounded a second time, on this occasion fatally. Pipe-Major Bertram spoke to him as he lay dying, and his last words were: "I'm done for." Lieut. J.B. Innes, too, although mortally wounded, continued to cheer on his men until he died from loss of blood. Poor Innes got one of his arms blown to bits by a shell, and after getting his cousin, Lieut. W.K. Innes, to cut it off, asked for a cigarette. Surgeon-Major Taylor worked unceasingly among the wounded during the attack, with shells bursting all around him, and he met death instantaneously while bandaging a wounded man at one of the dressing stations.'[551]

The total casualties of that operation as stated by Hamilton

> In the French Corps were not heavy, though it is with sorrow that I have to report the mortal wound of General Masnou, commanding the 1st Division. Our own casualties were a little over 3000.[552]

The Turks were heavily bled, too. Men, thanks to their courage, held positions, but whether ordinary soldiers or officers, they were decimated, some of the divisions losing more than 60 percent of their officers and were never able to recover.[553] The men's courage is what strikes friend and foe, again and again. Mustafa Kemal, on 20 July, during a lull in the fighting, in a letter to his friend, Corinne Lütfü said:

> Our life here is truly hellish. Fortunately, my soldiers are very brave and tougher than the enemy. What is more, their private beliefs make it easier to carry out orders which send them to their death.[554]

For the American high officer Patton:

> The principle reason for the Ally failure was the terrific power of rifle fire in the hands of men who had their hearts in their work and who were led by officers of initiative and military education.[555]

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[550] Ibid; p. 33.
[551] Ibid; p. 34.
[552] Ibid; p. 38.
[553] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 259-60.
[554] M. Özverim: Mustafa Kemal ve Corinne Lütfü: Bir Dostluğun Öyküsü (Atatürk and Corinne Lütfü: The Story of a Friendship), Milliyet Yayınları, Istanbul 1998, 56–7.
[555] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; 32.

Havoc of trench warfare.
Men were either pulverised by exploding shells,or were ripped open by bayonet thrusts.

The dead under the Summer heat. Often the dead and the living mingled not for hours but for weeks, months, even.

Onto Suvla/Anafarta:

In order to break the costly stalemate of trench warfare, something grander was needed, and so plans were made for a major Ally offensive at Suvla Bay, immediately to the northwest of the Anzac positions. This force would flank Turkish defensive

lines and thrust across the Peninsula to the Narrows.[556] As they did, they would literally cut the Turkish forces from the north, and either force them to surrender, or annihilate them should they chose to fight. The British felt confident because the Suvla Bay area was known to be lightly held by the Turks.[557] There in fact, Major Wilmer was in command of an extremely light Turkish screening force guarding the Suvla beaches, just two understrength infantry battalions, a *jandarma* (Gendarmes) regiment (from Bursa), and four artillery batteries.[558] Von Sanders still considered the Saros area as the more threatened even if doubts were expressed by Mustafa Kemal in particular.[559]

The Allies were getting huge reinforcements. The five divisions made available by Lord Kitchener, the Minister of War, appeared to raise the chances of success of the proposed operation. Briefly, General Birdwood's plan, approved by General Hamilton on 13 June, was as follows:

> A limited attack on the Helles front in order to hold the Turkish troops there, and use up their reserve.
>
> A main attack on the hill mass called Sari Bair (Sarı Bayır) by the Anzac Corps, reinforced by the 13th Division, 29th Indian Brigade, and one Brigade of the 10th Division. The purpose of this attack was to capture Hill 971, the key to the peninsula.[560]

The plans, as originally conceived, were intended to be put into operation about the third week in June. However, due to a Cabinet crisis in London, the assault was delayed by six weeks. At the end of this period, the new ministers learned the details of the operations and agreed to them.[561]

Mustafa Kemal claimed later to have predicted accurately where the attack would come,[562] while Liman von Sanders again fixed his attention on the Bolayır isthmus and on the Asian shore near Kumkale.[563] Kemal wrote to Esad Pasha, the corps commander, about the Arıburnu area and its defence problems in extreme detail, insisting that the Sarı Bayır ridge, with its peaks of Conk Bayır (Chunuk Bair) and Koca Çemen (Koja Chemen), were the Ally objectives.[564] A key to the defence of the heights, he explained, was the ravine of Sazlıdere, which led directly up to Conk Bayır, offering valuable cover to an enemy advancing over the foothills towards it. As Mustafa Kemal insisted, Esad Pasha came down to divisional headquarters with his chief of staff, to see for himself. Kemal took them up on to the top of the ridge and showed the whole area spread beneath and around them – the broken rocky country on either side of Sazlıdere, the beach below it, the bay of Suvla and the Salt Lake beyond,

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[556] E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to die;* op cit; p. 90.
[557] Ibid.
[558] Ibid.
[559] Ibid.
[560] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 36.
[561] Ibid.
[562] U. İğdemir: Atatürk'ün Yaşamı; op cit; 53–4.
[563] C. Erikan: Komutan Atatürk, op cit; 152.
[564] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 80.

the line of the ridge stretching north-eastwards to the summit of Koja Chemen (Kocaçimen). Rising to meet the sky, it looked impossible to scale.[565] Only raiding parties could advance through such difficult country remarked the Chief of Staff, whilst Esad Pasha asked Kemal:

> "Where will the enemy come from?"
> Kemal waved his hand in the direction of Ariburnu and the line of the coast as far as Suvla: "From there."
> "Very well," replied the Pasha, "if he does come from there, then how will he advance?"
> Kemal pointed again at Ariburnu and described a broad half circle towards Koja Chemen: "That's how he will advance."
> Esad smiled and patted him on the shoulder. "Don't worry, Bey Effendi. He can't do it."
> Kemal saw that it was useless to continue the discussion. "Insh'allah" he exclaimed. "Let's hope you are right."[566]

3. Unravelling the Military Operations

Whilst all historians agree on the two main Ally objectives, they disagree on many points, most importantly on the causes of its failure. Most authors also write from the perspective of a particular nationality, and its involvement in the operations, which tends to conceal the role in the campaign of other nationalities.

In regard to what concerns us here and now, the denouement of the operation, the reader — unless a supreme expert on Gallipoli — would make no sense whatsoever of what happened for a few reasons.

First and foremost, the participants, or many authors, all give varying names to secondary positions, such as hills, and particular spots, that at times the lay reader remains truly perplexed which is what, the historians failing to recognise that they are not writing for themselves but for those whom they sell their works to.

Secondly, as many attacks and fights took place at the same time, in different places, unless one is a military expert and an expert of the Gallipoli campaign, one cannot relate them to each other.

Thirdly, of course, even if one has immense memorisation capacities and a developed map-reading expertise, still following every action, every movement, day after day, by the different forces, the different divisions and brigades on the ground, is a challenge of the foremost nature.

Thus, to try and unravel the whole picture and give a thorough, clear, view of the August Ally campaign, especially from all sorts of perspectives — Australian, British, French, Irish, Turkish, and so on — and on all points of contacts, is extremely challenging. This author can only express his respect for those who do it, especially with competence, and they should be the sources readers should refer to and use in

[565] Ibid; p. 81.
[566] Ibid.

case they seek to know more in regard to the truly military side of the matter. What this author is going to do is simply this: simplify things; cutting away anything that might cram the readers' eyes and attention; cut the campaign to its most essential phases; reduce the names of places and army officers to the essential ones; look at the campaign from both Ally and Turkish sides, and focus on the early vital days of the operation, specifying that clearly. Now, those who wish to know the intricacies of the campaign, if they believe they have the mental and other abilities to do it, other sources are all better than this work.

At this stage, it is important to highlight some of the essential issues.
Firstly, regarding the troops involved. The Allies had received huge reinforcements, especially in the shape of a so-called New Kitchener Army. These new troops, which began to arrive at Mudros about the first week of August 1915, were not to be used for reinforcement purposes, as that was not needed, but to be thrown straight forward. They were fresh troops, and could also be used to surprise the Turks at a new point of attack (Suvla), push inland before the Turks had time to reinforce, and seize commanding positions in the first great rush, i.e. the first day.[567] In fact, it was a repetition of the attempts made earlier but applying the lessons learned at heavy cost on those occasions.[568] For this particular August 6 operation, the forces allotted were, if one puts the totals together from diverse sources, more than 50,000 Ally troops. It ought to be remembered that the total number of troops committed to the Gallipoli campaign was increased from the original 70,000 to nearly 500,000 men by its end in early 1916.[569]
Regarding the objectives of the operation, this was undertaken in order to break the stalemate already referred to.



Sketch of map of Suvla Bay District (Based on the Times map)

[567] The Project Gutenberg eBook, *The Story of the Great War*, Volume IV; op cit; p. 345.
[568] Ibid.
[569] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* Naval War College; Newport Rhode Island; 4 May, 1994, p. 4.

Regarding the physical setting (besides the simplified map just above), we give two differently worded descriptions, which somehow complement each other, the first by Norman Wilkinson, the second by George Patton. Wilkinson, one of the participants in the operation, who also left us memorable colour sketches of it, from his landing ship, writes:

> On our left Suvla Point, with Nebruniessi Point to the right, formed a small bay known as Suvla Bay some mile and a half across. To the right of Nebruniessi Point a long gently curving sandy beach some four or five miles in extent terminated where the Australian position at Anzac rose steeply to the Sari Bair range.
>
> Inside and immediately in front of us was a large flat sandy plain covered with scrub, while the dry salt lake showed dazzlingly white in the hot morning sun. Immediately beyond was Chocolate Hill, and behind this again lay the village of Anafarta some four miles from the shore. As a background, the Anafarta ridge ran from the village practically parallel with the sea until it took a sharp turn duewest to Suvla Point, where it gradually sloped down to the coast.[570]

Patton, an American army officer, by far one of the best sources for the whole Gallipoli Campaign, perfectly brings together the physical setting and the main lines of action:

> As I have stated, the principle objective of the initial attack (this is the only attack with which we are concerned) was the capture of Hill No. 971, and of the other and lower Hill of Chunuk Bair with the subsequent occupation of the whole hog-back. To attain this objective, it was necessary to reduce the garrisons of the Turkish right, in the vicinity of Hill No. 971, and to prevent the arrival in this vicinity of additional troops. With this end in view, at 5:30 p.m. on the 6th of August, the British initiated an attack on their right, that is, against the Turkish left, in the vicinity of Lone Pine. After dark, they proposed to send the major portion of their forces along the beach, beyond the three detached post positions, and to have them advance up the gullies with the purpose of gaining the crest at 971 and further down the hog-back, including Hill Q and Chunuk Bair.
>
> In order to maintain the secrecy of the initial move, it was necessary to send a detachment ahead of the main columns to capture, by stealth, Turkish outposts stationed at the foot of the several valleys.
>
> The timing of the attack, taken in connection with the landing at Suvla Bay has been criticized on the ground that the Anzac operations started too early (some five hours prior to the initial landing at Suvla). This, I think, is incorrect and results from the assumption, present in all the earlier articles on the campaign, that Suvla was the main effort. Had the Anzac attack synchronized with that at Suvla, it would have defeated its purpose of catching the Turks short of

[570] N. Wilkinson: *The Dardanelles*; Longmans, Green & CO; London 1915; pp. 13-4.

> reinforcements at the vital point of Hill No. 971, for, it is evident that the landing at Suvla Bay would have immediately induced a movement of Turkish reserves to the very part of the line which the British hoped to find unoccupied, or at least, weakly held.[571]

Whilst the two main operations were at Suvla Bay and the Sarı Bayır (Sari Bair) Ridge (the latter it ought to be reminded was the principal objective), there also took place diversionary attacks at Arıburnu and Helles on August 6 and 7.[572] However, a remark needs to be made here regarding the diversionary objectives. If we look at the previous major landing on 25 April, we read that the French landing at Kumkale, on the Asian shore, was a diversionary measure, which ended the following day as the French rejoined the main Ally troops on the other side of the Dardanelles.[573] Then, we are confronted with the reality that the French were in fact beaten away by the Turks on 29 April, so not the day after, and after terrific fighting.[574] This makes one think that possibly a diversionary measure takes on this status only after it fails. In regard to the August campaign looked at here, the Ally assault on the Turkish trenches of Lone Pine, was no mere skirmish but involved very heavy fighting, resulting in thousands of casualties over a few days of fighting.[575] In this situation, one, of course, accepts that the Allies were trying to occupy the Turks on all sides in order to dilute their power of opposition. However, there are other elements to take into account: Following the failure of 25 April, many places where the operations stalled, such as at Y Beach, were due to the fact that the troops accomplished their assigned duty and then stopped, which later on was criticised. For, had they taken the initiative and pursued their thrust, history would have been different. Maybe in light of that, it has now been concluded that should one sally, however diversionary, succeed, a much more ambitious objective could be given to it. This conclusion is simple to reach, for all the objectives were so near each other geographically that it makes sense that a diversionary attack could turn quickly into a major sally if initially successful. Furthermore, what historians fail to realise is this: The commanders at the time, true, had a strategic vision, but their objectives could be reached by many ways as long as flexibility in execution was allowed. So, somehow, what the British, i.e. Sir Ian Hamilton, subsequently were criticised for, that is their flexibility and improvising as events unfolded, was in fact a very effective way of operating. The principal reason for the belief in a flexible approach rather than strictly fixed plans is very simple: Whilst historians have the benefit of hindsight, military commanders then did not; and at the time, before combat started, none knew the outcome of any situation. So High Command would try something, a sort of probing, and then alter the plans according to developments on the ground. More importantly, just like the Turks did not know where the Allies would come from, the Allies themselves, despite aerial reconnaissance, which in few instances was essential to Ally success, did not always

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[571] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 36.
[572] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 260.
[573] See P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; 74; A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 146.
[574] E.J Erickson: *Ordered to die; op cit*; p. 84.
[575] G.S. Patton: *The Defence of Gallipoli*; op cit; p. 39.

know where the Turks were. In this situation, the best thing to do is to attack, with of course, some concentrations of troops in places greater than in others, but to remain flexible, that should things work in place A or B, then, move the operations, and reserves, accordingly. There is nothing extraordinary in that, for as seen already, the Turks were doing just that throughout the campaign, moving men around, even from distant places further north. Flexibility on the ground was one of the keys to victory; men's courage and fight to the death another. Both sides had both, except that the Turks, although with lower armament and numbers, had that extra ingredient: They were fighting for the survival of their land, families, and for their faith.

When dealing with the military operations one comes across the fact that the objectives assigned to officers varied, and instructions also changed (which is understandable, for they were given in light of developments before and during the battles). This is one of the main reasons why many afterwards attacked Sir Hamilton's strategy, and why so many works, thousands, have been written on Gallipoli, but hardly anyone of them agrees with the others.

Once more, just to help those who might not have the patience to read through the formidable work by Patton, which is a must for anyone, here is his summary of the strategic point the August offensive sought to capture, and all the richness of names associated with it:

> The principal feature of the terrain is Hill No. 971, or Koja Chemen Tepe. From this eminence a continuous hog-back defined by Hill Q – Chunuk Bair – Battleship Hill – Baby 700 – Brussels Top – Hill over Anzac Cove runs in a generally south-western direction. From this main ridge, five lesser ridges run in a north-westerly direction, terminating either on Ocean Beach or on the Suvla Bay plain.[576]
>
> The main objective of the initial attack was the capture of Hill 971 and of the other and lower Hill of Conk Bayır with the subsequent occupation of the whole hog-back.[577]

Finally, here, it should be repeated that it is not within the scope of this work to deal with all aspects of military operations, and how things went by the hour, every day and where. Neither is this author capable of dealing with these matters, for the likes of Erickson, Patton, and many others, if not all the others, especially those who were there and recorded their experiences, are more capable in this respect, and are better placed to bring forth the reality of what truly happened. Thus, the following will try to look at the August operations from a general aspect, how they were part of the greater picture at the centre of this work: the Turks topmost fight for the survival of their nation.

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[576] Ibid; 37.
[577] Ibid; 38.

4. The August Offensive

In the afternoon of 6 August 1915, the Allies launched their offensive, shifting the main focus from the Helles to the Arıburnu front. Their objective: the Sarı Bayır Range. The Allies sought to land secretly 25,000 more men in the Anzac bridgehead, planning a frontal assault on the Range.[578] Two columns would advance simultaneously, one directly up the Sazlıdere Ravine to the west of Conk Bayır, the other by a more northerly and winding route, up the valleys and over the foothills to Kocaçemen and the crests in between.[579]
This twin advance was to be supported by a fresh landing at Suvla Bay (under general Stopford), north of Anzac, of some 20,000 troops, mostly of Kitchener's 'New Army'. These troops would advance to the northern ridge of Anafarta, linking up in an enveloping movement with the Anzacs to march to the Narrows, split the Peninsula in two, and thus encircle the bulk of the Turkish forces.[580]
This, again, was not as Liman von Sanders had expected, believing the attack would come either on his extreme right or on his immediate left – against Bulair, where hence he concentrated both troops and all attention; or against the southern spurs of the Sarı Bayır Range (at Lone Pine), (where in fact a diversionary attack took place on 6 August, drawing off the bulk of Esad Pasha's reserves). This diversion was meant to clear the field for the main attack by night planned to capture the summits by dawn.[581]

On the Sarı Bayır front, the attack, in two columns, began well for the combined Australian/Indian and New Zealand armies, with a successful deception rehearsed for some days beforehand.[582] Precisely at the same hour after dusk, intense artillery fire began whilst search-lights swept the hillsides, and when the Turks left the trenches to take cover elsewhere, the Ally forces moved in under searchlights, and the first Turkish position was captured.[583] Fighting followed up the Sazlıdere Ravine, from which the Turks, owing to the ineffective defences, were forced to withdraw. As most of their outposts were occupied by the covering forces, and the way became free for the main assault on the crests, the Anzacs' success was now near certain.[584] Then, once more fate struck. Though the night advance had begun well, it soon ran into trouble. One section of the first column became lost in the dark, only finding itself back, after a series of exhausting ascents and descents, at its starting-point; the other section reached a shoulder of the Ridge, but was unable to proceed further without the lost section.[585] From this point to its final objective, Conk Bayır, it was only 1,500 yards, and had this column pushed directly on, it would have taken the heights by 2.00 a.m., just as planned.[586] Even some short delay would have been irrelevant, for until

[578] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 82.
[579] Ibid.
[580] Ibid.
[581] Ibid.
[582] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 40.
[583] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 83.
[584] Ibid.
[585] Ibid.
[586] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit; p. 40.

6:30 or 7.00 a.m., the only Turks available to resist its advance were twenty infantrymen and a platoon of mountain guns.[587] The second column, in the Aghildere Ravine to the north, had fared even worse. Similarly misled in the darkness its men, after a long confused series of marches, now lay scattered over the slopes, extremely worn out, well below Kocaçemen and their other objectives.[588] The Allies had, thus, missed their opportunity of capturing the Sarı Bayır Ridge before dawn, while it was still thinly defended and the element of surprise was on their side.[589]

Meanwhile to the north, on the evening of 6 August, the men of the New British Army, under General Stopford, were landing on the beaches of Suvla Bay. The bay is a wide, shallow indentation in the shape of half a circle. Whilst not a perfect site for landing, it provided plenty of more or less open country for manoeuvering once the troops were well ashore.[590] This was the element lacking in the case of all the other landings, which explains why Sir Ian Hamilton found it of vital importance.[591] On the Turkish side, the German commander Major Wilmer had a tiny force, a mere three lightly armed battalions, including one of Bursa Gendarmes, which held the high ground but could not guard the beaches, which were quickly occupied.[592] The British landing forces gradually rose to an impressive five full divisions.[593] Hence, on the first day, General Stopford's 20,000 men had a ten-to-one superiority, facing no more than 2,000 Turks backed by eleven guns.[594] The Allies, once ashore at Suvla Bay, were to advance rapidly across country, skirt the Salt Lake, and carry the crest of the Anafarta Hills, a range running to 600 feet in height and dominating two important roads and the adjacent country, excepting the all-important peak of Sarı Bayır.[595] This would take place at the same time as the Anzacs were to make a sudden and supreme attack upon Sarı Bayır itself.[596] But whilst the Anzacs got themselves lost in the darkness, the landed troops at Suvla did not advance.[597] There seems, as wrongly claimed, to have taken place an argument between the brigadiers, and the troops did little more than set up camp on the beach.[598] This claim of Ally inactivity is wrong, for there was fighting on the first day, following the landing. Just before the Ally attack, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 31st Turkish Infantry, holding one hill, retired to another without loss, leaving only a small rear guard of probably a hundred men who fought to the last to delay Ally advance.[599] In spite of the small number engaged, the Turks caused the British to lose 210 officers and 626 men during the attack.[600]

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[587] Ibid.
[588] Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 83.
[589] Ibid.
[590] The Project Gutenberg eBook, *The Story of the Great War*, Volume IV; op cit; p. 346.
[591] Ibid; p. 347.
[592] E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to die;* p. 90. G.S. Patton; 51; Lord Kinross; p. 8
[593] E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to die*; op cit; p. 90.
[594] E. Cohen, A. Elliott, and J. Gooch, John, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War.* New York: Free Press, 1990; pp. 143-144.
[595] The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Story of the Great War, Volume IV; op cit; p. 347.
[596] Ibid.
[597] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 84.
[598] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* Naval War College; Newport Rhode Island; 4 May, 1994, p. 21.
[599] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit, p. 56.
[600] Ibid.

A bird's eye view of the August 6-10 Campaign



The sacrifice of the Turks was the main reason for delaying the advance, not what is usually claimed, namely that the Allies landed and just sat back to enjoy the sun and the beach, as is abundantly found in most works. The loss of great number of officers did impair the Ally progress. So it was Ally officer gallantry that was responsible for this decisive setback, not the other way round. Nonetheless the delay gave Liman von Sanders the time to realise his error, and that the Sarı Bayır was indeed the Ally objective. Immediately he sent reinforcements, and the 9th Division once more was ordered to assist Major Wilmer.[601] The reinforcements now streamed to Suvla, and also to confront the Anzacs at Sarı Bayır, coming from all directions: Bulair, the Asiatic shore, and Helles.[602] In the meantime, the few troops at Suvla, under major Wilmer, had to hold the place, with all the odds against them. They had no machine guns and at no time during the day did they have over 500 men in line.[603]

Whilst attacks were proceeding at Sarı Bayır and Suvla, an attack on the right of Sarı Bayır took place earlier to serve as a diversion.[604] The attack on the right upon what was called Lone Pine Plateau was a costly affair.[605] The dismounted troops of the Third Australian Light Horse were sent forward to storm the elaborate trenches of the

[601] E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to die;* op cit; p. 90.
[602] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 84.
[603] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit, p. 56.
[604] The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Story of the Great War, Volume IV; op cit; p. 348.
[605] Ibid.

Turks.[606] The attack was made in three lines. The first was mowed down to a man; of the second only a few survivors reached the Turkish trenches to be either captured or killed; the third was stopped by a change of orders 'just as it was about to follow the other two into the valley of sure death.'[607]

The Turkish Counter-Attack (8-10 August)

Whilst the operation in Suvla Bay, under general Stopford had suffered grievous delay, the main thrust by the Australians, and those alongside them (the Indians, and the Ghurkhas), were now about to come under the fire of the forces led by Mustafa Kemal, who had anticipated their arrival where they precisely did. Early on the morning of 8 August 1915, the Australians moved out from Asma Dere, marching on a nearby hill from which they aimed to storm the height known as Kocaçemen.[608] The Turks had now arrived, though, and before long, the Allies realised that they were being rapidly encircled, and retreat became the only option. Under pressure, the Allies had difficulty even in holding their original position at Asma Dere.[609] As the sun rose, they were cut by a fierce fire from either flank – from Kemal's positions on Battleship Hill to their right, and from those on the adjoining crests of the ridge, to their left.[610] It was extremely difficult to dig in due to both hardness of the ground and Turkish pressure; and as exposed as they were, most of the men on the higher ridge were killed and only the remnants held on until darkness fell when reinforcements arrived and they had a respite at least until morning.[611] The Turks, likewise, kept arriving; still, on that day, only a Turkish force consisting of 8-1/2 battalions, possibly 5,000 men, and from 6 to 10 guns, met the British attack on the morning of the 8th.[612] The British had 15 battalions available (a possible 12,000 men) and were supported by most of the Anzac Corps' artillery and by the more formidable navy guns.[613]

Liman von Sanders now decided on a vigorous counter-attack, and was forced to dismiss Commander İzzedin, who was far too slow to execute orders for action, arguing that his men were too exhausted for the assault.[614] Thus was appointed Mustafa Kemal at the head of the whole Anafarta front. The Anafarta group controlled the XVI Corps, the 9th Infantry Division, and the Wilmer Group.[615] Prior to that when the offer of the new command was communicated to Mustafa Kemal through Esad Paşa's headquarters, he demanded that all the forces along the new front, north of Arıburnu, should be put under his orders. Asked by the 5th Army chief of staff,

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606 Ibid.
607 Ibid; p. 349.
608 Ibid; 350.
609 Ibid.
610 P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 84.
611 Ibid.
612 G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit, p. 46.
613 Ibid.
614 E.J. Erickson: *Ordered to die*; op cit; p. 90.
615 Ibid; p. 91.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kâzım (İnanç), whether this would not be excessive, Mustafa Kemal replied 'On the contrary, it's not enough.'[616] After some hesitation, Liman von Sanders agreed,[617] and Mustafa Kemal was given charge of six divisions, which defended the sector stretching from Kireçtepe Ridge (Limestone Hill) on the northern edge of Suvla Bay to Conk Bayırı, overlooking it from the south.[618] Two small villages, Great and Little Anafarta, lay in the middle of the sector, and Mustafa Kemal's forces were named after them the 'Anafartalar [Turkish plural of Anafarta] [Army] Group.'[619]

Now Kemal was in control of the whole front. Calmly he handed over his divisional command, first making dispositions for the renewed attack on Conk Bayırı, which would inevitably come in the morning. He issued a farewell message to the division encouraging the troops and commending their self-sacrifice; then, just before midnight he rode off northward over the hills to the Anafarta Ridge, where the more immediate danger now lay.[620]

Suvla Bay/Anafarta Front (9 August)

Kemal wrote in his diary:

> For four months, I had lived three hundred metres away from the firing line, breathing the fetid smell of corpses. Having left in dungeon-like darkness, at eleven o'clock that night, I was able to breathe clean air for the first time.[621]

He took with him his divisional doctor to organise the hospital services of Anafarta where casualties were likely to be heavy, and then marched on, regardless if this was his third night without sleep and he was suffering from a severe bout of malaria. He said afterwards, 'To assume such responsibility was no simple affair, but as I had decided not to survive the ruin of my country, I accepted the responsibility with all due pride.'[622]

As dawn was approaching there was no time but to announce that he had taken over the command, and gave orders for a general attack along the whole line from one ridge to the other, instructing his officers to inform him immediately of their positions and what measures they had taken.[623] At 4.30 a.m., in the company of a few officers, he rode to an observation post beyond the crest of Great Anafarta, from where he was to survey and direct the battle soon due to begin.[624] The fate of the battle, maybe the whole campaign, depended on a race for the crest of the Anafarta Ridge, and the

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[616] C. Erikan: *Komutan*; op cit; 156.
[617] I. Çalışlar: *Atatürk'le;* op cit; p. 51.
[618] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; p. 87
[619] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 152.
[620] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 87.
[621] E.B. Şapolyo: Kemal Atatürk ve Millî Mücadele Tarihi (Kemal Atatürk and the History of the National Struggle), Berkalp, Ankara 1944; p. 116.
[622] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 87.
[623] Ibid; p. 88.
[624] Ibid.

summit of Tekke Tepe in particular. Should one single Ally battalion reach there first, it would cover the whole army aiming to climb up to the Ridge.[625] And should this happen, the whole Peninsula would fall to the Allies. To reach there was extremely difficult due to both terrain and scrubs. At last, some Ally troops made it to the top of the Ridge – only to be met by a detachment of Turks pouring over it from the opposite side. The Turks had won the race for Tekke Tepe by a mere half hour.[626] The Allies still were greater in numbers. Regardless, on the morning of the 9 August, Mustafa Kemal attacked with three regiments of the 12th Division and Willmer's detachment.[627] This was a total of 6,000 men against the whole British force which then consisted of about 27 battalions (a battalion consists of between 300 and 800 men).[628] Kemal's men attacked with great force shattering Ally troops. Sir Ian Hamilton, from his warship, through a telescope could see the scene:

> As the light grew stronger some of ours could be seen pushing up the western slopes of the long spur running out South-west from Anafarta. The scrub was so thick that they had to climb together and follow-my-leader along what appeared to be cattle tracks up the hill. On our right all seemed going very well. Looking through naval telescopes we thought--we all thought--Ismail Oglu Tepe height was won. Very soon the shrapnel got on to those bunches of men on our left and there was something like a stampede from North to South. Looking closer we could see the enemy advancing behind their own bursting shrapnel and rolling up our line from the left on to the centre. Oh for the good "Queen Bess," her high command, and her 15-inch shrapnel! One broadside and these Turks would go scampering down to Gehenna. The enemy counter-attack was coming from the direction of Tekke Tepe and moving over the foothills and plain on Sulajik. Our centre made a convulsive effort (so it seemed) to throw back the steadily advancing Turks; three or four companies (they looked like) moved out from the brush about Sulajik and tried to deploy. But the shrapnel got on to these fellows also and I lost sight of them. Then about 6 a.m., the whole lot seemed suddenly to collapse--including the right! Not only did they give ground but they came back--some of them--half-way to the sea. But others made a stand. The musketry fire got very heavy. The enemy were making a supreme effort. The Turkish shell fire grew hotter and hotter. The enemy's guns seemed now to be firing not only from round about Anafarta Sagir, but also from somewhere between 113 and 101, 2,500 yards or so South-west of Anafarta. Still these fellows of ours; not more than a quarter of those on the ground at the outset-stuck it out. My heart has grown tough amidst the struggles of the Peninsula but the misery of this scene well nigh broke it. What kept me going was the sight of Sari Bair-I could not keep my eyes off the Sari Bair ridge. Guns from all sides, sea and land, Turks and British, were turned on to it and enormous explosions were sending slices off the top of the high

[625] Ibid.
[626] Ibid; p. 89.
[627] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit, p. 60.
[628] Ibid.

> mountain to mix with the clouds in the sky. Under that canopy our men were fighting for dear life far above us![629]

Over all the hillside, the picture was similar. The men of Kitchener's New Army, which had landed in Suvla Bay just a couple of days earlier, with great hopes placed on them, broke with the cry: 'The Turks are on us!'

The Turkish fire was so intense that the scrub caught fire sending them rushing for safety. By midday, Kemal was satisfied that the Suvla battle was won. He ordered his men to dig in. With a single incomplete division he had routed a far stronger enemy.[630] His men, ably-led by their officers, and superior marksmanship, had by the momentum of their downhill charge broken the enemy's morale.[631] Mustafa Kemal expressed surprise at the hesitancy of Hamilton, unable to ensure the carrying out of his orders despite being present in person. Hamilton had, indeed, arrived at Suvla late on 8 August, and had attempted to reinvigorate the offensive.[632] Only the next day were Stopford's forces able to muster an advance toward the high ground.[633] The delay had enabled Turkish troops to seize the high ground overlooking Suvla, and push down Stopford's troops.[634] Mustafa Kemal observed that General Stopford, 'seemed out of politeness to have been postponing the start of the battle until he himself should arrive.'[635]

The Suvla offensive had failed. But there remained the Australians and others on the Sarı Bayır Range, who had to be removed.

The Sarı Bayır Front

Whilst Mustafa Kemal was dealing with the Suvla Bay forces, further events had unfolded on the Sarı Bayır Front. During the night of 8 August 1915 and the early morning of the following day, the officers of the British forces who had survived the earlier fighting reorganised the scattered remnants and prepared for a fresh advance. About midnight, reinforcements arrived at all three bases and were hurried forward to relieve as much as possible the exhausted men in the firing line.[636] Just as dawn was breaking on 9 August 1915, word was passed along the lines that a supreme effort was to be made to carry the heights that stood in front of the Allied troops' 'great victory.'[637] British and French warships close to the shore opened an intense bombardment of the Conk Bayır, Hill Q, and Kocaçemen, then the troops leapt and charged up the Turkish positions.[638] Three columns had rushed up, but one, led by the

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[629] Sir Ian Hamilton; *Gallipoli*; vol 2; pp. 69-70.
[630] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 89.
[631] Ibid.
[632] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* op cit, p. 21.
[633] Ibid.
[634] Ibid.
[635] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 89.
[636] Project Gutemberg; vol 4; op cit; 350.
[637] Ibid.
[638] Ibid.

Gurkhas, actually reached the crest of Hill Q and even looked down on straight.[639] But 'When victory at last seemed certain,' says Patton, a salvo of six-inch naval shells (whose devastating effect has already been noted) landed among the Gurkhas, blasting them to pieces, forcing the survivors to fall back.[640] After the war, [Patton pursues] the Navy denied having fired this salvo, but since these were navy shells and the Turks had no naval vessels which could reach that point, it was certain that the British Navy fired at them.[641] As the Allies progressed, immediately Turkish guns from every angle were turned on the Indian troops and the New Zealanders who were supporting them on the left.[642] 'A hurricane of shells was poured on the troops before they had time to dig themselves in. A few seconds later a counterattack was launched in such force against the New Zealanders, that they and the Indians were swept down the slopes of Sari Bair.'[643]

In the meantime, having helped stabilise the front at Suvla Bay, Kemal was back to the Sarı Bayır Front; and after conferring with his officers, under the cover of darkness, in the night of 9 to 10 August, his fourth sleepless night, he moved his troops as close as twenty yards from the enemy; the initial attack, he insisted, was to be totally silent.[644] Strict orders were issued that no rifles or artillery were to be used, only the bayonet, and both lines ought to move swiftly forward on the enemy in the dark, without making a sound. The fate of the battle would depend on the surprise of those first few minutes.[645] Kemal looked at his watch and saw that it was almost 4.30; just a few minutes before daylight; should the enemy see them, the battle was lost. He ran forward with his divisional commander, stood before the troops, and in a low voice said 'Soldiers, there is no doubt at all that we are going to defeat the enemy in front of you. But do not hurry. Let me go ahead first. As soon as you see me raise my whip, then you will all leap forward.'[646]
He instructed that the same signal should be given by the other officers to their men; then, taking a few steps forward, he raised his whip. Straight at the signal, the soldiers, with fixed bayonets, and the officers, with drawn swords, rushed into the darkness, as he afterwards put it,

> Like lions. A moment later, the only sound which came from the enemy trenches was the heavenly cry of, 'Allah! Allah!'[647]

Caught by surprise, the British soldiers had no time to reach their rifles, and were overwhelmed in their trenches while those in the open were swiftly obliterated.

> The ponderous mass of the enemy [as Sir Ian Hamilton described it] swept over the crest and down the slopes, turning his right flank and piercing his lines below, so that his troops were driven 'clean down the hill'. It was a series of

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[639] Ibid.
[640] G.S. Patton: The Defence of Gallipoli; op cit, p.; 45.
[641] Ibid.
[642] Project Gutemberg; vol 4; op cit; 351.
[643] Ibid.
[644] p. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 91.
[645] Ibid.
[646] Ibid.
[647] Ibid.

> struggles 'in which generals fought in the ranks, and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat…[648]

Mustafa Kemal's Chief of Staff, Major İzzettin, described the fighting at the southern end of the Anafartalar Front, at first, before Kemal's arrival:

> After a sleepless night, our right flank [the right flank of the 19th Division] started the battle for Conk Bayırı. The situation round the hilltop is critical… The divisional adjutant sustained a grave wound as he went to find out what was happening. His assistant Hakkı has been taken to hospital at Lapseki suffering from dysentery… There is no one left and work has stopped in the headquarters [of the 19th Division].[649]

On the bloody occurring of this bloodiest of all days, 10 August 1915, when the battle reached its climax, Sir Ian Hamilton noted:

> The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently and calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it. Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brig. Gen. Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brig. Gen. Cooper.[650]

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, including a very large proportion of officers.[651] The 13th Division of the new army, under Major Gen. Shaw, lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500.[652] Brig. Gen. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff men and commanding officers, thirteen, had disappeared from the fighting effectives, whilst the Warwicks and Worcesters had lost literally every single officer.[653] The British held all they gained except two important salients, one a hill, briefly won by the Gurkhas, and the position on Conk Bayır, which was only kept forty-eight hours.[654] 'Unfortunately these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000 lives.'[655]

The Turks had won that decisive day. Major İzzettin noted:

> Good weather. At dawn we started attacking Conk Bayırı and pushed back the enemy. The crisis has been overcome. [Mustafa] Kemal's energy and effectiveness have borne fruit. We have all breathed a deep sigh of relief. The enemy is subjecting Conk Bayırı to intense shelling from ships and shore mortars and field guns. At least 15,000 shells have been fired. Our soldiers

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[648] See sir Ian Hamilton *Gallipoli Diaries*. See also his official report to Lord Kitchener published in The Official Gazette of Jan. 6, 1916.

[649] I. Çalışlar; op cit, 50–1

[650] General Ian Hamilton's Story of the Dardanelles; British Official Announcement of the Gallipoli Operation, made on 20 January 1916 by General Sir Ian Hamilton's report of his operations at the Dardanelles to Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, and published in The Official Gazette of Jan. 6, 1916.
See *Current History* vol 3; pp. 873-874.

[651] Ibid.

[652] Ibid.

[653] Ibid.

[654] Ibid.

[655] Ibid.

> have fought heroically under this infernal fire… Still tired and disoriented. I hope I'll be able to snatch some sleep… tonight.[656]

Indeed, in response to the Turkish success, Ally artillery gave the Turks back as good as they got. From daylight onwards they blasted Conk Bayır, turning it, as Kemal wrote,

> Into a kind of hell. From the sky came a downpour of shrapnel and iron. The heavy naval shells sank into the ground, then burst, opening huge cavities all about us. The whole of Chunuk Bair was enveloped in thick smoke and fire. Everyone waited resignedly for what fate would bring.[657]

The Turkish dead lay all over the hillside, their fingers still gripping their rifles as though awaiting the order to charge. When asked by Kemal where his troops were, a commander replied, 'Here are my troops. Those who lie dead.'[658]

During the bombardment, Kemal himself was struck by a piece of shrapnel in the chest, but his watch saved him. Subsequently, he gave the watch to Liman von Sanders in exchange for one which bore the German Marshal's family coat of arms.[659]

The artillery bombardment did not save the Sarı Bayır Ridge for the Anzacs, and by 10 a.m., though scattered units fought doggedly on until the evening, they had been repulsed back to the beachhead below.[660] Sir Ian Hamilton was still confident enough to write:

> Well, we had Chunuk Bair in our hands the best part of two days and two nights. So far the Turks have never retaken trenches once we had fairly taken hold. Have they done so now? I hope not… The Turks were well commanded: that I admit. Their Generals knew they were done unless they could quickly knock us off our Chunuk Bair. So they have done it. Never mind; never say die.[661]

Indeed, the Allies were not ready to give up, nor were the Turks. It was a fight to the finish.

5. The End of the Gallipoli Campaign and its Impact

Strong Ally attacks followed on 12 August and again a few days later. As before, the navy offered close assistance to the land war as on 16 August, when the destroyers *Grampus* and *Renard* in the Ejelmer Bay area gave immense fire support to troops on Kiretçtepe (Kiretch Tepe).[662] Rapid fire with high explosive and shrapnel rounds

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[656] I. Çalışlar, op cit; 50–1
[657] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 92.
[658] Ibid.
[659] Erikan; op cit; 171–2. Mustafa Kemal first told the story of the watch which saved his life in his report to the general staff in January 1917 (Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, I, 447).
[660] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 92.
[661] Sir Ian Hamilton: *Gallipoli*; op cit, vol 2; p. 89.
[662] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla*; op cit; p. 7.

prevented Turkish counter-attacks. As a post-war Turkish account stated, 'gunfire from destroyers caused heavy losses during the attacks and reinforcements could only come up singly on account of naval gunfire.'[663]
A further major Allied attempt to break out of the beachhead was defeated on 21 August.[664] The final large-scale British attack took place on 27 August, and like the rest, failed to achieve decisive results.[665]
All the while, reinforcements were reaching the Turkish defenders. Mustafa Kemal was to say later that he eventually commanded no fewer than eleven divisions and a cavalry brigade on the Anafartalar (Suvla Bay) front.[666] There were now four very strong operational groups: the Anafartalar Group under Colonel Mustafa Kemal; The Arıburnu group (Anzac sector) under Esat Pasha; the Sedd-el-Bahr (Cape Helles) group under Esat's brother, Vehip Pasha, and the Asia Group under Mehmet Ali Pasha.[667]

The Fifth Army held the key positions in every sector, which largely compensated for its lack of artillery ammunition and machine guns.[668] Not that the Allies had not tried everything, all that modern warfare of the time allowed, including submarines, whose novel use and effects on the war is well described by Norman Wilkinson who was at the Suvla Bay landing and in subsequent operations in August.[669] To reach the Peninsula, Turkish reinforcements went by a railway trip followed by a three-day march, but even then, land communications were attacked by the submarines.[670]

By the beginning of September, both sides were exhausted physically and psychologically. In early September, Hamilton requested 95,000 additional troops, most certainly to break the deadlock, once more. This time Kitchener refused the request. Fighting went into a stalemate. The months went by and the campaign grew static, relapsing into trench warfare.
By October, there was growing demand in the British press and parliament for the evacuation of Gallipoli. The Dardanelles Committee was convened to determine the reasons for the failure of the campaign, and in its first recommendation it called for Hamilton to be relieved. He was replaced on 15 October by General Sir Charles Munro. Munro arrived in Gallipoli on 28 October.[671] After two days of meetings with his staff, he decided that it was indeed time to begin planning an evacuation. At a meeting on 1 November, Munro and de Robeck agreed to establish a joint army-navy committee to organise the evacuation plan.[672] Kitchener himself personally visited

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[663] Ibid.
[664] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 153.
[665] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 91.
[666] ATTB, 10–11
[667] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 91.
[668] Ibid.
[669] N. Wilkinson: *The Dardanelles*; Longmans, Green & CO; London 1915; Chapter VI; Submarines; pp. 50-55...
[670] R. Pelvin: *Suvla: Sea power at Suvla*; op cit; p. 8.
[671] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* Naval War College; Newport Rhode Island; 4 May, 1994, p, 22.
[672] Keith Lawless: The Evacuation phase of the Gallipoli campaign of 1915; Unpublished research paper; US Army Command and General Staff College Ft Leavenworth; Ks 1993.

Gallipoli on 15 November, and seeing the situation firsthand agreed to an evacuation.[673]

The Ally Withdrawal

> Whatever initiative the Allies gained through their efforts seemed to evaporate quickly. Victory, seemingly within their grasp several times, eluded them. After eight months of failure and missed opportunities, the question was no longer when they would succeed but how were they going to extricate themselves from the stalemate. As casualties mounted (to nearly a quarter million men) the decision was made to withdraw. Here, in the last phase of a humbling and frustrating experience, the allies put together a *joint operation that was meticulously planned, superbly coordinated and brilliantly executed.* Virtually *all* of the intangibles missing earlier in the campaign -- including boldness, deception, coordination, agility, synchronization, adaptability and luck - were evident during the evacuation. It seems ironic that many of the same people who had failed to develop a cohesive plan for victory were so successful in "putting all the pieces together" for the withdrawal.[674]

One key to the plan's success was the ability of the Allies to deceive the Turks. While maintaining the appearance of business-as-usual during the day, the forces at Anzac and Suvla were methodically reduced at night, whilst the frontline troops, facing the Turks, were to be withdrawn last. Everything was carefully studied, whether logistics, potential threats by the Turks, and even the weather.[675]

For security reasons, the Greek islands of Lemnos and Imbros, which acted as intermediate sites for offloading evacuees, were cordoned off by the Navy, and fishermen and traders forbidden access to the Islands on accounts of 'a smallpox epidemic.'[676] Even some officers or men did not know about the decision to evacuate until the plan was actually implemented.[677] At night, the Allies left thousands of cooking fires burning, as had been done in ordinary times before, whilst men wrapped their feet in burlap, and blankets covered the piers to reduce the sounds of the embarkation. In day time, the Ally ship activities continued seemingly as before.[678]

The Allies evacuated their southern beachhead round Cape Helles on 8/9 January 1916. The barren Gallipoli peninsula in which the two sides had crammed some three quarters of a million men was now quiet.[679] Troops which had taken part in the fight were redeployed.

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[673] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited*, op cit; p. 22.
[674] Ibid, pp. 4-5.
[675] Ibid, p. 23.
[676] Ibid, p. 24.
[677] Ibid.
[678] Ibid.
[679] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit, p. 61.

'Thus ended one of the most original strategic conceptions of the First World War with the Turks again in possession of the peninsula.'[680]

The Impact of Gallipoli

> The British failure at the Dardanelles [Kinross says] gave a momentary psychological lift to the Turkish people. For the first time within living memory they had won a victory against a European power. Few Turks perhaps nourished the illusion that the tide of foreign pressure had been turned, that the Empire could look forward to a period of resurrection and recovery. But at least there had been a flicker of light and hope to illuminate the dark defeatist horizon. There was life in the old Turk yet. The national qualities of tenacity and courage and pride had vindicated themselves once again, as in the glorious past, here on the ridges of the Gallipoli Peninsula.[681]

The official British account of the campaign attributes two important factors 'in their failure to win in Gallipoli:' determined defensive fighting qualities of the Turkish soldiers and their extremely able leadership.[682] Not that the Allies had not thrown all they had: men, advanced military hardware, resources on a scale hardly ever seen, for they did. True, Turkish pressure on the Russians in the Caucasus was relieved, but the costs of the campaign — in terms of resources committed, casualties, and individual careers ruined — were enormous.[683] The British lost 205,000 men; of the 79,000 French, 47,000 became casualties.[684] The loss of hardware and equipment of all sorts was so high that when the allies departed, it took two years for the Turks to carry all the material they had left behind.[685] The losses inflicted by the Turks were such that the British never attempted another amphibious attack on Turkey during the remainder of the war.[686] Now, moreover, the Allies realised the Turk was no pushover. The British came away with renewed respect for the Turkish army.[687]

On the Turkish side, an important percentage of the army (17 out of 40 numbered divisions) and its officers (just less than half of the regular officers) served in the Gallipoli Campaign.[688] The casualty figures were considerable; overall 166,507 in

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[680] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 92.
[681] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 96.
[682] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 94.
[683] Cpt Bill Piersig: *Gallipoli Revisited;* op cit, p. 5.
[684] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 94.
[685] Ibid; p. 92.
[686] Ibid; p. 95.
[687] Ibid.
[688] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 261.

which 1,658 of them were officers.[689] Units were decimated; the flower of the Turkish army was lost there.[690]

Whilst the cost in human terms was considerable, victory had an immensely favourable impact. From the Turkish official and popular perspective, it was not only 'a magnificent victory but also signified the birth of the new Turkish nation from the wreck of the Ottoman Empire.'[691]
The pride of victory, Uyar and Erickson note, was so great that, psychologically, it improved the combat effectiveness of the entire military.[692] The prestige and cohesion of the military was greatly improved.[693] There emerged, indeed, a group of combat tested commanders with proven abilities, many of whom would make vital contributions to Turkish war effort subsequently.[694] Now, in addition to their good educational and theoretical background, which they had before, they had acquired practical combat experiences, which made them real leaders.[695] They have learned the tactics and techniques of modern warfare and were able to defeat or at least stand firm against the modern and powerful armies of Britain and France.[696] Not just France and Britain, and their incredible armada, but also troops from India, Australia, New Zealand, Scots, Irish, Welsh, Senegalese, and many others, a league of nation gathered against Turkey. These veterans would see action on other fronts that would prove difficult to defeat in subsequent campaigns.[697]
But the most important benefit of the campaign, Uyar and Erickson insist,
'Was the creation of new bonds within the rank and file. Facing danger and hardship every day, their shared experiences in the trenches created a special brotherhood.[698] Being a veteran of Gallipoli became a clear distinction and endowed prestige. It was no mere coincidence that the future commanders of the Turkish War of Independence (27 out of 91 commanding officers higher than regimental level) and the new Turkish Republican Army were veterans of the Gallipoli Campaign.'[699]

The performance of the ordinary troops during the whole campaign was the central reason why the Turks won. During the amphibious landing phase, their stand exceeded all estimates and expectations, surprising not only the Allied planners but also the Turkish General Staff.[700] Company and platoon size units kept the

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[689] Irfan Teksut and Necati Okse: Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi: Canakkale Cephesi Harekatı, vol. 5, book 3, (Ankara: Genkur. Basımevi, 1980), table no. 4; Most of the Turkish sources persistently give 250,000 figures as the overall numbers of the casualties.
[690] Hikmet Ozdemir, *The Ottoman Army 1914–1918: Disease & Death on the Battlefield*, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2008), 68–76.
[691] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 258.
[692] Ibid; p. 261.
[693] Ibid.
[694] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 95.
[695] Ibid.
[696] I. İnönü: Hatıralar (Memoirs), ed. Sabahattin Selek, Bilgi, Istanbul, I, 1985; II, 1987 (references are to this work, unless otherwise specified), pp. 146–147.
[697] E. J Erickson: *Ordered to Die*; op cit; p. 95..
[698] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 261.
[699] Teksut and Okse: Birinci Dunya Harbinde Turk Harbi, passim.
[700] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 259.

amphibious landings at bay for hours and, in some cases, more than a day.[701] For example, a sole infantry company (10th Coy, 3–26 Infantry) stopped the multi-brigade British advance in Ertuğrul Koyu (V Beach), and another company (7th Coy, 2–26 Infantry) held a similar advance of British troops in İkiz Koyu (X Beach).[702] The performance of the light units at Suvla Bay in August in holding a whole army was also quite remarkable. The text above is littered with instances of soldiers who won victory from the jaws of disaster.

Turkish officers, likewise, took the lead not just as able commanders, but also in leading from the front. The Gallipoli victory, Uyar and Erickson, insist, was the clear result of the efforts of officers, and their sacrifice was decisive.[703] The Campaign itself greatly affected the entire officer corps, who prior to it served 'under the psychological burden of complete defeat at the hands of the Balkan nations.'[704] Although several drastic measures and a dramatic reorganisation of the army helped overcome this stigma, psychological pressures continued to affect the officer corps.[705] The Gallipoli victory removed the stains of defeats and improved the morale and cohesion of the officer corps.[706] It became a symbol of determination and courage against the invaders. It also helped to improve the position and prestige of officers among the public. They began to see themselves proudly as the saviours and protectors of the nation once again.[707]

The statistical data concerning the high-ranking officers who actually fought at Gallipoli clearly show that the German officers in command and critical staff positions were only a minority.[708] According to the August 1915 order of battle of the Gallipoli front, there were two field armies, five army corps, 17 divisions, and 57 infantry regiments (not counting the supporting arms).[709] So, altogether, there were 80 commanding officers and 23 chiefs of staff, and amongst these, only eight of them were Germans.[710] This means that there were 95 Turkish officers in important combat posts (or 92% of the total available command and chief of staff posts).[711] Expressed differently, it was Turkish officers and not Germans who played the central role in the victory at Gallipoli at the level of command.

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[701] Ibid.
[702] Hickey, Gallipoli, 221–222.
[703] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 262.
[704] Ibid.
[705] Ibid.
[706] Avni Coker: Canakkale Sehitlerini Ziyaret Munasebetiyle, (Ankara: Akın Matbaacılık,1952), 14, 20–21.
[707] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 262.
[708] Ibid; p. 259.
[709] Ibid.
[710] These German officers were 5th Army Commander Liman von Sanders Pasha, XIV Corps; CO Trommer Pasha, 3rd ID CO; Col. Nicolai, 9th ID. CO Lt. Col. Botrich, Anafartalar Area Commander; Lt. Col. Willmer, 13th ID CO Col. Heuck, V Corps Chief of Staff; Lt. Col. Albrecht and 28th IR CO Maj. Hunker. Several other German officers served before August 1915; Weber Pasha, Col. von Sodenstern, Col. Kannengiesser, Col. Hovik, Lt. Col. Thauvenay, Maj. Muhlmann and Maj. Eggert.
[711] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 259.

> The name Gallipoli itself [Erickson concludes] evokes controversy and the campaign is, perhaps, the greatest 'what if' of the war for two reasons. First, the concept behind it was grand strategy of the first order that might have led to conditions ending the war two years early on allied terms. This might have avoided the bloodletting of 1916-1918, saved Czarist Russia from revolution, and sidestepped the disastrous Treaty of Versailles- in effect, altering the course of the entire twentieth century. Secondly, the campaign appeared to be a near miss for Britain on at least three occasions (18 March, 25 April and 6 August 1915) and, moreover, a battle that might easily have been won. For Britain the Gallipoli campaign was a disaster. For the Australians and New Zealanders the campaign was a coming of age as these peoples entered the mainstream of the twentieth century. But, for the Turks, the Gallipoli campaign was monumentally important. For the Turks, Gallipoli marked the first time since the seventeenth century in which they were able to defeat a great European power making the campaign a threshold event in the reemergence of a new national identity and pride.[712]

However, when all is considered, the main impact of Gallipoli goes beyond all this, for simply, as lengthily explained in the first chapters, had Turkey lost, the Allies would have dismembered her in 1915, and there would be no Turkey today. Except, maybe, in some remote enclave somewhere in Asia Minor, an enclave guarded by lightly armed gendarmes.

[712] E.J. Erickson: *Gallipoli The Ottoman Campaign*; op cit; Introduction; p. xi.

Five

FROM GALLIPOLI TO THE GREEK LANDING AT İZMİR (January 1916-15 May 1919)

Expressing his feelings in the wake of the Turkish victory at Gallipoli, utterly devastated by it, in fact, Henry Morgenthau, the then American ambassador (1913-1916), wrote:

> The Entente admitted defeat and withdrew its forces from the Dardanelles; and, with this withdrawal, Russia, which was the greatest potential source of strength to the Allied cause and the country which, properly organized and supplied, might have brought the Allies a speedy triumph, disappeared as a vital factor in the war. When the British and French withdrew from Gallipoli that action turned adrift this huge hulk of a country to flounder to anarchy, dissolution, and ruin....
>
> January 17, 1916, stands out as one of the big dates in the war. There was great rejoicing in Constantinople...
>
> THE withdrawal of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles had consequences which the world does not yet completely understand. The practical effect of the event, as I have said, was to isolate the Turkish Empire from all the world excepting Germany and Austria. England, France, Russia, and Italy, which for a century had held a restraining hand over the Ottoman Empire, had finally lost all power to influence or control. The Turks now perceived, that a series of dazzling events had changed them from cringing dependents of the European Powers into free agents. For the first time in two centuries they could now live their national life according to their own inclinations, and govern their peoples according to their own will. The first expression of this rejuvenated national life was an episode which, so far as I know, is the most terrible in the history of the world. New Turkey, freed from European tutelage, celebrated its national rebirth by murdering not far from a million of its own subjects.
>
> I can hardly exaggerate the effect which the repulse of the Allied fleet produced upon the Turks. They believed that they had won the really great decisive battle of the war. For several centuries, they said, the British fleet had victoriously sailed the seas and had now met its first serious reverse at the hands of the Turks. In the first moments of their pride, the Young Turk leaders saw visions of the complete resurrection of their empire. What had for two centuries been a decaying nation had suddenly started on a new and glorious life. In their pride and arrogance the Turks began to look with disdain upon the people that had taught them what they knew of modern warfare, and nothing angered them so much as any suggestion that they owed any part of their success to their German allies....

> Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him. And now that the fortunes of war were apparently favouring the empire, I began to see an entirely new Turk unfolding before my eyes. The hesitating and fearful Ottoman, feeling his way cautiously amid the mazes of European diplomacy, and seeking opportunities to find an advantage for himself in the divided counsels of the European powers, gave place to an upstanding, almost dashing figure, proud and assertive, determined to live his own life and absolutely contemptuous of his Christian foes. I was really witnessing a remarkable development in race psychology — an almost classical instance of reversion to type. The ragged, unkempt Turk of the twentieth century was vanishing and in his place was appearing the Turk of the fourteenth and the fifteenth, the Turk who had swept out of his Asiatic fastnesses, conquered all the powerful peoples in his way, and founded in Asia, Africa, and Europe one of the most extensive empires that history has known. If we are properly to appreciate this new Talaat and Enver and the events which now took place, we must understand the Turk who, under Osman and his successors, exercised this mighty but devastating influence in the world. We must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species.[713]

Mandelstam, for his part, in 1917, reminds us of the ultimate aim of the war:

> Le démembrement de l'Empire Ottoman, vers lequel ils (les Allies) convergent, n'est que la suite logique du grand but juridique des Alliés: l'instauration d'une humanité pacifique composée de nations libres, organisées par le Droit. Ce n'est pas le désir de conquêtes qui inspire les Alliés, mais le besoin impérieux qu'éprouve la partie non-allemande de l'humanité de libérer les peuples soumis à la « tyrannie sanglante » des Turcs, et d'arracher d'immenses territoires à l'incurie barbare des descendants d'Osman.[714]

Which means:

> The dismembering of the Ottoman Empire, towards which they (the Allies) are converging, is only the logical continuation of the great lawful/juridical aim of the Allies: the creation of a peace loving humanity made of free nations, ruled by the Law. It is not the spirit of conquest which inspires the Allies, but the imperative need that is felt by the non Germanic part of humanity, that is to liberate all the people under the bloody tyranny of the Turks, and to take immense territories away from the barbaric malpractice of the descendants of Othman.

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[713] Henry Morgenthau: *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*; Double Day, Page & Company; 1919; pp. 272-6.
[714] A. Mandelstam: *The Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*; Lausanne, Imprimeries Reunies; 1917; p. 548.

And finally here, Gibbons, the famed historian of Turkey, writing at more or less the same time as the previous two (in 1920 in his case), concludes his work on Venizelos, (unlike the distressed Morgenthau) with great hope:

> Adrianople and Smyrna are stepping-stones to Constantinople.
> Students of the Italian risorgimento maintain that the movement could not have ended elsewhere than in Rome. The renascence of Hellenism cannot end elsewhere than in Constantinople. How long it will take to achieve the unity of Hellas depends upon the Greek people.
> If they continue to give their support to Venizelos, he will know how to lead the Greek army to its final victory. The Powers may interpose their veto. But the life of Venizelos demonstrates the folly of vetoes. In the prayer of eight million Greeks, "Zeto Venizelos!" the aspirations of Hellenism are practically expressed. For if the Cretan lives and continues to lead, he will accomplish what the greatest Mediterranean islander before him failed to accomplish.
> He will take possession of Constantinople.[715]

Thus, the same rhetoric, always centered around the same themes: 'the barbaric Turk, mass murderer of Christians, and thus the necessity to break his realm.' This was the Western mindset during the period discussed here.

1. From Gallipoli Till the End of the First World War

The year 1916, which began with the Gallipoli victory, was soon followed by another great success in the south, in modern day Iraq, at Kut al-Amarah. For the first time after 'the Sarıkamış blunder,' Uyar and Erickson note, 'the future seemed bright' as the Turks not only had a strategic reserve (the divisions massed around Gallipoli Peninsula), but also the initiative.[716] This victory at Kut al-Amarah, little noted in history, was in fact a victory of decisive importance. The Russian-British plan was for their armies to move conjointly from north and south, meet in Baghdad, and in the process destroy the Turkish Southern and Eastern armies at once, and hence take out Turkey entirely out of the war.[717] And, obviously, had Turkey been taken out of the war then, not only the whole destiny of Turkey would have been different, the whole world history would have been reshaped. The details of this battle are looked at by this author elsewhere, and only a brief outline is made of it here.

The Kut al-Amarah victory had its origins in late 1915 when a joint operation was launched by the Russians and the British. The British marching from the south on Baghdad were meant to make junction with the Russians advancing from Persia in the

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[715] H.A. Gibbons: *Venizelos*; Houghton Mifflin Company; Boston; 1920, p. 376.

[716] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 262.

[717] On the episode itself, see Major General Vere Ferrers Townshend: *My Campaign;* The James A. McCann Company; vol 2; 1920. For the strategic implications of the battle, and the combined Russian-British to make junction at Baghdad, there is nothing better than *Current History* (CH), vol 3 Oct 1015-March 1916, and the so many articles, whether on the British or Russian sides, especially articles Significance of Events in Mesopotamia; pp. 877-878.

east and from Turkey's Caucasus front in the north.[718] Whilst the Russians were successful, the advance of the British army, commanded by General Townshend, was held at the battle of Ctesiphon (Salman Pak in Turkish), about twenty miles from Baghdad, on 25 November 1915.[719] As the British retreated, they were surrounded at Kut al-Amarah by Turkish troops. Even though the Turks lacked adequate resources for a siege, Colonel Nurettin (Sakallı) Bey (who was subsequently replaced by Halil [Kut] Pasha, Enver's uncle, on 10 January), still encircled the British quite effectively.[720] First, he isolated the Kut garrison and then placed the majority of his units downstream against the British relieving force.[721] The encounter was bloody, and General Townshend, who subsequently became one of Turkey's greatest friends, at the time showed an unflinching resolve. He noted in his *Campaign* that the Arab inhabitants of the town caused him much anxiety, as they communicated with the Turks, stored many guns, ready for an uprising.[722] For this reason, he says,

> I took some of the leading inhabitants into custody and announced that I would shoot them if there was the least sign of treachery. In order to put a stop to the looting of the Arabs at the commencement of the siege, I had caused twelve men who had been caught in the act to be tried by military commission and shot, pour encourager les autres.[723]

As in Gallipoli, Muslims fighting amongst the British Indian troops also did their utmost not to fight the Turks.

'Two sepoys from the 22nd and 66th Punjabis, deserted to the enemy on 27th-28th December. Both were fired on, but, unfortunately, were not hit,' tells us General Townshend.[724] This was a regular occurrence, which affected British troops.

The siege lasted for nearly half a year, and Townshend and his men were tested to their limit by not just a strict blockade, but also intense bombardments and assaults.[725] The relieving force, especially led by General Aylmer, sought stubbornly to break through the Turkish lines for much of the early Winter of 1915-1916, and mounted a series of bloody assaults between 6 January and 22 April, 1916.[726] Whilst the attacks were in progress, the British sought to bribe Turkish officers but unsuccessfully, in the end forcing Townshend to surrender unconditionally on 29 April.[727] The surrender of 13,309 British forces was received with dismay in Britain, it being the largest surrender of a British army between Yorktown in 1781 (during the American War of Independence) and Singapore in 1942 (to the Japanese in the Second World War).[728] The surrender was only part of the picture, as the British army lost considerable hardware in the fighting and after the surrender itself, besides the loss of considerable

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[718] The British Advance on Bagdad and Jerusalem; CH vol 6; p. 44.
[719] C.V.F. Townshend: *My Campaign;* op cit.
[720] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 257.
[721] Ibid.
[722] Major General Vere Ferrers Townshend: *My Campaign;* op cit; p. 38.
[723] Ibid.
[724] Ibid; p. 49.
[725] Ibid; throughout to moment of surrender.
[726] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 257.
[727] Ibid.
[728] Ibid; p. 249.

troops and officers, suffering around 25,000 casualties in the five-month long campaign.[729] The British had put such a gallant defence, that when Khalil Pasha came to see the British General and the latter offered him his sabre and pistols, Khalil refused to take them, saying, 'They are as much yours as ever they were.'[730]

On the eastern front, however, 1916 was a disastrous year for the Turks. Following the Russian successful offensive, Erzurum fell on 16 February 1916, followed by subsequent Turkish losses.[731] To counter the Russian advance, Enver decided on a pincer movement: while the 3rd Turkish Army would counter-attack from the west, the 2nd Army would be transferred from Thrace, and attack the Russian left flank, south of lake Van, from the south.[732] The plan was yet another reflection of complete lack of understanding of the basics of war or geography. More importantly: There is a huge difference between something perfect on paper and reality on the ground. For how could an army be transferred such a long distance on land (from Thrace to Van), without adequate system of transport, and be ready for an offensive? Examples of past campaigns by early Ottoman sultans such as Mohammed II and Selim I showed awareness of weather conditions and logistical problems. At the time Enver made those plans, Turkey had no means to carry an army east effectively, nor the means to provide for it on such a long distance, let alone meet its needs once it reached that area, which had been thoroughly devastated by war already.[733] The presence on the Russian front of fine Gallipoli veterans could not and would not suffice. It took at least forty days to transfer troops from western to eastern Turkey. The Baghdad railway only reached then as far as Ceylanpınar (known then as Ras al-Ain (Resülayn) in Upper Mesopotamia, with two gaps in the Taurus and Amanus ranges.[734] Troops had to cover up to 600 kilometres on foot, as the motorised means were not enough to carry men and equipment, especially as four eastern and southern armies were competing for such meagre means. The transfer of the 2nd Army, which started in April, was not completed until August.[735] The Russians had plenty of time to pre-empt the Turks by attacking once more in force along the whole of the front.[736] The Russians attacked and routed the 3rd Army in the north; on 18 April 1916, they captured Trabzon on the Black Sea coast, and made great gains in all directions, pushing the Turks and capturing great numbers of prisoners and material.[737] Only in few places was the front salvaged or prevented from entire collapse. The 25th Regiment, made of Gallipoli veterans, defended the frontline near the city of Bayburt

[729] E.J. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in World War I, 79–89, 92.
[730] Major General Vere Ferrers Townshend: *My Campaign;* op cit; p. 237.
[731] General von Falkenhayn: *The German General Staff and its Decisions 1914-1916;* Dodd, Mead and Company; New York; 1920; p. 295. For chronology of Turkish losses/Russian gains see CH especially vol 5 ff.
[732] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 160; See Liman von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; pp. 35 ff.
[733] See M. Philips Price: *War and Revolution in Asiatic Russia*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1917; pp. 63 ff; also 168 ff.
[734] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years;* op cit; p.116.
[735] Ibid.
[736] Lord Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 99.
[737] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; p. 117 ff; for that front see M. Philips Price: *War and Revolution*; p. 168 ff.. As for chronology of military operations see *Current History* vol 5 ff

with great success, and managed to push back the Russian offensive on 3 July.[738] Turkish counter-attacks made a few gains, such as the brief capture of Muş, and Bitlis, but forceful Russian counter-offensive at the end of August, forced Turkish withdrawal.[739] The Russians had thus completed their side of the plan, and were marching south to end Turkey's presence in the war, except that the British, who had been defeated at Kut al Amarah, did not accomplish their side of the plan. And so Turkey was saved once more.

Early in 1917, however, the story was different. The British were on the march northwards, and they expected the Russians to meet with them in the usual pincer movement, and destroy the Turks once and for all. Again, events, which had nothing to do with Turkish heroism this time, saved Turkey. In fact, late 1916-early 1917 had begun disastrously for the Turks due to the incompetence/circumstances noted in the previous paragraph. In the winter of late 1916-early 1917, two Turkish armies, hundreds of thousands of men, found themselves crammed, facing the harsh weather conditions in an area that had been devastated by nearly three years of total war. To make things worse for the Turks, as Uyar and Erickson explain, the British and Russian blockade ended the coastal shipping trade on which Turkey depended. This caused nearly twice more personnel and ten times more pack animals to be allocated to securing the poor lines of communications.[740] In conditions of total war and all men of fighting age at the front, it was near impossible to maintain any rural economy. Add the destruction of war, refugees streaming from all directions, farms and hamlets burnt down to the ground, bridges cut off, and so on, and the outcome was easy to guess: hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, even, perished from starvation.[741] Mustafa Kemal, who was in that region, could easily see and record the state of things:

> 7 November. Immediately after crossing Batman Bridge, we saw a man lying on the road. He appeared dead from hunger. Another two, between the bridge and our bivouac. It seems they are refugees… After the bridge, two horses that have just died (men and horses are dying of hunger).
>
> 9 November. Saw many refugees on the road, going back to Bitlis. They are all hungry and wretched. A child, aged four or five years, abandoned by its parents and left to die, was dragging its feet 100 metres behind a man and a woman. I reproached them for not taking the child with them. "It's not ours," they said.[742]
>
> 16 November. I inspected the hospitals in Bitlis and found them clean. I spoke to the Sheikh, who had an arm amputated. The chief doctor reports that when the houses allocated to the hospital were cleaned, they found the heads of some ten or fifteen Muslim women. I went on and visited the mosque called Şerefiye. It's full of dead animals and rubbish. A ruin. I came across an orphan called Ömer and took him along. When they saw this, they brought me another three orphans. This time I contented myself with giving them money.

[738] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 261.
[739] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 162.
[740] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 273.
[741] Ibid.
[742] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 163.

> 21 November. Up at 5 a.m. Made my toilet, ready for departure. Packed up. Told the ADC that Bitlis reminded me of the ruins of Pompeii. Went on to talk of the ruins of Nineveh, and so of history…[743]

And so, now, hundreds of thousands of soldiers found themselves short of armament, even worse, short of food for themselves and for their horses. Men were reduced to one third of their ration, whilst animals had no fodder whatsoever.[744] Poorly fed, poorly clothed troops still in their summer uniforms with foot rags for boots, Command having learnt nothing whatsoever from previous disasters (such as at Sarikamis), were caught by the harsh Caucasus Winter. In the wake of blizzards, whole detachments perished in caves, where they had sought shelter from hunger and freezing temperatures.[745] Diseases under such conditions took their toll, finishing off what the harsh winter and hunger had not.[746] In these conditions the fate of the decimated Turkish armies was sealed should the customary Russian late Winter-early Spring offensive take place. Due to High Command's policies on the Eastern Front, no amount of heroism on the Turkish part would have saved armies that had been so foolishly sacrificed, and consequently, Turkey itself would have been swept away in the 1917 offensive.

Just then, fate had its hand. The decimated Turkish army did not have to fight a late winter-early spring campaign, for in February-March 1917 a political event 'of world importance supervened – the Russian Revolution.'[747] The Revolution had begun in February 1917 in Petrograd, modern day St Petersburg, the capital of Russia then.

> 'RUSSIA IN REVOLUTION. ABDICATION OF CSAR AND RISE OF A REPUBLIC IN THE STRONGHOLD OF AUTOCRACY.'

Thus reported then *Current History*, the leading current events publication of the time.[748] After weeks of protests and disruptions, the revolution began threatening the manufacture of munitions, paralysing industrial activity, troops and police fighting each other in the streets, the revolt spreading all over Russia simultaneously, and in the end leading to Czar Nicholas' abdication on March 16.[749] The impact on the Caucasus Front was dramatic as Philips Price, the *Manchester Guardian* reporter, who was there, could then witness:

> On March 20th (1917) I left by the night train for Kars, as I hoped to see what effect the Revolution was having… When in the afternoon of the 21st my train entered the Kars station, the platform was crowded with troops from the garrison, waving red flags and singing the Marseillaise. I recalled the days in February of the previous year, when I had been here and had seen the commencement of the great offensive against Erzerum. There was no talk then of anything but of war against the Turk, and every road was covered with

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[743] Ibid; p. 164.
[744] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 100.
[745] Liman Von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; pp. 122-23.
[746] Ibid.
[747] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 100.
[748] *Current History,* Volume 6; April 1917-Sep 1917 opening page, 10 and ff.
[749] Ibid.

> troops marching to the slaughter... Now I saw grey-coated men who had marched like sheep to the slaughter were now raising the red banners of revolt against militarism and tyranny, and were sending a silent message to their Turkish brethren across the plateau.[750]

Then took place the mother of all shifts in policy ever witnessed in human history: The Russian claim to Constantinople was now reversed:
'Free Russia has no desire to annex Constantinople' declared the leading figure of the Revolution, Kerensky, a statement reinforced by the declaration of Premier Lvoff on April 10:

> The new Government considers it its duty to make known to the world that the object of free Russia is not to dominate other nations and forcibly take away their territory. The object of independent Russia is a permanent peace and the rights of all nations to determine their own destiny.[751]

By this, the main reason for Russia entering the war against Turkey was gone. Russia had now no further reason to fight the Turks.

The Russian Revolution had a powerful impact in every single respect. First and foremost it saved Turkey, for had the Russian offensive of early Winter 1917 taken place, the starving, frozen, Turkish army would have been swept away in a matter of a week at most and Turkey smashed thoroughly. Now Russia out of the war meant that it removed a principal foe of the Turks, a foe which would even turn when it was most needed during the War of Independence (1919-1922), into the greatest ally of Turkey. Even more immediately, the Bolshevik Revolution meant that the initial British-Russian plan of simultaneous action early in 1917 in order to destroy Turkey's armies in the East and the South did not take place. When the British arrived at the Rendez Vous in 1917, the Russians were not there. The Revolution was also crucial as it occurred precisely when another element of decisive nature entered the scene: the Arab uprising.

For a while now, the British, through some dubious Arab nationalist intermediaries, have been negotiating and making promises to the Shereef of Makkah to induce him into an uprising against the Turks. Shereef Husayn, the hereditary Emir of Makkah, obviously lured by the promises, led in October 1916 an anti-Turkish uprising.[752] The new commander of the Hejaz region, General Fahreddin (Turkkan) Pasha, against all odds, managed to defend one of the two holy cities of Islam, Madinah, for two and a half years until 9 January, 1919 (outlasting the end of the First World War).[753] He not only had to defend Madinah but also the single-track narrow-gauge Hejaz Railway on which the entire army logistics depended.[754]

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[750] M. Philips Price: *War and Revolution;* op cit; 288.
[751] *Current History*; vol 6; op cit; p. 295.
[752] There is a vast literature on the subject, but in order to have an on the spot or heat of the moment idea of issue, it is worth looking at the New York Times magazine, *Current History* from the years 1917 till 1922. .
[753] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 253.
[754] Ibid.

At this point, response must be made to the generalised claim that Arabs are faithless traitors, ready to stab a Muslim brethren at the back. Contrary to this claim made by hordes of Western historians,[755] Arab nationalists, and trashy films like Lawrence of Arabia, the Arab rebels who fought alongside the British were either misled Bedouins, who have always rebelled against any authority anyway, or people sold out to the Western cause. The anti Ottoman feelings, as a rule, have always been inspired by Christian Arab nationalists who have worked under Western umbrella, and who founded the Ba'ath parties. Included amongst the latter were the newspaper owner Louis Sabunji, the writer Nagib Azoury, and Edmond Rabat, another 'intellectual.'[756] The vast majority of Arabs, including in Arabia, stayed put.[757] As Mesut Uyar shows in his study of the subject, rather than the Arabs deserting the Turks, the Arabs fought and died in great numbers alongside the Turks over the decades, and especially in the First World War and even after, during the War of Independence.[758] Moreover, despite threats for their lives and all sorts of enticements, Arab prisoners caught fighting alongside the Turks by the British-Shereef coalition preferred execution rather than joining them.[759] Also, as Uyar shows, only a very small ratio of Arab officers sided against the Ottomans; his study explaining the origins and factual aspects behind the alleged betrayal or desertions of some Arab regiments or units, especially at Gallipoli.[760] And if there is any further proof that Muslim Arabs are not the traitors ready on first notice to backstab a fellow Muslim, as is generally presented to us, history is full of instances of Arabs dying in their countless numbers by the side of Turks in all wars, from North Africa, through the seas, through the lands, and from the times of the Crusades in 1095-1291 through the centuries until the 20th.[761] Out of the thousands of instances of Muslim Arabs fighting and dying for Ottoman Turkey let's cite the following. The great Algerian patriot, Bu Ma'za, played a leading role during the general anti-French uprising of 1845. When defeated by the French, he surrendered in April 1847. But in the years that followed, on the outbreak of the Crimean War (1853-56), he asked for and was granted, by Emperor Napoleon III, the right to fight for the Ottoman Turks against the Russians. Bu Ma'za lost his life during the Anatolian campaign at the head of a Turkish corps of volunteers.[762] There is also

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[755] See, for instance Andrew Mango, who in his book on Ataturk, only refers to Arabs as traitors, or at best, cowards.

[756] See: S. Lavan: Four Christian Arab Nationalists: A comparative Study; *The Muslim World*; vol 57; pp. 114-25;
Caesar. E. Farah: Great Britain; Germany and the Ottoman Caliphate; in *Der Islam;* vol 66; pp. 264-88.
George Antonius: *The Arab Awakening,* New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1946; pp. 101-11, and subsequently.

[757] Ann Scoville, British Logistical Support to Hashemites of Hejaz: Taif to Maan 1916–1918, (Los Angeles: University of California Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1982), 22, 38–42, 47.

[758] M. Uyar: Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty during the First World War; in *War in History*; Sage Publishing; vol 20; No 4 (2013); pp. 526-44; esp. p. 540 ff.

[759] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 275.

[760] M. Uyar: Ottoman Arab Officers between Nationalism and Loyalty; op cit; p. 538 ff in particular.

[761] The bibliography is endless, but just for a selection of Arab-Turkish fighting side by side, from the crusades till the 20th century, browse through: Ibn al-Athir: *Kitab al-Kamil*; ed., K.J. Tornberg; 12 vols; Leiden; 1851-72. Ibn Khaldun: *Kitab al-Ibar*; Cairo: Dar al-Tab'a al-Amira; 1867-8. Ali Reza Seyfi: *Turgut Reis,* Istanbul, 1899. R. Basset *Documents Sur Le Siege d'Alger en 1541* (Paris and Oran, 1890). P. Berthier: *La Bataille de l'Oued al-Makhzan*; 4 Aout 1578, Paris, 1985. S. Bono: *I Corsari Barbareschi*; Torino; 1964. G. Fisher: *The Barbary Legend;* Oxford; 1957. M. Emerit: les Memoires d'Ahmed Bey de Constantine, RA, 1er et 2em trimester; 1949; pp. 71-125. M. Hamed: "The Libyan/Turkish War against the Italian Invasion of Libya 1911-1912" (MSC thesis, Libyan Studies Center, 1988). M. Morsy: *North Africa 1800-1900;* Longman; London; 1984.

[762] W. Blunt: *Desert Hawk*; Methuen & Co. Ltd; London; 1947, p. 201.

the remarkable instance of the Libyans, who fought and died in the tens of thousands alongside the Turks against the Italians (after 1911), without any instance of a single Libyan siding against them.[763] In fact, there was one instance: A leader of the urban community, Hassuna Pasha, allied himself with the Italians, but his son went over to the Turkish side. Whilst there he received two letters from his father urging him to renounce the Turkish cause. The son's reply was that, 'not only would he never play the traitor to his country and his faith, but that, if Allah granted that he and the Turks should enter Tripoli again, he would shoot his father as one.'[764]

Nonetheless, the Shereef's rebellion cost the Turkish-German alliance very dearly. Led, misled, instructed, and duped, all at once, by captain T.E. Lawrence, arguably one of the most morally debased characters in history, the Bedouins indulged in raids and sabotage that crippled Turkish defence and supply systems.[765] This opened the way to the British advance.

Early in 1917, the new British commander in Mesopotamia, General Maude, launched an offensive, and through February, registered considerable advance, smashing Turkish defences.[766] Turkish front-line troops, commanded by Colonel Kâzım Karabekir, who had earlier fought successfully on the southern sector in Gallipoli, collapsed, and Kut al-Amarah was retaken by the British.[767] To the great fortune of the Turks, the Bolshevik Revolution had prevented the now victorious British from joining with the Russians in the great encirclement and destruction of the Turkish armies. Without the Revolution, had the British and Russians joined together, Turkey would have been out of the war early in 1917, and there and then dismembered by united Allies. Instead, the fate of Turkey was not just extended until the Autumn of 1918, the split of the Allies meant that the dismemberment of Turkey would have to be delayed, too, until victory and a plan B was devised.

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[763] See G.F. Abbott: *The Holy War in Tripoli*; Edward Arnold; London; 1912. E.N. Bennett: *With the Turks in Tripoli* (London, 1912). F. McCullagh: *Italy's War for a Desert;* Herbert and Daniel; London; 1912. A. Ostler: *Arabs in Tripoli*; John Murray; London; 1912. H.C. Seppings Wright: *Two Years Under the Crescent*; Small, Maynard & Company; Boston; 1913. W.T. Stead: *Tripoli and the Treaties or Britain's Duty in this War;* London; 1911.
See also F. Malgeri: *La Guerra Libica 1911-1912*, Rome, 1970, pp. 396-407. K. Holmboe: *Desert Encounter,* London, 1936. -Idris El-Horeir: "Mawaqif Khalida Li 'Umar al-Mukhtar" [Memorable attitudes of 'Umar al-Mukhtar], *Majallet al-Buhuth al-Tarikhiyya* 2 (July 1988). M. Howeidi, "The National Movement in East Libya During the First World War" (MSC thesis, Libyan Studies Center, 1988).

[764] G.F. Abbott: *The Holy War in Tripoli*; Edward Arnold; London; 1912; p. 115.

[765] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 253.

[766] General Maude's campaign, see E. F. Eagan: *The War in the Cradle of the World* (London, 1918); Kermit Roosevelt: *War in the Garden of Eden* (New York, 1919); Sir Charles Collwell: *Life of Sir Stanley Maude* (London, 1920); E. Betts: *The Bagging of Bagdad* (London, 1920); E. Candler: *The Long Road to Bagdad* (London, 1920); C. Cato (pseudonym): *The Navy in Mesopotamia* (London, 1917); F. Maurice, "The Mesopotamian Campaign," in *Asia,* Volume 18 (New York, 1918), pp. 933-936.

[767] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 166.



A general view of the Southern Palestine Front at the launch of Allenby's offensive.

Freed from the Russian threat, the Turks managed to stabilise the Southern front for some time until the autumn. However, on 30 October 1917, General Allenby launched a vast offensive on the Sinai front, capturing Gaza, then one place after another yielding; the Beersheba-Damascus railways junction on 15 November, followed two days later by Jaffa; now Jerusalem was doomed to fall.[768] On 9 December, 1917, Allenby entered Jerusalem.

> Nothing I think, [says Major Vivian Gilbert] who was part of the conquering army, gave a clearer indication of England's intentions in Palestine than the order of the commander-in-chief that no British flag should fly over the conquered city, and no flag was flown save the Red Cross flag, emblem of succour to the distressed, and this proud pennon flew from the American Hospital in Jerusalem.[769]

Lloyd George had asked Allenby to capture Jerusalem as a Christmas present for the British nation. He did so.[770] Christendom was jubilant. Allenby now took the status of the most successful, if not the Greatest Crusader of all times.[771] Allenby in his triumphant entry into the Holy City on 11 December 1917, declared:

> 'Today the wars of the crusades are completed.'[772]

A Punch cartoon from December 1917, entitled 'The Last Crusade,' had Richard the Lionheart gazing down at Jerusalem with the text: 'At last my dream come true.'[773]

'We had finished our crusade, peace and freedom were in the Holy Land for the first time for five hundred years — and it all seemed worth while.'[774]

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[768] General Allenby's campaigns in Palestine and Syria, see: H. Pirie-Gordon, A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (London, 1919); W. T. Massey, *Allenby's Final Triumph* (London, 1920); H. Dinning: *Nile to Aleppo: With the Light Horse in the Near East* (London, 1920); P.E. White: *The Disintegration of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1920); C. T. Atkinson, "General Liman von Sanders and His Experiences in Palestine," *Army Quarterly*, Volume 3 (London, 1922), pp. 257-275; J. Bourelly: *Campagne d'Egypte et de Syrie contre les Turcs* (Paris, 1919); G. A. Schreiner: *From Berlin to Bagdad: Behind the Scenes in the Near East* (New York, 1918).

[769] Major Vivian Gilbert: *The Romance of the last Crusade, with Allenby to Jerusalem*; D. Appleton and Company; New York; 1923; p. 178.

[770] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 108.

[771] R.E.C. Adams: *The Modern Crusaders* (London, 1920).

[772] In E. Siberry: *The New Crusaders*; Ashgate: Aldershot; 2000; p. 95.

[773] Ibid.

[774] Major Vivian Gilbert: *The Romance of the last Crusade*; op cit; p. 235.

After they were checked in their advance in front of Amman in the Spring of 1918 and their troops thinned by necessities of the Western European front, by the late Summer of 1918, the British were ready to move north towards Turkey proper. At 4.30 a.m., 19 September, an intense bombardment of the Turkish positions by three hundred guns began and lasted fifteen minutes.[775] Then, began the ultimate operation, whereby the infantry would open way for the cavalry which would hurl itself, and thus cut Turkish lines north, and in the enveloped pocket, terminate the very existence of the Turkish army in the south. In thirty-six hours, between 4.30 a.m., 19 September and 5 p.m., 20 September, the British crushed the 8th Turkish Army, whilst the 7th Army was in full retreat through the hills of Samaria. Just as they were being struck on land, the Turks were also struck from the air as they lay in the open. Some officers, like Mustafa Kemal, realistically came out of the delusional state which paralysed the minds of their superiors, and realised that saving Turkey itself was the only option left, and so began the re-organisation of the remnants of the Turkish army pulling northwards, thus preserving the remaining units from total obliteration.[776] This was done by late September. Von Sanders, like Enver, lacked Mustafa Kemal's quick perception of situations. Few days later, on 1 October 1918, the Australian cavalry entered Damascus, there capturing 20,000 men. Von Sanders had foolishly decided to defend the city, and it only took a traitor, Ali Rıza Pasha (an ethnic Arab better known as Ali Rida al-Rikabi), who was the commander of the central sector of the city defences, to cause the disastrous outcome.[777] The fall of Damascus and its subsequent history, just as that of Jerusalem, would teach bitter lessons to the Muslim Arabs (that is if they ever knew such history, which as a rule (that is with the rarest exceptions to be counted on the fingers of a few persons), they don't). Two years after the city's (Damascus) fall, Muslim Arabs rising against the French were crushed by the combined armies of the French and Arab Christians. The French general, Gouraud, on entering the city, straight aimed for Salah Eddin's burial place, kicked it with his foot, and then exclaimed:

> Awake, Saladin! We are back! My presence here sanctifies the victory of the Cross over the Crescent.[778]

Back to 1918 and the last moments of the Turks in the Arab East. In the midst of their unravelling, the remnants of the 4th and 7th Armies passed under the able command of Mustafa Kemal, who fought with grit and determination to retain as much territory as possible until the armistice.[779] With all the losses just suffered, there was no Ottoman Empire anymore.

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[775] Ibid; p. 225.
[776] Liman von Sanders: *Five Years*; op cit; 281–2. P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; p. 119.
[777] M. Uyar; E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 271.
[778] Translated slightly differently by K.E. Meyer-S.B. Brysac: *King Makers, the Invention of the Modern Middle East*; W.W. Norton and Company; 2008; p. 359.
[779] M. Uyar; E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 271.

> The Balkan Wars had deprived it (the Ottoman Empire) of Turkey in Europe; now the World War had deprived it of all its Arab provinces [says Kinross.][780]

Mustafa Kemal lost Aleppo on 25 October but managed to stop further advances into the Anatolian plains.[781] On 26 October, he established his headquarters at Katma, north of Aleppo, and as he did so, he stopped a probing attack by advancing British forces. It was the last engagement of the war.[782]

2. Armistice: 30 Oct 1918, and its Aftermaths: The Culmination of Plans for the Final Carving up of Turkey

> The Western public [Toynbee said around the time] has grown so used to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire that it takes the process for granted and assumes that it will go on till there is no Turkish state left on the map, while some publicists have gone so far as to prophesy the extinction of the Turkish nation. But if this process be examined, it will be found to have passed through two different phases, and to have entered on a third in which it is tending towards equilibrium. During the first phase (1682-1814) Turkey lost territory almost exclusively to Austria and Russia, the nearest Western or Westernised Great Powers. From 1814 to 1913, on the other hand, her losses to other Powers were inconsiderable, and her progressive break-up took the form of successful internal secessions — by subject nationalities in her Near Eastern and by ambitious viceroys in her Middle Eastern provinces. In the third phase, which began with her intervention on the losing side in the European War (1914-1918), it looked at first as if she might suffer total shipwreck. The appetites of the Powers were unleashed as they had never been before; Greek and Arab nationalism joined in the hunt; and Turkey at the armistice seemed to be at the mercy of overwhelming hostile forces.[783]

In October 1918, a few days before the Armistice, the Turkish authorities sent General Townshend, their former prisoner from Kut al Amarah, to inform the British Admiral in command in the Aegean Sea that they wished to open immediate negotiations for an armistice.[784] In response, the British stated that if the Turkish Government sent fully accredited plenipotentiaries, Vice Admiral Calthorp, the British commander, 'Was empowered to inform them of the conditions upon which the Allies would agree to stop hostilities and could sign an armistice on these conditions in their behalf.'[785]

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[780] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 124.
[781] Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, op cit; 285–319.
[782] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 182.
[783] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*; Constable; 1922; p. 211.
[784] Turkey's Surrender to the Allies Text of the Terms Under Which Turkey Laid Down Her Arms; on Oct. 31, 1918; in *Current History*, vol 9; October, 1918— March, 1919; p. 399.
See also accounts by Major General Vere Ferrers Townshend: *My Campaign;* op cit; p. 290 ff.
[785] Turkey's Surrender to the Allies Text of the Terms Under Which Turkey Laid Down Her Arms; op cit; p. 399.
See also accounts by Major General Vere Ferrers Townshend: *My Campaign*; op cit; p. 290 ff.

Following the Turkish plenipotentiaries' arrival at Mudros, three days of parley followed, about which General Allenby as well as the Entente Governments were kept fully informed, and in the end the armistice was signed on the evening of 30 October, to take effect at noon the next day.[786]

The Turkish leaders knew, of course, that the Allies had already plans to partition Turkey, as this was confirmed by the Bolsheviks — who, unlike their Tsarist predecessors, were neither allies of the West, nor were they keen to partition Turkey.[787] The Allies, of course, made it sound that no such a thought ever crossed their mind or their pure conscience. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, had declared in January 1918 that he had no intention of depriving Turkey of Thrace and Asia Minor, 'provided that the Straits were internationalized and that Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine did not revert to Ottoman sovereignty.'[788] More importantly, the American president Wilson's Fourteen Points, which provided the basis for all negotiations to end the war, insisted (in point 12) that the Turkish portion of the Ottoman State 'should enjoy full sovereignty, on condition that subject nationalities had the right to free development.'[789] With the Arab provinces already under British occupation, all that mattered to the Turkish leaders was to keep what they still held, that is Turkey proper.[790]

However, the Allies had their plans well set, and they were not going to change them. Years earlier, they built a united front against the Germans at the expense of Turkey, i.e. its carving up after victory.[791] The Russians had decided that nothing would do unless their demands were met, and the French and British Governments had agreed to Russia's acquisition of Constantinople and adjoining territories commanding the Black Sea Straits.[792] In a grand shift of policy, at the beginning of the war, for the first time in their history, the British and French were, hence, ready to concede to Russia what they had hitherto, and for centuries, strictly refused to give away: Constantinople and other territories Russia sought. In November 1914, in order to encourage Russian support, Sir Edward Grey had privately agreed that 'The question of the Straits and of Constantinople should be settled in conformity with Russian desires.'[793]
With a feeling of distrust, maybe believing this was too good to be true, in February 1915, as the Allies operation in Gallipoli seemed to be a successful possibility, the Russians insisted that the commitment be made public.[794] The Allies were worried that should they do that, attempts to bring in Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, who all sought a share of Turkey, might compete with Russia's demands, but realising the weight of Russia and the eastern front, which was utterly necessary, Britain and

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[786] Ibid.
[787] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 189.
[788] Ibid.
[789] Hikmet Bayur:, Atatürk Hayatı ve Eseri (Atatürk's Life and Work), Vol. I AKDTYK, Ankara 1990, 311.
[790] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 189.
[791] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 47.
[792] Ibid.
[793] W.S Churchill: *The World Crisis* Vol. 2; Thornton Butterworth, London, 1923; vol 2; pp. 197-200.
[794] Ibid.

France made the agreement public and granted Russia what it sought.[795] Thus, on 12 March 1915, just before the Ally Armada sailed towards Istanbul to burn it to ashes and to bring Turkey to its knees, and whilst the Russian-Armenian offensive was progressing in the East, the Allies made the public declaration that Russia should have territories which included the Gallipoli Peninsula and a strip along the European coast of the Marmara joining it to the Peninsula of Istanbul.[796]

This map shows the Franco-British-Russian agreement to carve up Turkey dated from around February-March 1915.

This division done in early 1915 is nearly entirely similar to the European section of the 'Zone of the Straits' as laid down in Article 179 of the Treaty of Sèvres (in the Summer of 1920) as indicated on the map annexed to it.[797] This contradicts the claims made today that Sèvres was never premeditated before 1920, and similar claims, for Sèvres was simply the culmination of previous agreements — the known and the secret — agreed during the war. The April 1915 Straits Agreement, signed by Russia, France and Britain, was in fact the inspiring model, laying out well in advance and exactly how Turkey and the surrounding area would be carved up once it was beaten.[798] Russia was also promised eastern Thrace to the Enos-Midye line, which was to be the boundary with Bulgaria; and the Anatolian hinterland of the Bosporus and the Sakarya River to the Gulf of İzmit.[799] Istanbul, however, was to remain a free port for all the Allies, Russia pledging to allow free commercial navigation through the Straits as well as the British and French spheres of influence in Anatolian Turkey.[800] (It is worth noting here how incredibly ironic history is: For centuries, Russia was refused what she wanted and was now given; and now that she was given all what she always wanted, two years later, in 1917, she no longer wanted it. In between, some of the bloodiest wars (including the Crimea 1853-1856) were fought over what she was refused for centuries and now publicly granted early in 1915).

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[795] Ibid.
[796] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 47.
[797] Ibid.
[798] Eleanor van Heyningen: *Helles*; op cit; p. 1.
[799] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 320.
[800] Ibid.

Just before the war, Russia agreed to join France and Britain on the condition that her competitor for claims on Turkish territories, Greece, was no allowed in the Allied camp. The Allies accepted. Greece, regardless of the Ally preference for Russia, still believed there was a lot for her to gain, for, by early 1915, the Ally victory looked certain. So, on 1 March, Venizelos offered three Greek divisions to support the Gallipoli landing, then two days later, he increased the offer to five. And that was not all. A jubilant Churchill commented:

> Behind all lay Bulgaria and Rumania, determined not to be left out of the fall of Constantinople and the collapse of the Turkish Empire.[801]

There was no chance whatsoever for the Gallipoli campaign to fail, all was set for a great victory, only for Russia to spoil everything: Russia's Foreign Minister announcing that, 'The Russian Government could not consent to Greece participating in operations in the Dardanelles, as it would be sure to lead to complications.'[802] Whatever the Greeks tried, the Russians said No! Greece went into neutrality; in fact, spurned, King Constantine of Greece would turn to the Germans.[803]

Now, another partner: Italy. Under the secret treaty of London, concluded precisely one day after the big landing at Gallipoli between the three powers (Britain, France, and Russia) with Italy on 26 April 1915, Italy was promised the Mediterranean region adjacent to 'the province of Adalia [Antalya], to the west of Cilicia, the Dodecanese Islands, and the port of Smyrna, with much of its hinterland.'[804]

The Italian share. *The agreement with Italy would eventually be subsequently finalised at St Jean de la Maurienne. Italy was to have the green zone that includes Smyrna and extends almost to Adana. This was before Greece was welcomed in the club thus forcing a reshuffling of the Italian grants. Blue is the French share. A and B correspond to the projected Arab state under Franco-British suzerainty.*

What spoiled the whole matter of carving up of Turkey was the unexpected, and surely cursed by all, Turkish victory at Gallipoli. Had the Turks failed then, Turkey would have been partitioned straight in 1915 as agreed and as per maps.

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[801] W.S. Churchill: *The World Crisis;* op cit; pp. 200-204.
[802] Ibid.
[803] Ibid.
[804] The text of the Treaty of London between Italy and the Allies is to be found in Parliamentary Papers, 1920, No. Cmd. 671, Miscellaneous No. 7.
P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, 1920-1922; in *Int.J. Middle East Stud.* 10 (1979), 553-565; at p. 553.

The matter was thus postponed, but long-term scheming and resilience are great marks of the Allies. As the war devoured lives, the carving up process progressed according to unfolding events, and most of all according to alliances being formed. What was definite was the carving up of Turkey in Asia just as Turkey in Europe had been during the Balkan Wars. Without going into all the intricate elements of such agreements, it is important here to sum them up.

On 26 April 1916, the first anniversary of the Treaty of London with Italy, France, and Russia, the secret Sazonov-Paleologue Treaty was signed concerning their respective territorial shares in Asiatic Turkey.[805] Russia was awarded full sovereignty over the Vilayets (administrative regions) of Trabzon, Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van, a vast area containing valuable mineral and petroleum resources.[806] 'This handsome prize,' says Mead, 'put Russia well on the road to Constantinople and in a fair way to turn the Black Sea into a Russian lake.'[807] Just when the treaty was signed, the Russian armies had de facto sealed it on the ground as they were actually occupying the said territory.[808] For her part, France was to receive ample 'compensations' in the region to the south and southwest of the Russian acquisitions, the actual delimitation of boundaries and other details to be the result of direct negotiation with Great Britain.[809] Which led directly to the infamous Sykes-Picot Treaty of 9 May 1916, which defined British and French shares once what's left of the now defunct Ottoman Empire was dismembered.[810]

This map shows the Sykes Picot Agreement. The blue and red zones were to be ruled respectively by France and Great Britain while the brown zone (modern Palestine) was to be internationalised. Zones A and B were to constitute an Arab state in which France and Britain were to have priority in financial and commercial privileges.

In more details, the Syrian coast from Tyre (modern Lebanon) to Alexandretta, the province of Cilicia (Turkish: Kilikya), and 'Southern Armenia' (from Sivas on the north and west to

[805] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway; A Study in Imperialism*; MacMillan; New York; 1924; p. 293.
[806] Ibid.
[807] Ibid.
[808] Ibid.
[809] R. S. Baker: *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (3 volumes, Garden City, 1922), Volume I, Chapter IV, contains an excellent account of the inter-Allied negotiations of 1916-1917 regarding Asiatic Turkey, based upon the private papers of Woodrow Wilson. Cf., also, Full Texts of the Secret Treaties as Revealed at Petrograd.
[810] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 293.

Diyarbakır on the south and east) were allocated to France 'in full sovereignty.'[811] In addition, a French 'zone of influence' was established over a vast area, which included the provinces of Aleppo, Damascus, Deir al Zhur, and Mosul.[812] Control over this area did not just have economic advantages such as control of the silk production of Syria, the potential cotton production of Cilicia, the Arghana copper mines, and the portion of the Baghdad Railway lying between Mosul and the Cilician Gates of the Taurus, it would also give the French what they most wanted since the Middle Ages: possession of a country in which France had many religious and cultural interests.[813] The Treaty also stated that the Baghdad Railway should not be extended southward from Mosul or northward from Samarra without 'the express consent of both France and Great Britain and in no case before the construction of a railway from Baghdad to Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley.' The reason for this was that the priority was to develop southern Mesopotamia and the Syrian coast (which were mostly Christian areas) but not Kurdish areas.[814] Great Britain, also by way of "compensation," was to receive lower Mesopotamia from Tikrit to the Gulf and from the Arab boundary to the Persian frontier. In addition, she was recognised

> As having special political and economic interests "particularly the right to furnish such advisers as the Arabs might desire" in a vast territory lying south of the French "zone of influence," which stretched from the Sinai Peninsula to the Persian border.

Palestine, it was agreed, at first, should be internationalised, but subsequently be made into a homeland for the Jews.[815] In the end, Britain secured all her political imperial designs, reinforcing substantially her strategic position in the Indian Ocean, and gaining considerably economically from the Mesopotamian cotton supply for the mills of Manchester and the same region's oil supply.[816]

The Italians now needed to be satisfied, too. And so in April 1917, the so-called St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement granted Italy nearly the whole southern half of Anatolia including the important cities of Antalya, Konya, and İzmir, besides an extensive 'zone of influence' northeast of İzmir.[817] Thanks to such a grant, which would satisfy even the most reluctant of would-be ally, Italy could at once, in the future, dominate trade in the Aegean Sea and revive the defunct Venetian monopoly of commerce of the Near East.[818]

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[811] Ibid.

[812] Ibid; p. 294.

[813] By a subsequent agreement of December, 1918, between Messrs. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, Mosul was transferred to Great Britain.

[814] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 294; note 25.
W. L. Westermann, "The Armenian Problem and the Disruption of Turkey," in *What Really Happened at Paris The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919*, by American Delegates, edited by E. M. House and C. Seymour (New York, 1921), pp. 176-203.

[815] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 294.

[816] The text of the Sykes-Picot Treaty was first published by *The Manchester Guardian,* January 8, 1920, and was reprinted in *Current History*, Volume XI (1920), pp. 339-341. Cf., also, Bowman, The New World, pp. 100-104; Baker, op. cit., pp. 67-69.

[817] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 295.

[818] R. S. Baker: *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, op cit; vol 1 pp. 68-70. The negotiations concerning the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement extended from the autumn of 1916 to August, 1917. The agreement appears to have been negotiated

> These inter-Allied agreements for the disposal of Asiatic Turkey [Mead remarks] were instructive instances of the "old diplomacy" in cooperation with the "new imperialism." The treaties were secret covenants, secretly arrived at; they bartered territories and peoples.[819]

When all was done and dusted, two unexpected developments took place.
The first was early in 1917, when the Russians decided to quit the war. On deciding to do so, the Bolsheviks renounced, and also denounced, the carving up plans of Turkey agreed by their Tsarist predecessors. Twice the annexations claim was formally and publicly renounced by the Soviets, and 'no Russian Government,' said Toynbee at the time, 'is likely to revive this particular claim, unless either Turkey or the Western Powers establish some regime in the Straits which does not secure a permanent commercial right-of-way for the riverain Powers of the Black Sea.'[820]
The second: Now, in 1917, following the Russian withdrawal, Greece sought to join the Ally club again. She had tried back in March 1915 just before the Ally fleet was on its way for the conquest of Istanbul and the Gallipoli campaign. Prior to the Russian veto, Sir Edward Grey had offered Greece 'large concessions on the coast of Asia Minor'.[821] Venizelos, her Premier, nurtured the customary Greek 'Grand Idea', of 'a really big Greece, to include practically all the regions in which the influence of Hellenism has been paramount throughout the ages,'[822] which means old Byzantium of centuries earlier. The dream was ruined by Russia's refusal to allow Greece's participation by the side of the Allies. Now, however, that Russia had left the conflict earlier that year (1917,) the Greeks would provide not just another anti-German/Turkish front, there would also be no squabble over Constantinople. The only regret was: how if it was Greece rather than Russia that had been the ally two years earlier on the Gallipoli front, with five extra divisions, a whole large fleet, and much else...? Nonetheless, now, as their condition for entering the war, the Greeks claimed, through Venizelos, the whole Aegean coast of Asia Minor and much of its hinterland, which had already been promised to the Italians, arguing that their claims were based on the ethnical argument that the Greek population formed a majority in the area. Venizelos also made similar claims for Pontus, in the Black Sea Mountains.[823] Pontus passed in Ottoman hands during the Sultanate of Mohammed II. The Allies accepted. Once satisfied, Venizelos enthusiastically entered his country into the war.[824] Obviously Istanbul was not cited openly as part of the package, but definitely the Greeks could not achieve the Grand Idea without the Grand Capital. Of course İzmir had been already promised to the Italians. So some adjustment would have to be made here and there.

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with the Italians by Mr. Lloyd George, in April, 1917, while Mr. Balfour was in America with the British Mission. It was amended in August, as a result of the insistence of the Italians that they had not received an adequate share of the spoils.
[819] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway; A Study in Imperialism*; op cit; p. 295.
[820] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question in Greece*; op cit; p. 48.
[821] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, 1920-1922; op cit; p. 553.
[822] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 140.
[823] Ibid.
[824] H.A Gibbons, *Venizelos* (Boston and N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923), p. 304.

Thus, by the end of the war, whilst everyone was agreed on the carving up of Turkey and its disappearance as it stood in 1918, the only slight disagreements between them were some little adjustments to be negotiated (between the Greeks and Italians in particular, and the French and British) of who should get what in some areas, and how much of Turkey should be left to the Turks. For the British minister Lord Curzon the most conciliatory of the lot, the Turks had to be removed altogether from Europe, where they had been for centuries 'a source of distraction, intrigue and corruption… of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned.'[825] Istanbul, of course, should no longer be theirs, and the Straits, should be entrusted to the League of Nations.[826] The Prime Minister, Lloyd George, saw Turkey

> Not as a living organism with a past and a present and aspirations for a future, but simply as a space on the map, a convenient repository from which other powers might be compensated and other concessions obtained in return.[827]

Here, if the Grand Greece Idea is to be applied, which most certainly would have been the case had the Turks failed to resist or been defeated (1919-1922), it would have meant that most of Turkey would have had to go. According to the map adopted by the Greeks, with the exception of central Turkey, i.e three regions from North to south, as follows: Kastamonu, Ankara, and Konya all the rest could be claimed by Greece with some accommodation with Armenia, on account of the Greek/Armenian population presence.[828] If the Konya region went to Italy, as already agreed, that would have left Turkey consisting of some overcrowded, modern Gaza type, Bantustan, around Ankara, its capital, without access to the sea, and without any army; besieged, and bullied at will by whoever had any grievances with the Turks. And as it stood then, the list of those was endless.

Now, having made peace with the Turks in order to detach them from the Germans, there remained the issue: how to proceed with the carving up process. The Allies were not fools. They knew that, with the exception of the few traitors and the fifth columnists, all the Turks would fight to the death any attempt on the integrity of their land. True, the Greeks had a fine army that was intact, but to take on the Turks then, in 1918, would have been impossible for the Greeks to even try. And so, the Allies began to implement the method or policy by which the carving up could become possible. All they did, thus, from November 1918 onwards was one measure after the other to dismember Turkey gradually, a slow but relentless policy, that sought first to break Turkey's fighting capacity, i.e break what was left of its army after 1918.

Before looking at this plan, it is important here to look again at the wider picture to explain why their plan went the way it did, i.e. giving the Greeks the role to do the main job, and why the Allies did not engage their armies to do the carving up straight after October 1918. They could, their historians would say today, have done it

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[825] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 139.
[826] Ibid.
[827] Ibid.
[828] See the map in H.A. Gibbons: *Venizelos*; op cit, following page 338.

themselves if it had been their intention to carve up Turkey. In answer, the reason they did not carve up Turkey straight in November 1918, by themselves, was simple: They could not. They could not for a number of reasons:

Firstly, they had been beaten by the Turks at Gallipoli despite all they threw at them. The Turkish army was still more or less intact in 1918. It had not disintegrated. It could still beat them, especially now that Russia was out of the game, and, under the Bolsheviks, Russia was willing to assist the Turks against the common enemy, especially if suddenly the Turks chose to become part of the Soviet community.

Secondly, the Italians were bogged down to their neck in Libya. They were in fact at the time being given a real beating there, and only towards the late 1920s-early 1930s, once they had locked up the near entire Libya population in concentration camps and, only after they had defeated and slain Omar al Mukhtar, the Libyan resistance leader, in 1931, that they could declare themselves victorious at last.[829]

Thirdly, and this applies to the French and British; both countries had paid such a heavy price in the battlefields of the First World War, that simply they no longer had either the will, or manpower, to start yet another conflict much to the east. Their populations would have never accepted it anyway, whatever the promises that it would all be dusted and over with by the end of 1918, for they had said the same thing years before when they started the war in 1914, that it would be over by Christmas.

Fourthly, there was the Bolshevik Revolution and all its headaches, which took much of what was left of their energies, especially as they were helping the White Russians to destroy the Revolution.

Fifthly, both the British and French were busy elsewhere. The French were trying hard to smother any attempt by Germany to grow strong again by garrisoning its lands and also fighting the Arabs in Syria; whilst the British were dealing with the Arab Rising and, closer to home, with the Irish Rising.

Thus, the reason they did not partition Turkey right then, in November 1918, was not due to their good intentions or good will for the Turks, or because they compromised, they simply could not. Had they been able to do it, they would have done it straight. So the only alternative they had left was to do it slowly and gradually, at the least cost, through a variety of means (mainly by disarming the Turks and disbanding the army) and allies (the Greeks and also Armenians to do the dirty job, and to be amply rewarded for it). And so, from the very moment the Moudros Peace Agreement was signed, precisely as planned for centuries already and refined years before 1918, the Western machine, slow, grinding, determined, always planning decades ahead, relentless, unforgiving, unrelenting, incapable of deviating, sure of itself, incapable of emotional deviation or compromise, began to pursue the Final Dismantlement of

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[829] See J. Wright: *Libya, A Modern History*, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 32 ff. C.G. Segre: *Fourth Shore*, The University of Chicago Press, 1974, p. 45 ff. R. Rapex: *L'affermazione…*, Tientsin, 1937, p. 281 f. E.E. Evans Pritchard: *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1949, p. 168 ff. See also and essentially: R. Graziani: *Cirenaica Pacificata.* Milan: Mondadori, 1932. Giorgio Rochat, "La repressione della resistenza araba in Cirenaica nel 1930-1931:' in Rochat, *Guerre italiane in Libia e in Etiopia. Studi militari 1921-1939,* 22-98 (Paese: Pagus, 1991). Eric Salerno, *Genocidio in Libia. Le atrocità nascoste de l'aventura coloniale 1911/1931* (Milan: Sugar Co, 1979); G. Ottolenghi, *Gli italiani e il colonialismo. I campi di detenzione italiani in Africa* (Milan: Sugar Co, 1997). For those who can read Arabic: Idris El-Horeir: Mawaqif Khalida Li Umar Al-Mukhtar; *in Majallat al-Buhut al-Tarikhiya;* 2; July; 1988.

Turkey Project, coolly, without anger or love, until it accomplished it. The defeatists, the weak, the traitors, the fifth columnist, cowards, and gullible amongst the Turks all fell for it and assisted the Allies, compromised and even did their dirty work. The patriots, that is the near entirety of Turks, fought and died and eventually won, as will be recounted here. This is the whole and simple story of the period and matter, not the grand nonsense that Western historians and any of their gullible followers, including many Turkish 'scholars,' keep bombarding the minds and publishers with.

Obviously what has just been said needs substantiating. And this is what the following does.

3. The Gradual Degrading of Turkish Power and Dismembering of Turkey

On 13 November 1918, Mustafa Kemal arrived in Istanbul. When he reached the first steps of the station, the first thing he saw were the fifty-five Allied warships in the habour about to cast off anchor in front of Dolmabahçe Palace on the European shores.[830] Depressed by the sight of enemy occupation, Mustafa Kemal is said to have told Dr Rasim Ferit: 'I've made a mistake. I shouldn't have come. Come what may, I must find a way of getting back to Anatolia.'[831]
According to another report, he said, as he looked at the Allied fleet:
'Just as they have come, so too they will go.'[832]
The Allied fleet landed 3,500 men, mainly British, who joined a French brigade which had arrived by train from the Macedonian front, following the French takeover of the railway in European Turkey.[833] As they began to jostle and bicker for power and influence, the Allies did not forget 'To trample not just the pride but also Muslim Turks properties, whose houses they requisitioned.'[834] Soon the French established themselves in Istanbul, the British across the water in Pera, and the Italians up the Bosporus.[835]

Continuing their occupation/subtle carving up, the Allies began to take over their assigned shares or portions of territory. The British put on the ground some of their forces, particularly on the railways, under the guise of supervising demobilisation 'and to prevent outbreaks of violence.'[836] While Istanbul was not officially occupied, the fleet that was largely Royal Navy lay in the Golden Horn, British land troops, the largest amongst the Allied 'presence' there to keep a watchful eye. In Kurdish areas,

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[830] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 195.
[831] H. Bayur: Atatürk Hayatı; op cit; 189.
[832] Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya: Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal (The Only Man: Mustafa Kemal), Vol. I (1891–1919), Remzi, Istanbul 1963; Vol. II (1919–22), 1964; Vol. III (1922–38), 1995; I, 323; İğdemir, Uluğ, Atatürk'ün Yaşamı (Life of Atatürk) (Vol. I 1881–1918), AKDTYK, Ankara 1988 (1st impression TTK, Ankara 1980); p. 148.
[833] Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991, I, 54, 56, 58.
[834] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 197.
[835] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 135.
[836] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, 1920-1922; op cit; p. 553.

British "advisors" were also present should any unwelcome development occur.[837] The British took those parts of Mosul originally assigned to the French in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but amended subsequently, in return for oil concessions.[838] Elsewhere, on 25 November 1918, a French officer, Colonel Raymond, arrived in Adana and told the Turkish governor that French troops would occupy the city, and ordered that the Turkish troops should be immediately withdrawn.[839] When Adana was occupied on 21 December, 'a sign of things to come,' local Muslims could see that the French were accompanied by detachments of armed Armenian volunteers, and that many Armenian civilians, deported to Syria in 1915, retook their old property, and tried to avenge themselves on their Turkish neighbours.[840] Inter-communal violence soon broke out as a result.[841] Which is precisely what the Allies sought, for then they could make the century-old argument that Christians were being massacred or being threatened with yet another massacre, hence justifying their measures. The Allied fleet that occupied İzmir (November 7) was commanded by a British officer, but it included French, Italian and Greek vessels and men, too.[842] Elsewhere in the southwest, the Italians occupied vast stretches of land, including Antalya and Burdur, in order to take what the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne had granted them, before seeking to establish a claim on Konya, which the British were disputing them.[843] In the east, it soon became obvious that the Allies were preparing to give the Armenians not only the six provinces specified at Mudros, but also the three districts of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, which Soviet Russia had just returned to the Turks, and which had smaller Armenian populations.[844] These aims became obvious when, during February 1919, Armenian officials were granted most civilian positions in the occupied eastern provinces.[845]

The British, in the meantime, were supervising the other essential task that was at the foundation of the carving up process, its pre-requisite in fact: the degrading-breaking of the Turkish army. The British had control officers scattered over Turkey from Thrace to the Caucasus, whose duties were the supervision or control of both demobilisation and disarmament.[846] At this stage, in November 1918, Uyar and Erickson remind, the Turkish military did not quit the war, as Lenin remarked about the Russian army, by 'voting with its feet.'[847] Unlike in Russia, Austria, and Bulgaria, the Turkish army, although defeated, was still in the field.[848] Its units were being

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[837] D. Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* trans. J. Linton (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1931), pp. 210-215.
[838] January, 1919; Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu: *Turk istiklal Harbi, I. Mondros Mutarekesi ve Tatbikat* (The Turkish War for Independence. I. The Truce of Mondros and Its Application), Ankara, 1962, henceforth; *Mondros Mutarekesi,* pp. 77-106.
[839] Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991; I, 50. A. Mango: *Ataturk*; p. 193.
[840] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 193.
[841] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 142.
[842] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: History; op cit; v2; p. 329.
[843] *Mondros Mutarekesi,* pp. 128-149.
[844] Ibid, pp. 107-167.
[845] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 328.
[846] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 142.
[847] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 283.
[848] Ibid; p. 273.

reorganised, while some of them were still fighting in Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and Iran.[849] The Turkish military managed to keep, besides its discipline and cohesion, the army divisions (most of which were composed of ethnic Turks from the Anatolian heartland)[850] and also their equipment. The commander of the 9th Army on the Caucasian front, Yakup Şevki Pasha (who had replaced Vehip Pasha) in June 1918),[851] did his best to obstruct Ally schemes.[852] He not only delayed until 25 January 1919 the full withdrawal of his army behind the pre-war Turkish-Russian frontier, but also saved the bulk of his equipment and supplies.[853] Much of this equipment would prove very useful subsequently during the War of Independence. When he left former Tsarist territory, he handed over power to the Kars National Muslim Council, which changed its name on 18 January 1919 to National Provisional Government of South-West Caucasus.[854] This body was subsequently dissolved by the British on 19 April 1919 and its members exiled to Malta.[855] Further to the north-east, the man who was to play a key role by the side of Mustafa Kemal in the start of the War of Independence, Brigadier Kâzım Karabekir, withdrew his 1st Caucasian Corps from north-western Persia. On his return through Batum, which was still under the Turks, he found Japanese field guns and ammunition in military stores and had them secretly shipped to Trabzon.[856] Karabekir's other immediate objective was to protect the pre-war Turkish frontier against Armenian and Georgian encroachments.[857] He knew he could handle both as long as he could keep both troops and their armament.[858] Whilst everywhere the Turkish officers were trying to keep such resources as they could, the patriots in the War Ministry in Istanbul were providing all support they could.[859] As Uyar and Erickson correctly note, the actual demobilization proceeded slowly and would come to a full stop with the start of a new war—this time to save what remained of the realm in 1919–1921—against Greek, French, Italian, and Armenian forces.[860]

The Turks' slowing the disarmament process was not to the liking of the British. Informed by their agents — the local Greeks and Armenians still within Turkish territory — the Allies reacted. Allenby hurriedly travelled from Palestine to Istanbul in February 1919. He summoned the Ministers of War and of Foreign Affairs and, not even allowing them to speak, he read them out a list of demands, including the removal of the recalcitrant officers, including the commander of the 6th Army on the

[849] Ibid.
[850] Ibid; p. 283.
[851] W.E.D. Allen, and P. Muratoff: *Caucasian Battlefields* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 478.
[852] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 194.
[853] Ibid.
[854] Ibid.
[855] W.E.D. Allen, and P. Muratoff: *Caucasian Battlefields*, op cit; 498.
[856] Kâzim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz (Our War of Independence) (Istanbul, 1960), p. 35
[857] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 209.
[858] Ibid; p. 210.
[859] Ibid; p. 194.
[860] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 283

Mosul front.[861] Having read his orders/instructions in five minutes, he rushed out, and returned at once to Palestine.[862]

Just as Allenby showed who was in charge now, not to let themselves down, the French made the same show. As Allied Commander in the Near East, General Franchet d'Esperey, the French commander, had paid a flying visit to Istanbul on 23 November 1918, but he made his official entry on 8 February — the day after Allenby's visit — riding into the city on a white horse, and was wildly cheered by local Greeks, Armenians and Europeans.[863] He was in this emulating Mohammed II's entry into Constantinople in 1453, thus signalling the recapture, or as he saw it, the "liberation" of the city.

Obviously, to undertake many tasks, including disarmament, the British had neither the means nor the capacity, nor the apparent authority. It was left to the Turkish "authorities" to do it. So, at the end of February 1919, the Sultan, symbolically put in power by the Allies who had now conveniently revived the defunct Ottoman rule, changed his government and put in place the sort of government the Allies — just as the West today — like to work with: docile puppets, or traitors in short. And so the Sultan appointed his despicable own brother-in-law, Damad (Demat) Ferid, as Grand Vizier. It was Ferid's first official post since that of First Secretary in the Foreign Service thirty years before.

> To the patriotic Turk [Kinross says] he was a nonentity, a man devoid of capacity. But to the British Ferid, with his reassuring Western appearance, his drooping moustaches, his veneer of European culture and his polite pompous manners, was 'a typical Turkish gentleman'. He was just the puppet they needed.[864]

Determined to wipe out opposition his first action was to launch a new wave of arrests of patriots with the backing of the British, who had begun to deport political and military 'suspects' to Malta, removing any person with patriotic feelings or representing a threat to the established order, using in the process quick methods of trial by court martial.[865]

Just as Damad Ferid was eliminating the patriots, in Paris, a general plan was adopted

> For the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the total elimination of that empire, the internationalization of Constantinople, the Straits, the creation of a Turkish State in the centre of Asia Minor, and the liberation of all nationalities from the rule of Turkey.[866]

This was morally legitimate in Ally view:

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[861] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 143.
[862] Ibid.
[863] Sina Akşin: İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele (The Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle), I–II, Cem, Istanbul 1992, I, 158.
[864] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 143.
[865] Ibid.
[866] Elimination of Turkey; in *CH* Vol 10 April, 1919— September, 1919; p. 63.

> The Allied forces [E.K and S. Shaw correctly note] entered the Ottoman Empire with an unshakeable belief in the truth of their own propaganda, that the Turks had slaughtered millions of Christians for no reason whatsoever, forfeiting their right to rule even themselves and demonstrating once again the essential superiority of Western civilization over that of Islam.[867]

Admiral Calthorpe, the Allied High Commissioner, himself stated that 'It has been our consistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk... and all interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden…'[868] That is with the Turks, of course, for it was no longer their country. Towards the local Christians, on the other hand, it was a different matter. As soon as the Allies landed and marched through the streets into the major cities they were welcomed by crowds of Greeks and Armenians (miraculously reborn from their countless massacres by the Turks) waving Allied flags and kissing and hugging 'their liberators.'[869] The Allies returned the favour by a great variety of policies, such as first kicking out Turks and other Muslims from positions of decision in the local government, railways and elsewhere and replacing them by Christians.[870] The local Christians, who during the Balkan Wars only jeered at the wounded Turks and the returning defeated soldiers,[871] now went further. They massacred large numbers of recently discharged Turkish soldiers as well as thousands of Muslim civilians without any effort made by the Allied forces to interfere.[872] Only the Italians, who also had called for protection of the Turks during the Balkan Wars, now, in the territory under their control in the south, made some efforts to control the Christian mobs and to protect the Turkish and Muslim Arab population.[873]

Whilst that was the case on the ground, the Allies constantly raised the spectre of threat to Christians and their massacres by Turks in order to justify their gradual dismantling of Turkish military power and institutions.[874] The Istanbul government, that is the few patriots within it, realised this, and tried vainly to pre-empt further Ally occupation either direct or via the Greeks.[875] However, the old tactics of raising the spectre of Christians being massacred or about to be massacred by Turks was used to the maximum. Everywhere inter-communal fighting was triggered, especially in areas that were planned to be taken from the Turks, as around the Black Sea, east of Sinop, where the Greeks sought to rebuild the old State of Pontus.[876] On 3/4 February 1919, Venizelos submitted the Greek claim to the Allied Council of Ten, which passed it on

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[867] S.J and E.K Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 329.
[868] Calthorpe to Curzon, June 6, 1919, FO 406/41, pp. 131-133, No. 58.
[869] S.J and E.K Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 329.
[870] Ibid.
[871] M. Pickthall: *With the Turk in Wartime*; J.M. Dent &Sons; London; 1914; pp. 19-20. H.C. Seppings Wright: *Two Years Under the Crescent*; op cit; p. 200.
[872] S.J and E.K Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 330.
[873] HTVD, no. 4 (June 3, 1953), nos. 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, (7, 83; A Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp Işittiklerim,* I, Ankara, 1949, p. 188.
[874] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; op cit; p. 212.
[875] Sina Akşin: İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele (The Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle), I–II, Cem, Istanbul 1992, I, 255–6.
[876] Euxine Pontus, literally the Hospitable Sea, was the name given to the Black Sea in antiquity.

to a committee for study.[877] At first, Venizelos had proposed 'an Armenian umbrella for 'the Black Sea Greeks,' (who seem to have survived despite all Western historians' [including Greeks] ranting that the Turks had massacred them tens of times over. In fact some of the barmiest claims this author cannot resolve are the simultaneous claims made by Western historians and their leaders, then as today, that the Turks had wiped out their Christian subjects in their hundreds of thousands, millions, even, before 1918, and yet at the same time also claim that the Christians in 1919 represented the majority in territories being claimed by Christians. We have excellent examples of this such as the following:

> CLAIMS OF GREECE
>
> The claims of Greece were heard before the Conference on Feb. 3 (1919).
>
> M. Venizelos expounded these claims at this and a subsequent session. The Greek Government issued a special memoir setting forth in detail the Greek point of view. The exposition of M. Venizelos bore on the following claims:

1. Northern Epirus, which has a population of 150,000 Greeks.
2. Thrace and the region of Constantinople, (731,000,) and the shores of the Aegean Sea, given to Bulgaria after the war of 1913, (43,000;)
3. The Vilayets of Balikeser and Aidin in Asia Minor, (1,694,000;)
4. The islands of the Dodecanese, (102,000;)
5. The Island of Cyprus, (235,000.)

These populations, said M. Venizelos, all together comprise 3,256,000 souls of pure Greek origin. The present Greek Kingdom has but slightly more, specifically 4,300,000.[878]

> On Feb. 4, M. Venizelos ended his exposition of the Greek claims with a treatment of the questions of Constantinople and Asia Minor. The Greek Premier recalled all the injury done to Europe by the Turkish possession of the Straits.
>
> Basing herself upon her historical past, Greece claims the city on the ground that both in numbers and in quality it is dominated by Greeks, (200,000.) The Turkish element equals the Greek only in the number of its functionaries of all degrees, and of its garrison.[879]
>
> In Asia Minor, M. Venizelos stated, there lived 1,700,000 Greeks, who had suffered every form of persecution. The giving of Thrace and Asia Minor to a peaceful power like Greece instead of to Bulgaria and Turkey, whose past policies argue ill of the future, would be advantageous to the powers of the West. The freedom of the Straits, he said, would be maintained.[880]

After a while, Venizelos concession to the Armenians changed, and so through the Greek spokesman of the Black Sea Region (which also seems to indicate that religious freedom was allowed under the Turks, whilst we never hear of an Imam in Athens, or

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[877] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; Allen Lane; London; 1973; pp. 71–5.
[878] Claims of Greece; in *CH* Vol 10 April, 1919— September, 1919; p. 60.
[879] CH Vol 10 April, 1919— September, 1919; 61.
[880] Ibid.

any part of liberated Greece for that matter), the Archbishop of Trabzon, Chrysanthos Philippidis, who joined the patriarchal delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in March 1919,[881] insisted on an independent Greek republic of the Pontus, which they expected to dominate.[882] The way they expected to dominate this part, just as all parts of 'Greek liberated territory,' has already been noted in the first and second chapter; i.e. the surest and only way being by wiping out all Muslim Turks, for this would, indeed, make their statistics of Greek majority hold. Obviously Greek ambitions around Sinop were bound to conflict with those of the local Muslims. Many had already been refugees for years or even decades, pushed there by the Russians, and the Laz, in particular, were the most determined of all as they were known for 'their fierce attachment to their religion.'[883]

Greek ambitions encompassed vast territories, including Istanbul itself, although such a claim was not declared openly. The Greeks of Istanbul, who hitherto had been 'good Turkish subjects,' suddenly made a volte face. On 16 March, the Greek community in Turkey, represented by the Patriarchate in Istanbul, 'severed relations with the Ottoman government and renounced its civic responsibilities as Ottoman citizens.'[884] The Greeks of Istanbul, as to be expected, opted for union with Greece.[885] Istanbul, itself, as Kinross puts it

> Under Allied "protection", was listless, defeatist, fraught with a sense of doom. "They'll do to us whatever they want," was the general foreboding. It was to be a cold, dark winter. There was no coal to be had. The trams were not running, the Bosporus steamers were few and far between. The main streets were lit dimly, the side streets not at all, so that criminals prospered and no citizen would stir out at night without a pistol in his pocket. The police were scarce, moreover corrupt and universally mistrusted. Profiteering was shameless, the currency valueless, the prices of foodstuffs exorbitantly high. Turks shut themselves up in their houses, emerging, shadows of themselves, only to buy bread, perhaps at half a crown a loaf. Some even pretended they were not Turks at all, shed their fezes and tried to get jobs with the Allied forces which had moved into the city.
>
> Greeks, on the other hand, swaggered through the streets, jostling the Turks to the wall. They flaunted the blue-and-white flag from their headquarters and expected the Turks to salute it, driving them to slink down the side streets to avoid the disgrace.[886]

The dark days of the armistice, as the Turks remembered the Allied occupation, were for most non-Muslims the happiest days of their lives.[887]

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[881] A. Alexandris: The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens 1992; p. 59

[882] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 212.

[883] Ibid.

[884] Ibid; p. 210.

[885] A. Alexandris: The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918–1974, Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens 1992, 56–7.

[886] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 134.

[887] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 198.

It was against this background of 'non-Muslim gaiety, of Turkish depression, and of pervasive intrigue' that Mustafa Kemal set to work
'As a soldier with a political cause. The cause was the independence of the Turkish-speaking Muslim nation and of its fatherland.'[888]

It was an uphill task, though. Gradually, the Ally screw was tightening, there soon was going to be no Turkish military force left. When the Turks mobilised in 1914, the army rose from 400,000 to 640,000, including 24,000 officers.[889] According to estimates, total Turkish war casualties were 325,000 dead, 350,000 wounded, and 250,000 prisoners.[890] In 1916, the army reached 700,000, and by the time of the Armistice, it numbered around 560,000.[891] However, its dismantling had been quite effective, and by May 1919, 338,000 men had been demobilised, while the rest had in large measure faded away.[892] It is very easy, indeed, to understand that in the situation Turkey was put in, there would be no army left, since for an army to remain or function, it requires a powerful central authority, which then Turkey did not have, except the fictitious one led by Damad Ferid, only there to implement the Allies' instructions. At most there must have been left possibly less than 10,000 Turkish military under state authority by May 1919. Even if the Turks had sought to maintain an army, and any other form of functioning institution, it would have been impossible under the circumstances of the time. Setting aside the restrictions imposed by occupation, it is easy to forget that the country had been bled by the war, which came on top of other wars. As E. K and S. Shaw remark, up to 6 million subjects of the Ottoman realm — Turks, Greeks, Arabs, Armenians, Jews, and others — were killed by a combination of revolts, bandit attacks, massacres and counter massacres, famine and diseases, all made worse by devastating and brutal foreign invasions 'In which all the people of the empire, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, had their victims and criminals.'[893]
On top of this, were the millions of orphans; and equal proportion of refugees, still not settled since the Balkan Wars; the wounded, also in their millions, and widows, too, all requiring attention. Turkey was ruined financially. It simply had no economy or resources to sustain its half-starved people. It was crippled and at all levels, and so much so, it is to the credit of the Turkish people that the country did not entirely collapse then.
Mustafa Kemal, subsequently, expressed it so well when he declared:

> They do not seek to kill us. They seek to bury us alive in our graves. Now we are on the edge of the pit. But if we stir ourselves to a final effort, we may still be saved.[894]

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[888] Ibid.
[889] Sabahattin Selek: Anadolu İhtilâli (The Anatolian Revolution), privately printed, Istanbul 1963; p. 87.
[890] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 194.
[891] Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya: Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa (Enver Paşa – from Macedonia to Central Asia), I–III, Remzi, Istanbul 1971–2; III, 285–6, 491–2
[892] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 194.
[893] S.J and E.K Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 316.
[894] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 167.

And, naturally, it is just as the country was somehow near agony, utterly defenceless (or so seeming), that the Armenians occupied Kars (on 19 April 1919),[895] whilst the Greeks, a month later, made their infamous landing in İzmir on 15 May 1919.

4. The Greek Landing 15 May 1919

It was during the last days of Mustafa Kemal's stay in Istanbul that the Allies gave the go ahead to the Greek troops to occupy İzmir. The decision was taken by Lloyd George, President Woodrow Wilson and Clemenceau in Paris on 6 May.[896] The Italians, who had been promised İzmir, acquiesced.[897] The Powers gave Greece 'a five-year administrative mandate in the Smyrna Zone, with the possibility of subsequent annexation.'[898] The Greek ownership of territory taken from Turkey would be made irreversible by a gradual exchange of populations, whereby many more Turks would have to be uprooted than Greeks.[899]

> It was wanton rashness to make such an experiment at Turkey's expense [says Toynbee.][900] It showed blind prejudice and partiality on the part of Western governments that they should continue to give Greece material and moral support in her enterprise as an apostle of their civilisation.[901]

The Greeks, who aimed to annex İzmir all along, immediately accepted the Western grant, Venizelos declaring that he had the troops available for the purpose.[902] And so, on 14 May, Allied detachments occupied the İzmir forts and informed the Turkish governor that the Greeks were about to land.[903] As news of the decision spread, local Greeks began to celebrate, while Turks held a public meeting at which they founded an Anti-Annexation Society *(Redd-i İlhak Cemiyeti)* whose purpose was to resist occupation and the loss of their land.[904]

And so, on 15 May 1919, the Greeks landed in the city. Greek troops advanced to the barracks, where the Turkish commander, Ali Nadir Pasha, had received strict orders to offer no resistance. When a shot was fired, Greek troops started firing both at the barracks and the government house, killing hundreds.[905] Turkish officers and officials were beaten up and humiliated, and Turkish property was looted.[906] The Turkish prisoners were led in a long procession to the quay.

> The Christian crowd rages and yells. Many (Turks)... fall under the bayonet thrusts. The officers are spat on and everything that is Turkish is insulted. The men are forced to tear the fezes from their heads and trample them under foot -

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[895] W.E. Allen and P. Muratoff: *Caucasian Battlefields*; op cit; p. 498.
[896] D. Von Mikusch: *Mustafa Kemal,* op cit; pp. 192-193.
[897] Peter Kincaird Jensen: The Greco-Turkish War; op cit; p. 554.
[898] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 35.
[899] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 210.
[900] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 35.
[901] Ibid.
[902] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit, 78–9.
[903] Ibid, 88.
[904] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 217.
[905] Hanns Froembgen, *Kemal Ataturk,* tr. J. Kirkness (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1935), pp. 104-108.
[906] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 217.

> the worst outrage to a Mohammedan - all who refuse are cut down with the sword. The veils are torn from the women's faces. The mob begins to plunder the houses of the Mohammedan.[907]

The Greek landing at Izmir. This was the direct trigger for the War of Independence.

Halide Edib, a Turkish writer, was driven to fight for the national cause in large measure because of what happened in İzmir. She writes:

> On May 15 the Greek army landed in Smyrna before the Allied warships, which were there to see the occupation properly carried out. A military detachment went to the Government House, the governor, Izzet Bey (a prominent member of the Entente Liberale, hence a faithful friend of the Allies), was pulled out of the *konak* with the rest of the officials to the quay and made to cry, "Zito Venizelos!" (Long live Venizelos!) under the threat of bayonets. Their fezzes and headdresses were torn and they were made to march on the quay for hours. In the meantime another detachment went to the Turkish barracks, where there was only a handful of soldiers, who hoisted the white flag by order of the commander, Nadir Pasha. But the Greeks opened fire all the same and dragged all the soldiers out, including the commander and the staff officers, tearing their headdresses and uniforms, and forcing them to cry, "Zito Venizelos!"
>
> Colonel Fethi and Major Shukri, two brave veterans who had refused to cry out-in spite of bayonet thrusts-were added with a number of other officers to the large crowd of Turkish notables who were gradually dragged out of their homes and brought to the quay. The crowd of martyrs were a few thousand strong and included boys of twelve. All were marched from the *konak* up to Karshi-Yaka on the shore, bayoneted, torn, spat on, and tortured by the Greek soldiers or the native Christians, who had joined in either as spectators or

[907] D. Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* pp. 192-193.

> murderers. The jeering and applauding as the mud- and blood-covered Turks succumbed one by one on the shore was tremendous. A few hundred died on the quay, the rest were taken to prisons in Smyrna or sent on the Greek warships. The waters near the shore were pink, according to the Smyrna people, and this spectacle of human slaughter by torture was calmly watched by the Allied warships, which were near enough to the shore to perceive the details of the show.
>
> While this jubilee went on in front of the fleets, the Greek soldiers and some native Christians were entering the Turkish houses in the back streets, robbing and killing the men and violating the women. In a week this celebration by murder, robbery, and rape went farther into Smyrna regions.[908]

Toynbee who was also living through these events recounts:

> When at length the signal was accepted and the Greek troops rushed in, these (Turkish) officers were formed into column and marched northwards along the quay. They had to hold their hands above their heads and shout either: "Zito o Venezelos!" (Long live Venizelos) or "Zito i Hellas!" (Long Live Greece). They could choose which they preferred, so long as they shouted sufficiently loud to satisfy their captors. Some who stumbled or fell out of the ranks were immediately bayoneted by the Greek escort and their bodies pitched into the sea. Later, as they waited on the quay for further disposal, local Greek civilians were seen to snatch the rifles out of the soldiers' hands and massacre this or that prisoner. The soldiers, unacquainted with Smyrna customs, attacked any civilian wearing a fez, and a number of Smyrniot Greeks, Armenians, and Jews — who till that day had worn the common Ottoman headgear — fell victims to this error or barely escaped. The killing went on for two days, and for many days after not a fez was to be seen in the streets. The looting lasted a fortnight, and probably more of this was done by Ottoman Greek civilians than by the soldiers. Not only in Smyrna but in villages within a radius of half-a-dozen miles from the city, local Greeks — suddenly possessed of arms — raided their Turkish neighbours' houses, stripped them of their furniture, and lifted their cattle. This was allowed to go on by the occupying authorities until Mr. Sterghiadhis arrived on the scene.
>
> It is difficult to estimate the number of the killed. When the slaughter was over, my first witness visited the morgue and counted there forty unreclaimed bodies in addition to parts of bodies and limbs. Before his visit, the majority had been recognised and removed for burial by their relations. For days afterwards, fresh corpses were washed up by the sea, those killed on the sea-front having been thrown into the water.... On the other hand, I have failed to obtain evidence that the Greek troops suffered casualties. My two Western witnesses had neither seen nor heard of any, and I have inquired in Greek quarters without result.[909]

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[908] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; John Murray; London; 1928; note 5; pp. 22-3.
[909] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 272.

The same happened all around to Turkish villages as well as in the town of Aydın.

> I afterwards met a Turkish landowner from one village [adds Toynbee] whose whole family had been butchered and the bodies thrown into a well. At the time of my visit, ruins flanked the railway for miles as one came into Aidin by the Smyrna train.[910]

Prior to the landing, the Turkish governor of Smyrna had received notice of the landings from the Allied naval authorities. He had proposed to resist, with the few troops which still remained under arms, and informed the authorities in Istanbul.[911] Fevzi, the Chief of the General Staff, had previously insisted that any such incursion should be met by force.[912] Now, however, his minister, without consulting him, gave orders against resistance, on the grounds that the landing was part of the terms of the Armistice. At this, Fevzi resigned.[913]

The Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid, had been informed of the Allied decision only the previous evening, and the Sultan had sent his chief secretary to the Porte to confirm the news.[914] When it was confirmed to him, he fell on the arm of his cousin Abdülmecid as he left a meeting of his Council, crying; he said to him,

> Look, I am weeping like a woman.[915]

When Mustafa Kemal made his farewell call on the office of the Grand Vizier on the morning of 15 May, he found the ministers stunned by the news.[916]

> 'By God, what an impertinence!' Mehmed Ali exclaimed.
>
> 'Have you heard? The Greeks are landing in Smyrna.'
>
> 'Has that happened too?' Kemal asked. He was shocked, of course, but not really surprised. He looked around at the upset faces of the ministers and calmly enquired, 'What do you mean to do?'
>
> 'We are going to protest,' was the helpless answer.
>
> 'All right. But do you think your protest will make the Greeks or the British retire?'
>
> They shrugged their shoulders. 'What else can we do?'
>
> 'There are perhaps more definite measures that might be taken.'
>
> 'What, for example?'
>
> He did not express his thoughts, but suggested, 'You can come and join me.'
>
> He turned to the Minister of Marine, and asked, 'Is my boat ready to leave for Anatolia?'
>
> 'It has been ready for some days. The Bandirma – at your orders.'
>
> He would leave next day. His ADC drafted an order to the captain, which the minister signed. Kemal left the ministers to their dazed deliberations.[917]

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[910] Ibid; p. 274.
[911] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 154.
[912] Ibid.
[913] Ibid.
[914] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 218.
[915] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 155.
[916] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 218.
[917] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 155.

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The Landing in İzmir, According to Today's (2000 and after) 'Scholars'

Today's Western scholarship of Turks and Turkey, again with the exceptions already cited (mainly Justin McCarthy, Bernard Lewis, E.K and S. Shaw. J. Salt) is hardly different in its views of Turkey and Turks from the above names seen at the opening of this chapter (Morgenthau. Mandelstam, and others). Their loathing of both Turks and Turkey is equal in tenor, except that they do not have the guts to express such loathing openly as their ancestors around a century or so did. Now, they hide behind the pedantic formalities of modern academia, i.e. an obsession with correct spelling of Turkish names, some references thrown here and there (at the wrong spots, where no reference is needed,) a couple of Turkish names in the reading list and footnotes, again where it matters little, and then, for the rest, they pour their usual vomit, a mass of muck through which it is difficult to thread. This outpouring of today fundamentally differs in substance from what is found in contemporary Western sources whether commissions of enquiries of the time,[918] or witnesses on the ground,[919] or consular reports.[920] The latter speak of massacres and persecution of Turks, today's scholars, with the few exceptions noted, only speak of massacres by Turks (and are unfortunately encouraged in their stance by the silent or complicit Turkish scholarship and media, which, with very few exceptions, shows excessive and at times sickening respect for such crooked minds).

In the following this author shows how the landing of Smyrna is today described in one of the countless hundreds of works which cram what is left of scholarship. This author is not going to accuse the authors of the article the extract is taken from as Turk haters, he will only say that much, in fact nearly all, of what they write is utter trash as shown here:

> As a result of Greece's contribution to the victorious Allied war effort in World War I, the Allies offered Greece parts of Asia Minor, including eastern Thrace and Smyrna, following the end of the war. The Ottoman Empire fought in the war for the Central Powers, and then proceeded to deteriorate during and following WWI. Territorial gains from the old Ottoman Empire seemed to the Allies like a worthy reward to offer the war-ravaged nation of Greece. In May 1919, the Greek forces, which already occupied the Eastern Thrace region, landed in and began to occupy the city of Smyrna located on the Aegean coast of Anatolia with the hope of eventually annexing it. With a mixed population of Greeks, Turks, and others within the city, the city of Smyrna greeted these Greek occupying forces in a variety of ways. Whereas the Greek inhabitants believed their liberators had arrived, the Turks treated Greek troops as a hostile invasion. Though there was some internal Turkish resistance, the resistance was weak and sporadic, and a good deal of the Turks in Smyrna fled.[921]

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[918] Gehri, M. (Delegue du Comite International de la Croix Rouge): 'Mission d'Enquete en Anatolie, 12-22 Mai 1921,' = *Extrait de la Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge*, 3em Annee, No. 31, 15 Juillet 1921, pp. 721-735. (Geneva, 1921.)

[919] T. Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution,* 2 vols; Edinburgh, William Blackwood, 1832.

-Ernst Jäckh; *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkan-Krieg;* Chapter 7: Deutsche und französische Augenzeugen von christlichen Massakers. (Die Balkangreuel des 30 jährigen Krieges); Martin Mörikes Verlag, Munich, 1913; pp. 83-98.

-P. Loti: *Turquie Agonisante*; Calman Levy; Paris; 1913.

A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question;* see in particular chapter: War of Extermination.

[920] It is impossible here to list all the names of consuls, and other officials, especially British, who witnessed all the horrific acts inflicted on Muslim Turks from the early times until after the First World War, but the very lengthy bibliography in McCarhty's: *Death and Exile;* op cit; shows the extensive list of such witnesses.

[921] *Turkey in the 1920s; Topic A: Turkish-Greek Relations*; Chair: Hannah Jones; Moderator: Thomas Lewis; Vice Chairs: Carol Shou & Ilayda Ozsan; Crisis Staffers: Colleen Cassingham & Medha Imam; Northwestern University Model, United Nations; April 10 – 13, 2014; p. 5.

These 'scholars' are part of an UN affiliated University. The only reference they use to back what they just said, whether in part, or in total is:
http://www.athensinfoguide.com/history/t8-7asiacampaign.htm
Needless to dwell too long here on the countless inanities in the paragraph above, for the rest of their article contains countless many more, one just struggles to decide which is more idiotic than the other. But just a couple of brief observations here. First, one needs to compare this account of the landing with the accounts by Halide Edib or Toynbee (above). Toynbee, it ought to be reminded once more, was initially one of the greatest enemies of Turkey until he saw what he saw, i.e. the reality on the ground. Then, regarding the claim 'war-ravaged Greece.' One has come across so many barmy claims in countless works, but this is the first time one came across this one. Greece was never affected by the First World War, except positively (one needs to reflect on her snatching the Aegean coastal parts from the Bulgarians). Of all participants, it escaped virtually intact, the country's first effective participation in the war being in May 1918. The country's total losses in the First World War did not exceed five thousand dead. Not a single bomb fell on the Greek people (good luck to them). It was the only country to end the war with an intact army, and hardly a Greek town or hamlet, or even a farm, was damaged.

Six

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: Part I (From 19 May 1919 Until February 1921)

The Greco-Turkish War was one of the major aftershocks in the wake of World War I. In attacking war-ravaged Turkey, Greece sought to realize her goal of a new Hellenic presence in Asia Minor. This action, together with British, French, and Italian designs upon Anatolian territory, threatened Turkey's existence as a nation.[922]

Four days after the Greeks had set up their standard of conquest on the shores of the Aegean, Kemal set up his standard of liberation on the shores of the Black Sea. The battle for Anatolia was about to begin. A new chapter had been opened in the history of the Turkish people.[923]

1. The Rise of the Free Turks and the Allies' Schemes (19 May-Early June 1919)

It was on 19 May, 1919, in Samsun, that Mustafa Kemal launched the campaign for the Independence of Turkey.[924] On the same day in a letter to the Turkish War Minister, General Sir George Milne, Commander of the British Army of the Black Sea, asked the Minister why if the Turkish 9th Army was being disbanded, was a 'Chief of Staff', sent to Sivas with such a large number of men?[925]
The War Ministry replied on 24 May that Mustafa Kemal's inspectorate took in two army corps (the 3rd and 15th), and that this was necessary in order to remove breech blocks from guns, and 'to prevent public disorder.' Mustafa Kemal, besides, would cover the whole area, and would not establish his headquarters in Sivas or anywhere else.[926] Before he left Istanbul, he was instructed to restore order and security, gather the arms and ammunition left by the Turkish forces, and prevent organised resistance

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[922] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 553.
[923] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 159.
[924] For early literature on Mustafa Kemal (which in many ways is much superior to most subsequent works, see, for instance, Major General James G. Harbord, "Mustapha Kemal Pasha and His Party," in the *World's Work*, Volume 36 (London, 1920), pp. 470- 482; M. Paillares: *Le Kemalisme devant les Allies* (Paris, 1922); "The Recovery of the Sick Man of Europe," in the *Literary Digest*, November, 1922, pp. 17 et seq.; M. K. Zia Bey, "How the Turks Feel," in *Asia*, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 857 et seq., and "The New Turkish Democracy," in *The Nation*, Volume 115 (New York, 1922), pp. 546-548; Major General Sir Charles Townshend, "Great Britain and the Turks," in *Asia*, Volume XXII (1922), pp. 949-953; Clair Price, "Mustapha Kemal and the Angora Government," in *Current History*, Volume XVI (1922), pp. 790-800; Ludwell Denny, "The Turk Comes Back," in *The Nation*, Volume 115 (1922), pp. 575-577; "The New Epoch in Turkey," in the *Muslim Standard* (London), November 9, 1922.
[925] A. Ryan: *The Last of the Dragomans* (London, 1951), 131.
[926] Bayur, Hikmet, Atatürk Hayatı ve Eseri (Atatürk's Life and Work), Vol. I (from his birth to his landing in Samsun), AKDTYK, Ankara 1990; p. 305

against the government — precisely what the Allies wanted the Istanbul government to do.[927] In order to do that, Mustafa Kemal was given command of both army and all the civil servants in the area.[928] Mustafa Kemal's real purpose, in fact, just as the two corps commanders, Kâzım Karabekir's in Erzurum and Refet's (Bele) in Sivas, was the very opposite: to make sure that breech blocks and other military equipment were not handed over to the British.[929] The Turkish General Staff, which was at the time doing its utmost to keep its forces and equipment against the Greek advance on the Aegean coast, shared this purpose.[930] With all the extensive authority he was given, Mustafa Kemal intended to do much more than just gather arms and serve the Allies.[931]

At Samsun he found that the local people hardly knew about the landings, and so meetings were held in the principal mosque, to call them to resistance.[932] Following a crowded service in the mosque, with prayers for success, a mass meeting was held in the small square of the town, the speakers insisting that the country was in danger; thus all Muslims must be armed, lest 'they die beneath the feet of the enemy.' A religiously binding oath was sworn to this effect.[933] To Mustafa Kemal, the army was to be the backbone of resistance, but it needed the support of civil officials and the population; and all three sections needed to be mobilised.[934] And soon the movement of resistance was joined by all sections of the population, regardless of age or status, including roving guerrilla bands, volunteer militias attached to local political committees, soldiers, civil servants, landowners, businessmen, artisans, religious leaders, peasants, members of old political parties, women, 'all united in reaction to the occupation and determined to be free.'[935]

Already before even Mustafa Kemal's arrival in Samsun, some leading army officers had begun to organise the movement of resistance. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, who had been sent to command the 20th Army Corps in Ankara in March 1919, had already begun to send out agents to coordinate the national defence forces in the vicinity.[936] A few days later, on April 13, Kâzim Karabekir, by far one of Turkey's ever greatest historical figures, who had fought virtually on every front, for decades already, and always with distinction, had left Istanbul by boat to assume command of the 15th Army corps in Erzurum. Also in charge of the provinces of Van and Trabzon, his main aim was to begin resistance among the soldiers and population where he was in command.[937] True to his intentions, no sooner he arrived there, he declared his aim to work 'to free Anatolia from enemy rule and also regain Kars, Ardahan, Batum, and the Turkish

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[927] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 342.
[928] HTVD, Sept. 1952, nos. 3-6; Btytkhoglu, *Ataturk Anadoluda,* op cit; pp. 42-46.
[929] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 221.
[930] For instructions to units, see Apak, Rahmi, İstiklâl Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu (How the Western Front was Formed in the War of Independence), TTK, Ankara 1990, 30–5.
[931] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 342.
[932] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 165.
[933] Ibid; p. 168.
[934] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 221.
[935] Midilli Ahmet. *Turk Istiklal Harbinin Başında Milli Mücadele,* Ankara, 1928; Bayar, VII, 2368-2383.
[936] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 341.
[937] Karabekir, Kâzım: *İstiklâl Harbimiz* (Our War of Independence), 2nd ed, Türkiye Yayınevi, Istanbul 1969, pp. 2-9, 16-17.

portions of the Caucasus.'[938] Already in command of a force of 18,000 troops, thus at the time the most powerful man of the resistance, he first secured the war materiel that the British were preparing to ship back to Istanbul.[939] As soon as knowledge came to him that the British had handed Kars over to the new Armenian Republic and that it was preparing a new force to invade Anatolia, he joined the Society for the Defense of the Rights of the Eastern Provinces and vowed 'a struggle to the end to keep Anatolia Turkish.'[940]

In earnest, Mustafa Kemal established swift and effective links with the established leaders, and also with all the Turkish army units surviving in Anatolia and Thrace. The forces were, however, weak and ill-equipped, and officers had to obey orders from headquarters in Istanbul. Fortunately, the general staff was sympathetic to the national cause.[941] Mustafa Kemal also began to form links between the various Defence of Rights Groups and, instead of disbanding them, as he had been ordered, he began to form new ones.[942]

In the meantime, the carving up of Turkey was proceeding. Just as in İzmir and its area, it was the same method being employed by the local Christians; such as around Trabzon, where the impeding arrival of armed Ally units encouraged the Christians to inflict atrocities on the Turks.[943] In Havza, where now Mustafa Kemal was, the Greeks had remained quiet until the Armistice, but now, with Ally support, they were in rebellion once more, largely under the leadership of a Greek bishop.[944] All around the area, they terrorised, robbed, killed, and burnt villages, doing– 'much as they had done in Macedonia in the days of his youth.'[945] The Turks could do little since the British had reinforced their troops in the area, militarily assisting the Greek gangs whilst confiscating Turkish arms.[946] In the south, the Armenians were returning not only to the areas in Cilicia and Upper Mesopotamia under British and then French occupation, but also to Central Anatolia, reclaiming houses taken over by Muslim families.[947] In Aegean Turkey, 113,000 Muslims, most of whom had fled from Greece in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, were now being uprooted once more.[948]

To justify their policies, the Allies used the usual arguments, such as that the 'Ottoman' government was incapable of ruling Turkey and needed foreign guidance,

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[938] Karabekir, pp. 19-23.
[939] A. Rawlinson, *Adventures in the Near East 1918-1922,* London and New York, 1923; Karabekir, pp. 161-162.
[940] May 30, 1919; Karabekir, pp. 31, 48, 65, 78; R.G. Hovannisian: The *Republic of Armenia;* I-IV; University of California; I, 426-428.
[941] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 221.
[942] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 166.
[943] Bayar, V, 1457-1465, VIII, 2581-2589, 2752-2755.
[944] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 167.
[945] Ibid.
[946] Ibid; pp. 166-7.
[947] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 222.
[948] Akşin, Sina, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele (The Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle), I–II, Cem, Istanbul 1992, I, 309–10

supervision, and protection for at least a few years.[949] The patriots were not going to be duped; not only did they see their country being carved up, they also knew from experience, such as in the wake of the Balkan Wars, what would happen to Turks; and in front of them were towns and cities still in ruin, such Erzincan that had been rased to the ground; its Muslim inhabitants massacred by the Armenians during their retreat in 1918.[950] There was no mystery as to what was awaiting the Turks.

On 29 May, Mustafa Kemal told headquarters in Erzurum, Sivas and Ankara that 'determined and honest hands' had to lead the nation along the shortest road to independence 'in our lands'. This duty fell to 'the patriotic charge of us soldiers, because of our special knowledge.'[951]

The following day, he attended Friday prayers in the main local Mosque of Havza, which was followed by a public meeting, at which Muslim notables called the participants to be ready to sacrifice themselves for the recovery of İzmir.[952]

The local Greek inhabitants informed their Metropolitan (Archbishop) Germanos in Samsun, who reported matters to the local British officer.[953] This fact highlights a very important issue: that the Greeks lived amongst Muslim majorities fearless and unmolested, contrary to the generalised claim of Turkish oppression and suppression of the minorities in their midst. This point also highlights the fact that unlike others, the Turks were not prone to carry revenge attacks for what was being done to them such as in İzmir and other areas. Christian Minorities, on the other hand, would always seem to be buying their time, waiting for the arrival of their religious kinsmen to turn onto their Turkish neighbours with mass-slaughter. This has been the generalised practice throughout, and not just in modern times, but since the Middle Ages, including during the Crusades.[954] Surely, this highlights a revengeful, loathing spirit, which is alien to the Turk, under whose rule minorities have survived and thrived,[955] whilst elsewhere, they were persecuted and burnt at the stake in their multitudes.[956] The Turk, true, can be brutal too, for no entity escapes evil in its entirety. But whilst his evil side has been vastly inflated, his noble character has been consigned to oblivion; and again, and once more this inflation of his evil and neglect of his noble character remains legitimised by weak Turkish (scholarly or other) response.

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[949] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 223.

[950] J. McCarthy: *Death and Exile*; op cit; pp. 198-9.

[951] Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri (ATTB) (Circulars, Telegrams and Proclamations by Atatürk), published as IV of above, separate volume, 1991, 26.

[952] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 225.

[953] Ibid.

[954] Several Armenian princes belonging to the subject Christian population had risen in arms in the Taurus, and on the banks of the Euphrates and in Mesopotamia, against their Seljuk rulers. In their advance, the crusaders were also provided guides and recruits by the Maronite Christians of Lebanon. Wherever the Frankish army successfully carried enemy strongholds, it owed some of this success to the support of local Christians to whom the crusaders appeared as saviours. All in Von Sybel: *The History and Literature of the Crusades*, London, Chapman; 1861; p. 33; Z. Oldenbourg: *The Crusades*; op cit; p. 114; P.K. Hitti: *History;* op cit; p. 639.

[955] T. W. Arnold: *The Preaching of Islam*; Lahore: Sb. M. Ashraf, 1961. Y. Courbage, P. Fargues: *Chretiens et Juifs dans l'Islam Arabe et Turc*, Payot, Paris, 1997. S. Khuda Bukhsh: *The Orient Under the Caliphs*; translated from Von Kremer's *Culturgeschichte des Orients*; Luzac and Co; London; 1920. J. Davenport: *An Apology for Mohammed and the Koran*; J. Davy and Sons; London; 1869.

[956] J.W. Draper: *A History of the Intellectual Development of Europe*; George Bell and Sons, London, 1875.
-H. C. Lea: *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, 4 vols; The Mac Millan Company, New York, 1907.

Back in Istanbul, the British, informed by the Greeks, did not like what Mustafa Kemal was up to, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir George Milne, now firmly requested the War Ministry to recall him.[957] Two days later he received the order from the Minister of War to return to Istanbul, but he disobeyed this and all such subsequent orders.[958] Mustafa Kemal instead sent out to his group of commanders and governors a strongly worded circular stressing the national rights. Insisting on 'complete independence and the safeguarding of the interests of the Turkish majority on Turkish soil,' especially denouncing Damad Ferid's acceptance of the principle of Armenian autonomy and the proposal for a British protectorate elsewhere.[959] He was not alone, around him coalescing patriots such as Kâzim Karakebir, Rauf (Orbay), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy).[960] Bekir Sami (Günsav), the military commander, also kept in touch with Mustafa Kemal.[961] The ranks were being replenished by the arrival of the surviving officers (including reserves and retirees) as well as the conscripts.[962] Regiment after regiment were now abandoning the Istanbul-based government and joining the forces of liberation.[963] In some places, in fact, the liberation struggle was already well in its armed phase. On 28 May, when Greek troops landed in Ayvalık, a coastal town with a Greek population north of İzmir, they met with fire from a regular unit commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ali (Çetinkaya).[964] Ali (known as Bald Ali), had met and fought with Mustafa Kemal in Eastern Libya in 1912.[965] The resistance put up by Ali's regiment was reported to Mustafa Kemal by Colonel Bekir Sami (Günsav), acting commander of the 17th Corps, which had moved up the coast from İzmir.[966] Mustafa Kemal was aware of the value of irregulars, and would establish contacts with them, including with one even closer, Lame Osman in Giresun.[967] In Havza itself, the local people captured a consignment of some tens of thousands of rifle bolts, confiscated from the Turkish forces in the east.[968]

Mustafa Kemal, in his circular telegram of 3 June 1919, asked all commanders to ascertain that Societies for the Defence of National Rights and other local assemblies demanded from the government that the Turkish delegation to the Paris Peace

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[957] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 166.
[958] Ibid; p. 169.
[959] Ibid.
[960] Rauf Orbay Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete: Yüzyılımızda Bir İnsanımız (From the Ottomans to the Republic: Our Man in Our Century), ed. Cemal Kutay, I–V, Kazancı, Istanbul 1992, 352.
[961] According to Mustafa Kemal, Rauf went to Bandırma and on to the Aegean region to meet Colonel Bekir Sami (Günsav), commander of the 56th Division and acting commander of the 17th Corps (Nutuk, 23). However, Rauf himself does not mention Bekir Sami, although he says that he met the 14th Corps commander, Yusuf İzzet Paşa, in Balıkesir (Orbay (ed. Kutay), IV, 359)
[962] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 283.
[963] Ibid.
[964] Apak, Rahmi, İstiklâl Savaşında Garp Cephesi Nasıl Kuruldu (How the Western Front was Formed in the War of Independence), TTK, Ankara 1990, pp. 64-6.
[965] Akşin, Sina, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele (The Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle), I–II, Cem, Istanbul 1992, I, 29.
[966] Apak, op cit; 73-4.
[967] Goloğlu, Mahmut, I, Erzurum Kongresi (The Congress of Erzurum), Kalite Matbaası, Ankara 1968; I. 59.
[968] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 168.

Conference insist on the country's full independence and the principle that 'Nowhere should the Muslim majority be subordinated to Christian minorities.'[969]

Now truly alarmed by the rising spirit of resistance, the Allies countered with the usual claim, as here reported to the British High Commissioner in Istanbul on 6 June that Mustafa Kemal was 'organising a movement which is only too likely to find an outlet for its energies in massacres.'[970] Any attempt by the Turks to defend themselves, Mango remarks,

> Tended to be seen by Allied officials as preparation for a massacre; the Christian minorities which wished to shake off Turkish rule did their best to foster this interpretation. The fate of Muslim Turks did not figure in Allied concerns.[971]

Receiving the telegram from the War Ministry on 8 June summoning him to Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal knew that a British detachment might be sent to stop him travelling further inland.[972] He, therefore, decided to move on to the remoter and more important city of Amasya, whose inhabitants had sent him a deputation declaring their loyalty.[973] Without giving anybody notice of his move, he left Havza on 13 June for Amasya, which centuries earlier had acted as the cradle of the Ottoman Rebirth. In Amasya, Mustafa Kemal could feel safe as the 5th Caucasian Division, a part of Refet's 3rd Corps, was quartered in the town.[974] 'This was a place well fitted to become the cradle of a Nationalist Revolution.'[975]

2. From Amasya to Ankara

> Throughout a long and distinguished history [says Kinross] it [Amasya] had shown a consistent spirit of independence. Saved from the Mongol occupation, it had been for a while the Ottoman capital and after the capture of Constantinople the tradition persisted that the heir to the Sultanate should receive his education in Amasya and serve as its governor. Thus Amasya preserved a high status and felt that it had something to teach Constantinople.[976]

Already, in its mountains, a resolute dignitary had recruited a force of Turkish volunteers, to fight against Greek gangs under their Orthodox bishop, and straight he came out in full support of Mustafa Kemal, and preached for his cause in the

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[969] Ataturk: Nutuk (Speech), original text, AKDTYK, Ankara 1989, Vesikalar (Documents), 1991; 19.
[970] Evans, Stephen F., The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk 1919–38, Eothen, Walkington 1982; p. 21.
[971] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 225.
[972] Rauf Orbay's letter to Kâzım Karabekir, dated 4 July 1941, in Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, 1100–1
[973] Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991, II, 8.
[974] Erikan, Celâl, Komutan Atatürk (Atatürk as a Commander), T. İş Bankası, Ankara 1972, 315.
[975] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 170.
[976] Ibid.

mosque.[977] Kemal delivered a speech to the citizens, announcing the start of a national resistance on three separate fronts:

1. In the west against the Greeks behind Smyrna.
2. In the south against the French and their Armenian collaborators from Adana.
3. In the east against the Armenians from Erzurum.

'Citizens of Amasya,' he called on them, 'what are you waiting for?... If the enemy tries to land in Samsun, we must pull on our peasant shoes, we must withdraw to the mountains, we must defend the country to the last rock. If it is the will of God that we be defeated, we must set fire to all our homes, to all our property; we must lay the country in ruins and leave it an empty desert. Citizens of Amasya, let us all together swear an oath that we shall do this.'[978]

The citizens vowed and declared that they awaited his orders. 'It was,' Kinross remarks, 'the holy men who proved to be his strongest adherents. For the first time he was to receive public and official support from a powerful religious authority.'[979]

On 19 June 1919, Mustafa Kemal met with Ali Fuat Cebesoy, commander in Ankara, Rauf Orbay, former Navy Minister, and Refet Bele, who commanded several army corps near Samsun.[980] On 21 June, they signed the Amasya Protocol, which became more or less the first call for a national movement against the occupation.[981] They also obtained agreement by telegram from Cemal (Mersinli), 2nd Army Inspector in Konya; and Kâzım Karabekir, Commander of the 15th Corps – the strongest in the army – in Erzurum.[982] The message was a simple one:

1. The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger.
2. The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities.
3. It is only through the nation's effort and determination that national independence will be won.
4. It is necessary to establish a national committee free from all external influences and control, that will review the national situation and make known to the world the people's desire for justice.
5. It has been decided to hold immediately a National Congress in Sivas, the most secure place in Anatolia.
6. Three representatives from each province should be sent immediately to the Sivas Congress.
7. To be prepared for every eventuality, this subject should be kept a national secret.[983]

Following the signature, a call for armed resistance was made after the Friday prayer in the mosque.[984] In his call, Mustafa Kemal declared that the independence of the country was in danger:

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[977] Ibid.
[978] Ibid.
[979] Ibid.
[980] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 343.
[981] Ibid.
[982] Erikan, Celâl, Komutan Atatürk (Atatürk as a Commander), T. İş Bankası, Ankara 1972, 374.
[983] Ataturk: *Nutuk,* op cit; I, 30-34.

> The capital was under Allied occupation and the Government subject to foreign control, hence incapable of governing. The nation must save itself by its own will-power. Its resolve to resist foreign domination had been proved by the rise of the numerous defence organizations. These must now be co-ordinated into a central national body, capable of judging the nation's needs and voicing its demands, free from outside influence and control.[985]

Now was envisaged the formation of a national Government, independent of Istanbul.[986] Kemal in fact wrote to a number of leading figures in Istanbul inviting them to join the national struggle, adding that 'From now on Istanbul no longer rules Anatolia but will have to follow it,' thus providing the rallying cry for the events that were to follow.[987]

On the enemy side, the forces leagued against the Turks were quite strong: the British, the French, Italians, Greeks, Armenians, and internal collaborators of these. The odds for a Nationalist victory were indeed faint. Yet, as happened on countless occasions before, fate struck again. At precisely this juncture the Nationalist movement received support from the source that was the least expected: Soviet Russia. Russia that had been the eternal and most threatening foe for centuries, was now the friend, and not just any friend, but one coming with the goods, i.e. arms and hard cash, and at the most needed time. Russia had now renounced its claims on Istanbul and other parts of Turkey, and even more crucially: both Turkey and Soviet Russia now had precisely the same enemies. Indeed, just as they were tearing Turkey apart, the Allies were also trying to crush the Bolshevik Revolution, even seeking Russia's dismemberment, by assisting militarily the enemies of the Bolshevik Revolution, Wrangel in particular.[988] So, now, at the most important time in its history, Turkey found itself in a situation in which, rather than being finished off by the traditional Russian enemy, it could build powerful links with it when it was needed most. Which is indeed a remarkable turn of events, for when Tsarist Russia was about to finish off Turkey especially in the 1870s, it was England that was then the agent of Turkey's salvation. And now that it was that same country Britain, together with France, the Greeks and Armenians, that were seeking the destruction of Turkey, it was Soviet Russia that came to the rescue. Of course, both England and Soviet Russia had their strategic interests in being altruistic towards Turkey at different times in history, but the facts are those just stated.

Thus, now, only a very short time before the Amasya meeting, a Bolshevik delegation headed by Colonel Semen Budenny met Mustafa Kemal and offered arms and ammunition in return for stemming Armenian expansionism in the Caucasus, which, obviously threatened Turkey's existence, too. Equally to Turkey's interest: The Soviets requested the Nationalists to close Allied access to southern Russia through

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[984] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 172.
[985] Ibid; 171.
[986] Ibid.
[987] Bayar, Celal, Ben de Yazdım (So I Wrote Too), I–VIII, Baha, Istanbul 1968–72, VIII, 2595-2602; *Nutuk,* I, 35, III, 916-7.
[988] To have the best idea on the Western-Bolshevik conflict and also Western involvement, and why, and all the political military ramifications, there is, and by far, nothing better than Current History, especially vols 5-12. Although the magazine itself is rabidly anti Bolshevik, it gives a wonderful idea of the situation as was lived and experienced then.

the Black Sea.[989] Budenny also urged Kemal to accept Communist ideology for the new Turkey, but here, Mustafa Kemal, at his most excellent diplomatic standards, replied that this matter had to be postponed until Turkish independence was achieved.[990] There could never be an answer better than that one. And so were laid the bases for the cooperation that was to be 'of utmost importance once the national movement was organized.'[991]

On the other side, the enemy was at work, too. The Allies, now with America on board, and surely guided in its policies by the likes of its ex-ambassador to Turkey, Morgenthau, despite all of Wilson's calls for self-determination of the people, which did not mean the Turks (nor the Arabs for that matter), were putting the final steps for the dismemberment of Turkey. Now the Armenian claims over their chosen provinces in Anatolia were being adopted in the West. The French and the Italians were also grabbing their 'territories,' which by now have grown even larger as compared to the initial 1915 agreement (as in this map):

Elsewhere, in the Aegean area, where resistance had already begun, Greek troops came with reinforcements to wreak vengeance on the Turkish population, killing many and causing wholesale destruction of property, forcing out yet another wave of refugees.[992] The Greek aim, of course, was to empty that whole area of its Turkish population, responding to the objective of a homogeneous zone of Greek settlement before it was annexed to Greece.[993]

The puppet government in Istanbul, meanwhile, seemed more concerned with the patriots. The new Minister of the Interior, Ali Kemal – who had replaced Mustafa Kemal's ally, Mehmed Ali – now issued a circular aimed at crushing the patriot movement. Ali Galib, a retired staff colonel, had been sent to Sivas, and there, he had bills posted on the walls, proclaiming Mustafa Kemal 'a dangerous man, a mutineer, a

[989] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 344.
[990] Ibid.
[991] Ibid.
[992] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 228.
[993] Ibid.

traitor,' and urged his arrest together with his 'associates.'[994] This action had come in the wake of the High Commissioner, Admiral Calthorpe, reporting to the Foreign Office on 23 June that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had made a 'considerable reputation for himself during the Gallipoli fighting,' had become 'a centre for national and anti-foreign feeling.'[995] Words put in the mouth of the puppet government claimed that Mustafa Kemal

> Was extorting money from the people, increasing the sufferings of Muslims in the Aegean region, and provincial authorities should have nothing to do with him.[996]

Seemingly more conciliatory than his ministers, the Sultan acknowledged that Mustafa Kemal's initiatives

> Were inspired by patriotic feeling, but the situation was not as bad as it looked in the provinces, that Mustafa Kemal need not return to Istanbul, where foreign authorities 'might treat him harshly,' and that the best course would be for him to take two months leave of absence and spend it in the town of his choice.[997]

Mustafa Kemal refused, of course. There was a cause, and there were good men too. It is of crucial importance to take note here of the role of Kâzim Karabekir, and what sort of admirable man he was, not just the great army commander, but also remarkable in other ways. Besides salvaging from the remnants of Enver's last Caucasian army a force which was stronger than any surviving in other parts of the country, he was particularly famed for his organising abandoned and orphaned children:

> With his paternal and charitable instincts [says Kinross] he had personally adopted more than a thousand orphan boys, between the ages of four and fourteen, whom he dressed in a para-military uniform and to whom his officers gave a form of military training. He established schools to give them an elementary education and to teach them useful trades. Since his own hobby was music, and he liked in his leisure hours to play the violin, he gave them also musical instruction, together with training in arts and crafts. The children knew him as 'Pasha Baba' – Father Pasha – and so trusted and revered him that he was able to control them with a minimum of punishment and to encourage them to develop as free individuals.
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> Colonel A. Rawlinson, who had arrived in Erzurum, on an official mission, to investigate the prospects of creating an independent Armenia, and to organize the surrender of arms, was so impressed by these educational activities that he wrote, "If this is going on throughout the whole country, the Turk of the future, with his natural gifts of courage and endurance, will become a power in the East, if not in the West also, that will presently have to be reckoned with in a very different spirit from that adopted by the European Powers at their post-war conferences hitherto." He admired the Pasha's intelligence, his conscientiousness, his mastery of every branch of his profession. He was "the

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[994] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 172.
[995] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 234.
[996] Ataturk: *Nutuk*, op cit; 24-5.
[997] Akşin, Sina, İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele (The Istanbul Governments and the National Struggle), I–II, Cem, Istanbul 1992, I, 55.

most genuine example of a first-class Turkish officer that it has ever been my good fortune to meet."[998]

When on 8 July 1919, Mustafa Kemal was dismissed from the army (under Allied pressure, of course) doubts, understandably, assailed him as to whether others would show respect to him. His doubts quickly dissipated when Kâzim entered the room, stood in respect and said 'I have brought you the respects of my officers and men. You are still our honoured commander, as you were in the past. I have brought your official carriage and cavalry escort. We are, all of us, at your orders, Pasha.'[999]

Kemal swayed a little, and was so overcome with emotion, he walked up to Kâzim and hugged him, kissing him on both cheeks, thanking him many times over. Rauf had not seen Mustafa Kemal thus moved since after the Battle of Anafarta.[1000] The Istanbul government had ordered Kâzim to arrest Mustafa Kemal,[1001] who now not only refused, thus declaring his own opposition to them; he now declared and confirmed Mustafa Kemal's leadership.[1002] Without Karabekir, there would never have been a Mustafa Kemal, just as without Selim I, there would never have been a Suleyman.

It was at this juncture that the Erzurum Congress took place, elapsing from 23 July until 7 August 1919. This came as a result of the Society for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia's call for a regional meeting to be held in Erzurum in response to the threat of further Armenian aggression in the east.[1003] Mustafa Kemal, with other nationalist leaders, was in attendance.[1004] In the end, whilst the protection of the eastern provinces was the original concern of the Erzurum Congress, its final declaration was the basis for the national pact that followed. It set forth a ten-point resolution for independence, which includes:

1. The province of Trabzon, the district of Samsun, and the provinces of Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis, sometimes called the "six provinces," are an integral whole which cannot be separated from each other or from Ottoman territory for any reason.
2. To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and our national independence.
3. As all occupation and interference will be considered undertaken on behalf of establishing Greek and Armenian states, the principle of united defence and resistance is resolved. The bestowing of new privileges to Christians in a manner to alter political control and social balance will not be allowed.
4. In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making decisions to defend our national rights.

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998 P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 174-5; Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, 65.
999 P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 178.
1000 Ibid.
1001 S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 344.
1002 Bayar, VIII, 2632-2656, 2760-2763.
1003 S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 344.
1004 Ibid.

5. We reaffirm the legal rights, as indicated in the laws of the Ottoman state, of non-Muslims.
6. We are calling for a decision based on right and justice, one that respects our historic, cultural, and religious rights... within the boundaries established by the armistice signed by the Allies on October 30, 1918.[1005]

Meanwhile Damad Ferid's mission to the Peace Conference of Paris of 1919 had ended in failure. To an audience of potentates, who had already formed their views of Turkey and her destiny, he admitted that

> Turkey, during the war, had committed crimes such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever. But it would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light. All these crimes were the fault of the Committee of Union and Progress, whose leaders had now been tried and found guilty, thus rehabilitating Turkey in the eyes of the civilized world. Henceforward she could devote herself to an intensive economic and intellectual culture.[1006]

After a few days he got his answer:

> They agreed with his estimate of the Turkish Government's crimes. Turkey, however, could not escape the consequences simply because her affairs "at a critical moment in her history, had fallen into the hands of men who, utterly devoid of principle or pity, could not even command success." However excellent the qualities of the Turkish people the Council "cannot admit that among these qualities is to be counted capacity to rule over alien races." As to their aspirations to economic and intellectual culture, "No change could be more startling or impressive, none could be more beneficial!"[1007]

The Turkish delegation was then granted the permission to leave.

The Nationalist Congress of Sivas on 11 September 1919, somehow repeated the principles established in Erzurum, most fundamentally

> The independence and integrity of the Ottoman lands within the armistice lines, fair treatment but no special privileges for minorities, and resistance to Greek and Armenian territorial claims.[1008]

After that, Kemal headed for what was to become the capital of Free Turkey: Ankara. On his arrival, he was given a rapturous welcome:

> The town-crier strode through the streets, proclaiming, "Mustafa Kemal and his Green Army are coming."... Crowds swarmed out of the city to intercept him on the road from Kirshehir; dervishes stood by the roadside ready to chant prayers to him... Thousands of horsemen and infantrymen, swaggering by in their picturesque kilted costumes, bristling with antiquated weapons of

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[1005] Gologlu, *Erzurum Kongresi,* I; pp. 201-203; Bayar, VIII, 2670-2681, 2764-2778, in S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 344-5.
[1006] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 181-2.
[1007] Ibid; p. 182.
[1008] Text in Gologlu, II, 232-4. A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 248.

formidable size, waving flags and breaking out of the procession to leap around in their national dances, while the beat of the drum and the clash of the cymbal and the reedy melody of the flute rang through the steep narrow streets of the citadel. Never before, within the memory of its inhabitants, had Angora seen such a gathering. The few foreigners looked on in some astonishment – the British at the station, which they had occupied a few days before, and whither the procession made a detour to demonstrate the fervour of the national feeling. Mustafa Kemal had appeared in a decrepit Benz touring-car, whose worn-out tyres he used to declare were stuffed with rags.[1009]

3. The Allies' All Out Assault

The Allies decided to use the means at their disposal to force the issue. Between 23 October and 1 November, 1919, French troops took over from the British the occupation of Maraş, Antep and Urfa in south-eastern Turkey, as they had earlier done in Adana and the rest of Cilicia.[1010] They brought with them Armenian detachments and proceeded with the resettlement of Armenians expelled in the Great War.[1011] Emrullahzade Asaf, who had served in the Great War as adjutant to Enver and then to his brother Nuri in the Caucasus, offered his services to defend the nation. Mustafa Kemal, although suspicious of the close associates of Enver, after a while saw the benefit of guerrilla forces in holding the Franco-Armenian takeover the region round Maraş and Antep.[1012] Asaf was given the nom de guerre of Kılıç Ali (Ali the Sword) and subsequently became a loyal supporter of Mustafa Kemal until the end of his life.[1013] Two other regular officers were despatched to lead guerrillas against the French in Cilicia.[1014] The units were well-armed drawing on the caches which Mustafa Kemal had formed just before the end of the war.[1015]

In the meantime, the Muslim Arabs, now having realised they had been duped by the Allies, rose to fight. On 12 January 1920, it was reported that fierce fighting had resulted in great numbers of casualties on all sides, and had involved the French and their Christian allies, against Syrian Muslims at Alexandretta and other points of demarcation in the French zone in Damascus.[1016] The Muslim Arabs had put in place a National Defence Committee against foreign intervention, which brought together all previously rival political and religious organisations.[1017] Meanwhile on the Turkish side, the local population, suffering from Franco-Armenian excesses and depredations,

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[1009] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 199-200.

[1010] For French military actions and policies in the region, see G. Gautherot: *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie* Hatıralarını Anlatıyor (Kılıç Ali Relates His Reminiscences), Sel, Istanbul 1955 (Paris, 1920); C. Stienon: *Les Campagnes d 'Orient et les interets de l'entente* (Paris, 1918), and *La defense de I' Orient et le role de I'Angleterre* (Paris, 1918).

[1011] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 259.

[1012] Ibid.

[1013] Kılıç Ali: Hatıralarını Anlatıyor (Kılıç Ali Relates His Reminiscences), Sel, Istanbul 1955, 9–10, 26.

[1014] Ataturk: Nutuk, Vesikalar; 119.

[1015] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 203.

[1016] French claims in Syria in *CH* Vol 11: October, 1919— March, 1920, Part Two; p. 274.

[1017] Ibid.

joined in the fight. On 21 January 1920, the Turks in Maraş, in eastern Cilicia, rose against the French and their Armenian protégés, who were soon decimated by guerrillas operating in the countryside.[1018] An attempt was made to mount concerted operations with Arabs resisting the French in Syria.[1019] Regular troops were also ordered to help guerrillas both in Maraş and in Urfa, further south. On 8 February, Turkish nationalist forces, led by the local gendarmerie commander, entered the town of Urfa, which had been occupied by the French.[1020] Whilst Armenians, both armed and civilians paid a heavy price, the French army was entirely destroyed both during the fighting and in its retreat under severe weather conditions; the news of the outcome relayed to the capitals of Europe causing them immense consternation.[1021] Now the Turks had gained control of the mountain regions and were soon carrying out sorties down into the wide Cilician plain to threaten the important centres of Adana, Tarsus, and Mersin.[1022]

The Greeks in the meantime were continuing their policy of murder and mass-clearance of Turks in Western Anatolia. An international commission noted the many acts of violence and pillage, and the mass-rape of women.[1023] While most of these acts were committed by civilian Greeks, the soldiers also took part in them, and the Greek authorities did very little to put a stop to them.[1024] In fact, as early as 21 May 1919, the Colonel in command of the Greek occupation forces received a telegram from Venizelos in Paris ordering him to expand Greek occupation. And so a regime of terror towards the Turks continued. In Aydın, Turkish men, women, and children who tried to escape from the quarter that was burning were butchered by the Greeks who then evacuated the city on the night of 29 June after having committed more atrocities.[1025] The findings of this commission were attacked by Venizelos, who, on 15 November, in Paris, asked the Supreme Council

> To declare the report null and void, and to rule that another investigation be conducted. In this connection he said: "When the Greeks landed at Smyrna they were immediately surrounded by enthusiastic crowds, which followed them, cheering and welcoming them, and advanced from the port to the city proper, without having occupied the strategic points of the city. Turks and Greekophobe residents fired from windows upon the troops. The evening previous the Turks had issued proclamations protesting against Greek occupation, and had opened the Jails and freed several hundred criminals, who armed themselves at Turkish commissaries, and began robbing and looting,

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[1018] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 267.
[1019] S. Aksin: Istanbul; op cit; II, 302-5.
[1020] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 267.
[1021] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 204.
[1022] For French policies and activities in Syria, Cilicia, see G. Gautherot, La France en Syrie et en Cilicie; op cit; C. Stienon: Les Campagnes; op cit;
[1023] The Problem of Turkey Survey of the Rival Claims of Territory and Power in Turkey. Which Menace Peace in the Near East; in *Current History;* Vol 11: October, 1919— March, 1920 Part Two; p. 273.
[1024] Ibid.
[1025] Ibid.

> causing the whole trouble."[1026] He added: "When we were asked by President Wilson and Premiers Lloyd George and Clemenceau to occupy Smyrna there was no mention of temporary occupation. We seek no mandate; we seek to enter our home."[1027]

So, there was no alternative for the Turks than to fight. The Greek forces were reported to number 70,000 men, and through December 1919 sought to bring İzmir's environs under their control.[1028] The Turks, who, although much less armed, were the majority and fought obstinately to resist further Greek advance, and by early 1920, on 2 January, reinforcements in men and arms were moving westwards.[1029]

All along, in face of Greek brutalities, all the Istanbul media could do was to deliver a note of protest that was addressed to the Peace Conference by the Turkish Government.[1030]

Meanwhile, resistance had been active in other places too, even near Istanbul. A group of guerrillas crossed the Sea of Marmara in the night of 26/27 January (1920), and emptied the arms depot at Akbaş, on the Gallipoli peninsula, after overpowering French sentries.[1031] The operation was led by Mustafa Kemal's friend from Macedonia, Colonel Kâzım (Özalp), commander of the 61st Division at Balıkesir, south of the sea of Marmara.[1032]

Of course, to the Allies, it was all too normal that Greeks and Armenians should be armed but not the Turks; an earlier version of the macabre disarmament of Bosnia in 1992, which only applied to the Bosnian Muslims but not to their Christian Serb and Croat foes. In a show of force, the British directed their action against the Istanbul War Ministry, in particular, as it included semi-discreet, but true patriots like General Fevzi, who was now once more Minister of War, and who had sympathies for the National cause.[1033] Early on 16th March 1920, as British warships drew in to the Galata Bridge, armoured cars rolled through the streets of Stambul and Pera, troops occupied police stations, military posts, and the main public buildings. French and Italian troops joined the British, and amongst the Turkish casualties were several musicians of a military band who had been mistaken for active soldiers.[1034] The entire Turkish staff of the War Ministry, including Fevzi, the Minister, were removed while British officers searched the building, before moving on houses, and tombs in the graveyards where weapons 'might be hidden.'[1035]

Two days later the British dissolved parliament. Now Istanbul was under effective Ally occupation, and many prominent Turkish officials were jailed.[1036] The Allies

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[1026] Ibid.
[1027] Ibid.
[1028] Ibid.
[1029] Ibid; p. 274.
[1030] Ibid.
[1031] S. Aksin: Istanbul; op cit; II, 302-9.
[1032] Ataturk: Nutuk: Vesikalar, document 239b.
[1033] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 204.
[1034] Ibid; p. 206.
[1035] Ibid; p. 207.
[1036] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War; p. 554.

covered the city walls with posters threatening 'DEATH', in large letters, to any Nationalist supporter. In the meantime, the ship *Benbow* was now on its way toward Malta with its cargo of prisoners: the patriots who had been supporting Mustafa Kemal in his opposition to the dismemberment of Turkey.[1037]
Under Ally pressure, the Istanbul government issued religious edicts:

> "Wrath of heaven and eternal torments of hell" were called down on the heads of all Moslems who did not support the Sultan. All Mussulmans who kill Nationalists will be blessed by Allah, and all who die fighting the rebels will earn eternal glory hereafter.[1038]

Propagandist literature also painted the national forces as Bolsheviks, 'Godless Unionists' – the residue of the 'masonic' CUP.[1039]
This was answered five days later by a counter-fatwa, drawn up by the nationalist Müfti of Ankara, Rıfat (Börekçi), and signed by 250 of his colleagues throughout Anatolia.[1040] It declared that the Caliph was 'the prisoner of infidels, that it was the duty of the faithful to save him and his dominions, and that fatwas issued at the behest of enemy states had no validity.'[1041]

Just as they used the Istanbul government as a stick against the Nationalists, now the Allies sough to earn the latter via the carrot. Colonel Rawlinson of the British Army was dispatched to Erzurum early in April to confer with Kâzim Karabekir apparently, 'to offer his services to bring back harmony between the Constantinople Government and Kemal Pasha, head of the Nationalist movement.'[1042] It is most likely that Rawlinson tried to bribe away Karabekir towards the Ally side. Karabekir answered that 'There could be no negotiations until the allied forces were withdrawn from Turkish soil.'[1043]

In the meantime, as ever before, the Ally propagandist machine was at work, using precisely the same rhetoric as had become customary now, as noted in the media of then reporting on events in the south of Turkey:

> The military situation in Cilicia continued after the Marash massacres (of Christians) to become more and more critical. Toward the end of March the Armenians were being armed by the French authorities. The French lines were thinly held and facing heavy odds. Forces of Mustapha Kemal and local Mohammedans were threatening the whole province. The entire Adana section was in a ferment, and the roads were infested with hillmen, co-operating with Turkish Nationalists. The town of Hadjin was being strongly besieged and was

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[1037] *Current History* 12 (Apr-Sep 1920) Tangled Turkish Question; p. 325.
[1038] Ibid.
[1039] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 276.
[1040] Özerdim, Sami N., Atatürk Devrimi Kronolojisi (A Chronology of Atatürk's Reforms), Çankaya Belediyesi, Ankara 1996; p. 26.
[1041] Text in Nadi, Yunus, Kurtuluş Savaşı Anıları (Reminiscences of the Liberation Struggle), Cumhuriyet (?), Istanbul 1978, 329–31.
[1042] *Current History* 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Tangled Turkish Question; p. 325.
[1043] Ibid.

> in danger of capture, with all the horrors of a new massacre of the Christian population, unless help came.[1044]

Seizing once more on the threat to Christians, the article pursues:

> In view of the threatening situation created by the activities of Mustapha Kemal in the French zone and elsewhere in Syria, M. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, offered to the Allied Council the use of a Greek force to protect the Christian populations, especially the Armenians, and on April 7 it was announced from Athens that the allied Ministers, acting through the Supreme Military Council, had authorized Greek troops to advance in anticipation of an attack by Mustapha Kemal. The Greeks at this time occupied a strategic position east of the Smyrna section to await developments.[1045]

Absolutely the same trick repeated on and on, not just in the spring of 1920, but since the Middle Ages; from the 'Saracen atrocities inflicted on Christians' justifying the Crusades in 1095 till Saddam's weapons of mass destruction in 2003, the same trick had never failed, indeed. So, now, the Greeks came forth to stop "Mustafa Kemal's atrocities."

In fact the real reason for the preparation of the Greeks for an offensive would soon become obvious, and will be looked at after an event of major importance that was now about to unfold on the Nationalist side. In Ankara, nationalists sent a circular on 21 April, describing the religious ceremonies which would precede the opening of the Assembly of the Free in Ankara: the Qur'an and portions of the compendium of the Prophet's Tradition would be recited, as well as other ceremonies.[1046] Mustafa Kemal instructed that similar ceremonies should be held throughout the country, with special prayers and sermons explaining the patriotic duties of the new assembly.[1047] Its opening was to take place on a Friday, to be preceded by a solemn prayer in the Hacı Bayram mosque. 'All the honourable deputies,' it instructed 'will take part in this prayer.'[1048] There would be prayers for 'the deliverance and salvation of the Caliphate,' to be followed by a ceremony 'of congratulation to the Assembly, and the recital of the Mewlud to honour the Prophet's birthday.'[1049]

And so, on Friday 23 April 1920, the first Nationalist Parliament opened its doors, and from dawn onwards the population of Ankara and the surrounding countryside, dressed in the best they had, filled the streets, and by midday, the hour of the inaugural service; the crowd inside the Hacı Bayram Mosque was so great, the deputies could hardly gain entrance.[1050] Three Imams led the procession, bearing the green flag of the Prophet, whilst the red flag of the Turkish state flew from the roof of

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[1044] Ibid; p. 326.
[1045] Ibid; p. 327.
[1046] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 276.
[1047] Ataturk: Nutuk, 288.
[1048] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 217.
[1049] Ibid.
[1050] Ibid.

the building.[1051] After the opening ceremony, Mustafa Kemal reminded the Sultan of a dream of his forbear, Sultan Osman, the founder of the dynasty, which had passed into oral tradition.[1052]

The sacred tree, he dreamt, which cast a shadow over three continents and sheltered a hundred million Moslems, had been deprived of its branches, and only its bare trunk remained. "The trunk of that sacred tree," Kemal assured the monarch, "is in our hearts."[1053]

The religious ceremony at the opening of the National Assembly in Ankara

On 25 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal issued his first proclamation to the nation as president of the Grand National Assembly.

> 'We, your deputies, swear in the name of God and the Prophet, that the claim that we are rebels against the sultan and caliph is a lie. All we want is to save our country from sharing the fate of India and Egypt.'[1054]

On 1 May, a communiqué from the court-martial appeared in the press announcing that

> The following Nationalist chiefs had been condemned to death by default for high treason, rebellion, and instigation of a long list of crimes ranging from massacre to confiscation of funds belonging to orphanages: Mustapha Kemal "Effendi" of Saloniki, ex-Inspector General of the Third Army; Kara Vassif Bey; Ali Fuad Pasha, ex-commander of the 20th Army Corps; the convert to Islam, Ahmed Rustem, formerly known as Alfred Rustem Bilinski, ex-Ambassador at Washington; Dr. Adnan Bey and his wife, Halida Edib Hanum.

[1051] Ibid.
[1052] Ibid; p. 223.
[1053] Ibid.
[1054] Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991, III, 96.

Kara Vassif was then in British custody in Malta, and Ahmed Rustem (Rüştem) was believed to be in Italy, whilst the others were with Mustafa Kemal, at Ankara.[1055]

Just as the Assembly was being opened in Ankara, in San Remo, on the Italian Riviera, was taking place the gathering that would soon unleash the Greek offensive in order to implement the Final Solution of the Turkish Problem: the removal of 85% of Turkey's territory and the elimination of 16 millions of its people. The terms of San Remo (April 1920) stated amongst other:

> Considered generally, the seat of Government, though remaining at Constantinople, will be under the dominating influence, if not the direction, of an inter-allied commission; Turkey loses all military and naval power; her national finances will be in the hands of an Anglo-Franco-Italian mission; the territory of the empire has been so contracted, distributed and assigned as to make it impossible again for the Turk to exercise his former control over the lives and property of the ancient races and religions in what for centuries has been a reproach to Christianity and a stigma on the politics of Western Europe.[1056]

Besides that the international mission 'has complete power of final approval over all Turkish budgets, supervision over the execution of all Ottoman financial laws, and the reformation of the Turkish monetary system.'[1057]

Turkey cannot seek any loans, externally or internally with approval of the commission.

The Commission, furthermore, has the power to fix: 'the annual sum to be paid the allied nations by Turkey to cover the cost of occupation.'[1058]

By this treaty the allies take away from Turkey on a permanent basis control the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus.[1059]

As for armed force, Turkey is only allowed a police force of 35,000 men, with an emergency increase of 15, 000 in case of special necessity.[1060] Turkey is

> Forbidden to maintain a fleet or military airplanes. All fortifications along the Straits are to be destroyed. An army of occupation there is to be maintained by France, England and Italy, Greece to furnish additional forces if required.[1061]

Turks charged with war crimes will be tried by allied military tribunals, and Turkey

> Must hand over the persons responsible for the massacres that have occurred since August, 1914, who are to be tried by a League of Nations court or some similar tribunal.[1062]
>
> 'All allied financial losses in the war are to be admitted as liabilities by Turkey.'[1063]

[1055] *Current History*; 12; Apr-Sep 1920; op cit; p. 627.
[1056] *Current History* 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Dismemberment of the Turkish Empire. Terms of the Final Peace Treaty of the World War — Effects on the Map of Asia Minor; p. 445.
[1057] Ibid.
[1058] Ibid.
[1059] Ibid.
[1060] Ibid.
[1061] Ibid.
[1062] Ibid.

> 'Even the sanctity of the harems will no longer be observed by his agents in search of forced alien converts to Islam.'[1064]

Then, of course, is the issue of territory:

When the First World War started, Turkey in Europe covered 10,882 square miles of territory, with a population of 1,891,000. With the addition of the Asiatic territories, the entire territory of Turkey was 710,224 square miles, with a population of 21,273,900. Now, San Remo cut total Turkish territory by more than 600,000 square miles to just 100,000 square miles, and cut its population by 16 millions to just about 5,000,000, a majority of whom 'are Moslems but, paradoxical as it may seem, a minority of whom are actual Turks, of the Ottoman type.'[1065] In words Turkey's total population and territory were cut by more than 80%, which is the worst instance of mass eradication of a nation in history.

This was the final stage in the carving up of Turkey, which Sèvres, few months later, would make binding by the signatures; nothing more; nothing to discuss, or whatsoever, just for the puppet regime in Istanbul to acquiesce. In fact from the start the regime was warned:

> If the Turkish Government refuses to sign the peace— still more, if it finds itself unable to re-establish its authority in Anatolia or give effect to the treaty— the Allies, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, may be driven to reconsider this arrangement by ejecting the Turks from Europe once and for all. The Allies are clear that the time has come when it is necessary to put an end once and for all to the empire of the Turks over other nations.[1066]



[1063] Ibid.
[1064] Ibid; p. 446.
[1065] Ibid.
[1066] Turkey and Her Lost Dominions; Counterproposals Submitted by the Turks on Many Articles of the Treaty — *Current History*; 12; 805

Now the Allies moved onto the next phase: an all-out military onslaught from three directions (the eastern Armenian front was not ready by then) consisting in an attack from within (by a so-called Sultan Army); a Franco-Armenian attack from the south; and the Greeks, now ready to spearhead the major onslaught. The British were to provide navy and aerial support.

In more details, this three pronged assault:

1. Beginning from within:

A government offensive was launched, supported by British arms just east of Istanbul. The men, however, had no enthusiasm for a fight with their compatriots, and whilst supposedly acting in support of Anzavur's (an anti-nationalist leader) forces, they fell back instead when the latter were defeated.[1067] Not just that, in very great numbers they changed side and joined the Nationalists.[1068] Already some leading figures had done the same. On 17 May, Salih Pasha, a former Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, with about fifty notables escaped police surveillance and joined the Nationalists in Ankara.[1069] This only increased the Allies' anger, the British, on 6 June, unleashing a massive naval and aerial bombardment on nationalist positions thirty-eight miles west of Ismid.[1070]

2. From the south, the French attacked alongside their Armenian Allies. During the Turkish counter attack in May 1920, a French unit holding the railway station of Pozantı, north of the Cilician gates (the pass of Gülek in Turkish) was cut off.[1071] When two French attempts to relieve Pozantı failed, the garrison of some 500 men abandoned the town and tried to force their way south through the mountains.[1072] On 28 May, the column was ambushed by some forty Turkish irregulars.[1073] Major Mesnil, the French commanding officer, having been wrongly informed by his superiors that 15,000 Turkish irregulars were operating in the area, surrendered to the Turks, who in reality were only a small group of villagers, armed with rifles and shotguns.[1074] The capture of over 500 French soldiers, and their much needed armament was succeeded by a twenty-day truce under which the French agreed to give up Pozantı and other outlying areas.[1075] This Turkish success came in the wake of earlier ones in the year, and the French, already stretched by Muslim Arab resistance in Syria, now found themselves opposed by much larger forces than they could cope with.[1076] Now even the Turkish 9th Army (undefeated in the Caucasus) was adding to French problems towards Aleppo.[1077] It was not too long for the French to decide:

[1067] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 280.
[1068] Ibid.
[1069] *Current History* 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Turkey and her former Dominion; p. 626.
[1070] CH 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Turkey and her former Dominion; p. 627; Tansel, III, 125.
[1071] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 295.
[1072] Ibid.
[1073] Ibid.
[1074] Arıkoğlu, Damar, Hatıralarım (My Memoirs), Tan, Istanbul 1961. The eye-witness report cited by Arıkoğlu (118–23) makes no mention of the peasant woman Hatice and the villager Kumcu Veli who, according to legend, were employed by the French as guides and who led them into the ambush (Aybars, 257).
[1075] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 295.
[1076] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 554.
[1077] Sidney Nettleton Fisher, *The Middle East* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 384.

either risk losing all by a fight with the Nationalists or keep Syria by coming to an agreement with the Turks.[1078]
3. The Greek offensive. We will look at this one in greater detail under the following heading: The 1920 Summer Greek Offensive.

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Triumphant Greece

'THE Greek Parliament held a session on May 14 (1920) which was historically momentous. It was the occasion for a scene of the deepest enthusiasm, caused by the appearance before the delegates of M. Venizelos, the Prime Minister, who announced Greece's triumph in the terms laid down to Turkey (days earlier at San Remo). By these terms Turkey was left a State in name only, stripped of its most important territories, and reduced from its former greatness to a nation no larger than the boundaries of the new Greece... A Turkish flag on a fort near Smyrna to be designated by the Allies was to symbolise the Turkish ultimate ownership.'[1079]
Now the Greeks, thanks to Ally blessing, could march to claim 'their land.'

4. The 1920 Summer Greek Offensive

Straight in the wake of San Remo, at a more formal conference in 'the agreeable Villa Belle at Boulogne,' 'with tea-parties at the Pré Catelan and a fête at the Casino,' the Supreme (Allies) Council gave the Greeks authority to advance from Smyrna.[1080] Whilst the Greeks were 'the Dagger of the Allies,' the British fleet was to lend its support.[1081] The offensive, in fact, was in execution of a plan put in place on the Greek side by Commander in Chief, General Paraskevopoulos, and on the Allied side by Lieut. Gen. Sir George Milne, Commander of the Allied Troops in Western Asia.[1082] In and around Smyrna the Greek concentrated five divisions, or 200,000 men, waiting to be moved into various directions to destroy a Turkish Nationalist army of 40,000.[1083]

On 22 June, 1920, the Greeks marched on. Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) had been appointed commander of the Turkish western front, but his forces were too weak to face the powerful Greek army.[1084] The Greeks had hoped for an early battle in which they were confident of breaking up Ali Fuad's sparse and ill-equipped forces, 'mere skeletons',

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[1078] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit p. 554.
[1079] *Current History* 12; Apr-Sep 1920; Territorial Gains of Greece; pp. 620-22.
[1080] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 232.
[1081] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 555.
[1082] Turkey and Her Lost Dominions; Counterproposals Submitted by the Turks on Many Articles of the Treaty — *Current History*; 12; 807.
[1083] Details of Greek offensive can be found in Turkey and Her Lost Dominions; CH 12; 807-808.
[1084] Özerdim, Sami N., *Atatürk*, 41; 43.

as Mustafa Kemal described them, 'without ammunition and incapable of being reinforced.'[1085]

The Greeks advanced quickly along three railways, leading respectively toward Lake Eğirdir and Afyonkarahisar, and to Bandırma, making great gains, and by 2 July, the Greek cavalry reached Balıkesir, 100 miles northeast of Smyrna, and in less than a week Bursa fell to them.[1086]

> The Greek columns [as Churchill described the offensive] trailed along the country roads passing safely through many ugly defiles, and at their approach the Turks, under strong and sagacious leadership, vanished into the recesses of Anatolia.[1087]

Against the Greek onslaught, the ragged and motley Nationalist forces had very little chance.[1088] All they could manage was retreat eastwards up to Eskişehir, followed by considerable numbers of refugees.[1089]

In a proclamation to the nation, Mustafa Kemal appealed to the Turkish people's religious sentiment:

> We call on the whole nation to come together in unity and rise against the Greeks in total determination. The jihad, once it is properly preached, will, with God's help, result quickly in the rout of the Greeks.[1090]

Here, it ought to be stressed that the attack was by the Greeks but with direct British military contribution, as was made clear in the sources and accounts of the time but had since been disappeared by most modern scholars, including those seemingly favourable to the Turks, the likes of Mango, for instance. Indeed, according to the news of the time, just a few days before the offensive, put in place by Greek and Ally High Command, British warships entered the bay of İzmit and began to shell the Nationalist lines, before, on 21 June, British engineers landed at all the Turkish fortifications on the southern side of the Straits and destroyed the guns there.[1091] The Greeks had thus their flanks protected. The British maintained their attacks, and by 26 June it was reported that their casualties were less than 100, while the Nationalists had lost, according to Ally estimates, 1,000.[1092] During the offensive, the British brought in reinforcements, including troops and navy crafts.[1093]

As places quickly fell to the Greeks one after the other, Western Chancelleries could not conceal their joy:

[1085] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 555.
[1086] Description of Greek offensive in CH 12; 807-808.
[1087] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 233.
[1088] D. Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* op cit; p. 254·
[1089] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 233.
[1090] ATTB, 358.
[1091] Turkey and Her Lost Dominions; Counterproposals Submitted by the Turks on Many Articles of the Treaty — *Current History*; 12; 807.
[1092] Ibid.
[1093] Ibid.

> These remarkable and unexpected manifestations of Greek power [wrote Churchill] were hailed by the Ally statesmen; the Ally generals rubbed their eyes; Mr Lloyd George became enthusiastic.[1094]
>
> He was right again, it seemed, and the military men wrong. They [the Turks] are beaten, and fleeing with their forces towards Mecca.[1095]

Venizelos seemed to have done the job. He had the will, the vision, and more importantly, unlike the poorly equipped and lower in number Turks, he had a formidable army, intact from the war, and largely supplied, at very favourable terms, by European arms factories.[1096]

Triumph on the Ally side was echoed by manifestations of dismay on the Nationalist side. The loss of Bursa, the first Ottoman capital, was equivalent to a disaster.

> A symbol, both religious and historical, of the Turkish spirit, how could it have fallen to the enemy so easily?[1097]

The deputies draped the rostrum in black as a sign of mourning for the disaster, vowing that 'the draperies should remain there until final victory had been accomplished.'[1098] They lamented that 'the call to prayer would no longer be heard from the minaret of the Green Mosque of the city;' now that 'the sacred city had been trodden underfoot by 'our worst enemies.'[1099]

One deputy rose to speak but overcome with emotions burst into tears and was forced to sit down. Another protested that this was no time for tears:

> Gentlemen, I pray you, put back your handkerchiefs in your pockets; don't weep. Weeping is only fit for women. If you are men, instead of weeping roar like lions in the face of such a tragedy. Show by your actions the sublimity of Islam.[1100]

The deputies insisted that the officers responsible for the loss of the city be court martialled at once, and demanded an operation for its immediate recapture, whatever the cost.[1101]

After passions cooled, Mustafa Kemal took to the rostrum and explained to them a few things regarding military affairs: that recapturing the city would not last; the enemy, having command of the sea, could land more troops at Mudanya, and so outflank it; and possibly capture the whole Turkish army, and then advance from the south to the vital railway line between Eskişehir and Afyon, which the Turks would thus have no troops left to defend.[1102] The priority was not the recapture of Bursa for the moment but the defence of Anatolia itself; the main objective being to prepare

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[1094] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 233.
[1095] Ibid.
[1096] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 286.
[1097] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 234.
[1098] Ibid; p. 235.
[1099] Ibid.
[1100] Ibid.
[1101] Ibid.
[1102] Ibid; p. 236.

coolly to meet the next attack of the enemy, from whichever direction it might come.[1103]

In the meantime, the Greeks were pursuing their attack. The campaign in Thrace began successfully on 21 July, 1920 thanks to the assistance of the British air force, which helped the Greeks capture the Sea of Marmara port of Tekirdağ.[1104] General Zimbrakakis was in command of Greek troops, operating between the Aegean and Black Seas, east and west, and the Bulgarian frontier and the Tchatalja (Çatalca) line of Istanbul, north and south.[1105] King Alexander, who had landed in Rodosto, Sea of Marmara, now followed the southern army on its way to Edirne. The Turks sought to cut off communications by destroying an important bridge over the Maritza River, and entrenched themselves between the Maritza and Çatalca.[1106] The Greeks were unstoppable; having occupied Çorlu and Muradlı on 21 July, they swung eastwards, made further gains, before preparing to take Edirne by assault.[1107] The city surrendered on 25 July. Colonel Tayar, who led the resistance with 5,000 followers, fought on. On 26 July, King Alexander entered Edirne; a city of 100,000, half of whom were Turks and the other half Jews, Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians.[1108] With the capture of Colonel Tayar, betrayed by a farmer in Halsa, five miles southwest of Edirne, the Turkish resistance in Thrace was over.[1109]

In Anatolia, the campaign had been extremely successful for the Greeks as well, having reached as far as Uşak, on the edge of the Anatolian plateau, some 200 miles east of İzmir.[1110] The major Greek objective was 'to swing the northern force' and advance on the strategically important railway junction at Eskişehir, whilst the southern force was to march on Afyon, another vital railway point.[1111] The capture of the two places would cut Turkish communications, ease the capture of central Anatolia, and open the way for an offensive on Ankara.[1112] Hence, by early August, the Greek prospects were the best they could have wished for, controlling a vast territory, which, with the exception of Istanbul and the Straits (which could still be gained peacefully from the Allies,) extended from the Sea of Marmara to nine miles east of Bursa, to the Menderes Valley, to a few miles east of Nazilli.[1113] Now they could regroup and prepare for the next offensive.

[1103] Ibid.
[1104] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 555.
[1105] Greek Conquest of Eastern Thrace; in *Current History*; p. 1077.
[1106] Ibid.
[1107] Ibid; p. 1078.
[1108] Ibid.
[1109] Ibid.
[1110] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, 1920-1922; op cit; p. 556.
[1111] Ibid.
[1112] P. Kinross, *Ataturk,* p. 294.
[1113] Geoffrey Lewis: *Turkey* (New York: F. Praeger Inc., 1965), p. 65.

5 Sèvres or Nothing

> It was in this atmosphere [writes Kinross] that Damad Ferid, with a new "ministry of marionettes" (in Churchill's phrase) formed for the purpose, signed the Treaty of Sèvres, a document "obsolete before it was ready." ... At last peace with Turkey: and to ratify it, war with Turkey! However, as far as the Great Allies were concerned, the war was to be fought by proxy. Wars when fought thus by great nations are often very dangerous for the proxy.[1114]

Whilst the Patriots in Ankara would accept nothing less than full Turkish sovereignty over the whole Turkish territory, the puppet regime in Istanbul, agreed with the Bantustan created by the Allies. On 10 August 1920, the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha signed the Treaty of Sévres, thus finalising plans for the partitioning of Turkey.[1115] The Istanbul press was unanimous in its condemnation of the treaty, which in effect meant the end of the country's very existence. The people resented it beyond any measure, and soon the flow of recruits to join the resistance 'swelled from a trickle into a slow steady stream.'[1116]

The fact that the loss of Turkish territory was to be gradual did not fool anyone. İzmir had already become Greek; President Wilson would determine the frontiers of Armenia; the League of Nations would decide 'whether the Kurds were capable of independence, should they wish it.'[1117] The Turks retained Istanbul, but under Allied control. The rest of Anatolia would be shared between the Turkish Bantustan, France and Italy. The latter two countries could dispose of such territories the way they wished (as per the Treaty) (very certainly granting them to Armenia and Greece respectively, subsequently.) The Franco-Armenian love affair/alliance, it must be reminded, dates from the times of the Crusades (1095-1291), when they were great allies against the Turks and other Muslims. And to be fair to both French and Armenians, throughout the centuries till this very minute, none of the two sides has ever failed the other, possibly the strongest and closest alliance in history. For the Italians their Anatolian territory would be quite handy to swap with the Greeks for other lands closer to home. Other stipulations of the treaty had already been seen (San Remo).

Obviously, the response from Ankara was as to be expected. On 19 August, the Ankara Nationalists decreed that members of the crown council 'Who had recommended the acceptance of the Sèvres treaty and the plenipotentiaries who signed it were traitors.'[1118]

[1114] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 234.

[1115] "Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sevres August 10, 1920," Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. II, 1920; "Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France, and Italy, Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920," Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, 1920. An official summary of the Sevres treaty was published in The Nation (New York), International Relations Section, Volume in (1920), pp. 21-28, and in *Current History*, Volume XIII (1921), pp. 164-184.

[1116] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 232.

[1117] In Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991, III, 168-75.

[1118] Dates in Ozerdim, op cit; 39, 44, 46.

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The Crippling Terms of Sèvres

The Sèvres Treaty did not just aim at breaking Turkey territorially, it aimed at breaking it altogether as a country as already seen above in reference to San Remo, for Sèvres was only the signing of what San Remo had already decided. Here, it is worth adding a couple of interesting facts as found in these extracts, from one of the best books on Turkey, Mead's *The Baghdad Railway, A Study in Imperialism.*[1119]

> The Treaty of Sevres, August 10, 1920 together with the accompanying secret Tripartite Agreement of the same date between Great Britain, France, and Italy carried further clauses. The Turkish Government was required to dispose of all property rights in Turkey of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, or their respective nationals and to turn over the proceeds of all purchases and sales to the Reparation Commission established under the treaties of peace with those Powers. The Anatolian and Bagdad Railways were to be expropriated by Turkey and all of their rights, privileges, and properties to be assigned at a valuation to be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to a Franco-British-Italian corporation to be designated by the representatives of the Allied Powers. German stockholders were to be compensated for their holdings, but the amount of their compensation was to be turned over to the Reparation Commission; compensation due the Turkish Government was to be assigned to the Allied Governments toward the costs of maintaining their armies of occupation on Turkish soil. German and Turkish property in ceded territories of the Ottoman Empire was to be similarly liquidated. The Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sevres left hardly a vestige of German influence in the Near East.[1120]
>
> Even the Turkey that remained a portion of Anatolia enjoyed sovereignty in name only. The Capitulations, which the Sultan had terminated in the autumn of 1914, were re-established and extended. Concessions to Allied nationals were confirmed in all the rights which they enjoyed before Ottoman entry into the Great War.
>
> Because of the reparations, and because of the high cost of the Allied armies of occupation, the country was being loaded down with a still further burden of debt from which there appeared to be no escape and debts not only mortgaged Turkish revenues but impaired Turkish administrative integrity. To assure prompt payment of both old and new financial obligations of the Turkish Government, an Inter-Allied Financial Commission was superimposed upon the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. The Financial Commission "had full supervision over taxation, customs, loans, and currency; exercised final control over the Turkish budget; and had the right to veto any proposed concession. In control of its domestic affairs the new Turkey was tied hand and foot."[1121]
>
> And all of this was done in order 'to help Turkey, to develop her resources, and to avoid the international rivalries which have obstructed these objects in the past!'[1122]

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[1119] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway; A Study in Imperialism*; MacMillan; New York; 1924; p. 301 ff.

[1120] "Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Signed at Sevres August 10, 1920," Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 964, Treaty Series No. II, 1920; "Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France, and Italy, Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920," Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 963, Treaty Series No. 12, 1920. Etc…

[1121] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 303.

[1122] Preamble to the Tripartite Agreement of August 10, 1920.

Whilst the defeatists had already surrendered the country, the patriots decided to fight, whether the Allies, or the Greeks and Armenians, who were far from being proxies, for they were to benefit greatly from the carving up of Turkey. Mustafa Kemal's task, Mango observes, now was to beat the Greeks and pre-empt the Armenians.[1123] The Nationalists had also to crush the risings from within.

In October, there was an anti-nationalist rising in Konya, which forced troops holding the front against the Greeks to be moved to the area, where the authority of the Grand National Assembly was re-established by 15 November.[1124] Prior to that, in fact in concert with the Greek advance in June, another rising took place based in Yozgat, across the plateau between Ankara and Sivas, led by an important feudal clan, the Çapanoğulları. Its leader, a local notable, Iban Zade Arif Bey, followed by about 2,000 strong mounted men, had declared the Nationalists 'as the successors of the CUP.'[1125] The rebels threw out the Nationalists from the neighbourhood, established their own Government in the town, and at Çorum, further north, they had the Nationalist military commander hanged by order of Arif Bey.[1126] The rising's objective was the capture of the rich city of Kayseri, an objective that might lead to the loss of a large part of Central Anatolia, and to the separation of the Nationalists in Ankara from their forces in the east.[1127] When local army units proved incapable of controlling the rising, Mustafa Kemal summoned Kılıç Ali and his guerrillas who had been fighting the French in eastern Cilicia.[1128] When Kiliç Ali failed, another group of even tougher irregulars were called in as the threat of secession was extremely serious.[1129] Before dawn, the irregulars advanced on the rebels' stronghold, lay siege to it during the day, then at dark swept in 'like a black cloud.'

> The fighting, street by street and house by house, was venomous and brutal. The Çapanoğulları defended themselves ferociously, pouring volleys of fire from the rooftops on the invaders, who bombarded and set fire to the houses until much of the town was ablaze. With the thundering of gunfire, the roaring of flames and the shrieking of victims, it was a 'night in hell.' The carnage continued until dawn. By now the Nationalists were in control of the town. Those caught were tried and hanged on the spot. Those who escaped tried to fight back. But they too were defeated.[1130]

Thus ended the bloodiest of the anti-Nationalist rebellions. Had the rebel forces been able to synchronise their operations, the outcome could have been much different, but as it was, the three main revolts (Anzavur, Konya and the Çapanoğulları) occurred singly, one after the other, giving the Nationalists just enough time in between to

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[1123] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 285.
[1124] S. Tansel: *Mondros*; op cit, iii, 140-1.
[1125] Greek Conquest of Eastern Thrace; in *Current History*; 12; p. 1077. A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 282.
[1126] Greek Conquest of Eastern Thrace; in CH 12; p. 1077.
[1127] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 237.
[1128] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 282.
[1129] Halide Edib believed that although Mustafa Kemal was fearless in battle, he dreaded mobs; which is quite understandable, indeed. With a mob the fight is not just unfair but has no basic rules.
[1130] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 238.

regroup and transfer their few forces, fight one after the other, and by the narrowest of margins defeat the rebellions.[1131]

Acting in concert with the Greeks, the French, the British, and the internal enemies, were the Armenians. Their threat came from both south and east.

In the South:

The Turks had already smothered much of French power, and so the latter could no longer lend the assistance they would have otherwise given to their Armenian proteges. In fact, it was announced on 4 October 1920 that General Gouraud, the French Commander in Chief, was forced to withdraw his troops beyond the River Dichinan, which exposed the Armenian flanks to combined attacks by Turks and Muslim Arabs.[1132] An Armenian army of 40,000 men was still standing, extremely well-equipped including by heavy ex-Bulgarian artillery sent to them by the Greeks.[1133] Regardless, on 15–16 October, Turkish irregulars successfully stormed the Armenian stronghold of Haçin (Hadjin, now Saimbeyli) 100 miles north of Adana in the Taurus.[1134] This somehow finished the Armenian front in the south. The Armenians reacted bitterly at such loss and also Gouraud's sharp U-turn in policy. The Armenian Bureau in London squarely put the blame on him for the capture of Hadjin, 'and the massacre of the inhabitants, 10,000 Armenians, by the Nationalists.'[1135] Gouraud was blamed for disarming the Armenian Legion, which the French themselves had trained and equipped, and for telling the Armenian refugees from Anatolia that they had to leave Cilicia.[1136] As the Armenians refused, Gouraud ordered the disarming of the forces heading for Hadjin, and the arrest of some Armenian notables, and had about 14,000 refugees deported into French territory in Syria.[1137] Gouraud also informed the Armenians that, 'as French troops would eventually evacuate Cilicia, Armenians resident there must choose between accepting Turkish rule or leaving the country.'[1138] Here, one must understand the French big picture. They knew they could not hold on to Cilicia, and they were also threatened in Syria by Muslim Arabs, now in full rebellion. They had to choose: Cilicia or Syria. For obvious strategic, religious and cultural reasons, they chose Syria, including today's Lebanon, where only through bringing in and resettlement of Christians (in this case, the Armenians) under French military protection they would eventually create a strong Christian concentration that could shape the destinies of Lebanon/Syria according to French views. And this is what happened since.

[1131] Ibid.
[1132] CH VOLUME XIII October, 1920— March, 1921; 256.
[1133] Ibid.
[1134] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 296.
[1135] CH VOLUME XIII October, 1920— March, 1921; 444.
[1136] Ibid.
[1137] Ibid.
[1138] Ibid.

Eastern Turkey:

In the Kars Province, the Armenians, many of them refugees from Anatolia, tried to drive out local Muslims, who had formed armed resistance bands, often under the command of Turkish officers.[1139] Leading the Turkish front was the 15th Corps commanded by Kâzım Karabekir, numbering only 12,000 men and 40 guns.[1140] The Armenians had clear numerical superiority. In August 1920, the British military advisers were putting in place an Armenian army of 40,000 men,[1141] and by October, the Armenians had more than 10,000 men on the Kars front;[1142] in addition, there were Armenian troops in other areas.[1143] The Armenians, seeking to finalise their takeover of the Kars province, which San Remo had granted them, entered the district of Oltu, and there, according to Turkish accounts, massacred the Muslim population.[1144] On 28 October, Karabekir launched his offensive, and after a swift campaign captured Kars Castle on 30 October.[1145] The fortress was of such size that Armenian generals and ministers waited for nearly two hours before they could be found by the Turks to accept their surrender.[1146] On this occasion the Turks captured 2,000 Armenian troops, 3 generals, and 676 guns at the cost to themselves of 9 dead and 47 wounded.[1147] This was the success all Nationalists were yearning for. Halide Edib in Ankara describes the effect of the news of the victory:

> I walked in. The large hall in which there had previously been one single table-Major Salih's-was now divided into thirteen small compartments to accommodate the staff officers who had joined us within the last few months. I found the room that was to be mine, but before I could sit down the door opened and a stout captain with tortoise-shell-rimmed spectacles and a jolly face peeped in. "Welcome," he said; "you have brought us luck. There is a telegram from the East-Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha has entered Kars." Then standing in the narrow corridor he called to the officers in their box-like bureaus: "The Department of the East will have sweet dishes tonight. But the Department of the west will have only leeks boiled in water." This jovial officer was Captain Tewfik, the present chief of the military cabinet of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and as he spoke thirteen doors flew open and some twenty staff officers assembled in the narrow corridor and all talked at once with suppressed emotion. This victorious achievement of the Eastern army, the conquest of Kars, was the first incident to give us confidence; and it rewarded us in some measure for those long and hopeless months.

[1139] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 288.
[1140] Erikan, Celâl, Komutan Atatürk, op cit; 285.
[1141] R.G. Hovannisian: *The Republic of Armenia*, I–IV, University of California, 1996, III, 341
[1142] Ibid, IV, 241).
[1143] Erikan, Celâl, Komutan Atatürk, op cit; 571.
[1144] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 288.
[1145] Belen, Fahri, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı (The Turkish Liberation Struggle), Başbakanlık, Ankara 1973, 249–51; Erikan, 577–9.
[1146] Hovannisian, IV, 259.
[1147] Hovannisian, IV, 259. Erikan gives Armenian losses in Kars as 1,100 dead and 1,200 prisoners.

> Colonel Ismet came in overjoyed. He patted me kindly on the shoulder, and his first words were: "Shall we write our congratulations to Kiazim Kara Bekir?"
> We wrote them there and then. Before Mustafa Kemal Pasha had entered Colonel Ismet's life with his all-absorbing personality Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha had been his greatest and dearest friend. From the vivid description of him Colonel Ismet gave, I could see Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha as a hard-working, sturdy soldier with an unfaltering sense of justice and order, and always quiet, always working, always trustworthy. He was very much attached to his violin, which he played whenever a pause for rest allowed him to wander in the world of sound. And Colonel Ismet did not only value his victory for what it meant to the cause: he was generously proud of his friend's success.[1148]

Further campaigns during November turned to the advantage of the Turks, until on 2 December, the armistice, confirmed by the treaty of Gümrü fixed the present frontier between Turkey and Armenia.[1149] The Armenians renounced all claims on Turkish territory, agreed to reduce their armed forces, and pledged to let the Turks use the railroads passing through their lands to the north.[1150] It was the first treaty signed by the government of the Grand National Assembly and it was marked by a Turkish victory.[1151] The arms left by the defeated Armenian forces were sent to the west to be used in the resistance being mounted against the Greeks.[1152] By a coincidence, on 22 November, President Woodrow Wilson had finally delivered his decision on the western boundaries of Armenia, which the treaty of Sèvres had reserved for his arbitration.[1153] Armenia, Wilson decided,

> Should be given a stretch of Turkey's Black Sea coastline, including the port of Trabzon, as well as Erzurum, Van and Bitlis in the interior.[1154]

In order to avoid embarrassment, the award of the President of the United States, now coming too late, was left unpublished.[1155] Mustafa Kemal was to comment in 1926:

> Poor Wilson did not understand that a frontier which is not defended with bayonets, force and honour cannot be secured by any other principle.[1156]

The Renewed Greek Onslaught

As expected, the Greek Autumn offensive began in early October, and as expected, it moved in the direction of the railway; so successful and swift, yielding large sways of land. In order to save themselves, the Turks had to hold the railway line running from

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[1148] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; John Murray; London; 1928; p. 202.
[1149] R.G Hovonisian, IV, 268–91, 394–8; full text of treaty in Soysal, İsmail, Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (Turkey's Diplomatic Treaties), I (1920–1945), TTK, Ankara 1983; 19–23. It is dated 2 December 1920.
[1150] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v 2; p. 357.
[1151] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 294.
[1152] K. Karabekir; op cit; 950-952.
[1153] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 294.
[1154] Ibid.
[1155] R.G. Hovonnisian, IV, 40-4.
[1156] Reminiscences published in Hakimiyet, 14 March–12 April 1926, quoted by Erikan, 244.

north to south between Eskishehir and Afyon, and from there to the vital strategic points of Ankara and Konya respectively. Its loss would mean central and much of southern Anatolia would fall to the Greeks.[1157] However, the Greek offensive once more was too strong in men and armament, and the Turks, still without adequate weaponry or numbers, under risk of encirclement, could only retreat eastwards as fast as they could.[1158] Once more, the Allies could not hold their enthusiasm:

> The Turks [Lloyd George exulted in the House of Commons] are broken beyond repair.[1159]

Then, suddenly, in the midst of their great success, when even Ankara was at their reach, the Greeks stopped. Another miracle that saved Turkey!

Western scholarship, including amongst them the usually crooked, i.e. the vast majority, and the good ones, like Kincaid Jensen and Kinross, tell us that the French and Italians stopped the Greeks.[1160] Explanations like these not only distort history, they make no sense at all, for how could it explain that on one hand these countries are seeking the carving up of Turkey, and then demanding it stops, two fundamentally contradictory policies. Furthermore, these explanations would turn the Greeks into the biggest cretins on earth, which they are not, for here they were sweeping Turkey aside and then, because they were so victorious, they stopped their progress. Scholarship is indeed full of aberrations of the sort. The reason the Greeks stopped was all due to a monkey. The ending of the Greeks' successful advance owed indeed all to the beast. As Churchill admirably put it:

> It is perhaps no exaggeration, to remark that a quarter of a million persons died of this monkey's bite.[1161]

What happened was this:

Early in October 1920, just as the Greeks were about to sweep through Anatolia, King Alexander died from the infection caused by the bite of one of his pet monkeys inflicted on him days earlier.[1162] This led to the call for, and organisation of new elections, which brought back to Greece ex King Constantine, Venizelos' enemy. King Constantine had been exiled back in 1917. In the elections of 14 November 1920, Constantine and his party defeated Venizelos, and on assuming power, the New King, Constantine, eliminated Venizelos' allies. So, whilst all this was happening, the military offensive, understandably, was held off, which not only stopped the Greeks from overrunning Turkey, it also gave the Turks the space and time they vitally needed. Then, crucially, this change at the top of Greek politics caused the French and other Allies to cool their support for the Greeks. The reason for this was that Constantine, the new ruler of Greece, and the Allies did not see eye to eye, in fact loathed each other. It was King Constantine who had many French soldiers and officers killed years before, and it was the Allies who kicked him out of power in

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[1157] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 238.
[1158] Ibid.
[1159] Ibid; p. 239.
[1160] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 557. P. Kinross, *Ataturk,* p. 239.
[1161] W. Churchill: *The World Crisis; the Aftermath (1918-1928)*; Butterworth; London; 1929; vol 5; p. 409.
[1162] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 253-6.

1917 in a coup that brought back Venizelos.[1163] Whilst the Allies supported Venizelos, they could not support Constantine, a former German ally. In other words, the monkey aside, the Ally attitude change was not the cause of the halt of the Greek offensive but its consequence as it came AFTER IT.
This completely alters the picture conveyed by Western scholarship of the whole matter of the Turkish War of Independence and the Allies' attitude to it. Indeed, this scholarship tries to show that these Allies, the very countries that were carving up Turkey, were the magnanimous friends of the Turks, maybe even their saviours. This is utterly false, for San Remo is in Italy, and the French were the carver up of Turkey in chief. None of the Allies stood by Turkey or bothered about the fate of its people; every single fact in history shows the opposite. The Allies would not side by the Turks even following the taking of power by Constantine at the expenses of Venizelos. They would only do so eventually, as we shall see, after the Ankara Nationalists had smashed the Greeks, the French and Armenians, and all the rebellious traitors. It was only then that there began some Ally move towards the Nationalists. The Allies realised it was better to throw in their lot with the Nationalists who were victorious; after all, Greece was now led by the loathsome figure of Constantine. It must be added that the other crucial factor that also made the countries that sought to carve up Turkey (Britain, France, and Italy) change their mind subsequently was the fear that the Nationalists might join with the Bolsheviks. These were the reasons for the shift away from the carving up of Turkey policy and support for Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalists, not the idiotic stuff one finds in literally every work one has the misfortune to lay hands on.

Back to the military ground, when the Greeks stopped their offensive, and went through their elections and change of leaders, thus permitting the Turks to use this providential window to the reorganisation of their forces. Ali Fuat, the commander of the Turkish forces in the west, was replaced by Ismet Pasha who had fought alongside Mustafa Kemal in the southern front.[1164] The Nationalist army had also undergone further improvements, including the incorporation of the irregular bands into the regular troops, some by persuasion, others by force; it had also grown stronger.[1165] And here, we have the main contributing Bolshevik factor. Admiral De Robeck (of the Gallipoli campaign) had warned that Mustafa Kemal would, if forced, turn towards the Soviets.[1166] Mustafa Kemal precisely did that, not to sell Turkey but to reach an understanding, for both Bolshevik Russia and Turkey had absolutely the same interests and more importantly the same foes.

[1163] Ref for Constantine killing of French soldiers: Revising the Turkish Treaty, *Current History;* VOLUME XIV. April — September, 1921; p.178. For Allies-Greeks misunderstandings and what happened see, Adamantios Th. Polyzoides: A review of the arbitrary acts of the Allies in Greece and of the reasons for the overthrow of Venizelos and the recall of Constantine; *Current History*; Vol 16; no 1; p. 128-131.
[1164] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 557.
[1165] Ibid.
[1166] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 239.

6. Relations with the Bolsheviks and their Impact

In the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution, the French and the British had intervened by the side of the enemies of the Revolution: 'The White Russians.' They did their utmost to break the revolution, which, however took place at the most opportune moment: the war conditions which brought it large support from Russians, and the same war conditions that had weakened their enemies. The Greeks, themselves, in return for ally support, had sent two divisions to Odessa in January 1919 to also support the White Russian commander, General Denikin. The expedition was withdrawn a few months later,[1167] but it had marked Greece as an enemy of the Bolshevik Revolution.[1168] The new Soviet government, facing the same foes, deemed itself a natural ally of the nationalistic Turkish government.[1169] For the Free Turks, the Bolsheviks were a useful counterweight to Britain, France and their protégé Greece, and the only major outside source of money and supplies.[1170]

Strategically, Turkey was important to the Bolsheviks, who, torn by civil war, and the armies of Denikin and Wrangel both of whom were strongly backed by the Allies, saw Nationalist Turkey as capable of protecting their exposed flank in Transcaucasia, where Turks and Russians had spheres of interest and where the Allies had concentrated troops as a bulwark between them.[1171] Contacts between the two sides had begun earlier, but it was, Kinross notes,

> The aggressive action of the British, in the spring of 1920, that precipitated and indeed made officially possible the first serious overtures by Kemal to the Soviets. Their occupation of Constantinople, the publication of the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres and the consequent war made Russian supplies urgently necessary.[1172]

Just as the Greek Autumn offensive was in progress, negotiations with the Soviets went under way. To a request from the Turks, there came a Soviet reply, recognising the National Pact, acknowledging the decision of the Grand National Assembly to 'co-ordinate our activities and your military operations against the imperialist governments,' and proposing the immediate establishment of diplomatic and consular relations.[1173] Following this, a Turkish diplomatic mission travelled to Moscow in the Summer of 1920, precisely after the Greek Summer offensive, and was eventually received by Lenin.[1174] When Yusuf Kemal, the leading delegate, returned to Turkey, not only did he bring back Soviet assurances of friendship, support, and so on, more

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[1167] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; 68.
[1168] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 287.
[1169] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 557.
[1170] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 287.
[1171] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 240.
[1172] Ibid.
[1173] Altemur Kilic: *Turkey and the World* (Washington D .C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 38. P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 241.
[1174] Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 242.

importantly, he also returned with a million gold roubles and even more interestingly with military supplies to be shipped across the Black Sea.[1175]

A new delegation was sent to Moscow under the same Yusuf Kemal (early in 1921), and on 16 March 1921, the Treaty of Moscow was signed between the Ankara Government and that of the Soviet Union. Bolshevik Russia gave utmost support to Turkish Nationalist resistance in opposing Sèvres; the Treaty also confirmed 'the solidarity which unites them in the struggle against imperialism.'[1176] By the terms of this treaty the Soviets ceded to Turkey the territories of Kars and Ardahan in the Caucasus region as a manifestation of full accord with the principles of the National Pact.[1177] The Soviet Republic,

> Recognizing that the regime of the capitulations is incompatible with the national development of Turkey, as well as with the full exercise of its sovereign rights, considers null and void the exercise in Turkey of all functions and all rights under the capitulatory regime.[1178] In particular, the Soviet Republic freed Turkey from any financial or other obligations based on international treaties concluded between Turkey and the Government of the Tsar.[1179]

Finally, both countries agreed to stand together in resisting all foreign interference in their domestic affairs.

> Recognizing that the nationalist movements in the East are similar to and in harmony with the struggle of the Russian proletariat to establish a new social order, the two contracting parties assert solemnly the rights of these peoples to freedom, independence, and free choice of the forms of government under which they shall live.[1180]

It was, Kinross remarks,

> Thus that those two notable realists, Kemal and Stalin, settled between them by negotiation and action, not indeed all their mutual problems, but their mutual frontiers, drawing a line across the map which survives without dispute as the boundary between these hereditary enemies, Turkey and Russia, today.[1181]

Now the British were getting worried. The elderly Marshal Ahmet İzzet Pasha, known for his sympathy with the nationalist cause, was visited by British officers, who asked him whether 'the gentlemen in Anatolia' were totally committed to Bolshevism.[1182] He replied:

> Most of them are military commanders, country notables and landowners, and educated people. It is inconceivable that such a group should incline to the

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[1175] Altemur Kilic: *Turkey and the World;* op cit; p. 46. Karabekir 882.
[1176] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 316.
[1177] Ibid.
[1178] Ibid; pp. 316-17.
[1179] The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is given as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, "Russia's Treaty with Turkey," in *Current History*, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 276-279.
[1180] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 317.
[1181] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 245.
[1182] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 299.

> theory of Communism. But if Western countries persist in applying unjust pressure, they may well throw themselves into Russia's arms.[1183]

Now, the whole situation had completely changed in every single aspect. We have the Bolshevik-Nationalist rapprochement coming on top of the arrival to power in Greece of the loathsome King Constantine (in Allies eyes that is.) Equally serious were unwelcome changes elsewhere. Whilst the Italians were getting bogged down in Libya, the French were having great trouble in Syria, and the British, likewise, were experiencing great difficulties in what was then called Mesopotamia. The Samarra region was in turmoil, whilst in the Ramadie-Feluja area, Britain had to use its planes to pound tribesmen from the air.[1184] Correspondents from Teheran wrote to London that 'the whole trouble seemed to have sprung from Pan-Arab propaganda, which, having been started by British officials in Egypt in order to win over the Grand Shereef of Mecca, now King of Hedjaz, to the side of the Entente, soon got beyond their control.'[1185]

In this situation, some sort of Plan B had to be implemented. And so, as if suddenly he was injected with immense powers and a great spirit of initiative, doubled by a great dose of patriotism, the Sultan in Istanbul, hitherto lame and powerless, acted with great firmness and resolution. He now promptly dismissed Damad Ferid, who even in Ally eyes, had suddenly turned into a bad man, maybe too much of a traitor even to them:

> The public saw him as a nonentity, a weakling, a figure of fun in a tragic situation. He was reputed to fall asleep at Cabinet meetings, and he had difficulty in finding ministers to serve under him. His own party turned against him, and the Sultan at last intimated that his services were no longer required.[1186]

Thus, Damad Ferid was resigned and retired to Carlsbad, to take a long cure. His place was again taken by Tevfik, who at once brought into his Cabinet two ministers friendly to the Nationalists – İzzet Pasha as Minister of the Interior and Salih Pasha as Minister of Marine.[1187] This is how Mango[1188] (a semi-reliable author,) who makes no reference to the real factors that forced Ally change of policy (as explained above,) erroneously explains this matter, and thus misleads the readers:

> On 21 October Damat Ferit was succeeded by the elderly Tevfik Paşa, the eternal conciliator, who sought immediately to contact the Ankara government. The atmosphere in Ottoman Istanbul had changed. The treaty of Sèvres had demonstrated that Mustafa Kemal had been right all along in urging resistance to the Allies. Legal action against nationalists was stopped, as the Ottoman war minister signed a document declaring that there was no doubt that the 'national

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[1183] İnal, İbnülemin Mahmud Kemal, Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrıazamlar (The Last Grand Viziers of the Ottoman Era), MEB [Ministry of Education], Istanbul 1965–9, 1996.
[1184] CH VOLUME XIII October, 1920— March, 1921; 256.
[1185] Ibid.
[1186] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 254.
[1187] Ibid.
[1188] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 285.

> forces' had sought to defend the fatherland, and that they should therefore be praised rather than arraigned in court.[1189]

The Istanbul government sent two men to ask Mustafa Kemal to compromise. They talked for some hours; İzzet tried to persuade Kemal that 'an out-and-out Nationalist Resistance could achieve no positive results, and that the moment had come to seek a reasonable peace.' The delegation returned empty-handed except with:

> Stories of Kemal's influence, the growing strength of his army, the prosperity of the Nationalists, their recent armistices with the Soviet Government at Moscow and the Armenian Government at Erivan, and the statement that Kemal would fight on until liberty of action had been secured for the Sultan, and the Turkish territories had been restored.[1190]

7. The New, King-Led Greek Offensive

Venizelos gone, the King takes over. Once the army and many top positions were reorganised, the King took the lead of the new offensive that would become known as the First Battle of İnönu.

The Greek position shows three fronts, isolated one from the other, aimed for offensive, not defence; the loss of the Autumn offensive impetus had been a disaster for them; the political changes, and some military, was another problem; the time that had been given to the Turks to organise was yet another challenge, and finally, winter was now freezing the landscape.

Nonetheless, the Greeks could not risk stalling or waiting any longer giving more time to the Nationalists. The objective was to advance to the railway, capture its key-points, Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar, then the combined forces would cut the Turks' retreat east, and march onto Ankara and Konya.[1191] This was also understood by the Turks. In his *Anatolian Revolution* Colonel Arif noted that the Greeks could easily occupy Eskişehir and then control the whole of the Anatolian railway.[1192]

In early January 1921 (here dates conflict; Kincaid Jensen says 9 January; Turkish sources speak of days earlier), the Greeks launched their offensive.[1193] The main thrust from Bursa, aiming upwards over layers of steep but broken ridges in the direction of Eskişehir, reached within sight of the plateau before it.[1194] As the Greeks moved forward, they expected the Rebel Edhem to assist them in attacking the Turkish army from the flank and the rear (the Greeks believed Edhem to have thousands of followers, which he did before these followers abandoned him after he sided with the

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[1189] Text in Tansel, Selahettin, Mondros'tan Mudanya'ya Kadar (From Mudros to Mudanya), I–IV, MEB, Istanbul 1991, III, 191; n. 321.
[1190] CH VOLUME XIII October, 1920— March, 1921; Part Two; p. 66; Gains of the Turkish Nationalists
[1191] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 256.
[1192] In Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; John Murray; London; 1928; p. 238.
[1193] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 558.
[1194] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 257.

Greeks against his fellow countrymen).[1195] The Turks, now commanded by Colonel İsmet, entrenched themselves on the Anatolian escarpment near the railway station of İnönü (Inn Eunu).[1196] The number of soldiers involved shows a two to one Greek superiority; İsmet's 12,000 troops armed with 6,000 rifles, 50 machine-guns and 28 field guns, whilst the Greeks numbered 18–20,000 men armed with 12,000 rifles, 140 machine-guns and 72 field guns.[1197] When the Greek army came in contact with the Turks on the west of Pazarcık on 6 January 1921, the main Turkish army was between Derbend and Guedos.[1198] In İnönü, Colonel Arif explains, the Turks had a partly fortified place, which was to cover Eskişehir, but from Pazarcık to İnönü the distance was only thirty kilometers, which could be reached by the Greeks in a day, whilst the major part of the Turkish army was eighty kilometers away.[1199] That would mean at the latest the Greeks could reach İnönü a day before Turkish reinforcements and could therefore get control of Eskişehir.[1200] Lieutenant-Colonel Nazim's division, the 4th, reached İnönü first, whilst the 11th Division, setting out from Derbend on 7 January, and having been fighting for eight days already, marched night and day and in twenty-four hours covered seventy kilometers and entered İnönü at dawn on 8 January.[1201]
The claims of what happened differ, but the Greek attack was stopped, and the Turkish force counter-attacked and forced the Greeks to retreat. Mango backs the Greek side of the story, as held by the Greek General in command, Papoulas, that the operation was a mere reconnaissance; Mustafa Kemal insisted it was a great Turkish victory.[1202] Kinross backs the Turkish view, explaining that İsmet's troops put up such great resistance that it surprised and disconcerted the Greeks. In the light of the earlier campaign, they had expected an easy walk-over against undisciplined and ill-equipped men, but this time, facing them was a highly disciplined army, which fought, despite being inferior in numbers and armament, 'knee-deep in mud and snow (…) stubbornly defending their own territory.'[1203]
After an all-day battle, the Turks (most certainly after receiving reinforcement from the 4th and 11th Divisions) counter-attacked, and in fierce hand to hand combat, broke the Greek offensive; the hills subsequently taking the names of "Nazim Bey Hill" and "Arif Bey Hill," after the commanders of the forces.[1204] The Greeks began to retreat the following day, as speedily as they had arrived, towards Bursa. Turkish losses were light – 95 killed and 183 wounded,[1205] which could reflect the limited scope of the engagement, as Mango puts it,[1206] or which might reflect a great victory as Kinross

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[1195] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; p. 238; reference to Ethem's forces in page 237.
[1196] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 307.
[1197] Erikan, op cit; 608.
[1198] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 238.
[1199] Ibid.
[1200] Ibid.
[1201] Ibid.
[1202] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 307.
[1203] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 257.
[1204] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 238.
[1205] Selek, Sabahattin, Anadolu İhtilâli (The Anatolian Revolution), privately printed, Istanbul 1963, 92.
[1206] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 307.

stated. Regardless of the size of victory, this was the first Nationalist victory against the Greeks, and the Turks played up its importance.[1207]
The commander of the Greeks in Asia Minor, General Papoulas, was impressed by the Turks' performance and asked Athens for more reinforcements for the next offensive.[1208] This was what Turkish Nationalists now sought: Having defeated the Armenians; 'neutralised the great powers, now only the Greeks remained to be dealt with.'[1209]

To the south, the French, being disappointed with the Greeks (who had voted the wrong way), and having disappointed their Armenian allies (by abandoning them for Syria), were now terminating their Turkish involvement, even if their final action was a success. On 9 February 1921, after a ten-month siege, the Turkish defenders of Antep surrendered to a force of 15,000 French troops.[1210] The assembly awarded the town the honorific prefix Gazi, 'Warrior for the Faith', which became its name since.[1211] This was the last major engagement on the southern front as by now, for the reasons cited already, the French had decided to wrap up their Turkish involvement. They would now wait and see what would happen between Turks and Greeks.[1212]

Meanwhile, the relations with Russia were bearing fruit. Ali Fuat Pasha had finally succeeded, and came to an important agreement in Moscow.[1213] As part of it, the Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin promised to remit to Turkey 10 million gold roubles 'for economic development;'[1214] deliveries of arms were also speeded up. On top of the tens of thousands of rifles, the Bolsheviks supplied 300 machine-guns, and nearly a hundred field guns, with appropriate ammunition.[1215] This armament was in part Russian and in part coming from stocks abandoned by the Allies.[1216]

Now seeing all these developments on the ground, especially that 'Continued resistance by the Nationalist Turks made it apparent that the Treaty of Sèvres could not be executed except through a prolonged struggle,'[1217] the Allies, ever realistic, and opportunistic, too, called for a conference in London, consisting of Lloyd George and delegations from Athens, Ankara, and Istanbul.[1218] Lloyd George's proposal that the Treaty of Sèvres be modified was the theme of the gathering.[1219] The delegates met in

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[1207] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 558; Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; p. 238.
[1208] *A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal,* p. 404.
[1209] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 310.
[1210] Ibid; p. 296.
[1211] Aybars, op cit; 258–9; date of surrender of Antep in Özerdim, 52. In the 1980s, two other towns which had resisted the French in 1920 were similarly honoured: Maraş became Kahramanmaraş (the Heroic) and Urfa was renamed Şanlıurfa (the Glorious).
[1212] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 296.
[1213] Text in İsmail Soysal, op cit; 32–8.
[1214] Text in Ergil, Doğu, Milli Mücadelenin Sosyal Tarihi (Social History of the National Struggle), Turhan, Ankara 1981, 420.
[1215] Ibid, 416-19.
[1216] See *Current History*: Carving up of Caucasus, Siberia, etc, maps and plans.
[1217] Revising the Turkish Treaty, CH VOLUME XIV. April — September, 1921; p. 176.
[1218] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 558.
[1219] Ibid.

February 1921. What happened, though, was that, whilst the Ankara Nationalist delegation was seriously engaged in the talks, and was then back in Ankara to discuss the Allies and Greek offers in order to consider its response, the Greeks launched a vicious and sudden attack.[1220]

[1220] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 262-4.

Seven

BATTLE OF SAKARYA
(August 1921)

On the eve of the Great Battle of Sakarya, called by the Greeks the Battle of Ankara, in the Summer of 1921, the Greek journalist, A.T. Polyzoides, contributing to the monthly New York Times magazine *Current History* writes under the title *The Passing of Turkey*, which he first sums up as:

> Narrative of the successful campaign of the Greek Armies against the Turkish nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal-facts about the strength of each side and summary of the chief battles –Why the Turkish Empire is gone for ever.[1221]

He begins:

> WITH the triumphal advance of the Greek armies in Anatolia, with the fortresses and cities of Kutahia, Afioun-Karahissar, Eskishehr and Ismid [İzmit] fallen in quick succession to the victors, and with Angora itself threatened, one may attempt to write the closing chapter of the passing of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire, which was created by the sword, is being ended by the sword, and the nation which is dealing the coup de grace to the once mighty horde of Osman is, as if by some strange decree of fate, the one on whose ruins five hundred years ago Turkish power was founded. It is not only, however, as a military force that Turkey is dying; bad as her military plight is, it is further complicated by the debacle of Turanian nationalism, for which there was no room in a twentieth century Europe.[1222]

Then follows the usual rant on the usual themes of 'Turkish barbarism, massacres of everyone,' the same arguments and the same conclusions as other authors already seen in previous chapters (Morgenthau, Mandelstam…), so similar at times one confuses him with one of them. Then after describing with great pride the Greek victories, and how now the Greeks are on their way to capture Ankara in the Summer of 1921 (just before the Battle of Sakarya), he concludes:

> Greece took the field against Mustapha Kemal; she mobilized her 300,000 troops; she borrowed money from the National Bank of Greece; she appealed to the Hellenic nation for support, and thus the Greek soldier, abandoned by all, crossed himself, as he does before the charge, and with God's help dashed forth and won the greatest triumph in his history. The pride and self-reliance of a nation were never more fully vindicated. The Greek people at that moment knew they had sealed the fate of the Ottoman Empire; they knew that they were the masters of the Near East…. The vilayet of Smyrna, with 2,000,000, and that of Constantinople, with another 2,000,000, are under Greek and allied control.

[1221] A.T. Polyzoides: The Passing of Turkey, *Current History*; a Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, vol XV; no 1; Oct 1923; p. 32.
[1222] Ibid.

> The (Turkish) killed and wounded, and those disabled during the Turkish participation in the European war, with those who left the country after the armistice, amount to more than 2,000,000 people. Kemal represents barely 7,000,000 people, and if he meets final disaster at Angora he will represent even fewer. Turkey has lost her prestige forever, and there is no power on earth that can restore it; both as an autocratic State and as a nationalistic experiment Turkey has been a ghastly failure, because she lacks vitality and will never adapt herself to the ideals of democracy and civilization. A Turkish State in Anatolia may live and prosper in peace. No one wants to exterminate the Turkish people, but no one will tolerate the reconstitution of the Ottoman Empire, now that its destruction is an accomplished fact.
> The Greek people are today the only guarantors of law and order in what was the Ottoman Empire. More than that, they are the only ones who can revive that whole country nationally, politically, commercially, financially and socially. They are the ones who always held the keys of business, shipping and industry in the Ottoman Empire. They are the only elements in the Balkans and in the Near East who have absorbed American ideals of democracy and business efficiency. Half a million Americanized Greeks from the United States are ready to help re-establish the old Byzantine homestead; and with these Greeks risking their all to see Greece succeed in Constantinople, America should join in the enterprise.[1223]

1. Background to the Battle of Sakarya

Just before the Greek Spring offensive that would eventually lead to the Battle of Sakarya, two remarkable developments took place. Now two Allies were ready to throw the towel and concede to the Turks: the French and the Italians, both of them, not out of altruistic reasons or affection for the Turks, but simply now aware that their claims on Turkish land were doomed, for both of them had nothing any longer to profit from, but much, if not all, to lose. The Turks were blazing with confidence, and, most of all were not ready or willing to give in one single inch of Turkey proper. Had the Greeks done the job in the January offensive, most certainly both France and Italy would have kept their support for the Greeks. Now, though, after all that had been thrown at Turkey, and in view of the rising power of the Ankara government, both countries decided to leave the contest, and only keep an eye on the outcome of the next fight (at Sakarya). (Both countries would only agree the final deal with Ankara in the Autumn of 1921 after the Turkish victory at Sakarya.)

It is crucial, once more, especially in regard to the previous point (Franco-Italian policies) to return to that particular point in time (1920-1921), and only using sources of that time (thus avoiding the corrupt, distorted, trash of today,) and look at the

[1223] A.T. Polyzoides: The Passing of Turkey, *Current History*; a Monthly Magazine of the New York Times, vol XV; no 1; Oct 1923; pp. 39-40.

general context of Sakarya, the circumstances preceding the battle, in order to understand why what happened happened (including after the battle).

It was against France, as seen in the previous chapter, that the Turkish nationalists launched their main attacks. General Gouraud, his hands tied by the Muslim Arab rebellion which had forced him to make considerable extensions of his lines in Syria, was unable to repulse the Turkish onslaught on Cilicia, which had reached grave proportions by the Autumn of 1920.[1224] Time after time French units were defeated and French garrisons slain; under these circumstances, France had to choose between the two following alternatives:

-Either to maintain her forces and to continue the war in Cilicia,

-Or to negotiate with the de facto authority which was in command of the Turkish troops in that region and focus on Syria/Lebanon.[1225]

The French armies in Syria and Cilicia already numbered more than 100,000 men; to reinforce them would not only have been to go against the opinion of the war weary nation and the National Assembly, 'Which had vigorously expressed their determination to put an end to cruel bloodshed and to expenditure which it was particularly difficult to bear.'[1226] France simply did not have the means. There was no money. The 1914-1918 War had impoverished the country. And where to find extra men to fight, following a war (the First World War) that had wiped out a whole generation of Frenchmen? To negotiate with Mustafa Kemal demanded the scrapping of the unratified Treaty of Sèvres. The French Government chose the latter alternative.[1227] It is said that during the London Conference of February-March 1921, at which the Ankara envoys were present, M. Briand of France declared to Mr. Lloyd George on several occasions, 'Without the British Prime Minister making the slightest observation, that he would not leave England without having concluded an agreement with the Angora delegation.'[1228] M. Briand pointed out that neither the Chamber nor French public opinion would agree to the continuation of hostilities, which had cost France losses which were 'both heavy and useless.'[1229] Accordingly, on 9 March 1921, a Franco-Turkish agreement ending hostilities in Cilicia was signed in London. The Turkish Nationalists acknowledged the special economic, religious and cultural interests of France in Turkey, including in the Baghdad Railway, and in return,

> France was to evacuate Cilicia, to readjust the boundary between Turkey and Syria, and to adopt a more friendly attitude toward the Government of the Grand National Assembly.[1230]

[1224] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 323.

[1225] Ibid.

[1226] Ibid.

[1227] Ibid.

[1228] Ibid.

[1229] M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, November 17, 1921, in the official correspondence: between the French and British Governments regarding the Angora Treaty of October 20, 1921, Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. i (1922). Cf. also, Toynbee, op. cit., Chapter III, "Greece and Turkey in the Vicious Circle"; Jean Lescure, "Faut-il detruire la Turquie?" in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, Volume 103 (1920), pp. 42-48; "Where Diplomacy Failed," *The Daily Telegraph* (London), September 19, 1922.

[1230] Cf. a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and the scope of the agreement, *Journal officiel*, Debats Parlementaires, Chambre des deputes, March 16, 1921, pp. 1272-1273. The text of the agreement is available in *Current History*, Volume XIV (1921), pp. 203-204, and in the Contemporary Review, Volume 119 (1921), pp. 677-679.

Swiftly, that is days later, the Italian Government followed suite. Italian troops had been driven out of Konya and were finding their hold in Antalya increasingly precarious; the Italian Government had neither the disposition nor the resources to wage war.[1231] Libya, again, was tying them as their losses there were rising, and their presence there even threatened.[1232] Between Libya and Konya, the Italians knew what they wanted: Libya, of course. Therefore, on 13 March 1921 (four days after the French), bypassing the Istanbul government, just like the French, the Italian and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed in London a separate treaty, providing for 'economic collaboration' between Turkey and Italy in the hinterland of Antalya, including part of the Sanjaks of Konya, Aydın, and Afyon Karahisar, as well as for the award to an Italian group of the concession for the Heraclea coal mines.[1233] The Italian Government pledged itself to

> Support effectively all the demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the peace treaty, more especially the demands of Turkey for complete sovereignty and for the restitution of Thrace and Smyrna. Italian troops were to be withdrawn from Ottoman soil.[1234]

Then, subsequently, following the Turkish victory at Sakarya, the French understood the game this time was truly up. So, following further negotiations on 20 October 1921, the Treaty of Ankara was signed by M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon, a special agent of the French Government, and Yusuf Kemal Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Grand National Assembly.[1235] This treaty officially and formally ended the state of war between the two countries, provided for the repatriation of all prisoners, defined new boundaries between Turkey and Syria, and awarded valuable economic privileges to France.[1236] The treaty stipulated that the French Government makes 'every effort to settle in a spirit of cordial agreement all questions relating to the independence and sovereignty of Turkey.'[1237]

Back to the Turkish Contest with the Greeks and Events Before the Battle of Sakarya

In the first months of 1921, the Nationalist cause was further reinforced by the inflow of Soviet armament and, more importantly, of men of war. A new generation of experienced commanders including reserves and retirees, as well as conscripts, were

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[1231] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 324.

[1232] For the vast literature on the Italian crisis in Libya, see notes in relevant parts in previous chapters.

[1233] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 324.

[1234] For the text of the Turco-Italian treaty see *L'Europe Nouvelle* (Paris), May 28, 1921, or *The Nation*, Volume 113 (New York, 1921), p. 214. *The New York Times,* April 13, 1921, contains a good summary of the treaty and the circumstances of its negotiation.

[1235] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 325.

[1236] Ibid.

[1237] The text of the Angora Treaty is given in Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1556, Turkey No. 2 (1921). It has been reprinted in *Current History*, January, 1922. For a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and scope of the treaty, cf. *Journal officiel*, Debats parlementaires, Senat, October 28, 1921, pp. 818-819.

drawn to the nationalist cause.[1238] One officer in particular would prove his immense commanding skills and qualities at the Battle of Sakarya, Colonel Fevzi, who was straight propelled to the high functions of Prime Minister and acting Chief of the General Staff in Ankara.[1239] Mustafa Kemal fully appreciated the value of a man of Fevzi's calibre. He was the conservative type of Turkish officer, who had won a great military reputation during long campaigns in the Balkans and later in the First World War.[1240] Afterwards, in Istanbul, his successive positions in the War Ministry had gained him political prestige, and he played a major role in the smuggling of arms to the Patriots. He was to resign following the Smyrna Greek landing when the orders were given not to fire at the landing Greeks.[1241] His character, says Kinross,

> Steady and slow and industrious, his strict habits of life and his middle-class virtues were such as to earn him popular respect. He was above all a man of deep religious beliefs, the devoutest of Moslems, who never touched alcohol and recited the Koran to his troops in the heat of the battle. He was thus an especial asset to the cause at this moment.[1242]

Much was made of his arrival in Ankara, where he became Minister of Defence, and head of the Cabinet – thus in effect Prime Minister, whereby his influence and respect for him helped Mustafa Kemal to hold the balance between the rival commanders.[1243] The reinforcements also came at the lower levels. Almost overnight, regiment after regiment abandoned the Istanbul-based government and joined the forces of liberation.[1244]

2. The Second Battle of İnönü (March-April 1921)

On 23 March 1921, the Greeks advanced in both the Bursa and Usak sectors. Their southern columns did well, capturing the railway junction at Afyon.[1245] At a Cabinet meeting, Lloyd George explained that there was 'a great concentration' of Turkish troops in front of them, and that it was impossible to prevent the Greeks from attacking in self-defence.'[1246] According to War Office information:

> There was [wrote Sir Henry Wilson] no concentration of Turks on that railway, and therefore this coming attack is entirely uncalled for and wholly unprovoked. And Lloyd George knows this. The whole thing is a ramp, and a disgusting ramp. Because the Turks are at this moment considering the terms offered to them a fortnight ago here in London, the Greeks, with the full knowledge of Lloyd George, attacked the Turks.[1247]

[1238] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 283.
[1239] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 311.
[1240] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 225.
[1241] Ibid; p. 154.
[1242] Ibid; p. 225.
[1243] Ibid.
[1244] M. Uyar and E.J. Erickson: *A Military History of the Ottomans*; op cit; p. 283.
[1245] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, p. 558.
[1246] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 264.
[1247] Ibid; p. 265.

Indeed, it ought to be reminded that the Greek attack came precisely at the moment the Turkish delegation had left the London Conference to consult in Ankara the Allies' new terms.

On the opening day of the offensive, March 23-24, General Papoulas had 130,000 men advancing on a 120-mile front extending from east of Bursa to beyond Ushak.[1248] The Turks were concentrated between this front and the Anatolian part of the Baghdad Railway around the Eskişehr and Afyonkarahisar.[1249] At first their numbers were 60,000 but were reinforced on 31 March by the 15th and the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Kâzim Karabekir, coming from the Transcaucasian front and numbering between 15,000 and 20,000 men.[1250]

General Papoulas launched a vigorous assault on İsmet's positions in the İnönü sector on 26 March.[1251] The Greeks, better equipped, particularly with planes, heavy artillery, machine-guns and motorised vehicles, made a two-pronged attack against Eskişehir in the north and against Afyonkarahisar in the south.[1252] By 31 March, the Greeks seemed to have succeeded, and General Papoulas dispatched a message to Athens stating 'that the first part of the plan for defeating the Turkish Nationalists had been accomplished and that it remained only to advance on Angora.'[1253] Their forces had captured Afyon without too much difficulty, but their success, as Mustafa Kemal noted, was a strategic error, for they should rather have moved northwards to support and ensure the success of the attack on Eskişehir.[1254] In the end, the Greek northern forces were stopped again by fierce resistance from the Turks, and when reinforcements arrived, on 31 March, İsmet counter-attacked again. Ernest Hemingway, the American writer, who was marching with the Greeks, could see their troops being beaten away:

> Dead men wearing white ballet skirts and upturned shoes with pompoms on them. The Turks had come steadily and lumpily, and running there themselves, and he and the British observer had run too until his lungs ached and his mouth was full of the taste of pennies and they stopped behind some rocks and there were the Turks coming as lumpily as ever.[1255]

The Greek losses were heavy. On 1 April İsmet sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal from the newly recaptured peak of Metristepe.[1256] 'The enemy,' he announced, 'has abandoned the battlefield to our arms, leaving thousands of dead behind.'[1257] Mustafa Kemal replied:

[1248] Greece attempts to impose the Sevres Treaty in *Current History;* VOLUME XIV. April-September, 1921; p. 350.
[1249] Ibid.
[1250] Ibid.
[1251] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 310.
[1252] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 265.
[1253] Greece attempts to impose the Sevres Treaty; op cit; p. 350.
[1254] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 265.
[1255] E. Hemigway: Snows of Kilimanjaro, in Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 265.
[1256] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 311.
[1257] Ataturk: *Nutuk*, 386; İnönü, İsmet, Hatıralar (Memoirs), ed. Sabahattin Selek, Bilgi, Istanbul, I, 1985; II, 1987, I, 248–51; Belen, Fahri, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı (The Turkish Liberation Struggle), Başbakanlık, Ankara 1973, 310–16; Erikan, 636–57

> Few commanders in the whole history of the world have faced a task as difficult as that which you undertook in the pitched battles of İnönü. The independent life of our nation was entrusted to the heart-felt care of your commanders and comrades-in-arms, who have honourably discharged their duty under your brilliant direction. It was not only the enemy you have defeated, but fate itself – the ill-starred fate of our nation.[1258]
>
> 'Our army has reappeared on the stage of history in thunderous majesty,' added Mustafa Kemal.[1259]

The Greeks were in full retreat. Toynbee, who was also amongst the Greek troops, retreated with one of their divisions towards Bursa, describing the retreat as

> An interminable procession of troops, mules, ox-carts and lorries crawling along a foundered road — we could not make out why no enemy attacked us from the mountains commanding our southern flank.[1260]

In fact, the Turks had despatched all their available forces to cut the railway and the line of retreat between Afyon and Uşak. This would have effectively cut communications and supplies from the overextended Greek southern group, and thus terminated it.[1261] The Turks were, however, hampered by difficulties in troop transport. A Greek unit held the Turks at Dumlupınar, west of Afyonkarahisar; in twenty-four hours of fierce fighting until it was relieved by the rapidly retreating bulk of the southern forces.[1262] Having narrowly escaped encirclement, the Greeks retired to their old positions about Uşak.[1263]

The victory was far from being final, but it was a turning point in the Nationalist fortunes, despite their inferiority in numbers and equipment.[1264] The Greeks refused to admit this, seeking to explain their defeat, as Toynbee recalls, by the myth of the hidden hand. They held:

> The Turkish artillery must have been served by Russian or German gunners to make such good shooting, Italian sappers must be traced in the trenches, French officers have kept the infantry steady. I convinced myself to my own satisfaction that this was a hallucination.[1265]

On the Turkish side, the victory at İnönü was greeted with joy even in Istanbul, where the sultan had prayers read for the soldiers killed in the fighting and sent a donation to the Red Crescent for the relief of victims.[1266] The heir apparent, Abdülmecit, went a step further and despatched his son Ömer Faruk to join the Nationalists in Anatolia.[1267]

The Greeks now vented their anger on the civilian population.

[1258] Ataturk: *Nutuk*, 387.
[1259] C. Erikan; *Komutan*; op cit; 663; ATTB, 398.
[1260] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 233.
[1261] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 558.
[1262] Ibid.
[1263] M. Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 198-201.
[1264] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 266.
[1265] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 234.
[1266] S. Tansel: Mondros, op cit; IV, 85.
[1267] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 314.

> It does suggest very strongly [Toynbee remarks] that the Greek military authorities, when they decided to simplify and shorten their Marmara front after the battle of In Ununu [İnönü], determined at the same time to devastate the country that they intended to abandon, and accomplished the devastation [as he, Toynbee described in Chapter VII of his work, correctly titled: War of Extermination,] before they executed the retreat.[1268] At any rate, on this hypothesis the organised atrocities which started on the Yalova-Gemlik Peninsula in the middle of April, the events which accompanied the evacuation of Ismid towards the end of June, and the incendiarism committed on the 29th June along the coast from Deirmendere [Degirmendere] to Karamursal [Karamürsel], fall into place as parts of a consistent programme. The object of the atrocities, on this showing, was to exterminate the Turkish inhabitants of districts which it was no longer convenient for the Greek Army to hold. They were a "political" corollary to a military move.[1269]

Toynbee's accounts and those of M. Gehri, representative of the Red Cross, confirm each other in their details of atrocities committed against the Turks; the burning of villages in the Gemlik-Yalova-Kumla and Narlı-Karacaali regions, mass-rape, and mass-disappearances.[1270] Toynbee could even see how the Greeks were operating to fool foreign observers:

> As we waited, the first event was a rumour from a Greek source. Three women had been killed that morning, on their way down from a village, by Turkish chettes (brigands engaged on "political" work)! In a few minutes, a strange procession arrived and halted in front of our window — an araba (native carriage) bearing the dead bodies of three women in Greek dress, neatly laid out and covered with flowers. The procession was conducted by a Greek priest, who took part in all the subsequent scenes. (This Greek priest was an emissary from the Oecumenical Patriarchate. He told me himself that he was the director of an orphanage at Constantinople.) He spoke Turkish fluently, and we were informed that he had arrived in Yalova two days before the Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry and had made inflammatory speeches. Certainly his conduct was inflammatory as we saw it. Whether intentionally or not, he marshalled the corpses into the square at the moment when the Red Crescent officials (who landed after us) were coming on shore. If the feelings of the Greek crowd had been aroused, as they well might have been at the sight of three of their women newly killed, the Red Crescent officials would have been put in some danger. But the crowd remained strangely calm. Not anger or horror or pity but curiosity seemed to be the dominant emotion. Our presence near the ground-floor window of the konak was not at first perceived. The priest gave a swift upward glance at the first-floor balcony, to make sure that the Allied officers were still closeted with the Greek commandant, and then

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[1268] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; p. 316.

[1269] Ibid.

[1270] Gehri, M. (Delegue du Comite International de la Croix Rouge): 'Mission d'Enquete en Anatolie, 12-22 Mai 1921,' = Extrait de la Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, 3em Annee, No. 31, 15 Juillet 1921, pp. 721-735. esp., pp. 724 ff. A.J. Toynbee: *Western question.*

> rapidly directed his assistants to arrange the sheets on which the bodies were laid, so as to show the blood-stains to the best advantage. Several times over this ghastly drapery was rearranged to improve the effect. It was like some obscene milliner dressing her shop window. The upward glances became more frequent, the expectancy of the crowd more intense. Then the officers came out and the spectacle was duly presented to them. Were the women really Turks or Greeks? To judge by the attitude of the crowd, they were not their compatriots. And who had killed them? I do not see how any Turk could have killed anybody in this district at this moment. The local Turkish civilians are disarmed and terrified, and though Yalova is close to the front, none of the Greeks stated to me that Turkish chette bands were operating behind the Greek lines. They ascribed the atrocities vaguely to chettes, but the only chettes we saw were Greeks. These Greek chettes, as well as the Greek soldiers, are going about the country in small parties, and the Greek and Armenian villages are still intact, while fourteen and a half Turkish villages out of sixteen have been destroyed. I cannot prove that what we witnessed was a fraud staged for our benefit, but it seems to me probable that the dead women were Turks and that Greek chettes had killed them.[1271]

Oddly, whilst Toynbee and those on the ground could witness the killings of Turks carried out by the Greeks, simultaneously, Greek and international media were full of the same stories of massacres committed by the Turks.[1272] According to *Current History*, for instance, right then the Turks were conducting their usual atrocities, and even more poignantly, the Kemalists, defying Italian authorities in Adalia [Antalya], had arrested, and put in chains the Greek Bishop in the area.[1273]

In the midst of this usual macabre trickery, certainly hoping they could sway the Allies sympathy in their favour at this crucial phase, the Greeks put the final touches to their next offensive, one of the greatest in those days. More equipment, all the latest that technology of those days could afford, and considerably more troops were readied; up to 200,000 men.[1274]

King Constantine, who still held by the Grand Idea, of reigning again in Byzantium, proclaimed himself Supreme Commander of the Greek forces in Asia, and in June, 1921, left for İzmir, thus becoming the first Christian king to set foot on Anatolian soil since the Crusades.[1275] As a symbol of a Returning Crusader, he stayed in the seaside suburb across the gulf, where Richard the Lion Heart was said to have landed over seven centuries earlier, and in an interview with *The London Times* he spoke of his forthcoming offensive and of 'his confidence that the Greek troops would finally break the Kemalist power.'[1276] Then he left to inspect the front and to decide on the date of the offensive, and, so, soon, the Greek army, in Churchill's words, was

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[1271] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; op cit; pp. 300-1.
[1272] Such as noted in CH; vol 14; pp. 519-520.
[1273] Greece attempts to impose the Sevres Treaty; in CH VOLUME XIV. April — September, 1921; p. 351.
[1274] H.R.H. Prince Andrew of Greece, *Towards Disaster* (London: John Murray,1930), p. 18. M. Llewellyn Smith, 222, note.
[1275] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 267.
[1276] Ibid.

> Marching steadily forward through harsh and difficult country to engage in the greatest campaign undertaken by Greece since Classic times.[1277]

3. The Great Summer Offensive 10 July 1921

The initial objective of this latest offensive once more was the railway. This time, however, the Greeks decided upon a change of strategy. Instead of a costly frontal attack by the northern group, they elected to put their emphasis on the southern column, precisely as Mustafa Kemal commented in regard to their error in the previous offensive.[1278] Their forces, it was planned, would, in a turning manoeuver, capture Afyonkarahisar and Kütahya instead of Eskişehir and march north, up the railway. Their northern forces would split in two: a northern army would hold the Turks there, while another would march south and converge with the southern forces. Eskişehir, the key to western Anatolia, would thus be captured by a turning movement from the south.[1279] By capturing Eskişehir, the Greeks would cut the Turkish retreat, and thus finish the Turkish army.[1280]

On the Turkish side, as Halide Edib points out, there was a sense of foreboding in respect to the Greeks' next move. She narrates:

> There was one man who seemed almost as if he were going through a psychic phase. It was Fevzi Pasha, the chief of staff. He seemed full of fears and premonitions. I remember him working on a map for hours with his staff and continually pointing to one spot, saying: "Nassouh Tjal will undo us."
>
> The plan prepared at headquarters had a vulnerable point: it left Nassouh Tjal insufficiently covered. But those at headquarters, as well as Fevzi Pasha himself, saw that they had prepared the best scheme they could, considering the available means: the rest would have to be left to the chances of war.
>
> One officer said to me: "Fevzi Pasha is troubled with dreams and forebodings; you cannot consider those in war." Mustafa Kemal Pasha was as hopeful and as confident as the others, and it seemed to us that this mattered most in any military undertaking in Turkey.[1281]

The attack was launched on 10 July; two large armies of more than 100,000 men, on each side about to face each other.[1282] The Greeks had overwhelming superiority in hardware: 410 field guns against the Turks' 160, some 4,000 machine-guns against the Turks' 700, and 20 aircraft against the Turks' four.[1283]

Simultaneously, three movements were made by the Greeks: the first along the line Pazarköy-İzmit; the second in the direction of Yenişehir; and the third in the direction

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[1277] Ibid.
[1278] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 559.
[1279] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 267.
[1280] M. Llewellyn Smith, *Ionian Vision,* p. 255·
[1281] Khalide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; 253-4.
[1282] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 315.
[1283] C. Erikan: *Komutan,* op cit; 685.

of Ainegeul; then a concentrated attack was made on Kütahya, thus aiming at breaking the Turkish centre along the Baghdad Railway line, Eskişehr-Afyonkarahissar.[1284] The move was so quick, so thorough and effective, the Turkish commander, İsmet Pasha, who had kept the bulk of his forces in the northern sector round İnönü, could do little.[1285] The Greek southern forces, having overran Afyon moved rapidly north, and soon, meeting the column moving south, captured Kütahya on 17 July. The Greeks then swung north-east towards Eskişehir threatening Turkish lines with Ankara, and the encirclement of the whole Turkish army.[1286] On the day Kütahya fell, İsmet received a brief telegram from Mustafa Kemal. It read: 'If it's no trouble, I propose to set out immediately to discuss the situation with you.'

At five in the morning on the following day İsmet met Mustafa Kemal at the Eskişehir station and drove him to his headquarters to the south of the town. Unlike İsmet, Mustafa Kemal, as his military career had shown, had no fear of taking ruthless or unpopular decisions. In Kinross' version, as soon as he reached İsmet's headquarters, he surveyed maps and telegrams, summed up the position, and without hesitation, ordered a general retreat. Rear-guard actions must be fought to cover the withdrawal of men and heavy equipment and what could not be carried away must be scrapped, including even fortifications. Once this drastic conclusion was reached, Mustafa Kemal returned by train to Ankara.[1287]

According to an officer present at the meeting, Mustafa Kemal asked İsmet,

> 'Haven't we lost the battle déjà?' (slipping in his favourite French word).
>
> 'That's what it looks like,' replied İsmet.
>
> 'Then,' said Mustafa Kemal, 'our job is to save the army and prepare a new position. We must withdraw step by step behind the Sakarya River. Let's write the order immediately.'[1288]

İsmet's account is different, whereby he states that he proposed a counter-attack against the Greeks in Eskişehir, and if it failed, he would then withdraw his troops east of the Sakarya River, with which Mustafa Kemal agreed.[1289] Whatever was the case, on 21 July, the Turks mounted a full-scale and disastrous counter-attack which cost many lives.[1290] The disaster was just about prevented from reaching irremediable proportions. Colonel Fahrettin's (Altay) cavalry succeeded in covering the retreat of the Turkish left flank,[1291] which abandoned Afyonkarahisar to the Greeks once again on 23 July.[1292]

> On the road driving back [Edib says] I was thinking Eskishehir was to be evacuated. Perhaps Ismet Pasha would make a last stand and try to cover the retreat of the main forces. But what would all these shattered, agonizing human

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[1284] The Greek Triumph in Turkey; in CH VOLUME XIV. April — September, 1921; p. 1066.
[1285] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 315.
[1286] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 559.
[1287] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 269.
[1288] Altay, Fahrettin, On Yıl Savaş ve Sonrası (Ten Years of War and After), İnsel, Istanbul 1925, p. 290.
[1289] İnönü, İsmet, Hatıralar (Memoirs), ed. Sabahattin Selek, Bilgi, Istanbul, I, 1985; II, 1987, I, 257.
[1290] Prince Andrew, *Towards Disaster,* pp. 34-35.
[1291] Altay, Fahrettin, İstiklâl Harbimizde Süvari Kolordusu (The Cavalry Corps in Our War of Independence), İnsel, Istanbul 1925, 14–19.
[1292] S.N. Ozerdim: *Ataturk;* op cit; 56.

> beings do? I felt sick beyond description at the thought of war, but my mind was caught like a rat in a trap by the necessity of it. The war seemed inevitable on our side. The enemy was in our very homes, and, fighting or no fighting, those homes turned into ashes and our people put to the sword. Why? simply because a politician or a few politicians had a capricious desire to change the map of Asia Minor.[1293]

İsmet, himself, had now realised that the situation was rapidly deteriorating, two Greek divisions were already swinging around to the east of Eskişehir.[1294] In his headquarters in a village on the outskirts of the city, he was faced with the responsibility of deciding on its evacuation, and was being overwhelmed by the weight of responsibility. Halide Edib, retreating with a party of wounded, found him seated in a bare low-ceilinged Anatolian room. He wore, as he always did during a campaign, the khaki uniform of a private soldier. Behind his cordial manner 'his face was haggard and his eyes feverish, and the lines about his mouth and eyes had multiplied.'[1295]

An atmosphere of gloom seemed to pervade everything.

> Just by the garden door [Edib says] was a tent where the dead were laid; a row of feet protruded from under the edge of the canvas. There was a bright yellow moon and I stared at the feet, almost hypnotized. Big Anatolian feet, some bare, some in heavy tattered shoes, all of them swollen, lacerated, and hardened with the walking of years and years. At last they were at rest forever![1296]

At last, decision to retreat was taken. Great many men had been lost together with valuable equipment, and now huge crowds of civilian refugees were fleeing from the Greek advance.[1297] Now, the army was retreating fast to the area of Ankara where the Turks would dig in on the banks of the Sakarya and await the next attack.[1298] The retreat would give up Turkish soil (over 100 miles) and also 'Turkish men, women and children to the national enemy who would burn, rape and destroy.' But had they stood and fought at Eskişehir, the Turkish main army would have been entirely wiped out.[1299] The withdrawal would, on the other hand, give the Turks precious time to reorganise for the coming Greek onslaught and stretch Greek long lines of communications.[1300]

> In short [Kincaid Jensen correctly remarks] the decision to fall back was a purely military one. With their backs against the wall, the Turks saw that all other considerations were now irrelevant.[1301]

[1293] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 271.
[1294] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 559.
[1295] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 271.
[1296] Ibid; p. 275.
[1297] C. Erikan: *Komutan*, 699-701. Arıkoğlu, Damar, Hatıralarım (My Memoirs), Tan, Istanbul 1961, 235.
[1298] H. C. Armstrong: *Grey Wolf* (New York: Milton, Balch & Co., 1933), p. 145.
[1299] Ibid, p. 146.
[1300] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 559.
[1301] Ibid.

There remained those anxious moments to see whether the Army had made it safely to the East. Here we have the remarkable accounts by Halide Edib, who from this point forth and especially through the Battle of Sakarya would provide us with a first-hand account of the events she witnessed:[1302]

> "It is from 'Nassuh T'jal' that the Greeks have come, just as Fevzi Pasha said," declared Dr. Adnan, her husband. "There is something uncanny about his military knowledge."
>
> "How is he feeling about the present disaster?" I asked.
>
> "He is curiously optimistic. He says he will lure the Greeks to the east of Sakaria and defeat them for good in the wastes of Middle Anatolia."[1303]
>
> Fevzi Pasha was the only person who seemed elated and enthusiastic. Silence reigned over the place; headquarters looked grim and said nothing: the civilians talked a lot of military stuff in a learned tone and were bitterly critical; some went so far as to declare that İsmet Pasha ought to be punished for the defeat.[1304]

Two days later, late at night, Halide entered the room where Mustafa Kemal was supervising the orderly army retreat.

> "Won't you have a cup of coffee, Hanum Effendi?" he said, and he settled down to a talk over the coffee-cups.
>
> "Ismet is fighting in front of Eskishehir; stay and hear the result," he said.
>
> Then he leaned against the desk, his face greyer and more discomposed as he smoked. Dr Adnan, who had gone out briefly, came in, with a smile on his face. He had been with Fevzi, who he declared to be "the most hopeful sight in the universe; he believes that all this is tending to the final defeat of the Greeks". Pasha (Mustafa Kemal) laughed and called Fevzi Pasha a name which is not usually complimentary, though one saw that he was well pleased at Fevzi Pasha's optimism. He was always most superstitious at the critical moments…
>
> To one of his close journalist friends, Mustafa Kemal proclaimed with defiance as though to the world,
>
> "Whatever happens we are going to remain in this country. We are going to defend every hill of our sacred Fatherland. We are going to die under our flag in the furthermost frontiers."
>
> A map lay before them, and with his fine long-fingered hands, surely created, as it seemed to the journalist, only for handling the most delicate works of art, he traced the position. Drawing a line with his finger-tips he said,
>
> "Here we are now. Our forces are retiring in a half circle from the north and south of Eskishehir. The night is bright and suitable for marching. But after the exhaustion and heat of the day this weather may lead to sleep. I have seen soldiers asleep while marching and especially while riding on horseback. I have a friend, a cavalry officer, who told me he only slept comfortably on horseback. When he got to bed he could not sleep."

[1302] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit.
[1303] Ibid; p. 279.
[1304] Ibid.

Kemal's face had the colourless aspect of death from his sleepless nights, but he still mused and joked he seemed to the journalist "to radiate vitality and power." He rang the bell for the duty officer and instructed him, "My child, get me at once the commander of the X. Division." His friend could hear the telegraphist tapping away downstairs as Kemal continued, "By tomorrow we must have put a distance of at least a hundred miles between ourselves and the enemy. The most suitable place to stand is here, north of the Sakarya River."
We shall fight a big battle only after we have reached it. The Greek army, of course, will follow us. They will cross the plain here, and advance towards here. This means …"
He was interrupted by the duty officer, who saluted and said, "Sir. The divisional commander has reached the village and is resting. Shall we wake him up?"
"Didn't I tell you so?" Mustafa Kemal replied. "Now let's look at this man. Find me," he ordered, "The commander of the Y. Division."
He turned to the journalist and winked: "He is not going to find him, because this man is marching very quickly to reach his appointed place as quickly as possible."
Mustafa Kemal changed his tone:
"The really important thing is to know what the enemy is going to do and how he is going to do it. Is he going to follow us now, while we are withdrawing in this systematic way?" Continuing to talk, he gave a feeling of confidence.
Mustafa Kemal knew in the calmer recesses of his mind that there was reason for optimism, as Fevzi had said. He knew that the enemy was superior in arms, whilst the Turkish army was still an incomplete fighting force, lacking transport, hampered in its mobility; arms still coming only slowly from Soviet Russia.
If the enemy should pursue us without coming to a halt, he would be getting farther away from his base of operations and would be obliged to take up new positions. In any case, he would find that there were many difficulties in front of him which he would have to provide for. Taking this into account, our army will be able to rally and meet the enemy under more favourable conditions. The disadvantage of such tactics would be the moral shock which might be produced in public opinion by the fact that a wide territory and places so important as Eskishehir would be abandoned to the enemy. But these disadvantages will automatically disappear in a short time as a result of the successes which we shall achieve.[1305]

[1305] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; John Murray; London; 1928; p. 280 ff; also in Kinross 269-271; but in a more selective manner, but quite agreeable to read without major alterations to what Edib was conveying.

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The Need to Return to Original Sources

At this stage, this author would wish to deviate somehow to return to that problem he constantly stresses, which is the systematic rewriting of history by Western scholarship, especially now. Western scholarship today dealing with Islam, Muslims, Turks, Arabs, and related subjects is not just fundamentally distorted, it is quite trashy in quality, which is a major problem. Even worse is its ass like Muslim 'scholarly' following (including Turks, of course) (with maybe one or two exceptions), which is incapable of discerning anything from anything.

One of the most dominant practices, quite unsettling, and very distorting, consists in the reinterpretation of what original or contemporary sources to events say. Instances of this have been shown by this author in a few of his works, whereby modern scholars, either hope, or believe, that people would not go back to the original, and so they can escape censure by using an original source to legitimise the distortion they put forth. Here we have the instance of Halide Edib's accounts of the *Turkish Ordeal*. Anyone reading this work available on the internet, would have to ignore entirely what is possibly the most cretin introduction an unfortunate reader might come across. The introduction to Edib's work was added by one of today's scholars, who thoroughly distorted Edib's depiction of the Turkish ordeal.[1306] The book is precisely about what the title says: the ordeal of the Turks, whilst the author(s) of the introduction turned it into the usual modern rant of Turkish crimes committed against Christians and other ludicrous issues. The fact that the author of the introduction adds a bibliography of works mainly written decades after Edib's death shows the author(s) true imbecilic mental aptitudes, for how could Edib share views which would only come decades after her death.

So at the cost of deviating a little, let's bring Halide Edib herself, who just as in her *Ordeal* (of which many extracts are included in this work) in her other work, *Memoirs*, begins by lashing at the likes of Mandelstam whose anti Turkish rant has been already dealt with above. Here, in the words of Edib:

> The second (book) is the "*Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman*," by A. Mandlestan, the first dragoman of the Russian embassy in Constantinople till 1914.' 'The book was published in 1917. He has gathered an extraordinary amount of data on the Young Turk regime and on the causes which led Turkey to enter the war on the German side. He has one single aim, and all his data is grouped and even twisted to prove his point. It is more or less the point of view blindly, passionately, and narrowly held by the allied world in those days. The spirit of his arguments is that the Ottoman Empire must be torn to pieces, and the Turks must not be considered as ordinary human beings, and the Young Turks are ordinary criminals, having massacred the Armenians. There is a detailed account of Armenian massacres and a series of exaggerated accusations with reference to the other minorities, whom he asserts the Turks meant to exterminate. I do not, however, find a word about the great massacre of the Turks by the Bulgarians nor its accompaniment of atrocities in 1912, not a word about the great massacre of the Turks by the Armenians who entered Oriental Turkey in 1915 with the Russian army, which has been simply told by the Russian officers of the same Russian army who revolted against the Armenian cruelties.[1307]

Two pages down, she adds,

> It is queer to observe that public opinion turned against the Allies and began to feel the arguments of the Young Turks justifiable only after the Young Turks had passed out of power. The Greek occupation and atrocities under British patronage, and the

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[1306] H. Edib: Turkish Ordeal; Introduction added to internet version by unknown. Accessed in Summer 2014.
[1307] Halid Edib: *Memoirs*; p. 378.

> Armenian atrocities against Adana under the patronage of the French, were talked of as the symptoms of the allied justice and rule in Turkey foreseen by the Unionists before the war.[1308]

Then throughout the book, and even more in her other book, *Turkish Ordeal*, Edib on and on and on details the horrors the Turks suffered from in more details than any author had or would ever care to do with maybe the exceptions of: Pierre Loti and Jaeckh, Toynbee in his *Western Question*, and today McCarthy.[1309]

Now, the readers could check by themselves the crookedness of the 'scholars' of today by just reading the Introduction of Edib's work written by a 'scholar' or bunch of 'scholars' of today, and compare what they claim with the author's (Edib) real account. The readers are also invited to pick any old, primary, source, and read what it says, and compare it with what the Western scholars of today (and their inept, moronic Muslim/Turkish following) make of it.

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Halide Edib's Account of Wounded Turkish Soldiers

'The Greeks had opened their biggest offensive-a hundred thousand men, most efficient staff, the very best equipment, and a strong artillery. The Turkish headquarters was at Karaja Bey. I neither knew nor cared to know what was happening at the front. The battle which was of such vital importance to me before I had come to the hospital had now been driven into the background. In the ward there were none but those to whom battles had ceased to mean much. Many of those who were unconscious groaned as I undressed them to wash away the mud which smeared their faces and sometimes their bodies too; but it was good to hear them groan: it meant they might still live-and each of them was a whole world to me. When I had put them all to bed, I had the feeling that for the last fifteen years Turkey itself had been just such a hospital.

One sergeant, a fairish man whose legs were wounded... seemed so eager for news... Near this sergeant lay a worn-out and silent figure. I wondered why no one came to take him to the operating theater or to attend to his wound. I asked him whether he wanted something. He did not answer, and some mysterious impulse made me put my hand on his head-the face was so sunken and the color so queer. He opened his eyes with an effort, and one could see that their light was fading. "Don't you want anything?" I repeated softly; the answer too came with an effort. "Lemon," he said. As I lifted his head on my arm to give him the drink, he smiled, and the eyes looked at the glass with the same look. It took me such a long time to make him drink; then he let his head fall on my arm ... surely the poor fellow was feeling very faint, I thought. I put his head on the pillow, meaning to go and call the doctor, yet I couldn't move away from the bed. I felt a hand tugging at my apron: it was the sergeant in the next bed. "Go out now, sister," he said with a protective tone; "you'd better call Sergeant Mustafa." But still I didn't move. "Will you make my legs comfortable?" he said. I knew that he was only trying to keep me from the next bed. "I cannot lie still," he said. I tried to make him comfortable as quickly as I could. When I turned round again Sergeant Mustafa was leaning over the other bed. He was lifting the man, and I knew from the expression on his face that the man was dead.

That same night another of the wounded arrived, so tall that no bed we had could hold him. He also was a sergeant. He was perhaps seven feet tall; anyhow, the largest bed was prepared for him and he lay on it with big legs bent and his head high up on the pillow. His

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[1308] Ibid; p. 380.

[1309] P. Loti; Jaeckh; J. McCarthy; etc. referred to above, or see bibliography for full refs.

wound was in the abdomen; he had peritonitis, with a fever incredibly high. Yet he was perfectly lucid, though very restless. The doctor had no hopes of him, but it was hard to believe that such a grand human specimen could so easily die. The last thing I did before leaving the ward was to feed him with milk. Suddenly I noticed the sergeant trying to raise himself up in bed, his eyes bulging with the effort. I must have looked surprised, for he apologized.
"We fought together," he said; "he is such a lion of a lad and now to see him fed by a woman with a spoon!"
Next day when I walked out of the ward to speak to the doctor, something extraordinary was happening. From the stairs leading to the large landing there was literally a throng of stretchers, and crammed between them were men with bandaged heads and arms and supporting each other. Except for Sergeant Mustafa, nobody seemed to have room to move. The gigglers had their giggles frozen on their lips and stood flattened against the wall. The doctors with blood-smeared aprons came in and out of the operating theater, where lacerated masses of human flesh lay on the tables. Everywhere was silence except for the patter of feet. A young officer, quite blind, clutching the hands of two of the wounded . . . and a big man on a stretcher crying aloud suddenly-crying as if his heart would break, rebelliously, stubbornly refusing to be carried to the operating theater: "I don't want to live! I don't care! He is dead-my commander is dead!" A middle aged major, all bandaged, tried to comfort him in vain....
"We have squeezed eight beds into the room opposite; please take charge." It was Dr. Shemseddine who whispered to me and passed on. The elderly major was leaning against the door of the room, white and faint. I tried to make him sit on a small table that stood near the door of my new ward. "That lad has upset me," he said apologetically. "I have had no food the last twenty-four hours-could you get me a cup of tea?" I got him some tea. When I looked around to give the next cup to another, I saw a stretcher practically under my feet. A face half bandaged, the other half smeared with blood-kneaded mud, the arm bandaged, the jacket torn and caked in mud, and, in spite of it all, gray-blue eyes which looked on as coolly and as steadily as if he were walking down the street..... I went on washing the men, dressing them, and laying them in their beds-that is, so that what was left of them should suffer as little as possible.'[1310]

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4. Interlude, Mustafa Kemal Granted Overall Command:

'The National Assembly in Ankara was in uproar, the civilian population in panic.'[1311]

On 24 July, the Prime Minister Fevzi (Çakmak) informed the Assembly that it had been decided to evacuate Ankara within a week and to move the government to Kayseri; whilst the army, he added, although having suffered losses, had withdrawn to new positions, and might even withdraw further to fight on until victory was won.[1312] Following his speech, the deputies demanded that commanders responsible for the defeat should be punished: 'I am the only commander responsible,' Fevzi replied.[1313]

[1310] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 266-70.
[1311] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 316.
[1312] Ibid.
[1313] Ibid.

In any case, Ankara would be defended; while offices and documents would be sent to Kayseri, the Assembly would remain in session in Ankara.[1314]

It was not an ideal situation as some panic had set in, morale fallen down, stragglers and deserters roaming about, rumours of the worst sort circulating, the people, of course, now dreading the arrival of the Greeks, and their perpetrating of their usual atrocities.[1315]

Rather than flee further eastward, the Turks chose to stand. In the three weeks it took the Greeks to prepare for the next offensive, the Turks exploited the time to prepare for the battle. Everyone came forth to volunteer. Military members of the Assembly obtained permission to serve at the front, deputies rushed to recruitment offices, and levies soon began arriving in Ankara to be sent by train to Polatlı, the station nearest the Sakarya River.[1316] And now, more importantly, many members of the Assembly demanded that rather than devoting himself to politics, Mustafa Kemal should take over direct command of the army.[1317] He agreed only on condition that he should be given the full authority of the Assembly, which was overwhelmingly accepted.[1318]

As soon as he was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Mustafa Kemal issued a proclamation to the nation. The enemy, he declared, would be

> 'Throttled in the inner sanctuary (harim-i ismet) of the fatherland.'[1319]

And he followed words by the action that was necessary.

Preparations for Battle

Mustafa Kemal in earnest established National Commissions for Requisitions, which made the population contribute stocks of food, clothing, shoes, horses, and any other material which would be of use in the upcoming struggle. Every owner of transport was to move army supplies a month free of charge; besides giving the military all carts and carriages; all weapons scattered as far as Erzurum and Diyarbakır, Sivas, and Trabzon, were loaded on to the long peasant oxcarts beneath loads of hay for the oxen, and were rushed to the front, many of them driven by peasant women.[1320]

> The women [says Kinross] jacketed and pantalooned, with their feet in rope-bound woollens, drove the carts over mountain and plateau, covering hundreds of miles to the front at a mere three miles per hour, the solid wooden wheels creaking and sighing over the tracks as they had done since Sumerian times. Many of the women carried babies, lashed securely to their backs, as they loaded and unloaded the artillery shells and the rope-handled boxes of

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[1314] Arıkoğlu, Damar, Hatıralarım (My Memoirs), Tan, Istanbul 1961; 237.
[1315] See, for instance, what befell populations that came under Greek sway following their advance in Gehri, M. (Delegue du Comite International de la Croix Rouge): 'Mission d'Enquete en Anatolie, op cit.
[1316] Arikoglu, op cit; 239.
[1317] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 317.
[1318] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 272.
[1319] Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri (ATTB) (Circulars, Telegrams and Proclamations by Atatürk), 1991, 413.
[1320] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 31.

> ammunition, carrying a shell on each shoulder and carefully covering it with a shawl, often at the expense of the baby, to protect the delicate fuses from dust or rain. When the carts broke down they hoisted the loads on to their backs and carried them thus for miles.[1321]

By a strike of good fortune, a shipment of Russian arms and ammunition had just arrived by sea in Zonguldak, and thither was dispatched to the war front.[1322] Then the best was made of Refet's organisational skills:

> As a Minister of War [Kinross says] he speeded up the oxcart convoys by a system of relays, no longer changing the carts at each village as the peasants had preferred, but changing the oxen instead at fixed staging-points, to draw them right through to the battlefield. He had carpets cut up to make tunics for the soldiers, and petrol-tins converted into medicine canteens. In the absence of flour he instructed the peasants to boil up their raw grain or to grind it with pestle and mortar, until a single disused flour-mill could be put back into commission. In the absence of timber, on this plateau denuded of trees, wooden houses were demolished to fire the trains.
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> Ploughshares were almost literally beaten into swords. The railway workshops in Angora were turned over to the forging of daggers and bayonets. Everywhere maintenance workshops were improvised, so that no weapon might go un-repaired. Refet was searching for recruits for the army from the remotest corners of the country. Recruiting appeals were broadcast from the tops of the minarets. Those who responded might have to travel on foot for hundreds of miles, often through country harassed by bandits.
>
> They might find, when they arrived, that there were no arms to equip them. On leaving for the front they would be instructed to pick up those of the dead and wounded – and those of the enemy.[1323]

The fighting men, in their countless thousands were rushing to the front. Here is yet another account by Halide Edib, who herself had volunteered to the front:

> Only a short line from Angora to Sarikeuy [Sarıköy] remained in the hands of the Turks. As there was next to no coal, the trains ran only for military purposes, with wood which was cut down and brought to the stations with infinite trouble.... At each station new recruits came and took their places in the trucks; women stood on the platform and looked on with silent agony on their faces: one old woman ran after the train, her toothless mouth a black gap frozen into a voiceless groan of despair. The men held each other's hands in the trucks and called out to those in other trucks, asking for any who might be from their particular place or village. "Is there a man from Castamoni?" "Is there a man from Changiri?" "Is there....?" One heard them say....
>
> There was a current of absolute strength and faith with which one came into contact occasionally, and which gave one the impression of a high and immovable courage. It came from the officer element, from the youngest and

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[1321] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 273.
[1322] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* John Murray; London; 1999; p. 317.
[1323] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 273-4.

> most unknown. Sakaria is the battle of the youthful and unknown officer. As the train plunged into the illimitable wastes of Anatolia I knew that this was going to be the turning point in the hardest ordeal Anatolia had as yet gone through... Two men were trying to climb on to the train and looked in through my broken window. I leaned out and asked, "What is it, countrymen?" One of them managed to reach my hand and kiss it. "We two were from Commander Nazim Bey's division. We are in this village; we came to kiss your hand." He helped his comrade to reach up to my hand and kiss it, and then put it on his forehead as is done with a mother's hand.
> "Good luck, countrymen!" I called out as they walked away hand in hand in the manner of little boys. My voice sounded hoarse: I was trying to fill myself with the invisible resolve and faith of the officer.[1324]

On 12 August, Mustafa Kemal travelled with Fevzi, the Chief of the General Staff, to the headquarters at Polatlı, located on the railway fifty miles to the south-west of Ankara. On arrival he rode to the top of Karadağ, the commanding hilltop, and surveyed the probable line of the enemy advance. As he remounted, the horse reared away and threw him violently on to his side, causing him to break a rib, momentarily affecting his breathing and speech. A doctor warned him, 'You will die if you go on.' 'I shall be all right when the battle is over,' he answered.[1325]
The soldiers quoted him as saying, 'It is a sign from Allah. On the spot where one of my bones has been broken the resistance of the enemy will also be broken.'[1326]
He returned to Ankara for treatment, and it was not until 17 August that he finally assumed his command.[1327]

On 13 August, the Greek army advanced from Eskişehir towards Ankara. Constantine's battle-cry was, 'To Angora!' and the British liaison officers were invited to a victory dinner in 'the city of Kemal.' The Athens press now compared the venture to 'the noble conquests of Alexander the Great.'[1328] The Greek armies were 'to cut once again the "Gordian Knot" as he had done, and thus 'to found an Empire in Asia.' For Gordion was on the direct line of advance. 'They forgot,' Toynbee observed, 'that Alexander had not after all outwitted the oracle, since he had cut, not untied, the knot, thus failing permanently to annex western Anatolia to his kingdom, as Constantine now aspired to do.'[1329]

The Greeks arrived in full force on 23 August, numbering around 100,000 troops.[1330]
The Greek plan was to make a turning manoeuvre at the Turkish left with the objective of forcing the Turks back and opening the road to Ankara, and at the same

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[1324] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 284-5.
[1325] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 274.
[1326] Ibid.
[1327] S.N. Ozerdim: *Ataturk*, op cit; 57.
[1328] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 275.
[1329] A.J. Toynbee: *Western*; op cit; p. 222.
[1330] C. Erikan: *Komutan;* op cit; 713; 733.

time to seek out and destroy the Turkish army.[1331] Some Greek officers had thought that it was better to dig in at Eskişehir, and lure the Turks into a hazardous counter-offensive.[1332] This was dismissed on the grounds that the Turks remained strong, and rather than let them rebuild their strength, and with autumn and winter looming, the best policy was to seize on the impetus of victory, seek the Turks out, and finish them. General Papoulas, in command, aimed for an enveloping manoeuvre which would cut off Turkish troops, and finish them there and then. The main objective was to have battle. The Turks this time would give battle; there would be no retreat.

5. The Great Battle of Sakarya (August 1921)

The Sakarya is one of the three great rivers which cut their way through the Anatolian plateau and pours into the Black Sea, throwing out a loop before Ankara. 'Flowing from the west it coils suddenly northwards, over a fifty-mile reach, then, as suddenly turns back on its tracks to the west.'[1333]

It was beyond this point, 'in a bare primitive region of plains patched with stubble and of hills rearing up from them, broken by outcrops of rock,' that the Turks decided to stand and await the arrival of the Greeks. The Turks had dug in on the edges of the Haymana Plateau – a rolling plain, at an altitude of some 3,000 feet to the south east of Ankara.[1334] The plateau is dominated by a number of hills, the most prominent of all being Mount Mangal (Mangal Dağ, literally Mount Brazier) overlooking the Ilıca Valley in the south, and Mount Çal (Çal Dağ, meaning 'bare, stony mountain') in the centre, west of the small town of Haymana.[1335] The Turkish front, Kinross explains, 'was flanked north and south by two tributaries of the Sakarya, completing as it were a loop in reverse, while the main channel of the river protected its centre.' The narrow stream, now in the summer quite shallow, runs through a series of gorges with precipitous banks, and could be crossed at only two places, north and south, which gave the Turks a good defensive position.[1336]

> The Turkish positions [Mango further details] followed the Sakarya River from north to south until its confluence with a tributary, the Ilıcaözü, where they swung east along the Ilıca valley. They thus formed a right angle. Papoulas' aim was to break through the base of the angle by crossing the shallow Ilıca stream and then thrust north-east to Haymana and Ankara, which, should he succeed, would cut off Turkish troops on the east bank of the Sakarya.[1337]

This was the unavoidable setting of the great battle. There was another possibility, which Edib subsequently raised:

[1331] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560. M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*, 229.
[1332] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 275.
[1333] Ibid; p. 276.
[1334] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1335] Ibid.
[1336] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 276.
[1337] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 318-9.

> I had a feeling that the Greek dragon, so much thicker and so much bigger than ours, might after all reach Angora first and leave us behind.
> "What if they finally reach Angora and leave us [the Turks] behind?" I said.
> He [Mustafa Kemal] 'chuckled in his dangerous, tiger-like way' and replied: 'I will say, "Bon voyage, messieurs!" And I will attack them behind and they will perish in the wilds.'[1338]

Mustafa Kemal established his headquarters in Alagöz, a village overlooking the plateau from the north and situated roughly half-way between Ankara and Polatlı.[1339] He wore the uniform of an ordinary soldier, without badges of rank, for the Assembly had given him no official military status and he had had none since his dismissal from the army back in July 1919. With his ailing rib still in bandages, he was unable to ride on horseback or get nearer to the battle scene, and so from a seat brought from a train, he directed the general course of the battle.[1340] Fevzi, most of all, and İsmet, as his second, conducted the campaign on the ground.[1341]
İsmet wrote, 'The western front headquarters was large enough for us and our staff officers … Mustafa Kemal slept even less than usual, dropping off just before dawn … The pain of his broken rib robbed him of such little rest as he had time for.'[1342]
Halide Edib, who had enrolled as a corporal and joined him at his headquarters, would eventually record the battle, giving without a doubt, at least in English, the best account of it.[1343] Describing the meticulous attention to detail of the commander-in-chief, Mustafa Kemal, she says:

> In that half-built humble Anatolian room he embodied the resolve of the young to die in order that a nation might live. No palace, no title, no power will ever make him as great as he was in that room from where he was to lead the Turks to their final stand against annihilation. I went up to him and kissed his hand.
> "Welcome, Hanum Effendi," he said.[1344]
> In view of the sentiment of the Assembly, so he cabled to Karabekir in Erzurum, he had no choice but to give battle west of Ankara; however, he added, "our position is unfavourable."[1345]

There was now no other choice or alternative. The Greeks were close. The armies involved numbered over 100,000 each; fighting amongst the Greeks were great numbers of local Greeks (in other words Turkish subjects); the Greeks once more having heavy superiority in artillery, aeroplanes, and other equipment, the Turkish advantage being in cavalry.[1346] The Greeks used twenty-one aeroplanes against the

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[1338] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; p. 288.
[1339] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 319.
[1340] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 276.
[1341] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 319.
[1342] İsmet İnönü: Hatıralar (Memoirs), ed. Sabahattin Selek, Bilgi, Istanbul, I, 1985; II, 1987; I, 262
[1343] H. Edib: *The Turkish ordeal*, 284-310.
[1344] Ibid; p. 287.
[1345] K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*, op cit; 933.
[1346] C. Erikan: *Komutan,* op cit; 713; 733.

Turkish one.[1347] The airmen who used the machine provided valuable information about the movements of the enemy, and also bombed successfully the Greek air fleet and their convoys. 'The outstanding figure, Captain Fazil, was one who would have captured the imagination of the whole world.'[1348]

The ensuing battle lasted for twenty-two days and nights. Kemal afterwards claimed that it was, by one day, the longest pitched battle in history.[1349] The series of heights occupied by the Turks had to be stormed by the Greeks one by one, and as a result, entire units perished as rugged hills were bitterly fought over, lost, captured, and lost again.[1350]

The setting of the Battle of Sakarya

[1347] H. Edib: T*urkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 300.
[1348] Ibid.
[1349] *A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal,* p. 522.
[1350] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560.

The Battle (23 Aug 1921)

On 23 August, the Greeks advanced against the Turkish left, positioned south of the stream, and, in an all night battle, forced it to pull away from Mangal Dağ.[1351] Mustafa Kemal reacted angrily, and threatened court-martialling the commanders of the Turkish 5th Division for its failure to defend the peak and ordered the unit 'to retrieve its honour by holding fast to its new positions.'[1352] The Greeks on their side, submitted the Turks to intense artillery fire before they made progress, capturing several positions on the hills as they swung north towards Mount Çal.[1353]

Greek artillery gradually caused so many losses that on 26 August İsmet proposed a retreat to a new line of defence. Fevzi turned down the suggestion and decided to hold on round Mount Çal, bringing reinforcements from the northern flank. On that same day, in the evening, the Greek commander-in-chief, Papoulas, and Prince Andrew, King Constantine's younger brother, who commanded the 2nd Army Corps, narrowly escaped capture as Colonel Fahrettin's cavalry stumbled on their headquarters at Uzunbeyli Village, south of the Ilıca valley, but they were unaware of their presence.[1354] Fahrettin at that very moment responded to a call from İsmet to move north where the situation had become alarming.[1355] Mustafa Kemal, just then called at once for the formation of a new line of defence, but also insisted that every inch should be defended till the end.[1356] The following day, 27 August, he proclaimed that what was to be defended

> 'Was not a line, but the country as a whole. Every unit was to stand its ground, even if neighbouring units were forced to fall back.'
>
> 'Retiring groups will halt when they can, but the whole line will not retire to form a new front. All of Turkey shall be our surface of defence, upon which our units will resist everywhere and all the time.' Not an inch of the country should be abandoned until it was 'drenched with the blood of the citizens. Every unit, dislodged from its position, but every unit, large or small, re-establishes itself in face of the enemy at the first spot where it can hold its ground, and goes on fighting. Units which observe the neighbouring ones forced to retire must not link their own fate to theirs; they must hold their positions to the end.' Section after section of his front was pierced by the Greeks, but the gap was filled by reinforcements for as long as they lasted, in as short a time as possible.'[1357]

Subsequently, he reported to the National Assembly that, ironically, the initial Greek advance worked in Turkish favour, as it shortened the line of defence and made it

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[1351] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 319.
[1352] İsmet İnönü, op cit; I, 262.
[1353] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 320.
[1354] Ibid.
[1355] Ibid.
[1356] Ibid.
[1357] C. Erikan: *Komutan*, op cit; 721-3. P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 278.

easier to defend 'Instead of fighting on two sides of a right angle, Turkish troops now held the hypotenuse.'[1358]

During the battle, the troops put on the most determined fight, just as at Gallipoli, dying on the spot without surrendering anything to the enemy. The Greeks could indeed muster the best of what the West had; including artillery, and the guns' impact was now similar, blasting men and defences atrociously. Mustafa Kemal hardly spared himself, until four or five in the morning, one officer after another coming in and bringing different reports.[1359] At times İsmet also came in, but so worn out he was that on two occasions he slept on his wooden chair at once.[1360] Mustafa Kemal's attention was entirely caught in the battle, conversing on the latest developments, his eyes on the map unfolded in front of him, 'moving the tiny red and blue flags on the pins hither and thither, rehearsed aloud all the possibilities in the coming encounter between the armies.'[1361] No detail escaped him as he perused the Order of Battle, pouncing on any error, however minute.[1362] His knowledge of the detail, both human and material, of the army he was handling 'seemed to me nothing short of uncanny,' says Halide Edib.[1363] In a split of a second he could visualise the whole ensemble, the number of every regiment down to very small units, and their position on the map.[1364] Colonel Arif, by his side, provided the knowledge of the land, and that of the moral qualities of many commanders. Leaning

> Over the pasha's shoulder, his face looking like that of a twin brother and saying in his low tones, "The village X lies ten kilometres to the north; there are two mounds on the left." "Excellent – the commander of the regiment?" "Like wood – stupid – but what a soldier! – and the men are veterans. No fear of artillery panic in that quarter: when they exhaust their ammunition, they will fight with bayonets, commander and all."[1365]

So observant was Mustafa Kemal was, at one crucial moment during the battle, Intelligence reported that the position was lost due to strong Greek concentrations against enfeebled Turkish defences only for Kemal to intervene: 'Bring me all last week's reports on the placing of the Greek units.'[1366] In a split of a moment he rightly concluded, 'The Intelligence Branch is mistaken. We have the enemy beaten.'[1367] Meanwhile, in Ankara, anxious deputies were receiving two daily briefings a day, assuring them that as long as Mount Çal (Chaldag / Çaldağ) remained in Turkish hands, there was nothing to worry about.[1368]

[1358] Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (ASD) (Speeches and Statements by Atatürk), I, 193.
[1359] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 292.
[1360] Ibid.
[1361] Ibid.
[1362] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 278.
[1363] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; p. 292.
[1364] Ibid.
[1365] Ibid.
[1366] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 278.
[1367] Ibid.
[1368] Arıkoğlu, Damar, Hatıralarım (My Memoirs), Tan, Istanbul 1961, 250, 253–4.

Heavy Greek artillery fire and numerical advantage met with stubborn Turkish fight, and some positions on the hills were won and lost at least seven times, and each time, this meant the complete annihilation of a Turkish unit.[1369] In the midst of carnage and even when all the odds seemed against the Turks holding, Fevzi, in the lead, retained enough serenity and, even more, certainty of success, which decisively sustained not just him but those around him.[1370] He had a strange light in his eyes and

> The air of a man who has a great secret conviction, which came in part from his religious faith. At the front he moved from trench to trench, reciting passages from the Koran to strengthen the morale of his men. On one occasion, when Kemal sent for him urgently, he could not be found. Finally an officer came upon him behind a large rock, out of sight of headquarters. He was tranquilly performing his devotions.[1371]

Under the hot Anatolian sun, it is easy to imagine the gigantic and brutal fight over a land, parched now, but as much precious as sacred to tens of thousands of men, equally determined, blasting each other with all that old and modern warfare had gifted them, none giving quarter, none daring to ask for it; heat, fear, courage and violent death now ruling supreme as caught in this unique picture:

[1369] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; p. 292.
[1370] Ibid; p. 296.
[1371] Halide Edib; p. 296; Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 280.

The picture is also a Greek propagandist illustration, which refers at the bottom to the defeat of the Turks as announced by the Greeks straight in the wake of the battle.
In fact, in ten days, the Greeks could only advance ten miles.[1372] The Turks fought mainly in the centre but the battle now shifted round once more to the left, the Greeks seeking to outflank the Turks and advance on Ankara.[1373] The Greek line, Kinross explains 'had swivelled round until its axis was rather from east to west than north to south, and at the eastern end of it the Greeks were now nearer to Angora than the Turks themselves at the western.'[1374]

The Turkish position was growing precarious, the road to Ankara under threat, the one strong Turkish position remaining being a high ridge on their left, Çaldağ, rising a thousand feet from the plateau between the two principal Turkish positions, commanding the railway to Ankara and the battlefield.[1375] 'Flatly scored with a pattern of vertebrae like the hide of a reptile, it offered little cover and was hard to defend.'[1376]
Holding this and other protective mountains would, for the time being, safeguard the capital. 'Until they occupy the Mount of Chal [Çaldağ],' Kemal would say, 'there is nothing serious to worry about; but if they do that, we had better look out – they could easily occupy Haymana, and after that they have us in a trap.'[1377]
Understandably, the people of Ankara could still consider making a stand on each of the several hills between Çaldağ and the city and, as one of them put it, 'If we leave so many dead on the summit of each one of them, the enemy, on arriving here, will be reduced to about fifty. And those we shall beat to death with sticks.'[1378]

The Greeks had realised the importance of Çaldağ, and so now concentrated both fire and assaults sparing neither firepower nor the lives of their men; and the Turks were equally resolute on holding to it, the Greeks incurring so horrendous losses until 'lieutenants were commanding battalions and a division of artillery was reduced to seventeen shells.'[1379]
In some places the fighting was so fierce that some Turkish units had to fight three Greek divisions at once.[1380] The Çaldağ wrested one of the heaviest tolls in any military campaign — to such an extent, it seemed the two armies might just crumble on its heights. Then, on 2 September, after some of the bloodiest fighting Turkey had ever seen, the Turks were driven off the commanding heights.[1381] Disastrous news came in the evening of that same day: that Çaldağ had fallen, and that the Greeks were now marching on Haymana. Halide Edib recounted the scene at headquarters:

[1372] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560.
[1373] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 279.
[1374] Ibid.
[1375] Ibid.
[1376] Ibid.
[1377] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 295.
[1378] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 279.
[1379] Ibid.
[1380] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; p. 298.
[1381] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560.

> There was grim silence everywhere, and the ugliest sort of fate seemed to hang over everyone in the headquarters. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was most affected. He fumed, swore, walked up and down, talked loudly, summed up the situation with the rare lucidity of a delirium, and tormented himself with indecision as to whether he should order the retreat or not. And I sat opposite him feeling as if the iron curtain of doom, something like the fire curtain of a theatre, was coming down, ever so slowly but surely.[1382]

The fight for Çaldağ had raged for four days, and in the little room at Alagöz headquarters, staff officers were discussing the desperate situation, and the final possibilities.[1383]

> A retreat meant certain defeat while continued resistance meant probable defeat. Was there any alternative? Time was getting on to two o'clock. Nerves were threatening to give out. Suddenly the phone bell rang. The officers roused themselves and strained themselves to catch the message.[1384]

Fevzi Pasha was on the line. He had been in the field throughout the battle.

> 'The dimly lighted landing, with the half-built ceiling from the beams of which cobwebs dangle, is like a stage-scene. The guards in their black, and the entire household behind the few officers who stand in a line--eyes glisten over their shoulders, hectic, curious, anxious-I am leaning against the door,' says Halide.[1385]

In the room opposite, Mustafa Kemal Pasha is at the telephone [speaking to Fevzi]:

> … A breathless instant, then: "Mustafa Kemal speaking. Is that you, Pasha Hazretleri? What? Did you say that the day is in our favour? Did I understand right? Haymana is nearly occupied? Do you say that the Greeks are at the end of their strength? What? A coming retreat of the Greeks?…"
>
> Eyes flash fiercely from the group, standing in the dim background of the landing.[1386]
>
> "The Chal Heights regained? The enemy is at the end of their strength?" ... Mustafa Kemal sprang to his feet.[1387]
>
> Turning round:
>
> ''Gentlemen, this is the great turning-point."[1388]
>
> As he returns to the group,
>
> … There is a strange chuckle in his throat, half amused, half pleased. Will the division he is sending to close the gap be there before the Greeks make another move? He calculates, writes, the red and blue flags are moved higher and thither. There are enormous blue circles around his eyes, he looks like a face in Dante's inferno, tortured beyond words.[1389]

[1382] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; p. 297.
[1383] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560.
[1384] Ibid.
[1385] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 297.
[1386] Ibid.
[1387] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 560; Halide Edib; 297.
[1388] D. Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* op cit; p. 294·
[1389] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 298.

> "Hadn't you better rest, Pasha?" I [Halide] said.
> "No, I cannot," he says hoarsely. "Let us have another coffee. Is that rascal Ali asleep?"[1390]
> Ali was one of his serving sergeants. Is there such a thing as an accidental human gesture which may change the tide of a people's destiny? If so, it is that call of Fevzi Pasha![1391]

This was the turning point of the battle. The Turks by sheer determination, will power, courage, and exceptional leadership, had won. The two armies had shattered each other, bled each other, decimated each other. The Turks held on the longest. The Greeks, now their force thinned considerably, could no longer follow up their attack on Haymana, and the Turks rushed reserves to close the gap in their line.[1392] Whilst the Turks had reserves, the Greeks, according to prisoners in Turkish hands, having counted on a shorter campaign, had run out of supplies, and even worse for them, their companies were reduced from a hundred and fifty to thirty men.[1393]
The Turks could now strike back.
Ankara was now safe; now it was time to eject the Greeks westwards. Troops needed to be switched to the right and the centre for a counter-offensive.[1394]

Hard fighting continued for seven more days.[1395] The Turks threw everything at the Greeks; tearing them as ferociously as they ever could, one officer, Kemaleddine Sami Pasha, calling Mustafa Kemal in the middle of the night, begging for ammunition in heart-breaking terms.[1396] There was hardly anything left to throw at the Greeks. Attacked from all sides, broken, Turkish cavalry harassing their positions incessantly, their transport captured or destroyed, their ammunition depots exploded, and stations raided, the Greek position had grown desperate.[1397] Even the rest of Edhem's old forces, who had left him because of his treachery, but had declined to join the regular army and lived on the mountains in the occupied area, now inflicted on the Greeks a murderous guerrilla war. Greek prisoners said that they had already lost one third of their forces.[1398] Fahrettin's cavalry was now threatening to cut their lines of communications.[1399] It was time for the Greeks to flee westwards. The Turks were on their heels.

[1390] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 280.
[1391] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit;; p. 298.
[1392] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; 298. P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 280.
[1393] Ibid.
[1394] Ibid.
[1395] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 561.
[1396] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; 298.
[1397] Ibid; 299.
[1398] Ibid.
[1399] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 320.

Here, we have Halide Edib's narration of what followed, with details of crucial importance, which cannot be found in any work in English, or most certainly any other, except her own:[1400]

> On the morning of the ninth of September ... headquarters was ordered to move on...
>
> The headquarters moved to railway carriages standing ten miles away from Puladli [Polatlı], where the fighting was going on. They stood in a curve, both sides of which were hidden by high hills....
>
> "That gun over on the left is a fifteen-centimeter one," said one of the officers proudly. We reached the foot of a hill where a Tartar village nestled close, and dismounted. Then we climbed the hill, keeping to one particular side. We caught sight of the Fifty-seventh Division huddled together in a narrow gorge. It was the reserve one of the Third Army Corps, which was making the offensive: the Fifteenth and the Twenty-third were fighting. From the top of the hill, over which the Greek aero-planes whirred and buzzed in the manner of giant bees and wasps, one had a marvellous view.
>
> The hill overlooked a wide valley bounded on three sides by the hills of Gordium [Gordiyon], Puladli, and Katirli [Katırlı]. Earth coloured masses moved on in the valley, and on the hills immense clouds of earth and smoke, black and ugly, rose into the air, and shrapnel exploded, sending down pretty tapering wreaths of bluish smoke.
>
> "It looks so pretty at night," said one of the officers. I saw Pasha's man, Sergeant Ali, coming toward me, and as he approached he knelt down.
>
> "What is it, Ali Chavoush?" I asked.
>
> "Your left spur is put on the wrong side. Pasha sent me to put it right," he said grinning. And over his shoulders I saw Mustafa Kemal Pasha's face peering from a trench and laughing at me. "Come in here, Hanum Effendi; we are fighting," he said, with the delighted voice of a boy who is at his favourite game. I went toward him and jumped into the trench. "Colonel Kiazim, the commander of the third group," said Mustafa Kemal Pasha. A man with a very pointed shrewd nose and very small and cunning eyes, in a fur coat, sat by a telephone and spoke quietly with the distant hills. A field-glass glistened in the trench. "We are attacking 'Dua-Tepe,' the highest hill on the left,'' Mustafa Kemal Pasha began explaining. I went along to other trenches. The hills surrounding the valley at our feet were lively with the lugubrious intonation of artillery, and the nervous *tac-tac* of the machine-guns. Through the field-glass I was seeing the game of war as it is played, and the beast in me was enjoying it as much as the rest, forgetting what its results would look like in the hospitals later on. I could see men coming nearer and nearer, and even the fall of the men in the front line, leaving it indented and broken; and the final onslaught with bayonets. Thus the ants take their exercises around the small yellow mounds of their nests. Until I realized that those who could not rise after the smoke had

[1400] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 301-5.

cleared away had had their eyes opened to reality and were scorning this clumsy, stupid game of death, I was feeling sorry for them for not having been able to continue.

"Do you see that black pyramid, very pointed? It is called the Black Mountain [Kara-Dagh]. Look there, through that opening, and you will see the Greek retreat." Yes, I looked and I saw a mighty cloud of dust rising from the ground to the sunlit sky, and a dark mass flowing ceaselessly like a flood.

"The Greeks are fighting gallantly," he went on; "their artillery is doing its utmost, and sacrificing itself to cover the retreat of the main forces."

It was this clear-sightedness of Papulas, this early order of retreat, that made the war go on for another year. From a soldier's point of view it was admirable, but from the human point of view it would have been better if the war had ended there and then.

The battle lasted till four o'clock, the two sides being kept in suspense until Major Muharrem said to Major Tewfik:

"The Twenty-third Division has entered Chekirdekler, behind the 'Dua-Tepe.' The Fifteenth Division should be told, for it is in a bad way. Corpora! will come with us," and turning to me he added, as if promising something to a child:

"You will be now at a place where people die by artillery fire." So we three started in a carriage and went as far as we could with it; then we walked stealthily and carefully till a narrow opening was in view. It seemed to me that we could almost touch "Dua-Tepe," where men moved frantically under the smoke, when from the opening something glistened and a metallic voice rang out: "*Atesh ... sh ... sh*!" (Fire!). The glistening object wiggled: smoke and a boom. We had come up to our own artillery. The same metallic voice shouted out harshly:

"Walk on your faces."

"They do not want their position to be discovered," whispered Major Muharrem in a consoling tone, while we walked on all fours, I was feeling extremely ridiculous.

"Be careful; we are at the commander's trench," whispered one of them, and an arm which seemed like that of a giant in a story-book stretched out and pulled me in. It was that of the commander, Colonel Shukri Nalli (who subsequently became pasha and commander of the Third Army Corps in Istanbul). He is a man nearly seven feet tall, with an enormous blonde head and very blue childish eyes: the smoke on his bronzed face made them glisten strangely. He lifted me up to his field-glass in the trench and added pleasantly:

"Now, Corporal, you will fire at the Greeks from my trench."

I asked to be excused. My exultation never went so far. He went on with the business of war, directing the artillery. As we crawled back again very carefully, I thought that Colonel Shukri Nalli would look ideal in a Teutonic camp of the old days. Colonel Arif had spoken of him as the commander who could use his bayonet like a common private if the occasion demanded. Seven

division commanders had already died in Sakaria: I hoped that he would not be the eighth. Dua-Tepe was taken. My last vision of it was with a single Turk standing all alone against the setting sun, his water-bottle glistening against the blue-gold sky.

We returned to headquarters at nine. The valley we had come through was now enveloped in inky air, the groups of men and transport lit here and there by ruddy flames casting their tremulous shades that moved around them. Again we rode wildly, the hoofs (of the horses) making that strange echo in the valley.

This lasted nearly a week. The Turkish offensive on Kara Dagh [Karadağ] carried on by the Fifty-seventh Division took place. As I watched it I understood how the individuals ceased to be separate beings, with feelings and thoughts of their own, but got submerged in the killing and dying mass. Of course, there would be no more war if this were not so. At half-past nine in the evening we descended the hill. The Fifty-seventh Division, composed of 1200 men, had already lost seven hundred men. And I was gradually being criticized by my normal self, which was wondering how I had got lost in the grim and ghastly emotion of Hell Scenario and the hell music on the mountains. I felt extremely tired, and Colonel Kiazim [Kâzim], the commander, asked me to rest in his tent while we were waiting for Mustafa Kemal Pasha. I sat on the straw bed of the commander and mused, till Mustafa Kemal Pasha's car growled; then I joined the others and we followed him on horseback.

The Greeks were leaving the eastern part of Sakaria as fast as they could. We would soon move to Puladli.[1401]

The Greeks, under steady hammering and threatened with cut-off by the Turkish cavalry, began a general retreat, trailing back to their starting-point on the rim of the plateau, and true to their usual practice, murdering, pillaging and destroying all that crossed their path.[1402] On 14 September, Turkish cavalry raided the Greek headquarters at Sivrihisar and got away with Papoulas' five war medals, but the surviving Greek army, managed to find its way to its starting point at Eskişehir.[1403]

'The Gordion of Alexander, with its bridge across the Sakarya River, had been abandoned, the knot still untied.' As Toynbee enquired: 'Would a Greek army ever penetrate that distance into Anatolia again?'[1404]

[1401] Edib 301-305.
[1402] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 282.
[1403] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 321.
[1404] A.J. Toynbee: *The Western Question*; p. 238.



Prayers at Sakarya for victory

Mustafa Kemal, in praising his troops, ascribed their salvation of their 'sacred country to the grace of God. After the battle he changed into civilian clothes, and returned unannounced, in his decrepit staff car, to Angora.[1405] Walking into the Assembly he received an ovation from Ankara's population 'who had lived for three weeks with the sound of the guns, then had heard it recede, carried on through the night amid a blaze of torches.'

Using maps, Mustafa Kemal stated the details of the battle and what lessons could be learnt from it. To a friend, he remarked, 'I think that what I do best is my job as a soldier.'[1406]

In Athens, in the meantime, Te Deums of thanksgiving were being sung in the churches.[1407] As Churchill summed it up:

> The Greeks had involved themselves in a politico-strategic situation where anything short of decisive victory was defeat: and the Turks were in a position where anything short of overwhelming defeat was victory.[1408]

No aspect of this was hidden from 'the warrior-chief who led the Turks.' On the motion of Fevzi and İsmet, Mustafa Kemal was promoted to the rank of Marshal, and endowed with the honorific title of Gazi.[1409]

[1405] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 282.
[1406] Ibid.
[1407] Ibid; p. 283.
[1408] Ibid.
[1409] Ibid.

The battle of Sakarya had lasted for twenty-one days. It was fought along a front of sixty miles, to a depth of twelve miles.[1410] The Turks lost 3,700 dead, 300 of them officers, and 18,000 wounded; their prisoners and missing numbered under a thousand. The retreating Greeks left nearly 15,000 men behind.[1411] When the front moved forward in Sakarya, Halide Edib moved forward, too.

> From Malli we took the train, taking our horses with us, and for the first time I saw the famous Fazil, the hero of the air. He and his little gray dog sat opposite me in the compartment. A neat, poorly dressed officer, with a broad, regular face and very gray eyes, serene, good, and sad. He seemed a person alone, looking at something which the others did not see, and reconciled to being shut in behind the walls of a unique individuality.[1412]
>
> If Fazil was to me the superman among the Turkish fighters in those days, Dr. Murad, the general inspector of the field health department, was the miracle of mercy. He seemed to create hospitals and ambulances out of nothing, transporting the wounded in ox-carts. Already a cold, bleak wind blew on the wilds, and thousands of those wounded who still had the use of their legs tottered on, their heads or arms bandaged, their faces masks of pain and weariness. And Dr. Murad wandered in the vast desert on his own horse, a man of powerful physique, great will-power, and an exceptional medical training which would have distinguished him in any country. Often he even worked under fire, transporting and bandaging in the field.[1413]

Years later, an artist presented Mustafa Kemal with a large picture of the Battle of Sakarya in which he was shown in the foreground on a magnificent horse. The painter, who was expecting congratulations, was told instead: 'That picture must never be exhibited.' There was an uneasy silence. 'All those who took part in the battle,' he explained, 'know very well that our horses were all skin and bone and that we were hardly any better ourselves. Skeletons all of us. In painting those fine warriors and sleek horses, you dishonour Sakarya, my friend.'[1414]

*****

The Impact of Sakarya was considerable, not just in Turkey, but throughout the world. It was the model, the inspiration other Muslims sought and needed. The sympathy and support for Turkey was immense from the Muslims in India, which at the time was one country (Pakistan would get its independence in 1947). From the Khilafa Committee in Bombay:

[1410] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 321.
[1411] C. Erikan: *Komutan*; op cit, 733. Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (ASD) (Speeches and Statements by Atatürk) ASD, I, 197. A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 321.
[1412] H. Edib: *Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; 301.
[1413] Ibid; 300.
[1414] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 283.

> Mustafa Kemal Pasha has done wonders and you have no idea how people in India adore his name. The honour of the Turkish nation has been once again vindicated. We are all waiting to know the terms on which Angora offers peace to the Greeks. …
>
> The Musulmans of India – particularly the poor and middle-classes, are doing their very best in subscribing to the Angora fund. … May the Great Allah grant victory to the Armies of Gazi Mustafa Kemal and save Turkey from her enemies and the enemies of Islam.[1415]

Part of the Indian fund, totalling £125,000, was used to pay the army, but most of it subsequently financed the construction of a new parliament building in Ankara and the foundation of the first Nationalist bank.

More funds came from Soviet Russia to compensate for the failed promise of supply of Russian arms, the funds used for their purchase elsewhere.[1416]

Now Turkey had allies; had arms, a recognised Government and an army which was growing in strength from day to day. There was no need to rush an attack, which had to take place anyway. Turkish troops were defending their homeland, and their morale was high. The Greeks were in a strange land, and their morale was slowly deteriorating. Mustafa Kemal would strike at them 'when his forces were entirely ready, when he felt certain of victory – but not a moment before.'[1417]

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After the Greeks Lost
(Further Narration from Halide Edib)

'As I sat on the step of the carriage trying to get some warmth from the sun, watching the dust cloud rising over the red-tiled roofs of Puladli, I saw a Turkish sergeant leading a group of Greek prisoners. They also sat opposite the train and rested. One of them, a youth about eighteen, with a narrow sun-burned face and wistful eyes, looked at me, and I beckoned him to come near me, which he did eagerly. He seemed to be so happy to hear Greek spoken, for he was from old Greece and did not know Turkish. I hate to see a prisoner, even of war; man is born free. He cheered up as he talked about his little town, his mother, and his six sisters. He told me how he hated the brutal way his government forced them all to fight. No, he was not the Greek patriot of these days. Greek patriotism meant such a lot of ugly and inhuman things these days, and the young boy I was talking to was a simple human boy. He did not understand the "Big Idea" of the Greeks, which meant this: "Asia Minor belonged to the Greeks some thousand years ago. The Turks, who own it now, must be swept aside. Their homes, women folk, and property, as well as their lives, belong to the Greeks. Kill, rob, and violate: these things are holy actions when done to the Turks." When the young Greek got up to go and shouted his last "Adioses Kiria," with a gleam of comfort in his pathetic

[1415] Ibid; p. 298.
[1416] Ibid.
[1417] Ibid; p. 299.

eyes, feeling less lonely because a woman who had two lads in a far corner of the world and no end of human ties had listened to his woes and patted his back, I thought a great deal with some queer hopelessness in my heart. Patriotism which could make people bear the impossible could also transfer itself into this beastliness whenever it took an aggressive form.

Late that evening Youssouf Akchura Bey and Dr. Murad came to see me. They had ridden to the top of Kara-Dagh to see the little plateau where the hardest fighting had taken place. They were touched and subdued by what they had seen.

"It was Providence which sent us up there," said Dr. Murad.

"We found three soldiers, unable to move, who were waiting to die because they had been overlooked by the search party. I was glad to hear that a Greek doctor had been kind to them, and had left them some bread and water, besides looking after their wounds."

Youssouf Akchura Bey's story was perhaps more characteristic. He had seen a Greek soldier and a Turkish soldier lying in each other's arms. Had they first fought and throttled each other and then realized in the throes of death that they were brothers after all? Had they, like two dying humans who have ceased to have any barrier, embraced each other in agony at the supreme moment of death?

We were hardly settled in Puladli when very ugly reports began to come to our section about the burning of the Sakaria villages by the Greeks and the atrocities committed. That masses sometimes commit atrocities is a fact, and rape is one of the evils when herds are allowed to give vent to their animal instincts, but the extent of it, and the deliberate way in which all the beastly things were carried out, did not seem to me believable. On the third day of our stay in Puladli I took some reports to Ismet Pasha. He was in one of the comfortably but archaically built Tartar houses, with their low ceilings and picturesque verandas. He asked me to lunch with him. He told me during the lunch that he wanted me to undertake a special work-the investigation and the reporting of the Greek atrocities in Middle Anatolia. He agreed with me that the hysterical and exaggerated way the people spoke of their grievances should be avoided and the whole report should be an undeniable historical document rather than propaganda. We decided on my staff before I left him.

Before I enter into this phase of my work I want to say that there is no such thing as a guilty nation. And that one of the obstacles to peace is the hysterical and exaggerated propagating of people's sufferings for political purposes. It burdens the younger generations of each nation with the crimes or the martyrdom of their fathers in which they have had no share. The consequence is either a destructive and pathological feeling of revenge, or shame in the generation which is not responsible for the past. And the political gambler takes advantage of this passion and uses it to the detriment of one nation or another. However, I believe that a dispassionate and unprejudiced study of the human tragedy involved in massacres and atrocities is necessary in the Near East. Though when I undertook the work I found it was almost impossible not to be carried away by the mere human side of it sometimes.

Yacoub Kadri Bey, Youssouf Akchura Bey, a lieutenant, and a photographer were the workers in my subsection. The lieutenant and the photographer went out into the distant areas and reported to me. I also received reports from all the military groups placed in the devastated villages. A few days of study convinced me that I must personally do research work, especially in the districts where the reports sounded as if the Greeks were a pack of lunatics who devised the ghastliest ways of torturing and violating women and very small girls. The races in the Near East, so far as I know, have all committed massacres on as large a scale as the Greeks, even on a larger, but the Greek treatment of the Anatolian women surpasses anything I have so far heard. This seemed to me the most delicate and difficult part to deal with. I finally decided with my new chief, Major Tahsin, a man of family and very strict morals, to avoid publishing the women's names as much as possible.

How often I have sat on the ash-covered stones of villages and heard confessions. I don't think there is any Catholic priest alive who has heard as much about the everlasting and the untamable beast in man.

The village of Euzum-Beyli and that of Chekirdekler seemed to have been the worst scenes of horror in the neighbourhood of Puladli. Papulas with his staff had been surrounded in Euzum-Beyli by a Turkish detachment and had escaped with great difficulty. And the Greeks had, according to reports, not only burned the village but all the villagers as well. In the iron bars of the windows there were charred human hands, clutching. It was only after twenty days that we could ascertain that the greater number of the villagers had been able to escape, and that they were slowly coming back. Chekirdekler I went personally to see. It was at the foot of "Dua-Tepe," a tiny village of twenty-five houses, although only three remained. Everything was either carried away or destroyed as was the habit of the Greeks. In their hasty retreat from "Dua-Tepe" they had not been able to carry away all the cattle, so they had killed them, and the swollen animal carcasses, purple-red and hideous, obstructed the way. In the wildness, in the bleak, dark-gray atmosphere of that day, among the ashes, and the stone-heaps, the men stood in a group, staring absently, the women moved among the ruins, and a baby cried all the time. Colonel Kenaan and Yacoub Kadri had come with me. Both sat on the stones, affected by the silence of the men. A woman ran toward me. She was shriveled and old-a dirty kerchief tied round her head. A long sharp nose loomed over the toothless mouth which moved incessantly; the black eyes were frightful in their insane agony. Hands like claws clutched me by the shoulders, and she sobbed all the time, although her eyes were dry.

“They have burned my husband, my Uzeir, alive,” she screeched into my ears.

The villagers hung their heads and said nothing. One old man, with some understanding left on his face, was watching the scene curiously. He shook his head. It was some time before I could extricate myself from her hands. I meant to hear it all from the old man with the face which looked less dead than the others.

“Have they really burned people alive in this village?” I asked.

“It looks like it,” he answered quietly.

“Show me the place,” I said. Uzeir's old wife was taken away by the women, and as we walked away I questioned the men and took notes. The villagers, men and women, were marched away five days before the battle at “Dua-Tepe” and each group kept separately in a different valley. Hardly any food was given to them, and to get water they had to beg the guards for it and often in vain. Occasionally several men were sent for *“angaria”* (work for the army) and they never returned. Uzeir was among them. At the general retreat, what was left of the men returned and found their women on the ashes of their homes. Some babies had died of exposure and hunger. As to the treatment of the women in the valley, men looked as if they would rather die than speak. On the outskirts of the village they showed me what made them think that four of their men were burned alive. There were four depressions in the earth where there were ashes, bits of charred bones, remains of burned paper with Turkish letters on, though not enough to make out anything, and bits of khaki blown here and there. Uzeir's wife had discovered the place, and according to the villagers she howled like a wounded jackal, believing that one of the four was her old man.

This was one of the typically badly treated villages in Sakaria.

But the horror of the place had a haunting quality, partly because of its extreme isolation, partly because the spirit of the villagers seemed to have been killed. None of the vitality of those who looked forward and made plans for their future over the ashes was evident here. There was a supreme philosophy of life in the other suffering villages, a feeling that all evil things pass just as do the good ones. The villagers of Chekirdekler were originally emigrants from Roumelia and still had the accent. The blow had taken their life away. If the harrowing spectacle of Uzeir's wife had not been there, I would have had the illusion of a visit to a graveyard.

The Turkish army was too worn out after the Sakaria to chase the Greeks much farther than Bolvadin. About the twentieth of September we were expecting Sivrihissar to fall into our hands. I went to Angora on three days' leave to get the reports printed. And I came back with Yoldash. The end which we had hoped to attain had not been achieved. How many more days? How many more lives to be lost to achieve it?[1418]

[1418] Halid Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 306-310.

Eight

THE BATTLE OF DUMLUPINAR
(26 August 1922)

Writing in the March 1922 issue of the extremely influential *Current History*, a magazine of the New York Times,[1419] the publication which in those days fundamentally shaped opinion, the Greek Prime Minister, Demetrios P. Gouranis, said in his lengthy account (abridged here), entitled WHAT GREECE HAS WON FROM THE TURK:

> For a century there have been tens of thousands of people in America who have longed very ardently to see the Greeks, not only in Greece proper, but throughout the Near East, liberated from the yoke of the Turk, and who have expressed that hope in their prayers. We Greeks naturally expected that when the moment of the final struggle for that liberation came we should have with us the expressed sentiment of all those who had for so long prayed and hoped for what has now been accomplished. But the late war confused many issues in people's minds, and the peace which followed the war was so complicated that there were many in every country who did not understand just what was being settled or how it was being settled…
>
> We all feel that if the American people understood clearly what is at stake in the Near East in this struggle with the Turks, there could be no question as to the whole-hearted support that America would give us. That is why I am going to try to set a few matters right as to our war…
>
> In the first place, we have been charged with conducting a war of imperialism—seeking to conquer vast territories in Asia Minor which are not Greek, with a view to subjecting a Turkish majority to Hellenic rule.
>
> Nothing is further from the truth. God forbid that we, a small nation which for a century has struggled for its very existence, should now enter upon a course of imperialism! It is the thing furthest from our thoughts. For 468 years, millions of Greeks knew what it was to live under the rule of conquerors. We know that it did not crush our spirit or our determination to be free. We know that it did not profit the world, advance civilization or better the state of the conquerors under whom the Greeks lived.
>
> It was a festering sore in the whole state of civilization… The war which we have been conducting is a war of liberation, and nothing else. It began not in 1919 but in 1821. Piece by piece, almost foot by foot, during a century of struggle we conquered back from the Turk the freedom which had been Greece's for 3,000 years. Little by little we had achieved that freedom so far as Europe was concerned, save in Thrace. Then came the World War. For a while

[1419] *Current History*; vol. 15 March 1922; pp. 911 ff.

we kept apart from it, saving our strength for the great final struggle with the Turks, which every Greek knew was bound to come…

The Treaty of Sèvres did one clear thing: It established the right of the Greeks to security in Asia Minor, and to that part not only the Greeks and the rest of Europe set their hands, but the Turks as well. Yet no sooner was this arrangement signed and sealed than it was called into question — as every previous settlement of the Turkish problem had been called into question for the last hundred years. And to maintain what they had gained and what had been officially recognized as theirs, the Greeks were called upon once more to take up arms and to fight.

An entire nation does not give over what it has been struggling for for a century, for nothing; nor did the Greeks in this instance.

And now comes the second important factor in the situation… The elements in Turkey which were opposed to the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres were not the Government of Turkey. The Government of Turkey—the only one recognized by any other Government in the world—had signed the Treaty of Sèvres and agreed to abide by its terms. The Government of Turkey was under the surveillance of the Allies, because Turkey had been one of the defeated enemies during the war; and the Government of Turkey was held by the Allies to carry out the terms of the treaty which it had signed. But at that moment there came into being a rebel force—that of Mustapha Kemal Pasha — unrecognized by any one as having either rights or responsibilities. And this rebel force said in effect: "We shall not carry out the terms of the Treaty of Sevres."…

There was a brief period in which even some of those who had signed the Treaty of Sèvres together with the Greeks felt doubtful whether it could be done or not. They said: "Mustapha Kemal Pasha is too strong. He cannot be made to agree to the terms of the treaty. Better compromise." But the Greeks said: "No!" And they set about demonstrating that Greece alone could force Mustapha Kemal's rebel army far out of the territory which had been granted to the freed Greeks by the Treaty of Sèvres, and keep it out. They have demonstrated that. Those who thought that Mustapha Kemal could not be driven out of the territory which he sought to wrest from the Greeks have been convinced that he could be driven out, and driven so far out that there is no chance of his return. That is all the Greeks set out to do… They want only Greek-inhabited territory, with whatever may be necessary from a military standpoint to see that it remains Greek… Whatever settlement is now made must, absolutely, place Greece in a position to guard, militarily, what has been given to Greece in the way of freeing the Greeks of Asia Minor from Turkish rule…

We have waited a hundred years for it, and we have won it with our blood and our treasure. We have done it alone…

All we ask now is that the rest of the world shall recognize the fact that the Greek populations of Asia Minor have been freed, and that it would be a

> grotesque negation of the whole civilization of the past century to return them to slavery.[1420]

1. A Lull in Fighting (Autumn 1921-Spring 1922)

On 13 September, the day on which Mustafa Kemal announced that the Battle of Sakarya had been won, he ordered a general mobilisation.[1421] The battle was not over until the last Greek had been ejected out of Turkey.

As the preparations for the next round went on, there were activities elsewhere. On 20 October 1921, the Allies, the French at the lead, realising that the Nationalists in Ankara are a true force that was not going to go away, rather the opposite, decided to conclude their U-turn in policy (already began months earlier (see previous chapter). Now was not the time to cajole the Turk, and so finding the right person in Franklin-Bouillon (a friend of the Turks), they sent him to Ankara, and after discussions, the complete withdrawal of French forces from Cilicia was agreed, save Alexandretta (İskenderun).[1422] Just a week later, in its sessions of 27 and 28 October, the French Chamber endorsed the treaty with Ankara, which granted France various economic advantages, most importantly, a concession for the operation of the Baghdad Railway from the Mediterranean to the Tigris River, and a ninety-nine year lease on the iron, chrome and silver mines of the Harchite Valley (Northern Anatolia), near the shores of the Black Sea.[1423] 'Politically, the editorial of *Current History* says:

> This treaty is beneficial to France, is displeasing to Great Britain and especially to the Greeks, who are still trying to dispose of the troublesome Mustapha by force of arms. It means that France has recognized the Government of Mustapha Kemal as the ruling Government of Turkey, rather than the Government at Constantinople, recognized by Great Britain. The agreement was negotiated for the French by Henry Franklin-Bouillon, an agent of somewhat vague status.[1424]

The Italians, likewise, also realising that the Nationalists were The Force, began to pull out of Antalya. On 21 December 1921, Turkish troops entered Adana; and on 25 December 1921 Gaziantep was Turkish once again. On 5 January 1922, a 105-metre long Turkish flag was spread out from the minaret of the largest mosque in Adana to mark the arrival of the Turkish commander.[1425] Except for the district of İskenderun, the Turks had regained the territory held in the south at the end of the Great War.[1426]

[1420] *Current History*; vol 15, March 1922; pp. 911 ff.
[1421] Atatürk'ün Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri (ATTB) (Circulars, Telegrams and Proclamations by Atatürk), 429.
[1422] *A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal,* p. 527.
[1423] Editorial *Current History*; vol xv; p. 511.
[1424] Ibid.
[1425] S. Tansel: *Mondros*; op cit, IV, 52–3.
[1426] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 325.

These actions by the Italians and the French greatly angered the British, especially as the two countries informally pledged to support the Nationalists in the upcoming Peace Conference.[1427] The British ire with the French in particular could no longer be contained; dominating the period, and leading to some violent recriminations and counter-recriminations, needless to go into here, but which can be found detailed at great length in the media of the time, especially in the magazine, *Current History,* of 1921-1922 (vols. 15 and 16). On first account, the British were incensed by the French October 1921 concessions to the Turks.[1428] Some concessions, the British insisted, France had no right to make, including withdrawing her troops from Cilicia, leaving Greece isolated.[1429] By leaving Greece isolated, the British did not really mean that, but meant their own interests under threat. In an extremely lengthy article in the said *Current History*, Henry Woodhouse adds a great number of details, amongst which is: that while for France the ending of the Anatolian military operations brought definite relief, to Great Britain this represented a definite loss, the nature of the loss being expressed in terms of land producing oil and other minerals and exposing it militarily through withdrawal of French troops, which had hitherto acted as a screen for the British.[1430] He writes:

> From 75,000 to 100,000 French soldiers were required in that (Cilicia) area, and several thousand French soldiers were killed in engagements (with the Turks, as seen in previous chapters.) The cost of maintaining so large an army so far from France was considerable, and the French nation grumbled about it. Though France is interested in protecting the Anatolia-Bagdad Railway, she is not as concerned as England is in holding and protecting the oil fields of former Turkish territory. On the other hand, the British Foreign Office knows that the Turkish Nationalists have never approved or recognized the British claims to Turkish oil fields, and that, if they should be victorious, the British oil monopoly on former Turkish territory would be in danger.[1431]

Indeed, what engendered great bickering amongst the Allies at this juncture, including the Americans, was the ownership of parts of Turkey, which had been carved up for the benefit of the British, 'it being known that these former Turkish territories are rich in oil lands, capable of yielding probably over five billion barrels of oil, or as much as the total estimated oil resources of the United States.'[1432]

This is what explains the reason for the Allies' bickering, and not the usual stuff one finds amongst lousy, crooked, modern Western scholars and their Turkish followers: that the Allies were divided because some cared for the Turkish cause more than others. The Allies could not care less about the Turks, the Greeks, or Judas. All that mattered were their narrow interests: a land freed of the Turks (hence all his "murderous barbaric deeds", which legitimised that); and whilst the Greeks did most of the fighting and killing, and dying, too, in the end, everyone had their interests.

[1427] P. Kinross, *Ataturk,* p. 341.
[1428] Editorial *Current History*; vol xv; p. 511.
[1429] Ibid.
[1430] H. Woodhouse: Anglo-French Discord in Turkey; *Current History* 15; p. 652.
[1431] Ibid; p. 658.
[1432] Ibid; p. 655.

Now, however, that all was falling apart, that the Nationalists were winning, and that the French and Italians had broken rank, this threatened some of the fundamental foundations on which all that had occurred over the past years was resting, including, even the First World War. In this respect, it is worth citing Mead here, who puts what has just been said in the context of the time, and shows a fundamental reason for the carving up of Turkey:

> Of all the spoils of the war, Turkey was among the richest. Her undeveloped wealth in minerals and fuel; her potentialities as a producer of foodstuffs, cotton, and other agricultural products; her possibilities as a market these were alluring as wartime necessities and peacetime assets. Her strategic position was of inestimable importance to any nation which hoped to establish colonial power in the eastern Mediterranean. Her future as a sphere of influence promised unusual opportunities for the investment of capital and the acquisition of exclusive economic rights. It was no accident, therefore, that brought men from Berlin and Bombay, Stuttgart and Sydney, Munich and Marseilles, to fight bitterly for possession of the cliffs of Gallipoli, the deserts of Mesopotamia, and the coast of Syria. Turkey-in-Asia was a rich prize upon which imperialists in Berlin and Vienna, London and Paris and Petrograd, had set their hearts.[1433]

Add to this the Greeks' Grand Idea of recovering the Old Byzantium and the Armenian dream of recovering old medieval Armenia in the east and in Cilicia, then all becomes clear from beginning to end, including why all that happened to the Turks and Turkey happened.

Now, what still remains unclear to some is why did the Allies fall out with the Greeks, for indeed, the enthusiasm for Greece had completely ebbed away by now. Proof of this is that when the Greek Premier, M. Gounaris, in the Autumn of 1921, departed on a visit to the Western Chancelleries, first and foremost to block the expected signing of the Franco-Turkish Treaty, he failed and left Paris empty-handed on the very day the treaty was signed.[1434] Next we find him in London, where he sought to persuade Lord Curzon to remonstrate with France.[1435] Curzon did, but as seen above, not really because he cared for Greece, but because British interests were at stake. The British, by now, had enough of the Greeks, just like everyone else. 'Aside from the zealous Prime Minister, Lloyd George, the British were not enthusiastic about re-sharpening the blunted Greek dagger.'[1436] The British could no longer risk much more than they had lost, and the French, Italians, and soon the Americans were threatening to run with advantages in Turkey whilst they, the British, were standing still showing support to the now lamentable Greek cause. So, soon, they, too, would come to their senses, and forget about the Greeks.

[1433] E. Mead: *The Baghdad Railway*; op cit; p. 280.
[1434] Editorial *Current History*; vol xv; p. 511.
[1435] Ibid.
[1436] Valentine Chirol and Lord Eversley, *The Turkish Empire* (New York: Fertig, 1969), p. 417.

There is also another fundamental reason why the Allies no longer liked the Greeks. Here we must return to the death of the previous King, Alexander (in October 1920) (following the monkey's bite), which reshaped the whole world history. The King's death not only broke the Greek offensive against the Turks, which was then sweeping through Anatolia (see Chapter 6), it had another impact of vast implications. Indeed, following the King's death, new elections were organised (14 Nov); Venizelos was beaten, and King Constantine was returned to power. Westerners, however, had a soft spot for Venizelos, and hated Constantine. Constantine, it ought to be reminded, had allied himself with the Germans during the First World War, unlike Venizelos (who was a pro-Allies), and this was not going to be forgiven by the Allies. True they did not like the Turks one iota, but they had very little time or affection for Constantine either. Constantine himself, and his supporters, had not forgotten either the Allies' coup in removing him, placing Venizelos in power, and dragging Greece into the First World War in 1917. It is better here to let the influential, pro-monarchist Greek journalist, Polyzoides, sum up these grievances and issues.[1437] Amongst other, he writes:

> [In 1917], they [the Allies] went to Saloniki and helped Venezelos to start his revolution against King Constantine; they disarmed Greece, and armed a revolutionary minority against the legally constituted Greek State. They demanded and obtained the dethronement of King Constantine, whom they considered as pro-German, and hence as their enemy; they prevented the Crown Prince from succeeding his father, and passed the crown to his other son, Alexander, against the Greek fundamental law…
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> The mere fact that the Allies were striving to force Greece into the war was sufficient to drive the whole nation in the opposite direction…
>
> It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the Entente powers never made any concrete offers to Greece to obtain her co-operation in the war. This they avoided because they wanted Constantinople for themselves. The Dardanelles (Gallipoli) expedition apparently was begun with the object of opening the Strait for Russia and giving Constantinople to the Czar. The Allies were keeping Thrace and Macedonia in reserve for Bulgaria, and Asia Minor with Smyrna was being held out as bait to the still neutral Italy…
>
> Venizelos brought back to power in 1917 and remained in power until 1920… (During that period) Greece was transformed from an independent country into an Anglo-French protectorate, modeled after the pattern of Morocco, Senegal and Egypt… The elections of Nov. 14, 1920, which so astonished the outside world, created a new situation.
>
> By this popular and overwhelming decision in favor of King Constantine, the Greeks declared their independence to all the world. For so doing, they were entitled to the respect and even praise of all liberty-loving peoples, for all they had done was to vindicate their outraged national pride. Instead of this, they won the enmity and opposition of the selfsame powers which during the war

[1437] Adamantios Th. Polyzoides: A review of the arbitrary acts of the Allies in Greece, and of the reasons for the overthrow of Venizelos and the recall of Constantine; *Current History*; Vol 16; no 1; p. 128-131.

had violated Greek sovereignty and Greek independence. The vexation of Great Britain and France over the result of the Greek election is partly explained by the fact that the Venizelist regime thus overwhelmingly repudiated was wholly an Anglo-French creation. To see it smashed by the vote of the Greek electorate was sufficient cause to ruffle the feelings of the governing circles of London and Paris. They were the more aggrieved because this thing was done in spite of their solemn warnings. No sooner was the call for elections issued by the Venizelos regime than the Ministers of Great Britain and France, as well as of the United States, in Athens, came out with a formal warning to the Greek people that they must vote for Venizelos at the risk, otherwise, of losing all friendship and support from the allied and associated powers…

The Ministers of Great Britain and France, representing also the attitude of the United States, solemnly notified the Greeks that in case Constantine was recalled an economic blockade would be declared against Greece… The American Government has not confined its hostility to the non-recognition of the present Greek Government, which has just as clear a title to power as our own Republican Administration; it has participated in the economic blockade of Great Britain and France against a nation that has always been correct in its dealings… In the meantime, Greece is fighting single handed against the influences shielding the Kemalist Turks. The war, which, at first sight, seems to be waged against Kemal, is in substance a struggle against French diplomacy, French money, and French guns. Bolshevist Russia, by giving the Turks similar assistance against the Greeks, whom Lenin considers as British pawns in the game of the Near East, is thus co-operating with the French against Greece. And Italy, which does not seem satisfied with what she received from the Great War, is also on the side of the Turks, in the hope that Greece's defeat in Asia Minor will open the way for Italian penetration into those markets, and will make things easier in the turbulent Tripolitan hinterland.

Despite these obstacles, Greece, having shouldered the gun since 1912, will continue the struggle against the Turks and their supporters. Whether Great Britain will assist her remains to be seen.[1438]

Obviously, for the Greeks, the loss of full British support represented the ultimate loss. And the British, although they had shared interest with the Greeks, as noted above, could not do much to help. Setting aside the dislike of Constantine, they had other worries on the ground. They had the Irish nation in arms against them. In the Arab East, in so-called Mesopotamia, which had been more or less under British control since 1914 and now supposed to be governed by Emir Faisal, King of Iraq, there was a general state of insurrection.[1439] The British, like the French in Syria were too much tied to do anything against the Turkish nationalists. They were forced to retain an army of about 100,000 men and a powerful air force equipped with guns and

[1438] Ibid.

[1439] H. Woodhouse: The Anglo-Indian-Turkish Crisis, in Current History; Vol 16; No 2; May 1922; p. 264-70, at p. 265.

bombs, under continuous war conditions throughout the years 1919, 1920 and 1921, and now in 1922.[1440]

For the Greeks, despite the loss of Ally support, the situation was this: their armies were still controlling vast lands in Anatolia, were strongly entrenched, and this was their chance to take what they had sought for centuries, and achieve their Grand Idea. Moreover, they had spent so much in terms of lives lost, and had dried their treasury in Athens — 'millions of drachmas were being absorbed by the Anatolian sponge.'[1441] They were not going to give in. Divided politically, certainly, but regarding the campaign in Anatolia all were united. No Greek, whether pro-Venizelos or pro-Constantine was going to give up the Grand Idea. Faced with growing Turkish military might and the lack of Allied assistance, they decided to take 'a desperate gamble.'[1442] Foiled in their designs on Ankara, they now redirected their attention to Istanbul. The Allied contingents in the city were small and weak, and to intimidate them, the Greeks gathered a large army in a show of force.[1443] They asked the Allies to let them enter Istanbul, the Allies refused, threatening likewise the use of force.[1444]

The Turks meanwhile had been preparing for their own final act: kicking the Greeks out of Turkey. First, Mustafa Kemal sent the Minister of the Interior, Fethi Bey, to the capitals of the Allies in a last attempt to remove the Greeks from Anatolia by diplomatic means.[1445] Fethi travelled to Rome, Paris and London. In Rome and Paris the ambassador was given at least an honourable reception, but in London, Fethi Bey tried in vain to get within sight of Lord Curzon or Lloyd George, but could only meet one of the secretaries of the Foreign Office. He telegraphed the single word 'Attack!'[1446]

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What do the Turks do?
(....when you sign peace with them, and they have power.)
(According to the opinion-making apparatus of the time.)

The following is an extract from *Current History*, a few months after the French signed the peace treaty with the Ankara nationalists:

> The snarl of complications created in the Turkish situation by France's separate treaty with Kemal's Nationalist Government at Angora (see text of same in January Current History) was aggravated by the resignation of Premier Briand, and the immediate succession of ex-President Raymond Poincare, M. Briand's opponent, to the Premiership. M. Poincare had been carrying on a press campaign to secure a modification of the Treaty of Angora, largely agreeing with British criticisms of it, that

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[1440] Ibid.
[1441] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 561.
[1442] Ibid.
[1443] Ibid.
[1444] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 305.
[1445] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 562.
[1446] D. Von Mikusch, *Mustafa Kemal,* pp. 313, 314.

it dangerously divided allied policy, and strained relations between France and Britain, and that France did wrong in conceding territories to the Kemalists over which she had only mandates.
The terrible plight the Treaty of Angora created for Christian minorities in Cilicia became apparent from the moment the withdrawal of French troops began, Nov. 28. Thousands of Armenians and Greeks had begun to migrate as soon as the French withdrawal was assured. The Kemalist Turks, rushing into the vacated territory, began such a series of atrocities and outrages that the remaining Armenians sent appeals to the British Government, to the French Government, and to the League of Nations both for relief from famine and for transportation of their entire population to some foreign country.[1447]

2. Battle Plans and Battle Front (Late July-16 August 1922)

During his trip to İzmit in June, Mustafa Kemal met İsmet, Fevzi and the War Minister Kâzım (Özalp) and discussed the military strategy.[1448] On 23 July, 1922, he travelled to the western front headquarters in Eskişehir. Then, the following day he went to Konya to meet General Townshend (of the Kut al Amarah episode), who, throughout the years, had continued to work for peaceful relations with Turkey. The meeting with him provided Mustafa Kemal convenient cover for inspection of the front.[1449]
On 28 of July, Mustafa Kemal went back to Akşehir, where Turkish senior commanders had gathered for a secret staff meeting under the pretext of watching a football match between two teams of officers.[1450] While the Ally High Commissioners in Istanbul were discussing the Greek threat to the city, Kemal and his General Staff were 'watching the football match,' finalising both the date and the ultimate details for the Turkish offensive for the liberation of İzmir.[1451]
The plan of campaign had been drawn up in secrecy nine months before, between Kemal, Fevzi and İsmet. Fevzi now explained it on a map. Then Kemal asked his generals for their opinion. A few were critical, not of the plan itself but of the timing of its execution.[1452] İsmet, in particular, was not convinced that it could lead at this moment to a decisive victory, but favoured a policy of defence, which would wear down the Greeks.[1453] The defensive policy was espoused by others who argued that there was an army in being, and it should not be lost.[1454] The Second Army commander, who had been one of Kemal's instructors at the War School, went further stating that the country's very existence would be in danger by risking a force which

[1447] *Current History*; editorial; vol xv; p. 877.
[1448] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 338.
[1449] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 338.
[1450] Ibid.
[1451] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 308.
[1452] Ibid.
[1453] Ibid.
[1454] Ibid.

was all it possessed.[1455] After asking Fevzi, Mustafa Kemal turned to his former instructor, and said,

> 'All right, my dear instructor. We are not playing the war game at Harbiye now. We shall throw all into the effort of securing a definite result for the country.'[1456]
>
> 'The night of 28-29 July,' says Mustafa Kemal, 'I exchanged views with them on the attack and after a further consultation with the Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Western Front, we arranged the details of the attack. Kiazim Pasha, the Minister of National Defence (...) also came to Ak Shehir on the afternoon of 1 August. We arranged the measures to be taken by the Ministry to complete the army's preparations. When I had ordered these preparations to be carried out and the attack to be pushed on rapidly I returned to Ankara.'[1457]

Mustafa Kemal returned to Ankara, and informed the ministers of his decision and of his belief in success. Fevzi backed him considering that there was an eighty per cent chance of it – allowing twenty per cent, for the hazards of war.[1458] The Opposition itself, whose propaganda implied that 'the troops were demoralized and incapable of action,' became an asset since it misled the Greeks as to the imminence of an attack.[1459]

Mustafa Kemal ordered that the armies should be ready for the offensive by the middle of August. İsmet rose to his feet, stood at attention and, speaking as the commander of the front on behalf of the rest, said, 'You wanted to know our opinion. We expressed it freely. But if what you have told us is an order, we shall obey it.'[1460]

On 6 August İsmet issued secret orders to army and corps commanders to prepare for the attack.[1461]

Highlighting the scale of the battle to come, Turkish and Greek armies now rose to over 200,000 each, presaging a fight of gigantic proportions and with vast implications.[1462] Whilst the Greeks had superiority in armament, the Turks had a much stronger cavalry.[1463] The Greeks had the great advantage of occupying a strongly fortified position on top of hills; the Turks would have to pay dearly should they seek to capture it, and might, indeed, lose their whole army: we know the ravages caused by the machine gun on troops attacking strongly fortified positions during the First World War. The Greeks were under the general command of Hatzianetis, who had succeeded Papoulas,[1464] The Commander-in-Chief, was a bit peculiar, though. A very strong disciplinarian, 'and prone to delusions (he often thought his legs were made of

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[1455] Ibid.
[1456] Ibid.
[1457] *Discours du Ghazi Moustafa Kemal, Oct. 1927,* Leipzig 1929, p. 528.
[1458] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 309.
[1459] Ibid.
[1460] Ibid; p. 308.
[1461] Ataturk: *Nutuk*, 446–7; İsmet İnönü, I, 283–7; C. Erikan: Komutan, 769–95; S. Tansel: *Mondros*, IV, 1544–5.
[1462] C. Erikan: *Komutan*; op cit, 785.
[1463] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 338.
[1464] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 561. A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 339.

glass and was afraid to stand for fear of breaking them),' he elected to direct the war from İzmir rather than lead at the front.[1465] Below him in rank, General Soumilas commanded the 3rd Army Corps, which covered the northern sector, running from the Marmara past Eskişehir to a point east of Kütahya, whilst the southern sector, including Afyonkarahisar, was held by the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, under Generals Trikoupis and Digenis.[1466] Trikoupis' headquarters were in Afyon, near the point of the salient held by the Greek 12th, 4th, and 1st Divisions.[1467]

The Greek front stretched over 400 miles long (according to Mango), or 300 (according to Kinross), from the Sea of Marmara to the Menderes Valley, encompassing all of north-western Anatolia from Gemlik on the sea of Marmara in the west to the fortified positions east of Eskişehir, Kütahya and Afyonkarahisar. There, it made a swoop south-west to follow the Menderes (Meander) Valley to the Aegean Sea.[1468] Llewellyn Smith adds one or two more details, stating that 'the sickle-shaped front, starting at Kios on the Sea of Marmara, followed a line south-eastwards, cutting the Eskishehir-Ankara railway, then turning south to Afyon Karahisar, then, from there, it ran westwards down the right bank of the Meander river to the Aegean Sea.'[1469] There were two strong points: one in Eskişehir in the north, and one in Afyon in the south. The Turks were largely concentrated in the north, so understandably the Greeks expected their attack to come against Eskişehir. Intelligence including from the British employees of the liquorice industry, reported strong activity there.[1470] It was, in fact, a Turkish ploy, as they were actually planning an attack in the south, against Afyon, because their aim was İzmir, and Afyon commanded the direct supply line by the railway that led to it.[1471] However, there were three major apparent deficiencies with the Turkish plan:

Firstly, if their troops were in the north, moving them south would cause the Greeks to have plenty of warning, reinforce there and thus smash the Turkish army entirely.

Secondly, the Greeks in Afyon were strongly entrenched, with vast artillery firepower; the Turks would be obliterated before they even launched their attack.

Thirdly, the Greeks occupied the high ridges, and a Turkish assault up the hills under Greek machine gun fire and light artillery would wipe them out. British engineers in fact judged Afyon so impregnable, that should the Turks try an assault, it would prove to be 'their Verdun', i.e. the German point of failure on the French front in the First World War.[1472]

The Turkish Western army consisted of two Army Corps: the First and Second, made of 17 infantry divisions and five cavalry divisions.[1473] Fourteen of these divisions had

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[1465] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision,* p. 273·
[1466] Ibid; p. 284.
[1467] Ibid; p. 285.
[1468] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; p. 339; P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 310.
[1469] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; p. 284.
[1470] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 310.
[1471] Ibid.
[1472] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 310.
[1473] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse to the Great offensive, Turkish Operational Encirclement planning, 1912-1922; in *Middle Eastern Studies*; Vol 40; No 1; pp. 45-64; at p. 59.

fought in the First World War and were now battle hardened.[1474] This was a considerable advantage. But, the most decisive factor in favour of the Turks now was General Command. Unlike its predecessors during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, now at the top were exceptional army commanders, highly gifted and with great experience.[1475] At the top was Marshal Mustafa Kemal, seconded by Lieutenant General Fevzi (later Cakmak) as the Chief of General Staff, İsmet who commanded the western front, Brigadier Nurettin Pasha (the same officer behind the success of Kut al Amarah encirclement of 1915) and Brigadier Yakub Sevki (Subasi) (who had distinguished himself on the Caucasus front), now commanding the First Army.[1476] These were no commanders who muddled through, who threw men to their death needlessly. Rather, they constituted some of the best military planners and leaders in world history. Their preparations of the battle; the meticulousness with which they dealt with each aspect of the operation, the cohesion and coordination of each action, not just on paper but subsequently on the ground; the vision and action of various units; the synchronisation of movements of infantry, cavalry, artillery bombardment, and about everything else, indicating by far one of the best ever high commands in the history of warfare. Besides all this, add the inimitable courage of the Turkish soldier, and the fact as Erickson notes, that the Turkish Corps and divisional command structure had every major position filled with officers disposing of great experience from hard won battles against the British and Russians,[1477] then one can understand why the Battle of Dumlupınar, which (in view of Greek defences) perhaps most, if not all, armies of the time would have lost, was won by the Turks.

In great secrecy, the Turkish plan of attack had been finalised by Fevzi and Ismet.[1478] In simple terms here, the aim was to attack and cut off the Greek army in the south holding the Afyon salient. The very simplicity of the plan indicates its sophistication. The Greeks held fortified positions some rising to a height of some 5,000 feet.[1479] The Turks would have to come down into narrow valleys and then storm up the Greek positions, which could literally wipe them out with heavy machine gun fire. Taking a trench on flat lands was a bloody matter as seen in the fields of Flanders during the First World War; definitely very costly if trenches were on the higher ground, as seen in the Gallipoli campaign, despite vast Ally artillery superiority. The way the Greeks were entrenched now, and in view of the physical setting: it was simply impossible. Of course the Turks would soften Greek positions with artillery fire, but even the best artillery fire today, in 2018, would still prove not enough in face of a foe deeply entrenched on high and steep slopes. Over half a century ago, in Monte Casino in World War Two, this was nearly impossible despite one of the most violent aerial bombardments of the German defensive positions and some of the bitterest fighting in world history. The Turkish plan, moreover, was far more ambitious, not only aiming

[1474] E.J. Erickson: Ordered to die; op cit p. 202.
[1475] Ismet Gorgulu: *On Yillik harbin kadrosu…* Ankara, 1993, pp. 289-95.
[1476] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 59.
[1477] Ibid.
[1478] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* Allen Lane; London; 1973; p. 287.
[1479] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 339.

at storming and capturing Greek hill-top positions, but also at encircling and annihilating the Greek southern army, Corps I and Corps II; in short, finishing the Greeks in Turkish territory;[1480] no time or chance for another round. Which makes the Turkish plan one of the most ambitious plans ever devised, with the exception of some German campaigns early in the Second World War.
Besides tactics and strategy, only the courage and perseverance of the attacking men could make the plan succeed. They had to keep climbing regardless of the numbers of dead around them, and regardless of whether they should die or live. This was the main pre-requisite. Should the men hesitate, the whole Turkish army would be annihilated on the slopes or in its retreat. It was this simple. Should the men fail to capture the hilltops, and the Greek army remain intact, no Turkish encirclement of the Greeks would work, because the Turkish cavalry and infantry would be annihilated by the Greek system of defence and Greek counter-attacks.
Now, of course, there was a need for tactical genius. The plan had four prerequisites for success:
-Moving enough men near the enemy's front, and in great secrecy.
-Attacking fast, relying on the element of surprise.
-Achieving a perfect coordination between the main army units, including cavalry, coming from different directions (east and south, primarily) so as to accomplish the encirclement.
-Putting such a sudden, brief, violent attack as to break the enemy once and for all, for there was no possibility for a second round.

The operation demanded the massing in front of the point of attack of 12 of the 17 available divisions, and, more importantly, doing it discretely.[1481] In late July and early August, the Turks began moving their forces from the north to assembly areas in the south from where to launch the offensive.[1482] In order to gain the element of surprise, and avoid detection by aerial reconnaissance, Turkish troops were marched by night and made to rest unobserved inside houses or under trees during the day.[1483]
In an attempt to deceive the Greeks, road repairs were supposedly undertaken in appearance in various parts of the front zone whilst they were carried out in reality where they were needed.[1484] Meanwhile, though only a small force remained before Eskişehir, camp fires were lit at night to suggest a mass concentration of several divisions, whilst dust was raised on the roads during daylight to show troops moving north, when they were actually moving south to Afyon.[1485]

[1480] Gorgulu, Ismet, *Buyuk Taaruz*, (The Great offensive) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basim Evi, 1992), pp. 80-1.
[1481] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 59.
[1482] Turkish General staff: *Turk Istiklal harbi*.....(The Turkish war of independence, Western front, Great offensive preparation and the Great offensive; (Ankara, 1967, pp. 337-51; Operations Division, First Army, Offensive Plans; 26 July 1922.
[1483] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 562. *A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal,* p. 566.
[1484] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; 287.
[1485] *A Speech by Gazi Mustafa Kemal,* p. 566. P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 310.

The Turkish plan, already explained, relied on artillery fire to soften Greek positions, then assault against the dominating Greek positions; the main instrument of assault being the 1st Army under Nurettin Paşha, supported by Yakup Şevki Paşa's 2nd Army.[1486] In concept, Erickson explains, the First Army (its I Corps) would attack the Greeks from south to north, whilst V Cavalry Corps by its side would sweep behind the Greeks; at the same time, from its northerly position, the III Corps would cut horizontally from east to west, and meet with cavalry in Kütayha. This leaves the IV and VI Corps to pin the Greeks down, the IV from the south, and VI from the east. II Corps was kept in reserve.[1487] Inside the newly created pocket the Turks planned to trap the Greek I Corps (four divisions) and the II Corps (three divisions).[1488] The aim of the offensive would destroy the Greek Army by eliminating seven of its twelve infantry divisions and would open the way for a complete collapse of the Greek presence in Anatolia.[1489] Suddenness, speed, decisive blunt action, and perfect coordination were essential in this respect. To a cavalry commander suggesting postponement because of a lack of fodder for his horses, Mustafa Kemal remarked, 'In two days' time you will have food in plenty for men and horses alike.'[1490]

3. Final Steps Before the Attack

Mustafa Kemal left Ankara by car in the night of 17/18 August, arriving in the western front headquarters at Akşehir on 20 August.[1491] Aware of the presence of spies, false news was spread that a tea party would be held in the Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal's residence in Çankaya, on 21 August, the sentries having been instructed to admit no one as Mustafa Kemal was busy preparing to welcome the guests. Only a few people knew of his departure for the front, but they acted as if he was around.[1492] Ali Fuat stated to the deputies that he had dined with Mustafa Kemal that night, and anyway, everybody was dismissive about the strength of the army, letting foreigners know this.[1493] Just before he set off to the front, saying goodbye to his mother, Mustafa Kemal told her he was going to the tea party. She looked at the way he was dressed.

> "This uniform is not for a tea-party."
>
> He soothed her and left. Later she rang the area commander to ask where he was, and was again told, "He has gone to a tea-party."
>
> "No," she replied. "I know. He has gone to the war."
>
> She sent him a note:

[1486] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 339.
[1487] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 59.
[1488] Gorgulu, Ismet, *Buyuk Taaruz*, op cit; p. 18, Overlay, 2.
[1489] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; at p. 60.
[1490] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 311.
[1491] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 339.
[1492] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 309.
[1493] Ibid.

"My Son, I waited for you. You did not come back. You told me that you were going to a tea-party. But I know that you have gone to the front. Know that I pray for you, and do not come back before the war is won."[1494]

On 24 August, the troop concentration that had begun on 14 August was completed.[1495] During the night of 24, and on the 25, Turkish infantry had advanced without being seen to their start lines within 400 m of the main Greek lines.[1496]

On 25 August when Mustafa Kemal joined the 1st Army battle headquarters that was to lead the attack, all communications between Anatolia and the outside world were cut off.[1497] He had moved his headquarters up from the plain into the mountain region next to the village of Shuhud, then to a camp behind the crest of Kocatepe.[1498]

As zero hour approached, Mustafa Kemal issued a battle order to the troops. It read:

'Soldiers, your goal is the Mediterranean!'

'The first major offensive of a nation that had committed itself for the last twelve years to defence was about to begin.'[1499]

In the hour before dawn on 26th August, Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi, Ismet and Nurettin gathered on the peak of Kocatepe which dominated the sector chosen for the breakthrough.[1500]

When he was in Ankara, before leaving for the front, Mustafa Kemal had had supper with a few of his confidents. As he said goodbye, he remarked,

"I'm going straight away to the front, to start the offensive."[1501]

Taken aback, one of them asked him,

"Pasha, what if you don't succeed?"

"What do you mean? Within fourteen days of the start I shall have destroyed the Greeks and thrown them into the sea."[1502]

[1494] Ibid.

[1495] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse to the Great offensive, Turkish Operational Encirclement planning, 1912-1922; in *Middle Eastern Studies*; Vol 40; No 1; pp. 45-64; at p. 60.

[1496] Ibid.

[1497] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 339.

[1498] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 311.

[1499] Ibid.

[1500] A. Mango: *Ataturk;* op cit; p. 339.

[1501] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 309.

[1502] Ibid.



Greek positions and Turkish plan of battle. Possibly the most simple and most complex plan ever devised in the history of warfare.
This map has been adapted from E.J. Erickson's excellent work and explanations of the Greek positions and Turkish plan of attack as in his essay referred to in the text.

4. The Battle 26-31 Aug 1922

'Then with a thunderous roar the artillery barrage began – and the Greeks woke up. Many of them had been out at a dance in Afyon until an hour or so earlier.'[1503]

The artillery barrage concentrated in the southern Afyon sector, but extended also to the front held further north by the 2nd Army, which had been ordered to join in the attack in order to pin down superior enemy forces facing it.[1504] The Turkish guns pounded most particularly at the Greek positions along the ridges and flanks of Akar Dağ.[1505] The strength and accuracy of the Turkish fire delighted Mustafa Kemal. After a time, Greek guns stopped responding, because, as it became clear later, their observation posts had been knocked out.[1506] From his lookout point on Kocatepe, with Fevzi and İsmet by his side, they looked northwards at the line of extremely steep and strongly fortified hilltops that the Turks had to take by assault.[1507] Each of the hills was the objective of a Turkish division, to be stormed in an uphill attack until the summit was reached.

[1503] Ibid; p. 311.
[1504] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 339.
[1505] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 288.
[1506] Ismet İnönü: *Hatıralar* (Memoirs), ed. Sabahattin Selek, Bilgi, Istanbul, I, 1985; II, 1987, I, 287-293.
[1507] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 288.

At 5.30 am, half an hour after Turkish artillery began firing, under a thick cloud of smoke from the artillery, the infantry and cavalry launched their assaults.[1508] It was a shattering and bloody assault as the Turks stormed uphill, 'tough Anatolian foot soldiers, in the face of deadly Greek fire' along a twenty-five mile front from Sinan Pasha to the railway east of Afyon.[1509] As they smashed through the defences about Afyon, the Greek field commander, General Trikoupis, belatedly realised that the Turks' main thrust was in the south.[1510] Having expected the attack to come from the east, they had kept a strong force to meet what proved only to be a holding attack.[1511] Now the surprise was complete. In this sector, air reconnaissance had shown a mere three Turkish divisions, easy enough to contain, but now they were being overwhelmed as the Turks kept advancing on them relentlessly.[1512]

The fighting was bloody, sudden, and in places brief. The first Greek position to fall was Kamelar in the sector of the 4th Division, lost after fierce fighting, and Tilki Kiri Bel was abandoned without resistance by the 1st Company of the 49th Regiment, 1st Division at 8 a.m.[1513] Apart from this position, which was later on retaken by the Greeks after a vicious counter attack, every hill was the scene of ferocious fighting at close range. In the brief, but extremely bloody first phase, all but two of the objectives were in Turkish hands by 9.30 in the morning.[1514] In the meantime the Turkish cavalry had swept round to the Greek rear, harrying them from the west and cutting the railway to İzmir at a point to be subsequently known as Yildirim Kemal – appropriately enough, since this was indeed at last a 'lightning' offensive.[1515]

The battle was not won, though; far from it, indeed. All along the front, fierce fighting raged all day. Except by the 49th Regiment, ground was given away only after the bloodiest of contests.

> The names of hills and defensive positions toll like bells for the Greek army in Asia Minor [says Llewellyn Smith] the 'Wooded Hilltop' in the 5th Division sector; Hasan Bel; 'Black Rock' and 'Saw-toothed Rock' in the Kaletzik sector. Each left its heaps of broken dead bodies on its flanks as witness to a Turkish breakthrough, a Greek counterattack.[1516]

The violence was such that some hilltop positions changed hands several times.[1517] The Greek II Corps sent the 7th and 13th Infantry Divisions forward to fill gaps and reinforce I Corps holding the forward positions.[1518] By the evening of 26 August, the situation was not yet lost for the Greeks. The Turks had made significant gains, but

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[1508] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 60.
[1509] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 288.
[1510] Froembgen, *Kemal Ataturk,* p. 188.
[1511] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 311.
[1512] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision,* op cit; pp. 294-296.
[1513] Ibid; p. 288.
[1514] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 311.
[1515] Ibid; p. 312.
[1516] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 288.
[1517] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 340.
[1518] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 60.

there was no definite breakthrough. Tilki Kiri Bel, which had been abandoned by the 49th without a fight, had been retaken by the 1st Division, reinforced by the 7th.[1519] Nearby, the Turkish 57th Division had not succeeded in breaking through at Hasan Bel (Chigil Tepe (the peak of Çiğiltepe). Mustafa Kemal had then demanded an explanation from its commanding officer, Colonel Reşat, a comrade from the Great War, who then promised to capture the hill in half an hour. But when Mustafa Kemal had called the divisional headquarters, he was read Reşat's suicide note: 'I have decided to end my life because I have not kept my word.'[1520]
In anger, Mustafa Kemal cursed him for dying in vain, then later, in sorrow, he remarked, 'What a pity for this child!'[1521]
Reporting the incident to the Assembly subsequently, he declared: 'It is not because I approve Reşat's action that I am telling you this. Such behaviour is not acceptable. But I wanted to illustrate the spirit in which our officers and our commanders discharged their duty.'[1522]

Whilst the Greeks still held on in two places, their situation was quite serious. During the day the Turkish cavalry had broken through their lines between Sinan Pasha and Elvan Pasha, across rough and inaccessible country which the Greeks considered impregnable and left badly defended.[1523] A small cavalry detachment had descended on the railway station at Koutsoukioi, and cut the telephone and telegraph communications between Afyon and Tulu Punar (Dumlu Pinar), on which the Greek I Corps depended.[1524] To add to this, and to the loss of many positions, General Trikoupis and the I Corps realised that reinforcements were moving into the Turkish lines and they could not resist a sustained attack on the same scale as they had experienced the first day.[1525]

The next day, 27 August 1922, in the early morning, the Turkish assault concentrated most powerfully on the Greek 4th Division. The Turkish 4th Corps of the 1st Army, commanded by Colonel Kemalettin Sami, who had won fame at Sakarya, after bloody fight, broke through the Greek lines, and captured the 5,000-feet high 'Saw-toothed Rock' of Erkmentepe (Kamelar).[1526] This was followed by two simultaneous actions further north to envelop the Greek front. The Turkish V Cavalry Corps broke free of the main defensive line, and advanced over 20 kms into the Greek rear area, whilst to the north-east, the Turkish III Corps broke in the Greek lines as well and advanced almost 10 kilometres.[1527] The encirclement of the Greeks was now proceeding to its final stage. Trikoupis realised the situation, and understood its gravity: the risk of the whole army being annihilated. Swiftly, he decided to abandon his positions and the

[1519] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 288.
[1520] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 340.
[1521] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 312.
[1522] ASD, op cit; I, 271.
[1523] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 289.
[1524] Ibid.
[1525] Ibid.
[1526] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* p. 289. A. Mango: *Ataturk*; p. 340.
[1527] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 60.

bulk of his stores, and retreat to a new line west of Afyonkarahisar; by noon on 27 August the Greek first line of defence was abandoned.[1528] Its hillsides criss-crossed with abandoned fortifications looked 'like a huddle of giant deserted ant-heaps.'[1529]
Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Divisions under General Frangou, which had been fighting hard all day to hold their positions on Akar Dag, recognising in the afternoon that the position was untenable, also retreated in order to take up new positions on the heights of Bal Mahmout.[1530]
The two sudden retreats took place in such confusion that the main body of the I Army Corps, under Trikoupis, and the subsidiary body consisting of Frangou's 1st and 7th Divisions lost contact with each other.[1531] Moreover, the Turks had succeeded in driving a wedge into the Greek southern army at a vital point that the two Greek forces could not converge towards each other. So, whilst Frangou and his two divisions, 'hugging' the railway, painfully marched westwards towards İzmir, the main body of I Corps under Trikoupis was forced deeper and deeper into the Anatolian hills, trying desperately to break out and fight their way through to join their comrades.[1532] By the end of the day, it became obvious that the Turkish breakthrough in the mountains south-west of Afyon on 27 August had 'knocked out the Greek army in Anatolia at one blow.'[1533]

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Fighting to the Last

It is an uphill struggle is the common expression for anything near impossible, that is in ordinary peaceful situations. One imagines the Turks taking by assault steep hills under intense enemy fire. At Gallipoli, as seen already, whole Ally armies were decimated as they struggled to capture positions on less steep positions, defended by fewer Turks, with many fewer machine guns or artillery than the Greeks now, and under massive Ally artillery pounding. So, now, the chances of the Turks capturing heavily fortified Greek positions on steep hills would seem humanly near impossible, unless they were all ready to die. Which precisely is what happened. Here is one story to show the price paid for capturing one position.

> On the right was an equally formidable strong-point (Erkmentepe), a precipitous slope on which the Greeks, fighting fiercely, repulsed several Turkish assaults. Then the army corps commander, Kemal-ed-Din (Kemalettin) Sami – a man nicknamed in the army 'the Lightning Conductor' from his propensity to draw the enemy's fire – appeared on the scene.
> "I'd sooner see the sky fall than the Greeks win," he said.
> He harangued the front-line troops. He called for volunteers, but only for men who wanted to die. Every man came forward. Then, know as he did the psychology of the

[1528] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 290.
[1529] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 312.
[1530] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 290.
[1531] Ibid.
[1532] Ibid; p. 291.
[1533] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 340.

> Turkish soldier, he taunted and cursed them for their cowardice. They were unworthy of their wives, who should have the right to divorce them.
> Bewildered and furious they asked why? Had they not volunteered to die? Having thus summoned up their blood to boiling-point, he ordered them over the barbed wire and up the slope. The Greek fire mowed them down. Soon there were pyramids of Turkish dead before the wire and the earth was red with blood, lying in pools on the hard ground. But more came on, clambering over the bodies of their comrades. Kemal-ed-Din Sami looked away, overwhelmed by the spectacle of slaughter and bloodshed. Then he heard an Imam chanting from the top of the rock, and knew that the position was captured.[1534]

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On the night of 27-28 August, brigadiers Nur Ettin and Ismet decided to renew their attacks on the following (28th) morning.[1535] At dawn, whilst the Turkish attack was beginning to unfold, the Greeks, now retreating, 'pushed their weary bodies into motion again. They had been fighting and marching now for forty-eight hours.'[1536] By now there no longer was any cohesion in their ranks. The shock and violence of the Turkish attack had had their toll. Instead of an army, Llewellyn Smith notes, there were scattered groups of soldiers, 'some frightened and anxious to run, others held together by dynamic commanders or a sense of necessity in this hostile environment.'[1537] Now further sudden attacks by the Turkish infantry and cavalry took their toll. The 4th Greek Division was thrown into confusion and split in two; some troops became lost in the defiles and gullies of Resil Tepe, whilst others meandered towards Oloutzak.[1538]

In the meantime, Mustafa Kemal had moved his headquarters to the municipal offices of the newly liberated town of Afyonkarahisar, 'the black fortress perched on its towering rock.'[1539] There he received reports that the bulk of the Greek 1st and 2nd Corps was grinding round Dumlupınar, some thirty miles to the west.[1540]

Here, Halide Edib, whom he had summoned back to his side, saw him 'gesticulating and poring over a map with Fevzi by the light of two lamps.'[1541]

> He [Mustafa Kemal] seems to be blinking at a hundred suns all rising over his head, so exalted and radiant he seems.[1542]
> "Welcome, Hanun Effendi," he said; "the ring of his voice and the shake of the hand made you feel his excitement – the man with the will-power which is like a self-fed machine of perpetual motion."[1543]
> "Congratulations, Pasha. You have done it at last,"

[1534] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 312.
[1535] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; at p. 60.
[1536] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 292.
[1537] Ibid.
[1538] Ibid.
[1539] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 340.
[1540] Ibid.
[1541] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; p. 354.
[1542] Ibid.
[1543] Ibid.

> There is a mighty chuckle-a chuckle that reminds one of the purr of a royal tiger.
> "Yes, we are doing it at last. How did you come? When did you come?"
> "I nearly fell into the Greek lines, I believe."
> "I also nearly fell into the Greek lines today."
> "Your falling into Greek hands would have quite a different significance."
> Another long chuckle. He seems to be contemplating the joke of falling into Greek hands.
> "Come, Hanum Effendi, let us eat."
> Fevzi Pasha sat opposite-he is patting his right shoulder, as he usually does in moments of satisfaction.[1544]

Mustafa Kemal discussed the options with Fevzi, İsmet and Nurettin, and decision was taken for the encirclement of the Greeks at Dumlupınar, and go for the kill.[1545] Fevzi moved to the north to command the right of the encircling army, whilst Mustafa Kemal took personal command of the forces in the south and west, leaving İsmet behind at Afyon. It took a day for Turkish troops to complete the encirclement.[1546] Trikoupis (in tactical command of both his own I Corps and the reinforcing II Corps infantry divisions) had realised that he was almost entirely encircled.[1547] Now the objective was to extricate himself before the jaws snapped shut, either westwards, or to break out fighting and rejoin Frangou's group, which he had gathered was moving to Dumlupinar. His aim was to re-establishing a defensive line there which could be supplied up the railway from Smyrna.[1548] The Frangou group, having lost all contact with Trikoupis', together with semi independent detachments and Evzones units had pressed on westwards down the line of the railway, and reached Dumlupinar in the early hours of 29 August.[1549] Here was a possible point of renewed resistance as it was strongly fortified, and well supplied from Smyrna via Ushak.[1550] Neither general had realised that the Turks had already planned to destroy them right there.

On 29 August, Trikoupis' troops were desperately struggling toward Dumlupinar in an attempt to make contact with Frangou's 'lost divisions.'[1551] Although one division got to within five miles of Frangou's group, it could not bridge the gap in the face of heavy Turkish fire.[1552] To make things worse, infantry and cavalry of the Turkish First and Second Armies had converged at different points, thus disrupting Greek movement.[1553] The Turks were concentrating their attacks on Trikoupis, who was

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[1544] Ibid.
[1545] Ismet İnönü: *Hatıralar* (Memoirs), I, 290-1. C. Erikan: *Komutan*; op cit; 808.
[1546] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 341.
[1547] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 60.
[1548] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 292.
[1549] Ibid; p. 293.
[1550] Ibid.
[1551] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1552] Ibid.
[1553] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; at p. 61.

hoping for Frangou's assistance.[1554] None came; also realising that the direct way through to Dumlupinar (Tulu Punar) was blocked, he ordered his troops to try to get through by an alternative route.[1555] First he sought to save his army from heavy Turkish fire, waiting until nightfall to make his move. Under cover of darkness, he gave orders for another attempt to break through, unknown to him that Frangou had evacuated Dumlupınar, which was now in Turkish hands.[1556] What had happened there earlier was that when he saw the difficult situation Trikoupis was in, Frangou had ordered an immediate supporting attack by the 7th Division, but before it could be launched, the 1/38 Regiment of Evzones, holding the strongpoint of Touklou Tepe on the right of the Greek line, was routed by a Turkish attack and fled westwards.[1557] Once his right wing was under threat, Frangou abandoned the idea of giving support to Trikoupis, and instead ordered the evacuation of Dumlupınar, and resumed the retreat westwards.[1558] Now was lost the last real chance of resistance, and no better defensive position was likely to be found. So, whilst Frangou's group was marching west towards Uşak, Alaşehir, İzmir, and the sea, under cover of darkness, the Trikoupis army was marching towards where Frangou had just left.[1559]

On the night of 29-30 August, Mustafa Kemal summoned his Chief of Staff and army commanders and ordered them to destroy completely the encircled enemy forces.[1560] On the morning of 30 August he moved his headquarters forward to a low hill, since named Zafertepe (Victory Hill), rising just above the railway line, a little to the east of Dumlupınar, to direct the final assault on the encircled Greeks.[1561] The small town of Dumlupınar, around which the Greeks had built up a fortified position, lies in an upland valley hemmed in by mountains – Murat Dağ in the north and Ahır Dağ in the south.[1562] The valley affords a passage for the single-track railway from Afyon to İzmir, which the Greeks sought to use for their retreat.[1563] Just as they were marching, they suddenly came under Turkish intense artillery fire and then infantry bayonet charges. Their troops disintegrated. Now Trikoupis realised that the road to Dumlupınar was blocked. Once more, he had to change course towards Banaz, a narrow, rough track leading across the northern flanks of the mountain Murad Dağ, his movement, however, hampered by a crowd of civilians and irregulars.[1564] On this day, 30 August, the Turks fought what they would later call the battle of the Supreme Commander, which destroyed most of the Greek forces remaining in the pocket.[1565] The Greeks were under heavy Turkish fire coming from the wooded heights above the plain to the north, and under attack from south and east as well; the trap was now

[1554] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 292.
[1555] Ibid; p. 293.
[1556] Ibid.
[1557] Ibid.
[1558] Ibid.
[1559] Ibid.
[1560] I. Gorgulu: *Buyuk Taaruz*, op cit; p. 106.
[1561] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 341.
[1562] Ibid; p. 340.
[1563] Ibid; p. 341.
[1564] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 294.
[1565] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 61.

closing on them. Only the road westward remained open.[1566] Because of the heavy Turkish fire, once more, the escape had to be made in the dark hoping that the Turks would not have time to close the gap.[1567] By nightfall, as the encirclement was still loose some of the Greek formations managed to slip through.[1568] A large group, with the 4th Division Commander Dimaras lost their way and blundered from one side to the other of the valley in vain, and would eventually surrender to the Turks two days later on the morning of 1 September.[1569] Trikoupis himself escaped with about 6,000 soldiers but the Greeks lost the bulk of their artillery and transport.[1570] In the course of the fighting and artillery pounding that took place on that day, the Greek 1st and 2nd Corps were annihilated as effective fighting forces, and amongst the troops which had evaded death or capture round Dumlupınar, only one thought remained: to escape from Anatolia as quickly as possible.[1571]

In the meantime, in the north, the Greek III Corps, virtually intact, stood by while its neighbours were being destroyed, and rather than assisting, prepared to beat a hasty retreat to the shores of the Sea of Marmara.[1572] Thus, all in all, by the end of 30 August, four days after the initial attack, half the Greek army had been either annihilated or taken prisoner, with the loss of all its war material.[1573] The scene of the Greek disaster became evident to Halide Edib as she afterwards came onto the scene:

> Like a disordered dream… Forsaken batteries glistened in the sun; rifles and ammunition in huge piles, endless material of all descriptions lay huddled in a great mass all over the valley. And amidst it all corpses – of men and animals – lay as they had fallen.[1574]

In the meantime, the surviving Greek army was in headlong flight to the coast, out of range of its pursuers, a fighting force no longer, but still burning villages and crops, slaughtering men, women and children as it fled. 'For this, according to the Greek soldiers' orders, was 'a war of extermination.'[1575]

[1566] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; pp. 294-5.
[1567] Ibid; p. 295.
[1568] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 61.
[1569] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* op cit; p. 295.
[1570] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 61.
[1571] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 341.
[1572] Ibid.
[1573] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 313.
[1574] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 356-7.
[1575] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 314.

Greek destruction of Turkish villages in their flight

Systematic destruction of Turkish infrastructure including the railway.

All through 31 August the main group of Greek survivors marched on, before snatching a little, and dangerous rest as the Turks were in pursuit. The greater part of the 9th Division under Colonel Gardikas pushed on westwards, and eventually reached the main Gediz-Ushak road, where they made contact with the 5th Division.[1576] Of his

[1576] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 295.

fine army, now Trikoupis only retained around 5,000 weary men, wheeling south towards Ushak, hoping of contact with fellow Greek troops, supplies, and communications with Smyrna.[1577] The men had been fighting and marching in difficult country under pressure for almost a week, with only short and precarious rests.[1578]

On the Turkish side, meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal, Fevzi and İsmet met in the yard of a village house near Dumlupınar discussing what they should do next.[1579] Whilst Fevzi sought to send the 1st Army to İzmir, and the 2nd to clear the north, İsmet urged that both the 1st and 2nd Armies should pursue the retreating Greeks to İzmir in order to prevent them from establishing a new line of defence, arguing, 'We have no arms factories to rely on, and I cannot prepare for another battle.'[1580]

Mustafa Kemal agreed with İsmet.

In a ruined village by the battlefield, his tent was pitched on the roof of a stable; peasant women gathered around, staring at him, begging him to avenge the sufferings which they had endured at the hands of the Greeks.[1581]

> They stared at him with wonder in their eyes, although they chatted with him in perfect ease [reports Halide Edib.] When he talked, they did not understand, but they listened all the same. Most of them were young and some had babies in their arms. They had suffered from the invaders unforgettably, and in more than one way, and they had that something in their eyes which I had not seen in the eyes of other peasant women, even among those who had suffered in the same way. One of them with burning eyes said to Mustafa Kemal Pasha:
>
> "Thou must avenge our wrongs, if thou ever catch their women; thou must see that they are treated as we were treated... Oh, the dogs, the pigs... they have treated us as if we were mire, abomination under their heels..."
>
> She went into details, in their grimmest form, and she produced a discordant sound in her choking throat that gave one creepy feelings in one's back. I felt that their wounds would never be healed with time; they would brood over them, they would probe them ever in the same passionate way. Yes, this mood was absolutely Western in its fixedness and its vindictiveness; it lacked the mellowness, the subtle understanding and forgiveness of the real Eastern soul. These women had learned the lesson of ugly hatred which the West had been trying so hard to teach the East.[1582]

Now Mustafa Kemal was sitting silently on a chair by the roadside, watching the droves of Greek prisoners as they filed back, dusty and ragged and blood-stained.[1583] The scene of devastation shocked him even if he was used to the carnage of war. To

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[1577] Ibid.
[1578] Ibid.
[1579] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 341.
[1580] Ismet Inonu: *Hatıralar*; op cit; I, 290-1.
[1581] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 314.
[1582] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; p. 360.
[1583] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 314.

an ADC he confessed 'To his hatred of it, philosophizing on the failings of mankind – and those of the Greeks in particular.'[1584]
Among the prisoners brought before him was an officer he had known in Salonika. The prisoner was surprised to see no badge on his shoulder, and so asked him his rank. 'Was he now major, colonel, general, what? Kemal replied that he was marshal, Commander-in-Chief.
The Greek exclaimed in Turkish, 'Whoever heard of a Commander-in-Chief being near the front line of a battle?' Kemal said to him jovially, 'We are soon going to take back Salonika, and to create an autonomous Macedonia. I shall make you a commander there.'[1585]

The Turks had just destroyed the Greek 4th, 5th, 9th, 12th, and 13th Infantry Divisions.[1586] In an era before the motorisation of armies, Erickson remarks, this was 'an unusual and dramatic accomplishment. The Great offensive opened the way for the destruction of the Greek army in Asia Minor.'[1587]

> It was the fruit of meticulous planning and a masterly concept of strategic and tactical surprise. The "Verdun of the Greeks had crumbled."[1588]

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In the Wake of the Greek Flight

As the Greeks were fleeing west, pursued by the Turks, Halide Edib herself (a corporal in the Turkish army) was behind the Turkish troops, and she offers us this vivid account of what lay in front of her:

> On the thirtieth of August Dr. Murad took me from Afium [Afyon] to Dumlu-Pinar... The roads were littered with piles of ammunition, cars, splendid horses, and mules which were left to die because they had come to that pathetic stage when they can no longer move or eat. Villagers stopped the car and talked to us, their eyes brimming with joy; one sturdy peasant woman jumped into the car, smothered me with kisses, and left a warm loaf of bread in my arms. "It is a symbol of her warm heart," said Dr. Murad. It was: the blessed daily food and sustainer of man in life. The soldiers were marching yet in thin columns; it was as if they were emerging from a narrow gorge behind which they had been shut out from their own world; later they would be like a mighty flood which would overflow and inundate the land they were going to free.
>
> Dumlu-Pinar was a primitive village, mostly burned. It was in a small valley surrounded with hills, low and high, covered all over with intricate designs of trenches, fortifications, barbed wire-all trampled and broken by fighting. It looked like a mass of nests of ants of a large and peculiar breed...
>
> Kizilje-Dere [Kızılcıdere], the long and narrow valley between the mountain range and the wooded hills, looked like a disordered dream that day. Forsaken batteries glistened in the sun, endless material of all descriptions lay huddled in a grand mess

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[1584] Ibid.
[1585] Ibid.
[1586] I. Gorgulu: *Buyuk Taaruz*, op cit; pp. 108-9.
[1587] E.J. Erickson: From Kirkilisse; op cit; p. 61.
[1588] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 314.

all over the valley. And amidst it all corpses-of men and animals-lay as they had fallen... We stood by the car and looked -Lo! My attention was shifted from the horror of the field by a number of wandering dogs. They were beautiful creatures, with pathetic yearning and mourning in their eyes: some watching by their dead masters, others searching for their bodies, smelling among the piles of forsaken material... They tore my heart most when they sat on their hind legs, too weary to move, their eyes full of distress... Yet they ran away with their tails between their legs whenever any one tried to be kind to them.

"Why are you running after stray dogs, Corporal?" said Noureddine Pasha, amused. "Come and choose a gun."[1589]

5. Finishing off the Greeks

On 1 September, Mustafa Kemal issued an army order, announcing for the first time that victory had been won. The order ended with the words:

'Armies! The Mediterranean is your immediate objective. Forward!'[1590]

The Mediterranean was 250 miles distant from Dumlupınar.

On the Greek side, on the same day, the 5th Division and the bulk of the 9th Division pushing ahead, hungry and chaotic, merged with the retreating troops of Frangou.[1591] Major Panagakos, a staff officer sent up the line for liaison duties, sent back a series of reports on the dissolution of the army:

> I came on the 5th Division and men of various other divisions at the 12th kilometre of the Ushak-Gediz road. They were all mixed up in one column. There followed the 9th Division and men of various units and formations. The state of the men in general is exceptionally poor... The few units which now make up the skeleton of the army are dissolving one after the other. Throughout the whole valley a rabble is moving westwards with no thought in mind but to get to Smyrna.[1592]

The rabble, no longer a fighting force, evacuated Uşak on the morning of September 2.[1593]

About noon on 2 September what remained of the Trikoupis group (5,000 men) came near Uşak, only to realise that the town was now occupied by the Turks, who had arrived there only hours before.[1594] Trikoupis decided to get his men off the road where they could take up defensive positions and rest until nightfall, before trying to withdraw on to a new line south of Uşak.[1595] They positioned themselves on Hill 1155, south of Karacahisar, where, in the afternoon the column's observers reported

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[1589] Halide Edib: *The Turkish Ordeal*; op cit; pp. 355-8.
[1590] ATTB, op cit; 473-4.
[1591] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1592] Greek General Staff: *The Asia Minor Campaign*, p. 283 and app. 21.
[1593] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision,* op cit; pp. 294-296.
[1594] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1595] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* Allen Lane; London; 1973; p. 295.

the approach of Turkish cavalry, and, further away, a large force of Turkish infantry.[1596] Trikoupis' troops were now completely surrounded in a steep valley with a Turkish division before them and another two at their rear.[1597] Choosing between surrender and certain annihilation, Trikoupis ordered the raising of the white flag.[1598] Their surrender was accepted by a Turkish captain. In all, nearly 500 Greek officers and 5,000 men were taken captive; hundreds of machine-guns and 12 field guns passed into Turkish hands.[1599]

Back to the point furthest north, the III Corps was now retreating toward Panderma and Mudanya for evacuation.[1600] To the south, to the surviving divisions, with the Turks on their heels, fast flight was the only recourse. The officers made for safety, each to save his own skin, whilst soldiers, angry, homesick, without any enthusiasm for the fight, fled as fast as they could.[1601] The men could no longer care for military discipline or even self-defence, many throwing their rifles for the sake of speed of movement, whilst at the same time, they burned and ravaged what lay in their path.[1602]

The captive Greek generals were brought to the Turkish front headquarters, which had now moved to Uşak. İsmet recalls:

> They [the Greek generals] were exhausted. Their lips were swollen. I offered them tea, but they were not able to drink it. We treated them well, like comrades. We told them that they had fought well, but that luck was against them… When we finished chatting, I put on my belt and sword, and said that I would present them officially to the commander-in-chief…[1603]

A day or so later, with a fellow army corps commander, General Dionis, Trikoupis was brought to Kemal's headquarters, which had moved forward by this time to Uşak. Halide Edib describes how Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Fevzi Pasha, and İsmet Pasha were sitting around a table in Uşak, in a large hall, how the prisoners walked between Nurettin Pasha and Kemalettin Sami Pasha as they came to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's headquarters 'partly as a military honour to their rank, partly as protection from any threatening demonstration. The grief-stricken population of Ushak saw in them only men responsible for the murder of their people and the burning of their houses.'[1604]

Mustafa Kemal Pasha was standing between Fevzi Pasha and İsmet Pasha when the two Greek generals were escorted to his presence.

> To me the scene was first-rate military drama, and I watched it with intense interest. The simple uniform of our generals, as simple as that of the private, their immovably set faces contrasted with the nervous, discomposed faces and the extraordinarily gilded and adorned uniforms of the Greeks. Fevzi Pasha

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[1596] Ibid.
[1597] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1598] P. Kinross, *Ataturk,* op cit; p. 357.
[1599] C. Erikan: *Komutan*; op cit; 827.
[1600] P. Kinross, *Ataturk,* p. 362.
[1601] H.C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf,* New York; 1932; pp. 159-160.
[1602] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 296.
[1603] İsmet İnönü; *Hatıralar*, I, 292. According to Halide Edib, Mustafa Kemal shook hands with the captive Greek generals, while İsmet and Fevzi refused to do so (S. Tansel: *Mondros*; op cit, IV, 174–6).
[1604] Halide Edib: *Turkish ordeal*; op cit; p. 364.

stood erect, his eyes as expressionless as those of a Chinese Buddha-he was most probably saying to himself, "These fellows cannot be really soldiers; look how fussily they move about, and they salute as if they were dancing some new frivolous steps." Ismet Pasha made efforts to keep his black eyes from flashing with anger. He was more man than soldier at the moment: he was visualizing the human tragedy which these commanders had probably ordered to be inflicted on the Turkish population.

[Both generals] bowed gravely without giving their hands.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha dominated the scene... He kept the rules of his game with dignity, with tact, and with exactitude. He thought neither of the appearance nor of the misdeeds of the Greek generals.

Now that his military opponent, Tricoupis, 'was on the ground,' he showed that military art and military courtesy he possessed to his fingers' ends.'

He grabbed General Tricoupis's hand and held it imperceptibly longer than for an ordinary handshake.

"Sit down, General," he said. "You must be tired."

Then he offered his cigarette case and ordered coffee, his eyes on Tricoupis, although he was equally polite and cordial to Dionis. General Tricoupis was looking at him with open admiration and wonder in his eyes. He was a man about fifty, 'nervous, sickly, overdressed, and very theatrical.

"I did not know you were such a young man, General," he said to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

Then they settled down around the table. Mustafa Kemal Pasha seemed impatient to begin talking about the game they had played together. 'His impatience was like that of a famous playwright who might say to another whose play had been hissed in public, "Let us discuss and analyze the plot of your last play. Let us find out wherein you have failed."[1605] The conversation began with an interpreter in Greek, but it went on in slow French. General Tricoupis was pouring out his woes to Mustafa Kemal Pasha: 'he sounded like an amateur speaking to a professional,' talking about the deficiencies in command and also about the exploits of Turkish cavalry, who cut the wires, circulated in the midst of the Greek army, and wrought havoc in their transport. Then General Tricoupis told of a counter-move which he had proposed from Chobanlar, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha pleasantly explained how he would have reacted if it had been carried out. One saw in a flash that he had calculated every possible move on the part of the Greek army. The end of the conversation degenerated into a spirited discussion, or more properly an argument, between the two Greek generals-General Dionis had not obeyed some order of Tricoupis.

'The Greek generals were not acting up to the military standard of decorum, I believe, for I saw our generals looking rather disillusioned because two highly

[1605] Ibid; p. 365.

placed members of their profession- although Greeks-were not as dignified as the honor of the profession demanded.[1606]

"Is there any particular thing you want me to do, General?" asked Mustafa Kemal Pasha, rising and ending the interview.

"I want my wife, who is in Constantinople, to be told," he replied.

Then Mustafa Kemal Pasha gripped the man's hand and held it for some time, speaking with sincerity and some humor.

"War is a game of chance, General," he said. "The very best is sometimes worsted. You have done your best as a soldier and as an honorable man; the responsibility rests with chance. Do not be distressed."

General Tricoupis, who was of less stern stuff, gesticulated theatrically with his hands and his head.

"Oh, General," he said, "I have not done the last thing I ought to have done."

He was referring to his lack of courage for not having committed suicide.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's eyes screwed up and his mouth took a cynical curve.

"It is a thing which concerns you personally," he said.[1607]

6. The Push on İzmir (4-10 September, 1922)

In Ankara and Istanbul, little was known of the progress of the battle until it was virtually won. Mustafa Kemal, still intent on security, issued only brief daily communiqués, which announced a series of forward movements without elaborating on their scale.[1608]

Ankara, which was closer to the front than Istanbul knew a little more of the situation, and when it was heard that operations had started, anxious crowds moved to and fro between the Ministry of War and the Assembly, seeking news and speculating intensified in the wake of the brief reports which were read out to the deputies in secret session.[1609] On the second day, when the battle had been virtually won, there was no communiqué, then came the news of the capture of Afyon, which attracted great crowds into the streets, celebrating the Gazi, the army, and the Turkish people, firing salvoes into the air.[1610]

In İzmir, On 28 August, a brief communiqué had announced the evacuation of Afyonkarahisar, and rumours of disaster had spread from mouth to mouth. Anxious visitors to the G.H.Q. were met with worried faces of staff officers who themselves could not assess the extent of the catastrophe.[1611] General Hatzianestis remained in İzmir, for to set off for the front at this stage would be useless, and Athens was

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[1606] Ibid; p. 366.
[1607] Ibid.
[1608] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 316.
[1609] Ibid.
[1610] Ibid.
[1611] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 299.

informed that in view of the critical situation of the army the War Minister should come to Smyrna immediately.[1612] On 1 September Theotokis and Stratos arrived and consulted at length with Hatzianestis and his staff, and then left.[1613] The same day, the High Commissioner, Stergiadis, dispatched a circular telegram to all his provincial representatives instructing them to collect their archives and papers together and prepare in absolute secrecy to leave their posts and retire to İzmir.[1614]

In Istanbul, there was still talk of an armistice, of a conference in Venice, and people's eyes were still on the Greek troops threatening the city from the lines of Çatalca.[1615] To many, the Anatolian offensive seemed a foolhardy enterprise, as Greek communiqués belittled the Turkish successes and hinted at a Turkish retreat.[1616] The Greeks drank champagne in the clubs of the city, 'to the destruction of Mustafa Kemal,' and a rumour had spread that he had been taken prisoner.[1617] When the first certain news of the Turkish victory came through, the newspapers printed it with some reserve for fear they would not be believed. Then the day came when it became certain that the truth far exceeded their most optimistic reports, and that it was not Kemal but the Greek generals who had been captured.[1618] The Greek armies were defeated and in full retreat. The following day, when the news was printed in triumphant headlines, the crowd before the newspaper offices was such that it blocked the doors and the papers had to be thrown from the windows.[1619]

Whilst the Turks celebrated, the Greeks vented their anger on the population and all that stood, finding the strength and the time to burn and kill whilst their enemy was just behind them. On 4 September, Alaşehir was abandoned. As Colonel Gonatas and his men passed through, the town was burning from one end to the other: 'The mad frenzy of destruction and plunder had seized the people.'[1620]
Stores of ammunition were blown up, finishing off the destructive work. The communist leader Stavridis of the 31st Infantry Regiment, passed through the town by the burning railway station:

> Many corpses, which smelled horrible in the fire and smoke. Who was to care what corpses they were? We passed through hurried, stooping, like ghosts, amid the smoke.[1621]

Most of the towns that stood in the Greek's army path were left in ruins. One third of Uşak no longer existed; Alasehir was 'a scorched cavity, defacing the hillside.'[1622] There, 4,300 out of 4,500 houses were destroyed with the loss of 3,000 lives, whilst in

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[1612] Ibid.
[1613] Ibid.
[1614] Ibid.
[1615] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 317.
[1616] Ibid.
[1617] Ibid.
[1618] Ibid.
[1619] Ibid.
[1620] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 297.
[1621] E.A. Stavridis. *Behind the Scenes of the K.K.E. (Ta Paraskiniatou K.K.E.),* Athens I953; p. 87.
[1622] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.

Manisa (ancient Magnesia) only 1,400 out of 14,000 houses remained standing.[1623] The Turkish population was subjected to all sorts of atrocities by the retreating troops and accompanying civilian Christian mobs.[1624] The pursuing Turkish cavalry did not hesitate in kind on the Christian populace; the road from Usak to Smyrna lay littered with corpses.[1625] The Turkish forces were hurrying on towards Smyrna striving to overtake the Greeks before they could decimate all western Anatolia 'by fire and sword'.[1626] As Turkish troops, spearheaded by cavalry, rushed headlong towards, pockets of resistance by the retreating Greeks and the local Greek population were quickly mopped up.[1627] The infantry, burdened by its various impedimenta of ox-carts and mule trains, crossed the two hundred miles of winding roads between the plateau and the sea more slowly. In three days its main body marched a hundred miles but failed to catch up with the enemy.[1628] Still, from the start of their offensive, it took the Turks fifteen days to recover their Anatolian soil.[1629]

On 5 September, the Greek retreat continued from Alaşehir west to Salihli.

> A long, endless column [Colonel Gonates writes.] All the divisions are moving virtually on the same road, on the railway track and on either side of it, and they need a fore-guard, rear-guard and flank detachments to guard the flanks, because *chettes* and enemy cavalry are in a position to surprise the columns and sow panic, to break up the baggage trains and take them prisoner. The feet of most of the men are swollen from the long march. The sick and those with bad feet fall by the side of the roads and ask the rest to take them. But no one pays any attention, it is each man for himself now. Many go to sleep and then when they wake up follow whichever unit is passing. When we go past we wake them up and shout to them that there are no more detachments behind us and that if they stay there they will be taken prisoner, that is if they are not killed. The column moved very slowly.... To the other hardships was added lack of food. If there had not been grapes on the vines at that period, the army could not have been kept going.[1630]

Salihli was now burning as the Greek rear-guard marched through, only to be caught by Turkish cavalry under Fahrettin. They had ridden hard for 50 kilometres, without saddles or spare baggage in order to catch up with their enemy.[1631] As the Greek columns trekked on towards Menemen, burning the railway bridges as they went, Fahrettin and his troops saw flames light up the sky above Manisa.[1632]

[1623] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 343.
[1624] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1625] Ibid.
[1626] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1627] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 344.
[1628] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1629] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 563.
[1630] S. Gonatas: *Memoirs (Apomnimonevmata),* Athens I958, p. 209.
[1631] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 297.
[1632] Ibid; p. 298.

The same day, 5 September, a Greek division arrived by sea in İzmir to help hold the city, but the troops mutinied.[1633]

The following day, September 6, the Greek high command decided that Nif, lying in a gap in the last barrier of mountains east of İzmir, should be abandoned, and that retreating troops should be directed to the Urla peninsula, south-west of İzmir, for embarkation to Greece.[1634]
On the 7th, the troops had now reached the line which had long been recognised as the last defence of İzmir. The city itself was only some 25 kilometres away.[1635] But on the afternoon of 8 September, the order came through that the retreat should continue during the night and that the thought of defence of İzmir should be abandoned.[1636] The army was to retire on the metalled road from Nymphaion, but near İzmir it was to swing round the town on the southward side, to march to Chesme [Çeşme] opposite the island of Chios.[1637] Thus on 9 September the frightened inhabitants of İzmir saw the main Greek columns, 'their only protection against the Turks,' bypass the city and rush towards the sea and their homes in 'Old Greece.'[1638]

The Greek retreat had lasted a week. Everywhere the Greek troops carried off Christian families 'that their quarters too might be burned and not a roof left for the advancing Turks.'[1639]

> They tore up the railway between Smyrna and Aydin. They pillaged and destroyed and raped and butchered. "They went to pieces altogether," as Rumbold recounted to Curzon on the basis of reports from his consul in Smyrna. It was 'a sickening record of bestiality and barbarity.[1640]

Filling the atmosphere, as the Turks advanced down the valleys, was the stench of unburied bodies, of charred human and animal flesh.[1641] As early as February, the British representative in İzmir, Sir Harry Lamb, had warned:

> The Greeks have realized that they have got to go, but they are decided to leave a desert behind them, no matter whose interests may suffer thereby. Everything which they have time and means to move will be carried off to Greece; the Turks will be plundered and burnt out of house and home.[1642]

The Turkish victory had been so rapid, no more than six days, that the Greeks were unable to evacuate all their loot.[1643] But the rest of Sir Harry Lamb's prophecy came true. In Afyonkarahisar, the Turks were able to put out the fires started by the retreating Greeks.[1644] But hundreds of villages and market towns – from Uşak to İzmir

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[1633] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 344.
[1634] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 344.
[1635] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 298.
[1636] Ibid.
[1637] Ibid.
[1638] Ibid.
[1639] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1640] Ibid.
[1641] Ibid.
[1642] Gilbert, Martin, Sir Harold Rumbold: *Portrait of a Diplomat,* Heinemann, London 1973, 251.
[1643] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 343.
[1644] ASD, op cit; I, 274.

– were burned down.[1645] In the north, the neighbourhood round the railway station at Eskişehir was destroyed.[1646]

For Western powers, though, what mattered were the Christians, who, following the Turkish push, and their customary view, would only end in their massacre. A personal telegram for Mustafa Kemal had arrived from the Allied powers, relayed through the French cruiser Edgar Quinet in the harbour of Smyrna, stating that they hoped he would protect the Christian population.[1647] At once surprised by the speed of the Turkish advance, and also seeking to mellow the reaction towards Christians, the Allies swiftly renewed their plea for an armistice, which was passed on to Mustafa Kemal.[1648] His reply on 5 September said that, since the Greek army in Anatolia had suffered a total defeat:

> There was no longer any need to negotiate an armistice there; negotiations, instead, should, therefore, be confined to the return to Turkish rule of Thrace up to the 1914 Ottoman boundaries.[1649]

This area, he insisted,

> Should come under the military and civil authority of the Ankara government within fifteen days of the conclusion of the armistice, and that Greece should free all Turkish prisoners and guarantee to pay compensation for the damage it had inflicted in the previous two and a half years. The Turkish offer to negotiate these conditions would remain valid until 10 September.[1650]

Whilst the Greek army had been fast retreating, in Izmir, meanwhile, the situation had fast risen to its paroxysm. From villages and towns in the hinterland the Christians had crowded the roads down to the city, fully realising that the Greek occupation was at an end.[1651] A British eye-witness described the refugee trains as

> A wonderful sight: passengers standing all along the footplates and others swarming on the roof. In the carriages the passengers were so crowded that dead bodies were passed out at stations on their way to Smyrna.[1652]

After the refugees came those parts of the army which did not bypass the city:

> Then the defeated, dusty, ragged Greek soldiers began to arrive, looking straight ahead, like men walking in their sleep… In a never ending stream they poured through the town toward the point on the coast to which the Greek fleet had withdrawn. Silently as ghosts they went, looking neither to the right nor the left. From time to time some soldier, his strength entirely spent, collapsed on the sidewalk, or by a door… And now at last we heard that the Turks were moving on the town.[1653]

[1645] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 343.
[1646] S. Tansel: Mondros, IV, 173.
[1647] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1648] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 344.
[1649] Ibid.
[1650] Ibid.
[1651] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 300.
[1652] Admiral Sir Bertram Thesiger, *Naval Memories,* privately printed.
[1653] G. Horton: *Recollections Grave and Gay,* Indianapolis I927; pp. 119-120.

The Great Powers sent ships to protect their own: the British sent in the *Iron Duke, George V, Cardiff,* and *Tumult.* French, Italian and American ships were also there.[1654] The Asia Minor National Defence League started to issue rifles to the citizens, hoping still to join with the retreating army in defending the city and its surroundings. It was too late. 'The army would not stop for any cause.'[1655]

The Metropolitan Chrysostom sent a message of despair from himself and his Armenian colleague to the Archbishop of Canterbury appealing to him to use his influence with the British Cabinet to help 'keep Kemal out of the city.'[1656] The Rev. Charles Dobson, the British chaplain entrusted with this message, took it to Admiral Brock, who replied that he did not expect a disorderly occupation by the Turks, but would give protection to those who needed it if disorder ensued.[1657] The Metropolitan 'was unimpressed by these assurances.'[1658]

On 7 September, the Metropolitan Archbishop Chrysostom was still seeking the assistance of the Allied representatives, writing to those such as the Ecumenical Patriarch who might help.[1659] He also wrote to Venizelos, his last letter:

> Dear friend and brother, Eleftherios Venizelos, the great moment for a great gesture by you has come. Hellenism in Asia Minor, the Greek state and the entire Greek Nation are descending now to a Hell from which no power will be able to raise them up and save them.
>
> For this unimaginable catastrophe it is of course your political and personal enemies who bear the blame; but you too bear a great weight of responsibility for two of your actions. First because you sent to Asia Minor as High Commissioner an utterly deranged egotist. Secondly because before you had completed your work and put the crown and seal on the unimaginably fine and magnificent creation you had built up, the establishment of the foundations of the most glorious Byzantine Empire, you had the unfortunate and guilty inspiration to order elections on the very eve of your entry to Constantinople and the occupation of it by the Greek army in the implementation of the Treaty of Sevres –now alas for ever destroyed. But what is done is done.
>
> There is still time though, if not to save the Treaty of Sevres, at least to save the whole Greek Nation from destruction through the loss not only of Asia Minor but also of Thrace and perhaps even Macedonia…
>
> If in order to save Greece you judged it your duty to initiate the revolutionary movement of Salonika, do not hesitate now to initiate a hundred such movements in order to save the whole of Hellenism everywhere and especially that of Asia Minor and Thrace, which nourishes such a religious adoration for you…

[1654] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 300.
[1655] Ibid.
[1656] Ibid.
[1657] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 300.
[1658] Dobson's account in L. Oeconomos; *The Tragedy of the Christian Near East,* Anglo-Hellenic League pamphlet no. 50, London 1923.
[1659] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision;* Allen Lane; London; 1973; p. 302.

> It is not necessary for this Hellenism and these territories with Constantinople to be united with Greece, because that dream has been removed from us for at least a hundred years, but hasten to raise your powerful voice so that these territories may be made an autonomous Eastern Christian state, even under the sovereignty of the Sultan, with your noble self as High Commissioner.[1660]

On 8 September the Greeks crowded down to the quay once more, as on 15 May 1919 when the Greek army had first set foot in Asia Minor. All hoped for a pass on one of the remaining boats to leave İzmir[1661] All knew that the Turks would soon arrive. However, as the day passed the Greeks of İzmir realised they were being deserted by one after the other of the Greeks from across the water.[1662] The Cavalry Division under General Kallinski rode through, seemingly unaffected by the fighting, riding along the front before swinging westward to Çeşme, and witnesses noticed that, 'like all the Greek troops, they were staring straight ahead with dead eyes.'[1663] General Polymenakos, whose first loyalty was to the defeated army, left the barracks, on his way to Çeşme, where the bulk of the Greek army was now concentrated.[1664]

Mustafa Kemal, meanwhile, who had now moved his headquarters from Uşak to Salihli, then to Nif, on the hills above İzmir, had taken steps should the Greeks make a final stand before the city itself.[1665] The French had instructed their consuls to negotiate with him so as to hand over the city to the Turkish army, and had asked him to fix a time and place for a meeting.[1666] In response, he offered to meet them in Nif on 9 September.[1667]

That same day, the Greeks left Smyrna. The last of the Greek troops, but for a few stragglers, had left the day before – forty thousand of them in a convoy of Greek warships, together with all the Greek civil servants and police. They left behind them tens of thousands of prisoners (Kinross puts the figure at fifty thousand.)[1668]
The same day, 9 September, an Allied force, primarily British, entered the city 'to prevent looting and arson before the arrival of the Turks;' thus says the New York Times.[1669] In truth, had that been their intention, they ought have entered the city long before the Greeks had committed their final atrocities there, the Allies' entry really aiming to protect Christian subjects in case the Turks decided to take revenge.
Everyone knew that the Turks would soon be there that day.

The first Turkish soldier to reach the Mediterranean was a young cavalry lieutenant, who was greeted by a French colonel on the deserted quay of İzmir, the French officer

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[1660] Venizelos Papers, 317; Chrysostom to Venizelos, 7 Sept. 1922.
[1661] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; op cit; p. 303.
[1662] Ibid.
[1663] Ibid.
[1664] Ibid.
[1665] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 318.
[1666] Ibid.
[1667] Ataturk: *Nutuk*, op cit; 449-50.
[1668] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 320; the true, official figure was a maximum of 35,000. See below.
[1669] *The New York Times,* September 11, 1922, p. 1.

delivering to him a long speech, 'advising him to see to the protection of the Christians,' only to be interrupted by a Christian bomb which fell from a window and Christian fire shots which wounded the lieutenant.[1670]
Witnesses are in agreement regarding the orderly and highly disciplined Turkish entry into the city at 11 o'clock on 9 September. The British chaplain was one of those who saw them as he was on his way to the British Consulate.[1671] Another British, George Horton, coming to the door of his office, watched the cavalry ride by — 'sturdy looking fellows passing by in perfect order. They appeared to be well-fed and fresh.'[1672]

On 9 September, Mustafa Kemal arrived at Nif, where his car was at once surrounded by peasants. The next day he would follow his army into the city.[1673] He had won it in fifteen days, and when he subsequently returned to Ankara he apologised to his friends:
'Forgive me. One can sometimes make mathematical errors. I was one day out in my estimate.' He had promised them 14 days.[1674]

On 10 September, Mustafa Kemal and his troops were greeted with wild enthusiasm by the Turkish population.[1675] By a remarkable coincidence, this was three years, almost to a day, since the proclamation of the National Pact at the Sivas Congress (9 September 1919). The procession was met at the entrance of the city by a regiment of cavalry, which was to act as escort. These soldiers had been riding and fighting almost without a break for nine days. 'When Kemal promised his cavalry food in plenty, once the advance had begun, he did not reckon with the enemy's scorched earth' tactics.'[1676]
The last Greek troops in western Anatolia left the Urla Peninsula on 16 September.[1677]

Bursa, the first capital of the Ottoman Turks, had reverted intact to Turkish rule a day later than İzmir, on 9/10 September.[1678] In anticipation, the Grand National Assembly had voted on 6 September to remove from its tribune the black drape which had been placed there two years earlier as a sign of mourning for its capture.[1679] Gemlik and Mudanya were recovered on September 11, with the capture of an entire Greek division.[1680]

[1670] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 320.
[1671] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*; Allen Lane; London; 1973; p. 306.
[1672] Horton, p. 126.
[1673] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 319.
[1674] Ibid.
[1675] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1676] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 321.
[1677] M. Llewellyn Smith: *Ionian Vision*, op cit; 311.
[1678] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 344.
[1679] S. Tansel: *Mondros*; op cit, IV, 182.
[1680] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; p. 363.

The Turkish War of Independence was won. In three years of fighting, Turkish losses numbered 13,000 officers and men killed and 35,000 wounded.[1681] At the Battle of Dumlupınar, the Turks lost 13,000 men killed, wounded and missing, whilst Greek losses reached nearly 70,000, including 35,000 prisoners.[1682] The Greeks left behind half their guns and most of their stores.[1683] The biggest loss was suffered by the Turkish civilian population of Anatolia.[1684]

The Turkish Entry Into İzmir

Here, one compares the Turkish entry into İzmir with that of the Greeks on 15 May 1919. Obviously every Western historian tells us about the violence of the Turks: one Christian civilian shot. Only a handful of such historians speak about the countless hundreds if not thousands slain by the Greeks when they made their entry three years earlier. And one needs to note here, how unlike when 'the civilised Greeks' landed and butchered, the Allies watched from their boats, whilst here, they were quick to land, and make sure none (i.e amongst Christians) got harmed. One would also need to take special notice of the vast discrepancies which exit between the narrative of Westerners who were then present at the scene, and saw the events, i.e Turkish restraint (despite some isolated incidents) and modern historians, who completely reshape such events, and as usual, rant about Turkish bestiality and massacres.
One begins with a British officer, Captain Thesiger, subsequently Admiral Thesiger, who saw the Turkish arrival, and wrote his memories, as here summed up by Lord Kinross:

> In command of a detachment of British marines and bluejackets – who formed the bulk of the force, since the French and the Italians contributed little – was Captain Bertram Thesiger of HMS King George V.1 Guards had been posted at the Consulate and at the gasworks, and were now needed at the stores of the railway station, where he could see, as he later recalled, "about three thousand Greeks, some armed, cheerfully looting everything." At this moment there was a general scream and a rush. Shots were being fired, and there were yells of "the Turks are coming". They came in his direction – a unit of Turkish cavalry, advancing in extended formation across open ground. They galloped towards the captain with drawn swords and a swashbuckling air.
>
> Foreseeing unnecessary bloodshed, he determined to halt them. Getting between Greeks and Turks, he held up his hand, looking, as a British eyewitness put it, "for all the world like a London policeman", feeling none too confident since his white uniform was like that of a Greek naval officer.

[1681] Özakman, Turgut, Vahidettin, Mustafa Kemal ve Milli Mücadele (Vahidettin, Mustafa Kemal and the National Struggle), Bilgi Yayınevi, Istanbul 1997, 464–5, correcting Selek, 92–3.
[1682] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 345.
[1683] C. Erikan: *Komutan*, op cit; 838.
[1684] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 345.

> The Turkish commander, however, halted his men and dismounted. Captain Thesiger went up to him. In awkward French he explained to him that the Allies had landed troops to keep order and that if he would refrain from firing there was little danger of trouble. The Turkish officer, who bore the rank of colonel, replied that he did not intend to fire but wished to enter the city. He suggested doing so by a side street, but the captain advised him to follow the sea-front. He agreed to do this. Thesiger asked the colonel to leave a patrol to guard the railway stores. This was done. The cavalry then rode on into town, and Thesiger returned to the *Iron Duke* to report.
> Captain Thesiger was struck by the discipline of the Turkish forces. Nevertheless soldiers were demanding money from the Greeks and he saw one of them shoot a Greek dead, presumably because he had refused to comply. Presently the listless hordes of refugees, squatting on the pavements, saw the Turkish cavalry general make his entry into the city, riding the white horse of General Tricoupis, and soon long outlandish files of baggage camels were lumbering slowly along the sea-front.[1685]

Now, let us look at some of the stuff amongst modern historians. Some of their accounts such as by Clogg have been seen in chapter one, and will not be repeated here. The worst accounts are by historians still exerting now, in 2010-2018, specialising on Turkish studies, whose accounts are so awful one cannot see where to start, and so one resolves this is not the place to deal with their trash. So, instead, one looks at one amongst the least hateful of the Turks, Mango, who fails to go into the details of the mass-killing of the Turks during the Greek entry, but now lets his emotions explode again:

> Nurettin [whom Mango cannot stomach], who became military commandant of İzmir, was determined only on revenge. Soon after entering the governor's residence, he summoned the Greek archbishop Chrysostom, with whom he had a personal score to settle, for it was the archbishop who had procured Nurettin's dismissal from İzmir in 1919. Having accused the archbishop of treason, Nurettin pushed him out of the residence and invited the assembled crowd of Muslims to deal with him. He was lynched before the eyes of a French patrol.[1686] It was an invitation to mob rule. Attacks, mainly on the Armenians, intensified. Having won their War of Independence and thus prevented the loss of their land to their neighbours, most Muslims in Turkey wanted to see the last of the Christian minorities.[1687]

Of the modern historians, Kinross, paints an altogether different picture, although he does point to Turkish excesses:

[1685] Thesiger Naval Memories ….Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 320-1.
[1686] Puaux (22) and Llewellyn Smith (309) give the date of the murder of Chrysostom as 9 September, the eve of Mustafa Kemal's arrival in İzmir. This is more likely than Marjorie Housepian's account which seems to place it on Sunday 10 September (Smyrna 1922, 133).
[1687] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; pp. 345-6.

The situation in Smyrna was tense. Some thousands of refugees had embarked with the Greek forces, but more were still pouring in, standing all along the footplates and swarming on the roofs of the trains, passing their dead out at the stations over the heads of the living. They camped in the streets, hungry and hopeless and often sick, with their possessions in bundles around them. Thanks to the burning of the crops there was danger of starvation. With no Greek troops left to protect them, the people of the city, their minds still dwelling on an Ottoman past, had become obsessed with fears of a massacre of Christians.
Reprisals were feared for this devastation of the countryside and for the maltreatment of Turks by Greeks on the occupation of the city three years before. The foreign consuls were anxious for the safety of their nationals. Thus one of Kemal's first actions was to issue a proclamation, sentencing to death any Turkish soldier who molested non-combatants.
The gendarmerie was on its way, and would restore order within twenty-four or at the most forty-eight hours. Serious measures were being taken, in liaison with Constantinople, to feed the refugees.
The admiral then referred to the arrest and internment by the Turks of all the able-bodied male Christian population, and their threatened deportation to the interior as indicated by Nur-eddin. This had caused panic throughout the Greek and Armenian communities, and would create a bad impression abroad, as recent deportations from the Samsun area had done. Kemal replied in a conciliatory spirit. Nur-eddin had spoken in military terms, at the moment of victory, concerned to prevent the passage of potential Greek recruits to continue the war in Thrace. In fact the Turkish intentions were not so drastic, and he undertook to reassure the population accordingly. None the less deportations continued.
As events turned out it was not massacre but fire that made a tragedy of the Turkish reoccupation of Smyrna. The excesses committed by the Turkish soldiery against the local Greeks were brutal indeed, but of a sporadic and individual kind. There was no repetition of the organized massacres which had occurred elsewhere and which the Christians feared. An official American observer, contradicting lurid reports in the American press, afterwards estimated the total deaths, from various causes, at about two thousand.
Nevertheless feelings ran high between the Turks and Armenians, and for several nights there was bloodshed, with knives and bayonets, in the streets of the Armenian quarter, where the Turkish troops were ostensibly rounding up suspected traitors and confiscating arms. Typical of such skirmishes was one described, with true British understatement, in the diary of a midshipman on board the King George V:
"Looking out of the window I saw an Armenian throw a bomb at some Turks. They chased him and he jumped into the sea. They got a boat and chased the Armenian and brought him on shore. He then died unpleasantly."[1688]

[1688] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 322-4.

Kemal remarked humorously to Halide Edib,

> In the name of all common sense tell me how, Hanum Effendi, could the Greeks have landed in Smyrna without the strong help and desire of the British Government? Could anything have happened in the Near East without their express desire? Of course we were at war with them, not with the Greeks – a thousand times so.[1689]

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Turkish Wounds

On 30 August, Halide Edib tells us,

> After passing the village of Islahanlar we saw a little group of men in the distance. As we went nearer I could distinguish the loose black gown of a hodja waving in the wind. They were opening a grave, and a human form lay near them covered with a blanket. A young lieutenant, disheveled, haggard, torn all over, saluted Noureddine Pasha and introduced himself.
>
> "Lieutenant Fikri."
>
> "What are you doing here, my son?" asked Noureddine Pasha.
>
> "I have been searching for the body of my twin brother since last night. I have found him at last. What shall I say to my mother? He was the favorite, and she had not seen him for the last two years."
>
> "What was his name?"
>
> "Lieutenant Jelal, sir."
>
> Noureddine Pasha patted him on the shoulder, then leaned over the blanket and pulled it back. The twin brother Lieutenant Jelal lay on his back. His was the reflection of the other's distressed face in a happy mood. He had on only a chemise and his trousers. One of his thick black eyebrows had a perpendicular gash; the gray eyes were open; something far beyond the world's conception of rest and peace was all over the young body. It suggested that ideal peace and annihilation of self which I longed to connect with death.
>
> "We will help you, my son," said Noureddine Pasha, and taking a spade from the ground began to dig the grave with the rest. I wondered whether all graves were as deep as that. Then they lowered him into it, pulling the blanket back. He lay there with the same rest and peace in his open gray eyes while the dust shower gradually hid him away. At last I heard a whisper, "You also throw some earth on the grave."
>
> The hodja knelt over the grave, his palms opened to the sky. His loose sleeves were filling with the wind, a loose edge of his white turban was waving in the air like a peace signal to the heavens. We all stood and raised our hands to the sky.
>
> *"Elhamdulilahi-Rabbil-Alemeen,"* he chanted (All Praise be to Allah the Lord of All that Exists).[1690]

[1689] Ibid; p. 323.

[1690] Halide Edib: *Turkish Ordeal;* op cit; pp. 359-60.

7. Aftermaths

A few days after the Turkish recovery of İzmir, a huge fire destroyed the city. Debate has raged as who did it. Heath Lowry has dealt with the issue, and ought to be consulted by whomsoever needs to know more on this.[1691] In the meantime, the Greek and Christian population, unmolested (although modern scholars, as noted in the first chapter like to differ on this,) left the city on board of Ally ships, 213,000 men, women and children – the majority of the population of the city.[1692]

Leaving Smyrna to the Turks

Western Powers waited to see what the victorious Turks would do next.

> It was [wrote Vansittart] as if a boxer, after being counted out, had risen from the ring, stunned his opponent, knocked the referee through the ropes and levanted with the purse.[1693]

Even though the Greeks had been defeated and expelled, Eastern Thrace was still under their occupation, and Istanbul was still in Allied hands.[1694] The Turks intended to cross the Straits to enter Eastern Thrace, but the Allies had established a neutral

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[1691] Heath. W. Lowy: Turkish History, on whose sources will it be based; A case study on the burning of Izmir; in *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*; vol IX; 1989; pp. 1-29.
[1692] David Walder, *The Chanak Affair* (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1969), 177.
[1693] In P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 330.
[1694] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.

zone along each side of the waterway.[1695] In a series of interviews in İzmir, Mustafa Kemal clearly stated that both places would be won back, that he would be in Istanbul within eight days and would then recover Thrace.[1696] He put Turkish claims with quiet resolution, and should the Allies refuse to accept Turkish claims, he was ready 'to pursue the Greeks into Europe.'[1697] Now the Allies found themselves in a quandary. Before even the Turks entered İzmir, Lloyd George's Cabinet had declared that any attempt by the Turks 'to cross over to the European shore should be met by force.'[1698]

> An invasion of the Straits, Constantinople and Thrace by the Turks was a danger to Europe and to the Christian population of Turkey – moreover an affront not to be borne. Defeat is a nauseating draught; and that the victors in the greatest of all wars should gulp it down, was not readily to be accepted.[1699]

The days passed, and the Turks were about to move into Thrace. In view of Italy's and France's recent agreements with the Nationalists, the British realised they would have to do the fighting alone.[1700] As the Turks arrived at the border of the neutral zone near Çanakkale, General Harington, the local commander there, was instructed to withdraw his forces.[1701] Harington, however, had other plans.[1702] At a High Commission meeting in Istanbul, he persuaded the French and Italians to show some support to the British in order to intimidate the Turks.[1703] Mustafa Kemal cared little: Having received notice that Harington would defend the neutral zone, on 19 September, regardless, he ordered Turkish troops to resume their advance.[1704] Four days later, on 23 September, a Turkish detachment of cavalry crossed to Ezine, south-east of Çanak.[1705] Keen on avoiding confrontation, the French and Italians promptly withdrew their forces.[1706] As further Turkish reinforcement arrived, the Turks pressed forward, pushing the British behind the barbed-wire perimeter of Çanakkale.[1707] Now the risk of an all-out conflict between the two countries was extremely high.[1708] Incensed, Lord Curzon rushed to Paris, where he and Poincare after long shouting at each other agreed to ask the Nationalists to attend a meeting which would determine lines of demarcation between Greece and Turkey.[1709] Their declaration 'viewed with favour' Turkey's desire to recover Thrace as far as the Meriç (Maritza) river, including Edirne, but the area had to remain neutral for the time being. Likewise, the Turks could have Istanbul, but only after peace was signed.[1710] What this meant was a

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[1695] Ibid.
[1696] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 330.
[1697] Ibid; p. 331.
[1698] Ibid; p. 324.
[1699] Ibid; p. 332.
[1700] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1701] David Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, op cit; pp. 195-208.
[1702] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1703] David Walder, *The Chanak Affair*, pp.195-208.
[1704] C. Erikan: *Komutan*, op cit; 844.
[1705] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 333.
[1706] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1707] D. Walder: *The Chanak Affair*; op cit; pp. 242-3; 259.
[1708] A. Mango: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 353.
[1709] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1710] D. Walder: The Chanak Affair; op cit; p. 222; 229.

proposal for an Allied-mediated armistice.[1711] It had become obvious to them that Mustafa Kemal was not bluffing but would use force if necessary. Five days after the initial incursion, Harington estimated that 40,000 Turks now threatened Çanak, another 50,000 stood in front of İzmit, besides a general reserve of 40,000 in Istanbul, and 20,000 more troops in eastern Thrace.[1712] On receiving these reports, the British government became thoroughly alarmed, especially that Mustafa Kemal had not replied to their invitation of talks. On 29 September, having heard nothing, the British drew up an ultimatum meant to be delivered by Harington: the Turks must leave the neutral zone or run the risk of immediate war.[1713] Harington, wisely, did not deliver the ultimatum, instead he sent an 'unofficial' emissary to İzmir in the shape of Franklin-Bouillon, who was much liked on the Turkish side, and who urged restraint on Mustafa Kemal.[1714] Just as he was determined to regain Thrace and Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal was realistic enough to reject councils coming from his side that the Turks should now recover the territories they had lost before, including during the Balkan Wars. Mustafa Kemal replied: 'Certainly not! The cry would go up again, "The Turks are coming!" and every state in the Balkans would be appealing to the powers for assistance against us.'[1715]

Mustafa Kemal was now drafting his acceptance, in the name of the Grand National Assembly, of the Allied invitation to a peace conference, then agreed to the meeting to be held in Mudanya.[1716] The principal demand was Eastern Thrace and the ending of the Greek occupation (the Allies had already accepted to surrender Istanbul).[1717] The preliminary meeting at Mudanya was announced for 3 October.[1718] After appointing İsmet as the Turkish representative, Mustafa Kemal left İzmir for Ankara to receive 'a conqueror's welcome.' There he declared:

> The sweet sun of peace will not delay in shining on the horizon of our country… watered with the blood of her children.

He presided over a large military parade and accepted the freedom of the city; then he settled down to follow the proceedings of the conference, whilst maintaining uninterrupted contact, by telegraph and telephone, with İsmet.[1719]

At Mudanya, say E.K and S.J. Shaw, unlike Mondros, now it was the Turkish representative, İsmet İnönü who took the chair, 'while it was the British and the Greeks who were the vanquished.'[1720] The British, the Shaw note, still expected the Turks to make concessions, and so were utterly confounded when İsmet continued to demand the fulfilment of the National Pact, thus causing the negotiations to drag

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[1711] Ibid, pp. 281-2.
[1712] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 334.
[1713] D. Walder: *The Chanak Affair*, op cit; pp. 181-2.
[1714] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 335.
[1715] Ibid; p. 336.
[1716] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 564.
[1717] M. Llewellyn Smith; *Ionian Vision,* p. 318.
[1718] P. Kinross: *Ataturk*; op cit; p. 337.
[1719] Ibid.
[1720] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; p. 364.

on.[1721] The only concession that İsmet made was an agreement that Turkish troops would not advance any farther toward the Dardanelles; and that was all.[1722] Harington, the chief British representative, described the scene:

> Ismet Pasha said he could not agree, and there was a deadlock... the scene is before me now- that awful room- only an oil lamp.... I paced up one side of the room saying I must have that area and nothing less. Ismet paced up the other side saying he would not agree. Then quite suddenly he said 'J'accepte!' (I agree) I was never so surprised in my life![1723]

After the negotiations at Mudanya, General Harington made a brief nervous speech: 'We met as strangers, but we part as friends.' The compliment escaped Ismet due to his deafness, but he replied that this day would be among his happiest memories. To Franklin-Bouillon, who had been in touch with Mustafa Kemal from the start, he remarked, 'It is your day of triumph, my friend.' At last peace was assured.[1724]

By the terms of the Mudanya Treaty, and amongst others, the Greek army would move west of the Maritsa, returning its positions in Thrace to the Allies, who would in turn surrender them to the Turks.[1725] According to the agreement, Istanbul would have to wait a little while longer for liberation.[1726] Refet Bele, as special representative of the Grand National Assembly, came forth to arrange the recovery of Thrace.[1727] And so, on October 19, he arrived in Istanbul to be greeted with jubilations.[1728] The following day, a victory parade took place from the Sirkeci boat station up the Divan Yolu to the Aya Sofya Mosque; 'Where prayers were offered in gratitude for the Turkish success.'[1729]

Istanbul witnessed scenes and emotions such as never had taken place before in its long history.[1730]

The handover of Eastern Thrace proceeded smoothly and was completed by 26 November.[1731]

Meanwhile in England, in a meeting at London's Carlton Club, the Conservatives decided to withdraw support from the Conservative-Liberal coalition that had taken Great Britain to the brink of another war.[1732] David Lloyd Georges resigned, and retired with his mistress to his native Wales. At a speech prior to that in Manchester, he chose to launch a last diatribe against

> The barbarous Turks, and the scenes of intolerable horror which they had been perpetrating in Asia Minor over the past years.[1733]

[1721] Ibid.
[1722] Ibid.
[1723] Lord Kinross, *Ataturk,* p. 385.
[1724] Ibid; p. 338.
[1725] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; 364.
[1726] Ataturk: *Nutuk* ii; 679.
[1727] S.J. and E.K. Shaw: *History*; op cit; v2; 364.
[1728] Ibid.
[1729] Ibid.
[1730] Fethi Tevetoglu, *Ataturkle Samsuna* Çıkanlar (Atatürk's Companions in Samsun), Ayyıldız, Ankara 1971; pp. 77-81.
[1731] S.N. Ozerdim: *Ataturk*; op cit, 68-9.
[1732] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 565.
[1733] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 339.

In Greece, shortly after the Mudanya Armistice, a military coup d'etat deposed King Constantine.[1734] After a trial, among those subsequently executed for treason were Prime Minister Gounaris and General Hatzianestis.[1735]
Many years later Trikoupis confessed to the view that the campaign in Anatolia, where the Greeks had no real interests of their own as distinct from those of the European powers, had been a disastrous mistake for his country.[1736]

1923 saw the signing of the peace Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July, ascertaining a self-determining Turkish national state.[1737] It was, Kinross remarks,

> The only peace settlement signed after the First World War in which one of the central powers was able to demand her own terms from the Allies, and the only one to survive the second as an instrument of peace for the future.[1738]

This end had been achieved against all odds, and most of all,

> Against the designs of British and French imperialism, against the Armenians, against reactionary domestic elements, against the ambitions of their worst enemies, the Greeks. The "sick man of Europe" had survived the fever and was well on his way to recovery.[1739]

[1734] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 565.
[1735] Gibbons, *Venizelos,* p. 399.
[1736] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 316.
[1737] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 565.
[1738] P. Kinross*: Ataturk*; op cit; p. 373.
[1739] P. Kincaid Jensen: The Greco Turkish War, op cit; p. 565.

FINAL WORDS

The Turkish victories at Gallipoli, Sakarya, and Dumplupınar, as seen in this work were not just remarkable in themselves, they were the result of incomparable courage of Turks first and foremost, and most extraordinary leadership and top command.

What made the victories looked at in this work, even more extraordinary, perhaps unique in history, is that had Turkey lost these battles, there would be no Turkey today and many fewer Turks.

Modern historical narrative with its endless deficiencies, countless of which were noted in this work, has demeaned both the Turkish merit in such victories and their impact. In regard to demeaning the merit of the Turks, this has been done the usual way: Defeats of their foes are always attributed to poor command, bad luck, bad health, bad weather, etc. Great Turkish leadership and courage of men are always set aside.

Demeaning the Turkish role is the lesser of evils, though. The worst is in demeaning the impact of these victories and their saving both Turks as people and Turkey as a nation. The reason for this is the perennial claim: the Turk has always to be a threat and the mass murderer in chief. This is the most enormous flaw of Western historiography: that it should see the Turk from this angle and this angle alone.

Nobody, Turks principally, should delude themselves. As a rule, and with rare exceptions, all that comes in the direction of Turkey is pernicious, including today in 2017-2018. Any Turk who believes the opposite is a cretin. This is the result of centuries of enmity, of hundreds of bloody battles, and massive volumes of anti-Turkish propaganda by the lay and secular, past and present, and future, too.

Therefore, if Turkey wants its victories, just as its history, to stand true, there is only one solution: The Turks must take care of their narrative themselves and they must do it proficiently, and in all languages; write, and film, with talent and proficiency or not at all. Should they fail to do this, their history will remain the dodo of all historical narratives, with anyone ready to swipe at the Turkish memory.

Putting the latter thought in a different manner in case it escapes some:

Should the Turks fail to shoulder the responsibility for the writing of their history, in universal languages and to high standards, not only its narrative will remain corrupted, but in view of the way it has been, and still is being, written, they will end up, not as the descendants of victors who paid a huge price in blood for the survival of their nation, but as the descendants of the worst fiends in history. They will then not only bear guilt, but also responsibility for it eternally. And the Turk has always been made to pay 'for his crimes.'

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Whilst the battles of Gallipoli (1915) and Sakarya (Aug 1921) on one hand and that of Dumlupınar (Aug 1922) on the other differ in the sense that the first two were defensive, the third was offensive, they all played an equal role in maintaining Turkey as we know it today.

During the 19th century, in particular, then in the wake of the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Ottoman realm had, after each defeat, shrunk so much that by the First World War, only Turkey as we know it today was left. Thus, had the Turks lost the battles cited here, there would be no Turkey as exists now; and whatever would have survived would have been a much narrower piece of land with a population perhaps the tenth of what it is today.

This work does not focus on the military side of these battles, although this takes some interest; its interest is in highlighting what was in store for Turkey in terms of its final carving up, including just prior to the Gallipoli Campaign, and soon after prior to the other two battles.

The book relies primarily on sources of the time to catch the raw picture of what was truly happening on the ground, a reality that has been since much muddled by historical narrative.

This is the first book on the Battles of Sakarya and Dumlupınar written in a European language.

The book includes maps and illustrations.

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